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Iliya F. Harik
Author

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POLITICAL CHANGE IN A TRADITIONAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF
INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE IQTA' POLITICAL
SYSTEM OF MOUNT LEBANON, 1711-1845

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL THOUGHT

BY

ILIYA F. HARIK

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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Transliterations

The system of transliteration followed in this study is based on The Encyclopaedia of Islam (the new edition, 1960). I have made only a few changes, such as writing "j" instead of "dj" for the Arabic ج . Other usages which are special here are the following:

ﺝ = al used regularly without a hyphen.

ﺝ = t when there is a liaison with the following word as in Maktabat al 'Arab.

ﺝ = h when no liaison exists with the following word as in al Maktabah al 'Arabiyyah.

Names of persons and places occur sometimes with consonants as the first two letters of the name, like "Bk" in Bkirki and "Hb" in Hbaysh. This is not an Arabic form, and the names transliterated in this way come mainly from Syriac and have no known Arabic forms. Often names with known Arabic forms have been written here in the way they are commonly pronounced in Lebanon, like 'Atallah instead of 'Ata'ullah, and 'Abdallah instead of 'Abdullah. In the case of names which have been used in English works in a special form like Duwayhi instead of Dwayhi, the English form has been followed. For famous cities and places the commonly used English form has been used. For instance, Beirut, not Bayrut; Cairo, not Qahira.

Abbreviations

The following are some common bibliographical abbreviations used in the footnotes for this study.

- AL = Awraq Lubnaniyyah.
- KTS = Munayyar's Kitab al Dur al Marsuf fi Tarikh al Shuf.
- MAA = Mudiriyyat al Athar al 'Ammah (Lebanon: National Department of Antiquities).
- MAE = Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (France: Correspondence Consulaire).
- MB = Al Majma' al Baladi (ed. Bulus Mas'ad).
- MM = Al Majami' al Maruniyyah (ed. Rashid al Khury al Shartuni).
- MQ = Al Mashriq.
- MTL = 'Aynturini's Mukhtasar Tarikh Jabal Lubnan.
- PAB = Patriarchal Archives of Bkirki.
- TA = Duwayhi's Tarikh al Azminah.
- TML = Tarikh al Majma' al Lubnani, published in al Usul al Tarikhiyyah.
- TRLM = Blaybil's Tarikh al Rahbanah al Lubnaniyyah al Maruniyyah.
- TTM = Duwayhi's Tarikh al Ta'ifah al Maruniyyah (ed. Rashid al Khury al Shartuni).
- TZ = Ma'luf's Tarikh Zahli.
- UATS = Rustum's Al Usul al 'Arabiyyah li Tarikh Suriyyah fi 'Ahd Muhammad 'Ali Basha
- UT = Al Usul al Tarikhiyyah (ed. Bulus Mas'ad and Nasib al Khazin).
- Dimashqi . Tarikh = Tarikh Hawadith al Sham wa Lubnan.
- Haydar . al Ghurar = Kitab al Ghurar al Hisan fi Tawarikh Hawadith al Zaman,
by Haydar Shihab.
- . Lubnan = Lubnan fi 'Ahd al Umara al Shihabiyyin (ed. Bustani and Rustum).
- . Nuzhat = Nuzhat al Zaman fi Hawadith 'Arabistan (MS).
- Ma'luf . Dawani = Dawani al Qutuf fi Tarikh bani al Ma'luf.
- Mashaqah . al Jawab = Muntakhabat min al Jawab 'ala Iqtirah al Ahbab.
- Propaganda = Archivio Sacra Congregazione de Propaganda Fide (Rome).
- Shidiaq . Akhbar = Akhbar al A'yan fi Jabal Lubnan.
- Yaziji . Risalah = Risalah Tarikhiyyah fi Ahwal Lubnan fi 'Ahdhi al Iqta'i
(ed. Qustantin al Basha).

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CHAPTER I

THE COUNTRY AND THE PEOPLE

The story of Lebanon in modern times is a story of three strangers who came to live together on one terrain because they suffered from similar conditions. The three were a Maronite, a Druze, and a Shi'i Muslim; the terrain was the mountain range on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea stretching along the coast from Tripoli in the north to Sidon in the south. The shared condition in their life situation, as defined by a modern Lebanese historian, was that each was a representative of a lost cause.¹

The question immediately arising from such a situation is whether these strangers could make a success of the new phase in their life histories on the rocky mountains of Lebanon. It was accident that brought them together; but for a human community to evolve, accident had to be subjected to intelligent action and purpose. The rugged peaks of their mountains could not offer them a real security to enjoy the benefits brought by the salutary effects of social life. Historical evidence shows that foreign soldiers, at different periods, tramped over most of Mount Lebanon. The difficult mountains provided for the communities' immediate need for protection, but its physical shelter could not sustain among them an enduring mode of social life as a community by which they could face challenges from outside as well as from inside.

The following is an account of these three peoples and the country in which they lived, with special emphasis on the differences which separated them

¹Philip Hitti, Lebanon in History: From the Earliest Times to the Present (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1957), p. 246.

in beliefs, historical background, place of residence, and socio-political conditions. This inquiry will be limited to the periods after the Ottoman conquest in 1516.

Mount Lebanon

The peoples who inhabited Mount Lebanon through the ages lived for centuries in separate geographic regions without relations with each other, except, perhaps, for chronic hostilities. Mount Lebanon as a plural political community is a modern development. During the Mamluk periods and later in the Ottoman period until the end of the sixteenth century, Maronites, Druze, and Matawilah lived in separate regions independent from each other. No one name was known for these separate parts of Mount Lebanon; the Maronites called their part of the mountain Mount Lebanon, the Druze called their region Mount of al Shuf, and the Matawilah Mount 'Amil.¹

It is not historically known in exact terms when the term Lebanon came to be used for the whole mountain area familiar to us since the nineteenth century as Mount Lebanon. Political unity was achieved in the last decades of the eighteenth century and was preceded by a partial social integration of two religious groups, Druze and Maronites. It is important to note that the use of the name "Mount Lebanon" for the whole area started with the period of unity achieved under the Shihabis, and was not universally used until after that unity was firmly established at the end of the eighteenth century. This new usage was not the result of an official policy or purposeful attempt on the part of an interested party; it simply crept into the common language of the people of Lebanon in a slow and obscure manner. The correspondence between the name and the political development might have been an accidental matter, or it could have been

¹This point of nomenclature unfortunately is glossed over by modern writers on the history of Lebanon.

the result of better communications among the different groups inhabiting the Mountain. Why the name "Lebanon" and not another took precedence cannot be definitely settled; an account of the history of the term, however, may provide some suggestions.

The name "Lebanon" as a geographic term for the mountain range is known since antiquity, though it seems to have been applied by different historians in different ways. Some used it during the Roman Empire period to cover the entire mountain ranges on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean extending as far east as Mount Qalimun of Damascus.¹ Others used it in a very limited sense as that region of present-day northern Lebanon.² As a political expression, however, the term was used no earlier than the last decades of the eighteenth century; after 1840 it acquired an official and international usage.

A look at the map (Figure 1) will help in grasping this question of political nomenclature. To the extreme north of the map, around the famous cedars, there is the region known as Jibbat Bsharri. The village of Bsharri is the major center of this region and the seat of the muqaddams (chiefs) of the Maronites since the days of the Mamluks. Written documents going back to the early sixteenth century confirm that as early as that period the term "Mount Lebanon" was applied almost exclusively to that region.³ An Apostolic messenger who visited the Maronites during the last two decades of that cen-

¹Cf. Henri Lammens, "Tasrih al Absar fi ma Yahtawi Lubnan min al Athar," al Mashriq, V (1902), 361-67. (Henceforth MQ.) Also R. P. Jean Baptiste Labat (ed.), Memoires du Chevalier d'Arvieux, II (Paris: n.p., 1735), 398-400.

²Lammens, MQ, V, 361-67.

³The first known Maronite chronicler, Jibra'il al Qila'i (d. 1516), see Kamal S. Salibi, Maronite Historians of Mediaeval Lebanon ("American University of Beirut, Faculty of Arts and Sciences Publication: Oriental Series No. 34"; Beirut: Catholic Press, 1959), pp. 23-87. Also Patriarch Istfan al Duwayhi, Tarikh al Ta'ifah al Maruniyyah, ed. Rashid al Khury al Shartuni (Beirut: n.p., 1890), p. 78. (Henceforth TTM.)




Figure 1
Mount LEBANON

tury testifies to that usage, too.¹ Bilad al Batrun and Bilad Jbayl, whose Maronite population during the Mamluk and early Ottoman periods was dispersed and failed to stand together as cohesively as that of Jibbat Bsharri, do not seem always to have been covered by the term.² Patriarch and chronicler Istfan al Duwayhi (d. 1704), for instance, uses the term most frequently when he refers to Jibbat Bsharri. Only vaguely does one sometimes get the inkling that he includes some parts of Bilad Jbayl and al Batrun.³ However, al Duwayhi seems to have an idea of a geographic Lebanon not corresponding with the particular region of Jibbat Bsharri, but one which is bound by the country of the Druze in the south and Bilad 'Akkar in the north.⁴ Geographic Lebanon, as viewed by Duwayhi, starts from Nahr al Kalb in the southwest following a line in the northeast direction to Afqa and as far north as Bilad 'Akkar region and the country of the Matawilah in Hirmil, with the exception of the seaport and town of Tripoli.

Another Maronite chronicler, al 'Aynturini, who wrote a century after al Duwayhi, follows the steps of Duwayhi and shows that he has an idea of a Lebanon which extends from the Qati' al Matn to the northeast corner of Jibbat Bsharri.⁵ Since the early Maronite history, which he identifies with the Maradah,

¹Jerom Dandini, Voyage to Mount Libanus, published in John Pinkerton (ed.), General Collection of Voyages and Travels (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, and Orme, 1811), pp. 285-95.

²Istfan al Duwayhi, Tarikh al Azimnah: 1095-1699, ed. Ferdinan Tawtal, MQ, XLIV (Beirut: al Matba'ah al Kathulikiyyah, 1951), 103, 214, 276. (Henceforth TA.) Also, a Maronite clergyman writing at the end of the seventeenth century mentions Kisrwan in "Jabal Lubnan," see Ibrahim Harfush, "Al Adyar al Qadimah fi Kisrwan," MQ, V-VIII (1902-1905), VII, 349. Also 'Abdallah Ghibra'il, Tarikh al Kanisah al Intakiyyah al Siriyaniyyah al Maruniyyah (2 vols.; B'abda, Lebanon: al Matba'ah al Lubnaniyyah, 1900-1904), II, 633.

³Duwayhi, TA, pp. 103, 214, 276 and passim.

⁴For instance, Duwayhi states in TA, p. 201, that "Jabal al Baruk," which lies in the Druze country, is the lower extremity of Mount Lebanon.

⁵Antonius Abi Khattar al 'Aynturini, Kitab Mukhtasar Tarikh Jabal Lubnan, ed. Ignatius al Khury, MQ, XLVI-XLVII (1952-1953), XLVI, 541-42. (Henceforth MTL.)

this Lebanon was the home of the Maronites, in which their movements were periodically subject to a rhythm of withdrawal and return. Al 'Aynturini represents a transitional period in which the term "Lebanon" had started to have a wider application, yet not losing the more particular Maronite application. However, al 'Aynturini makes use of these three usages: first in a historical sense just mentioned, second in a general sense to cover the Shihabi domain including Jabal al Shuf,¹ and third in the sense commonly used by the Maronites, which is limited to Jibbat Bsharri.² Volney, who visited Lebanon in 1784, uses the term in a limited sense to apply to Jibbat Bsharri, Bilad al Batrun, and Bilad Jbayl.³ Another European traveler who visited in the same decade as Volney divides the Shihabi domains into three provinces, one of which is Mount Lebanon meaning strictly Jibbat Bsharri.⁴ In his clarity and specificity, this latter writer no doubt followed the usage of the people with whom he visited in Lebanon. We notice the general and specific meanings of the term at that period in another traveler, Burckhardt. Burckhardt is very clear about the specific meaning, for he states plainly that "at 'Akoura Djebel Libnan terminates; and farther down the mountain is called Djebel Sanin." "Djebel Libnan" is the way the common people pronounce the term, and Burckhardt learned from that that Mount Lebanon was the country north of al 'Aqura. When he turns to his knowledge of geography, he uses the word "Libanus" meaning the whole of what is today known as the western range, which extends south to the country of the Druze.⁵

¹Ibid., XLVI, 332-33.

²Ibid., XLVII, 60; Yusuf al Sim'ani makes a similar use, see Duwayhi, TTM, p. 265.

³C.-F. Volney, Travels through Syria and Egypt in the Years 1783, 1784, and 1785, II (London: G. G. J. and Robinson, 1788), 168.

⁴See Butrus Ghalib (ed.), "Ta'rif 'an Hukum Jabal Kisrwan fi Awakhir al Qarn al Thamin 'Ashar," MQ, XXVIII (1930), 588-91.

⁵John L. Burckhardt, Travels in Syria and the Holy Land (London: J. Murray, 1822), p. 25.

In these definitions one thing is clear: "Mount Lebanon" was used as a term for the country of the Maronites, and its indefinite application seems to have been caused by the instability in population movements among the Maronites. In its most limited sense the term was used to signify the heart of the Maronite country, Jibbat Bsharri. That sense is the oldest and the most definite of all.

To the south of the Maronite lands is Jabal al Shuf, also known as Jabal al Druze.¹ In this case the country took its name from the inhabitants, the Druze who made their home in southern Lebanon as early as the eleventh century when their religion was founded. The population movements of the Druze and the time when Jabal al Shuf took their name are questions as obscure as the early history of the Maronites. However, it is known that the Druze started out in Wadi al Taym from whence they spread in southern Lebanon, namely the Gharb and al Shuf.

The Druze mountain under the Ma'nis, before the advent of Fakhr al Din li (1585-1635), was limited to al Shuf, al Gharb (the upper and the lower), al Jurd, and al 'Urqub, not including the Matn, the Biqa', the districts (iqlims) of Jazzin, al Tuffah, al Kharrub, and Jabal al Rihan. The iqlims were directly under the Pasha of Sayda, and al Biqa' and Matn under the Vali of Damascus.² During the rise of Fakhr al Din these regions were integrated under his suzerainty and remained as such for most of the Ma'ni and Shihabi period. This area became known as the "Mountain of the Druze" officially as well as by the common people. Ottoman investitures of the Shihabis would be addressed to Jabal al Shuf or Jabal al Druze.³ This was the practice in the case of the

¹Not to be confused with present-day Jabal al Druze in the southwestern part of Syria.

²Hananiyya al Munayyar, Kitab al Durr al Marsuf fi Tarikh al Shuf, ed. Ighnatius Sarkis, MQ, XLVIII-LI (1954-1957), XLIX, 270. (Henceforth KTS.)

³Haydar Shihab, Lubnan fi 'Ahd al Umara' al Shihabiyyin, ed. Asad Rustum

last Amir of the Shihabis, when in 1840 an Ottoman firman went to Bashir Shihab III investing him Amir of "Jabal al Druze."¹ However, the official Ottoman terminology was outdated by that period, as is clear from an official letter written by the same Amir in which he refers to his domain as "Jabal Lubnan."²

During the Imarah period the Ottoman government never used the term "Jabal Lubnan" in any official papers. When they wanted to refer to northern Lebanon they used the terms "Jbayl" and "al Batrun." The Ottomans did not use "Jabal Lubnan" because the term was not current except among the Maronites and not become general before the nineteenth century, and also because at the time of the Ottoman conquest the Maronites, whose country bore that name, had no political importance.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century the term "Jabal Lubnan" became commonly used and its meaning extended to cover all the country under Shihabi rule, the country of the Maronites as well as that of the Druze. This is clear from the usage of the term by the chronicler Haydar Shihab (1761-1835). While he uses the old terms "Jabal al Shuf," "Jabal al Druze," "Jbayl," etc., he reserves the term "Mount Lebanon" for the whole country. The manuscript of Father Butrus Hbaysh, written in 1829, uses the term "Mount Lebanon" almost to the exclusion of all other terms.³ In 1840 we have the first written document in which Maronites, Druze, Shi'is, and Sunnis all sign a document in which they refer to a common territory as their country. The statement was made in the common declaration of revolution against the Egyptians. The statement reads,

and Fu'ad Afram al Bustani (Beirut: Lebanese Government Publication, 1933), passim, pp. 597-681. (Henceforth, Haydar, Lubnan.)

¹Asad Rustum (ed.), Al Usul al 'Arabiyyah li Tarikh Suriyyah fi 'Ahd Muhammad 'Ali Basha (5 vols.; Beirut: American University of Beirut, American Press, 1930-1934), V, 172-74. (Henceforth UATS.)

²Ibid., V, 234.

³Published in Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 792-872.

"We the undersigned Druze, Christians, Matawilah. and Muslims, who are known as inhabitants of Jabal Lubnan . . . ," followed by signatures, "We the Druze people of Mount Lebanon, the Christians, Matawilah, and Muslims in general."¹

There was also a tendency among the early nineteenth-century poets gathered around Amir Bashir II to use the word "Lubnan" without "Jabal." They used it with an emotional and patriotic attachment, reflecting the early stirrings of national consciousness among the Lebanese. Nasif al Yazigi in a long panegyric calls Bashir "the great pillar of Lebanon," and on another occasion he applauds the Amir for the prestige he brought to Lebanon during his rule:

Lebanon you have clad with the light
of the angel Gabriel over the mountain.²

Another of the Amir's poets, Nqula al Turk, makes a common use of the term "pillar of Lebanon," which he applies to the Amir. On an occasion in which the Amir emerged victorious in a military campaign in 1810, al Turk wrote,

He is the foundation on which the edifice of Lebanon rises;

and further,

The homeland he honored, its life he made pleasing;
Remembered for ages the prestige he has brought it.³

A sense of emotional attachment to Lebanon as a homeland can also be detected in the lines of poetry which appear in the correspondence between the son of Amir Bashir II, Amir Amin, who was in Egypt, and a certain Lebanese poet.⁴ Descriptions of the beauty of Lebanon and longing for the life there are major themes in these letters.

¹Bulus Mas'ad and Nasib Whaybah al Khazin (eds.), Al Usul al Tarikhiyyah: Majmu'at Watha'iq (3 vols.; Beirut: Matabi' Samya, 1956-1958), I, 146-47. (Henceforth UT.)

²Antonius Shibli (ed.), "Al Athar al Matwiyyah," MQ, XLVIII-LV (1954-1962), XLVIII, 162, 400. Also Haydar, Lubnan, p. 715.

³Ibid., pp. 561, 563.

⁴Ibid., pp. 731-32, 745-46.

The application of the term "Mount Lebanon" to the whole mountain range coincides with the period in which Amir Bashir Shihab II governed the Mountain. There is no evidence at all that he had anything to do with its widespread acceptance. People were not self-conscious about using the term. Two factors, however, can be considered of particular importance in this change in terminology: the spread of the Maronite population through all the Mountain mixing with other peoples like the Druze, and the unification of Maronite and Druze Lebanon under the Shihabis during the second half of the eighteenth century.

The Maronites

The Maronites are a Christian people belonging to the Catholic faith. For several centuries past they have lived almost exclusively in Mount Lebanon,¹ and their church may be described as a national church of Lebanon. The name Maronite is derived from the name of the sect's patron saint, the monk Maron, who probably lived and died in the first part of the fifth century.² Their spoken and written language is now Arabic, but for a few centuries after the Arab conquest of Syria they continued to use their national language, Aramaic. In the fifteenth century their language was already Arabized, though they continued to use Aramaic script for Arabic words (Karshuni) till late in the eighteenth century. The clergy still use Syriac liturgies in mass.

The Maronites' early history is shrouded in obscurity.³ It seems that

¹Some Maronites lived in Cyprus, Aleppo, Damascus, and Bilad 'Akkar, but generally in negligible numbers. They also seem to have started to take up residence among the Druze in the sixteenth century, as witnessed by the Papal delegate to the Maronites at that time; see Lwis Shaykho, "Al Ta'ifah al Maruniyyah wa al Rahbaniyyah al Yasu'iyah fi al Qarnayn al Sadis wa al Sabi 'Ashar," *MQ*, XVII-XXI (1914-1923), XVII, 761-62.

²Ghibra'il, Tarikh al Kanisah . . ., I, 84; also Hitti, Lebanon in History . . ., p. 247.

³One of the earliest and most educated Maronite historians, Patriarch Istfan al Duwayhi, found it impossible to go back beyond the eleventh century in writing the history of the Maronites because of lack of evidence, and thus most of the history of the early Maronites must be considered at best conjecture; see Duwayhi, TA, pp. 1-2.

they started as a schismatic sect in northern Syria during the sixth century, a century of division in Christian history. Although they derive their name from the monk Maron, the real founder of the sect was Yuhanna Marun (d. 707?), who is also considered by the Maronites the sect's first Patriarch of the Church of Peter in Antioch.¹ He left his original home in Syria and settled in Lebanon in the late seventh century, a period conventionally considered as the date of the Maronites' settlement in Mount Lebanon. It is likely that they first settled in the regions north of the Damascus road and, during the Mamluk period, pushed to the northern country where they concentrated in Jibbat Bsharri. Their population movements were subject to a process of withdrawal and return in search of land for expansion.

The Maronites' relations with the Church of Rome cannot be dated, with conclusive historical evidence, to a period earlier than that of the Crusades in the twelfth century.² Previously, it seems, they were a monotheletic sect. Contacts with the Popes were made from that period on, intermittently, until a measure of continuous relationship was established in the year 1578. The year 1215, when the Maronite patriarch attended the Lateran Council IV, will be considered here as the conventional date for the union of the Maronite Church with the Church of Rome.³

After the Mamluk disciplinary expeditions and the expulsion of the Maronites from Kisrwan in the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Maronites

¹Duwayhi, *TIM*, pp. 88, 92. For early documents related to the founder of the sect see F. Nau, "Opuscules Maronites," *Revue de l'Orient Chrétien*, IV (1899), 175ff.

²See for the intermittent contacts, Salibi, *Maronite Historians . . .*, pp. 138-43; also Kamal Salibi, "The Maronite Church in the Middle Ages and Its Union with Rome," *Oriens Christianus*, XLII (1958), 92-105; also Shaykho, "Al Ta'ifah al Maruniyyah," *MQ*, XVII, 321-24.

³The Apostolic Messenger, Eliano Battista, also makes this date the time of union, see Shaykho, *ibid.*, p. 759; see also Istfan al Duwayhi, "Silsilat Batarikat al Ta'ifah al Maruniyyah," ed. Rashid al Shartuni, *MQ*, I (1898), 311.

were circumscribed to Jibbat Bsharri as a small and insignificant community under Mamluk rule. The Mamluk governor of Tripoli ruled the Maronites and appointed chiefs from among them to collect tribute and maintain public order. When Sultan Salim conquered Syria, the Maronites did not appear to be a political community like the Druze, whose chiefs figured as important political leaders in Western Syria. There is no record that Sultan Salim took any notice of them. The regions of northern Lebanon where the Maronites lived were given by Salim I as a muqata'ah to the Turkoman house of 'Assaf.

The Maronite patriarchs, unlike other Christian sects in the Ottoman Empire, did not seek investiture from the Sultan but from the Pope. This privilege continued up to World War I, at which time the Turkish military governor of Syria and Lebanon, Jamal Pasha, forced Patriarch Hwayik to seek investiture from the Sultan.¹ The fact that the Maronites did not have to apply for confirmation from the Sultan, there can be no doubt, was not a legal concession on the part of the Ottomans but rather the result of the latter's lack of interest and attention to such a small group. The Maronite Church in early times had no political significance to warrant the special attention of the Sultan, as did the Melkite Orthodox Church. Yet what started as an indication of humble status became a matter of pride among the Maronites of a later age. As the Maronite community grew in political importance in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman government began to look with an angry eye on the Maronite patriarch's independence.

Of Maronite social organization before the seventeenth century we know very little. For some time Bsharri seems to have been the major town and the seat of their most important chief, known as muqaddam, who was subject to the governor of Tripoli from Mamluk days. Other villages in northern Lebanon

¹According to Bishop 'Abdallah Khury, patriarchal secretary to Huwayik; 'Abdallah Khury, "Al Batriyark al Maruni wa Jamal Basha Ibban al Harb," MQ, XXII (1924), 161-67.

also had muqaddams of their own during different periods in history.

In early times the Maronites did not have the privileged social and political status they did in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Like the rest of the Christian peoples living in a traditional Muslim society, they were a dhimmah people, i.e., they were a protected but not a free people. This meant that the

Moslem ruler guarantees their lives, their liberties, and to some extent their property, and allows them to practise their religion. The Dimmis in return undertake to pay the special poll-tax, called Cizya [jizya], and the land-tax called Harac [kharaj], and agree to suffer certain restrictions that mark them out as a caste inferior to that of their Moslem fellow subjects. These restrictions are of various kinds. In the first place Dimmis are at a disadvantage legally in comparison with Moslems: for instance, their evidence is not accepted against that of a Moslem in a Kadi's court; the Moslem murder of a Dimmi does not suffer the death penalty; a Dimmi man may not marry a Moslem woman, whereas a Moslem man may marry a Dimmi woman. In the second place, Dimmis are obliged to wear distinctive clothes so that they may not be confused with true believers, and are forbidden to ride horses or to carry arms. Finally, though their churches may be, and in practice frequently have been, converted into mosques, they are not to build new ones. The most they may do is to repair those that have fallen into decay.¹

The condition of the Maronites living outside the domain of the Ma'nis or the Shihabis was similar to the preceding description, and sometimes it fell short of these guarantees. In 1578 the Apostolic messenger to the Maronites wrote that the

Maronites who leave their villages and go to the coastal towns are subjected by the Muslims in these towns to forced free labor. They make them carry their burdens for them, they force them to do hard labor in the Government Hall or in private homes.²

At that period, it seems, even those Maronites who lived among the Druze were subject to humiliating conditions, and

in public they act like Muslims, they put a white turban on their heads

¹ Hamilton Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Cultures in the Near East (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1957), I, Part II, 208.

² Shaykho, MQ, XVII, 761; regarding free forced labor, see also a traveler's account in 1697, Henry Maundrell, A Journey from Aleppo to Jerusalem 1697 at Easter, A.D. 1697 (Oxford: [Impr. G. Delaune], 1732), p. 25.

like the Muslims, and go to mosques for prayer. If someone asks them about their religion, they make public avowal that they are Muslims.¹

This category of Maronites were well known among their fellow coreligionists as "White Maronites."²

Regarding the dhimmah status of the Maronites we have a comprehensive statement by the second Apostolic messenger to the Maronites at the end of the sixteenth century, Jerom Dandini. Dandini wrote about his visit in 1595,

One cannot imagine what vast sums the Christians of Mount Libanus pay to the Turks; besides the Carage [kharaj] which is an ordinary tribute, they make daily new Avanges [?]³ and continuous extortions. The Carage is great, for every one pays separately for his goods, person, and his religion. The second tribute amounts to seventeen crowns a head, as well as for children nine or ten years of age . . . and although the Grand Seignor hath fixed the sum he is to collect for all the year, yet he ceaseth not to demand more . . . wherefore it comes to pass that, if any one has not his money ready, he is obliged to take it from the Turks⁴ upon very great interest. . . . The dead pay their Carage as well as the living, for, as the Grand Seignor esteems himself absolute master of the country, and of all the estates of the inhabitants, to whom he grants only the use of them, he believes, all their possessions ought to return to him, and by consequence the right heirs or testations, if they have a mind to enjoy them peaceably, ought to pay him a certain sum proportionable to the estates they inherit. . . . There is a person who rangeth the country up and down continually, for to learn who are dead, to the end he may raise the tribute. If anyone has been lately intered he soon perceives it, and causeth them also often times to open the graves, to see if there be any newly dead.⁵

Theoretically land was the property of the Sultan,⁶ hence the law of inheritance among the Maronites and the whole of Syria. As dhimmah people, the Maronites

¹Shaykho, MQ, XVII, 761-62.

²Regarding "White Maronites" see al Duwayhi, TA, p. 300; idem, TTM, pp. 558-59.

³Possibly "avanges" from the Arabic 'awniyah or aid, a tax paid for the ruler's expenses of government, which in practice amounted to extortion and pocket money for the ruler.

⁴The term "Turk" was then used by Europeans to refer to Sunni Muslims.

⁵Dandini, Voyage to Mount Libanus, p. 292.

⁶A. N. Poliak, Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon: 1250-1900 (London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1939), p. 44. Also John Bowering, Report on the Commercial Statistics of Syria, Great Britain, Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty (London: H.M. Stationary Office, printed by William Clowes and Sons, 1840), p. 102.

were also forbidden to carry arms, ride horses, wear Muslim garbs, or ring bells in their churches. Not until the ruling Amir of Jabal al Druze, Fakhr al Din II, had occupied their country were the Maronites to enjoy free status.

During the rule of Fakhr al Din the Christians raised their heads, they built churches, rode on saddled horses, and wore white turbans, . . . and drooping belts¹ and carried the bow and inlaid rifles, and in his days French missionaries came to live in Mount Lebanon; for most of his armies were Christians and his advisors and servants were Maronites.²

This did not last for long, however, but reverted to the previous conditions with the decline of Ma'ni power in the middle of the seventeenth century, with the exception of KISRWAN which became incorporated in the Imarah.

During the second half of the seventeenth century the influence of the Shi'is (Matawilah) was on the rise. They were able to acquire for themselves the iqta' of many districts including the country of the Maronites, which they ruled intermittently from 1654 to 1701. In 1701 the shaykhs of the Matawilah Himadi house established their rule as an iqta' from the governor of Tripoli on all the lands of the north Lebanon where the Maronites lived, from the boundaries of KISRWAN to 'AKKAR. The Himadis succeeded in controlling the Maronite country for only half a century. In 1759 the Maronites rose up in arms and expelled the Himadis, and Shihabi rule was established in place of the Matawilah lords.

The condition of the Maronites improved considerably under the Shihabis. This fact is born out by Volney, who visited the Maronites after their unity with the Druze under the Shihabi Imarah, or 200 years after Dandini's visit. Volney writes, "The Maronites are, to this day, equally strangers to the oppressions of despotism, and the disorders of anarchy."³ As for property, it is not

¹Dhimmah people were not allowed to wear the customary wide belts which drooped low to the feet; they would wear instead a string.

²Duwayhi, TA, p. 329.

³Volney, Travels through Syria . . ., II, 17.

owned by the Sultan but by the people themselves. "Property," he writes, "is as sacred among them as in Europe."¹ Nor did the Maronites and the Druze pay inheritance tax, for "by a particular privilege, the Druze and Maronites pay no fine for their succession; nor does the Emir, like the Sultan, arrogate to himself original and universal property. . . ."²

In a rural community like Mount Lebanon of the eighteenth century social stratification was very simple. Society was divided into shaykhs and peasants. The shaykhs were local village headmen, not marked out by great distinctions or wealth but, rather, derived from the peasant class itself. They were large property owners, and cultivated their lands with the aid of tenants. Only in Kisrwan were there wealthy and powerful shaykhs, like the Khazins. The shaykhs, according to Volney, were distinguished from the rest by "a bad Pelisse, a horse, and a few slight advantages in food and lodging."³ The peasants were either small owners or tenants who cultivated the lands of shaykhs and shared the produce with them in equal portions. They grew mulberry for the silk manufacture, olives, grapes, tobacco, cotton, and some grain.⁴ Silk was the one industry of the country and formed the basis of the economy.

The size of the Maronite population was small. In 1578 the Maronites were estimated to be about 40,000⁵ living in about 200 villages.⁶ The large majority of these were in Jibbat Bsharri. The Maronites started to emigrate

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid., pp. 79-80.

³ Ibid., pp. 17-18.

⁴ See Bowering, Report, p. 8.

⁵ Estimate by Eliano Battista who visited the Maronites during the years 1578-1580, see Shaykho, MQ, XVII, 758.

⁶ Ibid., Patriarch Mihak'il al Rizzi (1567-1581) in a letter to Pope.

to Jabal al Druze after the Ottoman conquest in 1516.¹ In the last decades of the sixteenth century, five or six villages in Jabal al Druze had some Maronite people living in them.² During the Ma'ni period (1516-1697), especially that of Fakhr al Din I, Kisrwan started to attract the Maronites; and by the beginning of the eighteenth century it became predominantly Maronite in population. Most of the people who went to live in Kisrwan were originally living to the north in the regions of Jibbat Bsharri and Jbayl, which became almost deserted.³ The population of these two regions did not start to grow again until the second part of the eighteenth century, when the country became a domain of the Shihabi Imarah. Under Shihabi rule there was a marked increase in the population of the Maronites in the north, as well as in the rest of the Mountain. By the end of the eighteenth century the population figure for the Maronites was fairly large compared to the earlier periods and to the other communities living in the Mountain. The estimate usually given is close to that of Volney, which must be a reasonable figure. The figure Volney gave is 115,000⁴ excluding the southern regions of the Imarah, which were inhabited by Maronites and Druze mainly. With the figures of these included, the Maronite population at that time should read something like 150,000.⁵

¹Duwayhi, TA, p. 236; also Shaykho, MQ, XVII, 761; see also letter to Rome by Patriarch Istfan al Duwayhi, Mas'ad and al Khazin, UT, III, 39.

²Shaykho, MQ, XVII, 761.

³Duwayhi, TA, pp. 295-96.

⁴Volney, Travels through Syria . . ., II, 365.

⁵Volney is often quoted wrongly in Arabic and French sources as giving the figure of 115,000 to the entire Maronite population of Mount Lebanon. This is wrong because he mentions explicitly that the figure is for Kisrwan, by which he means the whole of northern Lebanon including Jibbat Bsharri. The figure of 150,000 was reached by adding the population figure of the Maronites in the south to that of Volney. The figure for the south was reached through a conservative estimate based on the figures given in the following sources: Tannus bin Yusuf al Shidiaq, Akhbar al A'yan fi Jabal Lubnan, ed. Munir Whaybah al Khazin (Beirut: Matabi' Samya, 1954), I, 32. Camille de Rochemonteix, Le Liban et l'Expédition

The Ma'nis and under them the Druze aristocracy encouraged the Maronites to emigrate to their lands because the Maronites proved to be a peaceful and hardworking peasantry who worked on the land and increased the revenue of the country. The Shihabis followed a similar policy toward the influx of the Maronites and the other Christians of their domain.

The first victims of the migration phenomenon, as we shall see later, were the Matawilah, who themselves to a large degree precipitated and speeded up the movement of Maronite migration. Because the Maronites were hard working and law abiding, they were encouraged to replace the Matawilah in KISRWAN, Bilad Jbayl, and al Batryn, and even in the south of Jabal al Druze. The Matawilah were not only unruly but also constituted a political threat to the Imarah of Jabal al Druze, with whom they had a long history of political struggle. With the passing of northern Lebanon into Shihabi hands, the Matawilah there were crushed and the Maronites encouraged to resettle. As a result the population of Jibbat Bsharri and Bilad Jbayl showed a remarkable rate of growth. Figures show that the Maronites there in the middle of the nineteenth century more than doubled the size of the population of KISRWAN.¹ A century earlier KISRWAN had had almost three times the population of those regions.

Besides the Maronite Christian population, another Catholic community which took up residence in Mount Lebanon and contributed in its way to the life of the country was the Melkite Catholic.² The Melkite Catholics in Lebanon were a very small community who lived in the larger Lebanese towns like Dayr al Qamar,

Francaise en Syrie (1860-1861), (Paris: Librairie Auguste Picard, 1921), p. 347. Achille Laurent, Relation Historique des Affaires de Syrie depuis 1840 Jusqu'en 1842; Statistique Générale du Mont Liban (2 vols.; Paris: Gaume Frères, 1846), I, 433-68. This is the most detailed and thorough account.

¹Shidiaq, Akhbar, I, 32, see table of census; also Rochementeix, Le Liban . . ., appendix, opposite p. 346.

²Detailed account of the Melkite Church and community may be seen in Cyrille Charon, Histoire des Patriarcats Melkites, II, Fasc. 1 (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1910).

Zahli, Beirut, and other trading centers in Kisrwan. Along with the Maronites they ranked as the most educated group in Lebanon, both lay or clergy. Another Christian community was the Melkite Orthodox, from whose sect the Melkite Catholics became converted. The Orthodox were also a very small community in Lebanon living in the towns like Beirut and Tripoli, and concentrated to a larger degree in the Kura region in northern Lebanon. Their higher clergy were Greek, while the priests were mostly, if not all, native. The state of education among the Orthodox was not good, neither among the clergy nor among the lay. Unlike Maronites and Catholics they were recognized by the Ottoman government as a millet.

The Druze

The Druze are a religious sect which originally stemmed from Shi'i Islam, but its radical difference from Shi'i Islam on doctrinal matters warrants considering it a separate religion. The Druze people have their own religious organization and enjoy a religious life separate from the rest of the Muslim communities. Not long after the sect was founded in the eleventh century, its religious leaders ceased to accept new converts or to allow anyone to give up his Druze faith.¹ Thus by their own choice they have remained few in number to this day. The esoteric nature of their doctrine, and the hostilities of other Muslim sects to their creed, may have caused this policy of self-isolation.

The sect originated in Egypt at the beginning of the eleventh century during the reign of the Fatimid Caliph al Hakim (996-1021). As it met with no success there, its proponents concentrated their efforts on the Isma'ily sects in Syria and particularly in Wady al Taym in southern Lebanon.²

¹In later years, it seems, Muslim people of noble families like the Tannukhs, the Arslans, and the Jumblats who ruled in Druze populated regions accepted the Druze faith, see Hitti, Lebanon in History . . ., p. 262.

²For the beginning of the sect see Marshall G. S. Hodgson, "Al Darazi and Hamza in the Origin of the Druze Religion," Journal of the American Oriental Society, LXXXII, No. 1 (January-March, 1962), 5-20.

Their early history is not better known than that of any other group in Lebanon. By the sixteenth century, however, Druze communities were established in the regions of Wady al Taym, Jabal al Shuf, and al Gharb, and in al Jabal al A'la in the Vilayet of Aleppo. These latter were brought to Lebanon by Bashir II in 1811 at their own request and on account of the continuous quarrels which they had with their neighbors. They numbered 400 families, and Bashir distributed them in the Druze muqata'ahs.¹

The Druze faith is a syncretic doctrine. Its sources are, on the one hand, neo-Platonic philosophy, and on the other hand, the revealed religions of the Semites: Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and its Shi'i sects. From neo-Platonism they borrowed the concept of emanation of God and reconciled it to the Shi'i doctrine of the reappearance of the holy Imam in time and space, and also with the Christian doctrine of the dual nature of Christ. This doctrine of the reappearance of the Imam is in obvious contradiction with the Sunni dogma that Muhammad was the last of the prophets, and the transcendental nature of God. According to Druze doctrine God manifests Himself periodically in human form. The purpose of these revelations is to guide men to truth. While they deny the transcendental nature of God, the Druze are nevertheless like the Sunni Muslims in that they emphasize the unity of God. Thus instead of the name Druze, they prefer to call themselves muwahhidun, or unitarians.²

A Druze should understand of his religion the knowledge of God and the whole Druze concept of Him, especially of His manifestations in the human form; he must abide by the bond of faith in relation to other Druze people; and he should keep away from the worship of false religions like Islam and Christianity.

¹Haydar, Lubnan, p. 572.

²Hananiyya al Munayyar, Théogonie des Druses; ou Abrégé de leur Système Religieux, ed. and trans. Henri Guys (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1863), p. 52.

A strong tendency to stress the social unity and solidarity among themselves as a community is manifested in the ethical teachings of the Druze religion. Brotherhood in the faith, one of the seven ethical injunctions, urges the believers to keep aware and observe the religious ranks in the ladder of initiation, to love one's coreligionists, to show deference to the high among them, and to be accessible and helpful to the inferior.¹ A Maronite historian who lived among them and studied their history and culture describes their national character in a way that makes comparison with this injunction instructive. The national traits which characterized the Druze throughout their history, he writes, are "intense community loyalty, high sense of solidarity, vigorous spirit of independence, endurance in the face of adversity."²

In their religious organization, however, the Druze have no clear distinction between the clergy and the laity. The entire Druze population is divided into two categories, the initiated ('uqqal) into the secrets of the faith, and those who are not initiated (juhhal). Those who are not initiated, it is reported by observers, know nothing about their articles of faith in their religion, but they belong to the Druze sect all the same, and identify as Druze.³ However, complete ignorance of the faith cannot be imputed without question to the juhhal because socialization in villages is performed mainly at home and the neighborhood levels as well as at village gatherings,⁴ which, one might assume, includes some imparting of religious knowledge along with social orientation. On the other hand, the Druze do not perform such religious duties

¹Ibid., pp. 78-79. This doctrinal exposition relies heavily on the Munayyar text. For a detailed account see Silvestre de Sacy, Exposé de la Religion des Druzes (2 vols.; Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1838).

²Hitti, Lebanon in History . . ., p. 262.

³Nasif al Yaziji, Risalah Tarikhiyyah fi Ahwal Lubnan fi 'Ahdih al Iqta'i, ed. Qustantin al Basha (Harisa, Lebanon: Matba'at al Qiddis Bulus [1936]), p. 24. (Henceforth, Risalah.)

⁴See Volney, Travels through Syria . . ., II, 82.

as those performed by Christians and Muslims, like praying, fasting, or confessions. The symbolic importance of religious practices like these cannot be overlooked in the inculcation of religious commitment and conformity. In the case of the Druze, it seems, strong social organization made up for the laxity of religious organization. Travelers who visited Lebanon before the beginning of the nineteenth century do not seem to have been struck by the religiosity of the Druze the way they were by the Maronites and Muslims. Volney was greatly impressed by their social spirit, but talks about their "indifference for religion, which forms a striking contrast with the zeal of the Mahometans and Christians."¹

The 'uqqal are all those men and women who have received some information regarding the tenets of their religion and are allowed to sit within the worshiping halls (majalis). The 'uqqal are also divided into two categories, the general and the special classes. The general class are those who have passed the simple test of trust and can be permitted to know some elementary facts of religion. The special class may be described as those who are well founded in the knowledge of the mysteries of their religion. The 'uqqals kept their relations with the juhhal to a minimum and did not receive money for religious functions on occasions of marriage or death. They carried arms wherever they went and had a reputation for being good warriors.²

The Druze population was thus organized on a religious basis into different categories: the juhhal, the general 'uqqal, the special 'uqqal, and shaykhs al 'aql. This last category is actually a religious office. These divisions, however, are all ranks of perfection, rather than of authority. Re-

¹Ibid., p. 81; also Ghalib, MQ, XXVIII, 579.

²Shayban al Khazin, Tarikh Shayban, in UT, III (1958), 519. (Henceforth, Shayban, Tarikh.)

ligious hierarchy was not the pattern of the Druze religious organization. There was no religious office, strictly speaking, or dependence of one rank on another except insofar as the impartation of religious knowledge was concerned. Social ranks were not confused with religious ones, and a shaykh or amir could belong to any of these religious ranks, the juhhal or the 'uqqal.

Although the Druze religious organization was not hierarchical, the community did have a religious head, known as Shaykh al 'Aql. In theory, the Shaykh al 'Aql is the successor of the hidden Imam who provided the community with all the laws needed for its salvation before he disappeared.¹ The Shaykh al 'Aql in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had a judicial function in addition to his office as head of the religious community. He judged cases of personal status but, unlike the Maronite patriarch, had no authority in civil matters, which went to the Qadi of the Imarah.² This division between civil and religious matters may be attributed to the secular nature of the Druze state, and to Druze religious history, when the religious jurisdiction was separated from the civil with the death of the last God-King, al Hakim. After the disappearance of the Hakim, the Imamah went to men who were not king.

The religious function of Shaykh al 'Aql as head of the community was to see to it that everything was in order among the faithful. For this purpose he kept some kind of social relationship with the 'uqqals and the ascetic shaykhs al 'aql who lived in solitary cells, by visiting them periodically and maintaining personal connections with them. Because he was not able personally to keep up this performance all the time, the Shaykh al 'Aql appointed a few assistants to help with the visits.³ His domain did not extend to Druze communities outside the Imarah of Lebanon.

¹Yusuf Khattar Abu Shaqra, Al Harakat fi Lubnan ila 'Ahd al Mutasarifiyah, ed. 'Arif Abu Shaqra (Beirut: Matba'at al Ittihad, n.d.), pp. 187-89.

²Ibid. Also al Yaziji, Risalah, pp. 24-25.

³Ibid. Also Abu Shaqra, al Harakat fi Lubnan . . ., p. 189.

The office of Shaykh al 'Aql was not entirely a non-political office. By virtue of the prestige of his office, Shaykh al 'Aql often performed political roles like mediating differences among Druze chiefs or between the chiefs and the Amir.¹ In their serious political moves, the prominent chiefs sometimes received the help of the Shaykh al 'Aql in rallying the people.² The distinctive feature in the political role of Shaykh al 'Aql was that he acted on behalf of the Druze chiefs but not on behalf of his flock, the people, nor on behalf of the clergy as an organized group. The absence of a religious bureaucracy made it unlikely that the shaykhs al 'aql might act as an independent body.

Although the 'uqqal were known for shunning all money, food, or goods coming from the ruling class and adamantly refused to use such goods, they were not able to maintain their independence from the government. Political chiefs were able to draw the 'uqqal into their political partisanship very easily.³ The highest religious office, that of Shaykh al 'Aql, was entirely subject in political matters to the leaders of the two Druze factions. Each faction elected a Shaykh al 'Aql of its own, and thus the Druze communities instead of having one religious head had two, one for each of the two iqta' parties. There was a Jumblati Shaykh al 'Aql and a Yazbaki Shaykh al 'Aql, a division which persists to this day.⁴

The Shaykhs al 'Aql had no seats of their own; the home of each, wherever it happened to be, was his religious seat.⁵ For the purpose of public

¹ Al Munayyar, *KTS*, XLVIII, 688; *ibid.*, LI, 479-80.

² Haydar, *Lubnan*, p. 61; also Manayyar, *KTS*, XLVIII, 688.

³ Cf. Haydar, *Lubnan*, pp. 766-67.

⁴ Abu Shaqra, *Al Harakat fi Lubnan . . .*, pp. 191-92.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

worship the religious had halls called majalis. Each of these majalis consisted of one or two rooms within one large hall, with each section marked out for a separate congregation according to rank. The category of general 'uqqal stayed in the outermost section; the special class of 'uqqal went into the inner hall and stayed after the departure of the outer congregation. Left by themselves, the most learned divulged the mysteries of the faith to the less learned ones.¹ In addition to these majalis the ascetics among the 'uqqals had isolated cells all over their country. Asceticism seems to have been the only similarity in religious life between the Druze and the Maronites.

The state of learning among the Druze, the religious men as well as the lay population, was almost completely non-existent. The only learning they had in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, reported a nineteenth-century writer who lived among them, was that of the stars and talisman. In case one aspired to become a judge, he added, one studied the shari'a.² But how many among them had an opportunity to become a judge? During the Shihabi rule the Druze government had only one judge at a time, handling cases of civil nature. In personal status matters, Shaykh al 'Aql was in charge. Volney, who became well acquainted with their way of life, wrote that Druze children "are neither taught to read the Psalms, as among the Maronites, nor the Koran, like the Mahometans; hardly do the Shaiks know how to write a letter."³ We know of no schools of any sort for children in the Druze community until late in 1849 when Shaykh Sa'id Jumblat opened a school in his village, al Mukhtara, and brought to it a Muslim shaykh from Tripoli as a teacher. It was mostly a pri-

¹Yaziji, Risalah, p. 24.

²Ibid., p. 27.

³Volney, Travels through Syria . . ., II, 82.

vate school for the Druze Jumblat shaykhs and their allies;¹ hardly anything is known of this school and evidently it did not amount to very much.

Social stratification among the Druze was more sharply defined than was their religious organization. Society was divided economically into three classes: tenants, property owners, and muqati'jis. Mention should also be made of the small population of craftsmen and tradesmen, both Christian and Druze. History does not provide us with a very clear record of the proportion of tenants to landowners in Mount Lebanon only rough estimates or guesses are possible in this respect. Volney indicated a high percentage of property owners, but unfortunately he did not find it necessary to distinguish between tenants and propertied peasants; he believed there was not much difference between the two groups since tenants rented the land and it became their responsibility. Shaykh Shayban al Khazin, at approximately the same time as Volney, seems to confirm Volney's account, at least insofar as Kisrwan was concerned. According to his account, apparently by far the greatest amount of land belonged to small peasants.² One also gets the impression from chronicles and other records that property ownership was predominant among the Maronites from Kisrwan to Jibbat Bsharri, as well as among the Druze population. Accordingly it seems that the tenant class was, on the whole, not very large.

As for the muqati'ji class, only a few remained the owners of great estates in the first part of the nineteenth century, among whom the Jumblats were the largest landowners. The muqati'ji class alienated a large proportion of their land through sales and donations as wagfs. Their property itself was parceled into small plots as a result of increase in their numbers, especially in the case of the Maronite muqati'jis.

¹See Shakir al Khury, Majma' al Masarrat (Beirut: Matba'at al Ijtihad, 1908), pp. 20-21.

²Shayban, Tarikh, pp. 445-47. Similar observation is made by Bowering, Report . . ., pp. 8, 102.

Among the Druze and the Maronites there was a limited group of middle-class landowners whose conditions were much better than those of the small peasants and tenants. A better idea is possible about the size of this class, but not about the size of their property. This class was known in the days of the Ijarah as al tawa'if,¹ namely a group of patrilineal lineages who enjoyed a fairly high social and economic status in society and politically were headed by the muqati'jis. In the mixed Druze and Maronite areas there were about 41 Druze ta'ifah (pl. tawa'if) and some 11 Christian.² One of the larger of these ta'ifah counted up to 100 members.

There is no available figure for the Druze population before the nineteenth century which can be taken as reliable.³ However, they seem never to have been large in numbers.⁴ The earliest figures we have go back to the third decade of the nineteenth century. One estimate gives a total population of no more than 60,000 people,⁵ and another makes the number of men 10,000, which should actually give about the same total as the first.⁶

The Shi'is (Matawilah)

No other group gave the Maronites and the Druze greater trouble or more competition for the lands of the Mountain than the Shi'is, commonly known in

¹Not to be confused with the more current meaning of the term, that is, a religious sect and sectarianism. The term then was used to designate a group of the same patrilineal lineage.

²Munayyar, KTS, LI, 456; also Yaziji, Risalah, pp. 15-16.

³Volney gives a figure of 120,000 people for Jabal al Druze, which must have included the Maronites and others living with the Druze. See Volney, Travels through Syria . . ., II, 365. Also Laurent, Relation Historique . . ., I.

⁴Shayban comments that they were a very small group, Tarikh, p. 519.


⁵Joseph Michaud and Jean Joseph Poujoulat, Correspondance d'Orient: 1830-1831, VII (Paris: Ducollet, 1835), 342. They exaggerate the number of the Druze and the effects of the Egyptian occupation on the size of their population.

⁶Yaziji, Risalah, p. 28.

Lebanon as Matawilah (the partisans of 'Ali). The Matawilah are an Islamic group, schismatic but moderate partisans of Ali, the cousin of the Prophet. They differ from Sunni Islam on one fundamental question, the Khilafah, a religio-political question regarding the supreme authority in the Muslim community. They believe that the Khilafah belongs to 'Ali as a matter of right and after him to his descendants. Although in recent times the question of al Khilafah has ceased to have practical relevance for the political organization of the Matawilah, it has remained ideologically a symbol of identification in Shi'i communities and a basis of social solidarity. The Matawilah inhabitants of Lebanon did not deify 'Ali as did some of the extremists among the Shi'is (al ghulat). Another major point of difference between the Shi'is and the Sunni Muslims concerns the Shari'a or Divine Law, for some laws accepted by the Shi'is are rejected as unauthentic by the Sunnis, and vice versa.

However moderate their differences with the Sunni Muslims, hostility between the two groups nevertheless was strong enough to force some Shi'is to take refuge in the mountain sides on the periphery of the Muslim world. The Matawilah occupied most of the lands of Lebanon by the second part of the seventeenth century and the first part of the eighteenth (Figure 2), but by the beginning of the nineteenth century they were already pushed out by the Druze and the Maronites. They continued, however, to form an uneasy belt around Mount Lebanon, though no longer within it. (The Shi'i belt still exists and was officially incorporated into the modern state of Lebanon in 1920.) By the second part of the eighteenth century the Druze and the Maronites had the field to themselves with no Matawilah of any significant number living among them; nor was any group during that period able to expand much at the expense of the other.

A brief survey of the population map of Lebanon in the first half of the eighteenth century (Figure 2) indicates the extent of the threat the



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Matawilah had presented to the continued existence of the Maronites and the Druze. The Matawilah were in sole control of Jabal 'Amil as far north as Iqlim al Tuffah. They were also dominant in the areas northeast of Jabal 'Amil in the direction of Jazzin and the Biqa' to Ba'albak. The country of the Druze under the early Ma'nis was a small circumscribed island in a sea of Matawilah. It consisted of al Shuf and al Gharb. In the north the Matawilah were spread from Ba'albak to the Hirmil including lands west of that line like Jibbat al Munaytara, al Ftuh, parts of KISRWAN, Jbayl, and al Batrun.¹

Politically, the Matawilah controlled Jabal 'Amil, Bilad Ba'albak, Hirmil, al Dinniyyah and Bilad 'Akkar, Jibbat Bsharri and al Zawiyah, al Kura, Bilad al Batrun, Bilad Jbayl, and al Ftuh. When the Shihabis succeeded the Ma'nis in Jabal al Druze in 1697, their inheritance constituted only of five muqata'ahs: al Shuf, al Gharb, al Jurd, al Matn, and KISRWAN. The political dominance of the Matawilah corresponded with the decline of Ma'ni power in the second part of the seventeenth century. However, unlike the Druze, the Matawilah had no single dynasty or chief ruling in all the lands they dominated. Al Saghir and other chiefs were in control of Jabal 'Amil, the Harfush house was in power in Bilad Ba'albak, and the Himadi house controlled Hirmil, Bilad 'Akkar and al Dinniyyah, the Maronite country of Jibbat Bsharri, Bilad al Batrun, Bilad Jbayl, and al Ftuh.² There was no political unity among these different chiefs as there was among the Druze.

By the middle of the eighteenth century the Himadis were ousted from Bilad 'Akkar, the Sunni country of al Dinniyyah, the Maronite country of Jibbat

¹The settlement of KISRWAN by the Maronites started in the early period of the seventeenth century and was completed by the end of that century. For the last Matawilah exodus from KISRWAN, see Bulus Qar'ali, Tarikh 'Awd al Nasara ala Jurud KISRWAN (Egypt: Matba'at al Muqtataf wa al Muqattam, n.d.); also Shayban, Tarikh, p. 517.

²Aynturini, MTL, XLVI, 436-37. Also Mansur al Hattuni, Nabdhah Tarikhiyyah fi al Muqata'ah al KISRWANIYYAH (Beirut: n.p., 1884), p. 9. (Henceforth Nabdhah.)

Bsharri, Bilad al Batrun, Bilad Jbayl, and al Ftuh.¹ In Jibbat Bsharri they were expelled in 1759 and in Bilad al Batrun and Jbayl in 1763.² In 1764 Amir Yusuf Shihab took over the government of these northern regions. Two reasons account for most of the misfortunes and the expulsion of the Matawilah. One was the outside pressure from powerful neighbors bent on expansion; and the second factor was related to the defects of the internal organization of the Matawilah political system.

In the first case, the Matawilah of Jabal 'Amil were sandwiched between the Shihabi state of the Druze and the ambitious Pashas of Sayda. There were three powers in the Vilayet of Sayda: the Shihabis, the Matawilah, and the Ottoman governors of the Vilayet. The Druze, who were politically better organized than the Matawilah, were successful in pushing the Matawilah farther south and out of the iqlims. The Shihabis established control by means of continued campaigns against the Matawilah, through dealings with the Ottoman Valis, and by encouraging the Maronite and Druze peasants to settle on the land. The Shihabis' tolerance toward all their subjects made it possible for some of the Shi'i peasants to remain in the lost districts, thus minimizing the effects of the Matawilah loss. However, fate did not bring the Matawilah a Shihabi rival from the south. There they had to encounter the ruthless Pasha of Acre, Ahmad Pasha al Jazzar (d. 1804), who within the three decades of his rule crushed the Matawilah pitilessly.³ Large numbers of them were dispersed in the northeast in Bilad Ba'albak and Hirmil.

In the north, the case was different; there the Matawilah did not have

¹ Aynturini, MTL, XLVI, 440; also ibid., XLVII, 39-47.

² Ibid. Also Butrus Karam, Qala'id al Murjan fi Tarikh Shamali Lubnan (2 vols.; Beirut: Matba'at al Huda and Matba'at al Ittihad, 1929-1937), II, 34-35.

³ See Muhammad Jabir al Safa, Tarikh Jabal 'Amil (Beirut: Dar Matn al Lughah, Samya Press, n.d.).

a real power to fear. The Pashas of Tripoli, unlike those of Sayda, were too weak to affect the Matawilah's fortunes seriously after 1700.¹ In these regions the fall of the Matawilah came from within.

The Matawilah house of Himadi ruled northern Lebanon as muqati'jis by renting the domain from the Ottoman Vali of Damascus. Their rule was autonomous, and except for paying the tribute they were let alone by the Ottoman government. Instead of protecting their peasant subjects, the Himadis terrorized them.² Their taxing policy was unbearably harsh³ and their ways of executing it worse. Unlike the Druze they did not show religious tolerance. Their Maronite subjects migrated to the south in increasing numbers. The Himadis did nothing to halt the emigration of their peasants; rather, they precipitated it, in ignorance of the consequences of their actions. An incident which took place between the Maronite patriarch and the Himadi chief, Shaykh 'Isa, illustrates how the Himadis violated the iqta' principles upon which their ruling system was founded.

In 1704 the muqati'ji Shaykh 'Isa Himadi went to Qannubin, the seat of the Maronite patriarch, and requested a large sum of money, which the patriarch declined to pay.⁴ The patriarch was Istfan al Duwayhi, famous historian and student of the Maronite College in Rome. When the patriarch failed to satisfy him, Shaykh 'Isa slapped him on the face, knocking his headgear off; then he threw the patriarch flat on the ground, beating and cursing him. The patriarch did not utter a word, but later he wrote to Kisrwan to the Maronite Shaykh Husn

¹For the weakness of the Pasha's of Tripoli see Shayban, Tarikh, p. 512.

²See Duwayhi, TA, pp. 295-96, 331, 367, 376. Also 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVII, 47, 439-40; Hattuni, Nabdah, p. 9.

³For the Himadis taxation policy in Jibbat Bsharri see Ibrahim Aouad, Le Droit Privé des Maronites au Temps des Émirs Chihab (1697-1841) (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste, Paul Geuthner, 1933), p. 96. Also Butrus Ghalib, "Nawabigh al Madrassah al Maruniyyah al Ula," MQ, XXII (1924), 111.

⁴Ibid. See Duwayhi's letter of 1700 to the King of France.

al Khazin and told him what had happened. The Khazin shaykh immediately sent a band of men under his brother to fetch the patriarch to the safe haven of Kisrwan. When Shaykh 'Isa heard news of the patriarch's imminent departure, he promptly went to Qannubin and threw himself before the patriarch, beseeching him not to leave and asking his forgiveness. The patriarch extended his forgiveness, but refused to stay. Shaykh 'Isa implored. Do not leave us, he said, for if you do, this country will lay waste.¹ Shaykh 'Isa knew very well that if the Maronite patriarch left Jibbat Bsharri, the Maronite peasants would follow him. This he could not afford, since that entire muqata'ah was cultivated by Maronites.

The ill effects of the Himadi policies on land cultivation is also well illustrated in the case of another region under their rule, the Ftuh. Comparing the Ftuh region under the Himadis with the time when it came under the Shihabis, the chronicler Hattuni writes that as soon as Amir Yusuf Shihab took over that country, the Christians moved into it in droves to live and to appropriate the lands which had been mostly owned by the Matawilah. Previously, he goes on, the Christians had not been able to settle in this region because of the lack of security, a condition brought about by the bad government of the Himadis. At the time Amir Yusuf was installed, there were only two priests serving the villages of that muqata'ah; a century later the area had about 80 priests.²

Without the peasant to cultivate the land, the Himadis could not fulfil their obligations to the Ottoman government and pay the tribute. Their misrule and acts of banditry cost them a great loss of power. It embroiled their relations with the Ottoman Valis, who were usually angry with the Himadis for failing to pay the yearly tribute.³ The Matawilah, unlike the Sunni Muslims of

¹Hattuni, Nabdhah, pp. 113-14. He quotes this story from the biography of al Duwayhi written by Patriarch Sim'an 'Awwad.

²Ibid., p. 9.

³See Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, III, 398, 404-06, 512.

Syria, were hostile to the Ottoman administration; and in their mistrust of it, they were like the Maronites and the Druze. However, their opposition to the Ottomans was not always conducted in a rational manner. Isolated incidents of violence, banditry, robbery, and raids caused the Ottoman governors to undertake disciplinary war against them, occasionally burning their lands and expelling them from their homes.¹

There is an interesting account of how Christians established themselves in one village in Kisrwan inhabited by Matawilah at the end of the seventeenth century. The account is left by the priest of the village, who served at that period.² It is clear from this manuscript that the Maronites were able to buy the land of the Matawilah after the latter had been weakened and impoverished by Ottoman disciplinary expeditions. The Matawilah, unlike the Druze, would not suffer the presence of Christians among them and, in the initial stages of Christian penetration, killed a number of the newcomers. But as the Christians gradually overcame these early difficulties, they started humbly to implore the Matawilah just to let them build a small church. At first it was very difficult, but later the Matawilah conceded on condition that the Christians would not ring bells as they did in other Maronite villages in Mount Lebanon. When the number of Maronites in that village increased and they became the dominant element in the village, the Matawilah deserted the place, leaving it entirely to the Maronites. It was relatively easy for the Maronites to establish themselves in the Matawilah villages in Kisrwan. The pattern was clear: initial violent resistance on the part of the Matawilah, efforts for moderation on the part of the Maronites, sale of Matawilah lands to the Maronites, and finally Matawilah withdrawal.³

¹Ibid.

²Qar'ali, Tarikh 'Awd al Nasara

³Similar relations took place between the Maronites and Matawilah in the nineteenth century when the Maronite monks and peasants pushed farther east to Jibbat al Manaytarah; see Lwis Elaybil, Tarikh al Rahbaniyyah al Lubnaniyyah al Maruniyyah, III, ed. Butrus Sarah, in MQ, LI-LIII (1951-1959), LIII, 558-59.

These are some of the discernable reasons for the retreat of the Matawilah to the periphery of Lebanon before the pressures and expansion of the Maronites and Druze. The Matawilah's lack of organization and tolerance has kept them in a very poor and backward condition to this day.

Political History

As one country politically united, Lebanon is of recent origin, going back only to the middle of the eighteenth century when the Shihabis incorporated Bilad Jbayl with Jabal al Shuf. Obviously, the early infiltration of the Maronites into Druze territory in south Lebanon, beginning in the seventeenth century, gave the peoples of north and south Lebanon something in common and facilitated social relations before political unity was achieved. Both parts, north and south Lebanon, were ruled by one dynasty which presided over the local chiefs, Druze and Maronite, and to a lesser extent Matawilah. The Matawilah lords of Hirmil and Ba'albak stayed outside the actual system of the Shihabi Imarah, though they could be considered political dependents of the Shihabis. Jabal 'Amil chiefs showed more independence from the Shihabis than those of Hirmil and Ba'albak.

Jabal al Shuf and Bilad Jbayl, the Shihabis' domain, were tributaries to the Ottoman Valis of Sayda and Tripoli respectively. Official investiture of the Shihabi ruling Amir came from these Valis. The investiture by the Valis meant political subordination to the Sultan and constituted the means by which the Sultan levied tribute from his subjects. The actual government of the Lebanon was left almost entirely to the ruling Amir and the chiefs. The Shihabis were very careful not to give the Ottomans any reason to break this autonomy and made sure that the Ottoman government received the yearly tribute.

The Ottomans occupied Syria in 1516 and expelled the Mamluks who had been its masters for centuries. From that date till 1918 Syria was an Ottoman territory. When Sultan Salim I conquered Syria, the country not only came under

his rule but also became his personal property as a land of conquest.¹ However, a small region on the mountainous coast of the Mediterranean, al Shuf and al Gharb (Figure 2), remained an exception to this rule. The iqta' system in these regions dated back to the times of the Crusades and the Mamluks.² Some of the muqati'jis in al Shuf and al Gharb rallied to the support of the conqueror Salim I against their masters the Mamluks. Sultan Salim rewarded these muqati'jis by confirming them on their old muqata'ahs and in some cases granting them additional territory. Among those who enjoyed these privileges was Amir Fakhr al Din al Ma'ni I, who, having entered secret relations with the enemies of the Mamluks,³ won the favor of Sultan Salim. In his meeting with the Sultan he left a good impression and the Sultan bequeathed upon him the title of "sultan al Barr." The Sultan's gesture was a confirmation of Ma'ni political precedence over other muqati'jis in the country of the Druze, a precedence which had just recently been established by the Ma'nis.⁴ Meanwhile, in contrast to the illustrious role of the lords of the Druze in the affairs of Syria at the time of the Ottoman conquest, the Maronites were isolated in their mountain ranges of north Lebanon in utter political obscurity.

The political division of Mount Lebanon as confirmed by Sultan Salim I was as follows. The Ma'nis in al Shuf replaced the Buhturs and the Tannukhs;

¹An instance which reflects this difference between the country of the Druze and the rest of Syria is provided by the case of Fakhr al Din II, whose expansion in Mount Lebanon was carried out freely; but when he tried to attach Tripoli to his rule he had to undertake careful and special techniques not to arouse the suspicions of the Ottomans, since Tripoli was the Sultan's territory. See Yusuf Muzhir, Tarikh Lubnan al 'Am (2 vols.; [Beirut]: n.p., n.d.), I, 313.

²Salibi, Maronite Historians . . ., p. 22; also Poliak, Feudalism . . ., passim.

³Hitti, Lebanon in History . . ., p. 357.

⁴Regarding the rise of the Ma'nis to political precedence in the Shuf see Salibi, Maronite Historians . . ., p. 232. For the encounter with Sultan Salim see 'Isa Iskandar al Ma'luf, "Lubnan fi 'Ahd al Amir Fakhr al Din," MQ, XXX (1932), 603.

al Gharb went to Amir Jamal al Din, who was of a separate lineage of the Tanukhs; the Turkoman house of 'Assaf was confirmed in the muqata'ahs of Kisrwan and gained Bilad Jbayl in addition.¹ These muqata'ahs in subsequent years expanded or shrank according to the success or failure of the political and military enterprises of their chiefs. The 'Assafs in Kisrwan reached the peak of their power by the end of the sixteenth century, then declined rapidly, losing their position to the house of Sayfa, a Kurdish clan which made its home in the region of 'Akkar.

Under the 'Assafs, the Maronites in Jibbat Bsharri were ruled by their own muqaddams (village chiefs) on behalf of the 'Assafs, to whom they paid tribute. After the downfall of the 'Assafs the political conditions of the Maronites continued in the same way under the Sayfas.²

The Ma'nis started to show political vigor at the same time the Sayfas rose to pre-eminence in northern Lebanon. A bitter struggle for dominance followed between the Sayfas and Fakhr al Din II (1585-1635). Fakhr al Din's first success was in Kisrwan, which he annexed from the Sayfas and bestowed on his Maronite advisor, Abu Nadir al Khazin, in 1616.³ Thus the Khazins were the first Maronite house to become muqati'jis. In 1616 Kisrwan was firmly controlled by the Ma'nis and remained under the dynasty which ruled Jabal al Druze till the downfall of the Shihabis and the reorganization of the political system of Lebanon in 1842. Kisrwan, which was until then inhabited by Muslims, mainly Matawilah, was gradually colonized by the Maronites with the encouragement of Fakhr al Din. The Maronites, attracted by the security, freedom, and govern-

¹See Hitti, Lebanon in History . . ., pp. 371-72; also Ma'luf, MQ, XXX, 603.

²See Duwayhi, TA, passim. 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVII, 36.

³Haydar Shihab, Kitab al Ghurar al Hisan fi Tawarikh Hawadith al Zaman, ed. Na'um Mughabghab (Egypt: Natba'at al Salam, 1900), pp. 649-50. (Henceforth, Haydar, al Ghurar.) Cf. Mas'ad and al Khazin, UT, III, 311.

ment employment under the Ma'nis, emigrated in large numbers to Kisrwan and other regions of Jabal al Shuf.¹

In the south, Fakhr al Din's first expansion took the lands of the Sanjak of Sidon² which are known as the iqlims (districts) of the Kharrub, Tuffah, Jazzin, and Jabal al Rayhan. After a long struggle these iqlims were finally incorporated permanently into Mount Lebanon under the Shihabis. Fakhr al Din continued his policy of expansion until he imposed his authority over most of geographic Syria. He built a very large army of mercenaries known as sukman,³ and he could supplement them with his Druze and Maronite irregular forces.

Fakhr al Din reportedly expressed his political ambitions in a statement regarding what constitutes power and empire: "Empire is nothing but moving to a new frontier naqlu tukhmin . Every time we take a country its men and wealth will constitute for us a new base of power enabling us to move to the next."⁴ His political career was a living example of this philosophy in the high moments of its glory and the depressing tragedy of its consequences. By 1630 he was master of all the lands from Aleppo to the frontiers of Egypt.⁵ This expansion aroused the suspicions of the Ottoman government, which sent against him two expeditions, one by land and one by sea. Neither his courage nor his constant efforts to establish political alignment with the powers of Europe were to any avail. His attempts to build up a defense pact with Euro-

¹Shaykho, MQ, XVII, 761. Also Duwayhi, TA, p. 236; 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVI, 436.

²Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 374; also Munayyar, KTS, XLIX, 270.

³Also Sukban. Hitti maintains that Fakhr al Din had 40,000 troops of these mercenaries at one time, Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 375.

⁴Ma'luf, MQ, XXX, 832.

⁵Hitti, Lebanon in History, pp. 381-82.

pean powers failed to materialize, and without a fleet he could not meet the Ottoman expedition. He met his death at the hands of the executioner in Istanbul.

After a short period the affairs of the Imarah fell to Fakhr al Din's brother, who was able to restore Ma'ni rule to southern Lebanon. In 1697 the last Ma'ni died without an heir, and with him the dynasty came to an end. A Shihabi who was descended from the Ma'nis on the maternal side started the Shihabi dynasty, which was politically a continuation of the Ma'ni dynasty.

The legacy of the Ma'nis left to the Shihabis was of a modest nature compared with the glory of Fakhr al Din. The territory which the Shihabis received consisted of al Shuf, al Gharb, al Jurd, al Matn, and Kisrwan.¹ Kisrwan was the only Maronite land left to the rulers of Jabal al Druze after Fakhr al Din. The rest of the Maronite lands and other parts of northern Lebanon remained in the hands of the Pasha of Tripoli, who appointed different chiefs to farm out the country. Starting in 1701 the Himadis succeeded in monopolizing iqta' rights to the whole northern territory, until the middle of the century. As for Jabal al Druze, it maintained its autonomous status under the Shihabis in the same way as under the Ma'nis. The right of hereditary succession to the Imarah continued to be the rule, rather than direct appointment from the capital of the Empire. The governing Amir had full liberty in the government of his domain, so long as he continued to pay tribute, a sign of subordination, to the Sultan.

After the downfall of Fakhr al Din II, the Ottoman government reorganized the administration of Syria to keep closer vigilance over the Druze. To facilitate this for the Vali, the city of Sayda was made the seat of the Vilayet of Sayda in 1660. Bilad Jbayl and Batrun and Jibbat Bsharri became attached to the

¹Shayban, Tarikh, p. 403.

Vilayet of Damascus in 1638.¹ The Shihabis therefore had to deal with two Valis at the same time. They were tributaries to the Vali of Sayda for Jabal al Druze and Kisrwan, and to the Vali of Damascus for the northern territories of Lebanon. Thus the Shihabis of Mount Lebanon were deeply affected by what went on around them and became quite involved in the politics of the different Valis and rising powers in the Syrian territories.

From the beginning of their rule in 1697, the Shihabis had to fight Ottoman encroachments on their mountain on two fronts. They had to curb the ambitions of the Valis and Pashas on the one hand, and on the other, they had to crack down on a rival dynasty in the Mountain itself, the 'Alam al Din house, who were the chiefs of the Yamani faction. Since the days of the Ma'nis, the Yaman and Qaysi political factions, widely spread in the Arab Middle East, had taken in Lebanon the character of rivalry between two dynasties, the Ma'nis and the 'Alam al Dins, for the government of the Mountain. The 'Alam al Dins showed more loyalty to the Ottomans and were supported by the Valis. The Ma'nis, who were the chiefs of the Qaysi faction, stood for greater autonomy in the affairs of the Ijarah and generally distrusted the Ottoman government and its Valis. Most of the Druze, however, supported the Qaysi chiefs, rather than the house of 'Alam al Din, although the latter was Druze in religion while the Ma'nis were Sunni Muslims.²

After a serious setback, the Qaysis re-emerged under the leadership of

¹Haydar, al Ghurar, p. 724.

²Although there is no clear evidence that the Ma'nis changed their Sunni Muslim religion, some historians believe they were converted to the Druze religion. The Druze historian Yusuf Muzhir takes their conversion for granted, see Muzhir, Tarikh Lubnan al 'Am, I, 370, and Hitti, Lebanon in History . . ., p. 262; also Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society . . ., I, Part I, 222. Cf. for the opposite view, the account of Fakhr al Din's contemporary and judge, al Shaykh Ahmad bin Muhammad al Khalidy, 'Ahd al Amir Fakhr al Din, ed. Fu'ad Afram al Bustani and Asad Rustum (Beirut: Lebanese Government Publication, al Matba'ah al Kathulikiyyah, 1936), pp. 2, 4, 6.

Amir Haydar Shihab (1703-1732) and gave the Yamani faction in Jabal al Druze the coup de grace in a decisive battle fought in 1711 at 'Ayn Dara, a village in Jabal al Druze. After this event the Shihabis reasserted their precedence and power and, to the end of their rule, were free to attend to their affairs without any serious threat to their dynasty.

As for their relations with the Valis in Sayda and Damascus, the Shihabis were by no means subservient. Especially after 'Ayn Dara, and for almost all the rest of their rule, the Shihabis could deal with the Valis on almost equal terms. On several occasions Valis sought their assistance to establish their (the Valis') authority. Early in the eighteenth century the Shihabis re-established their authority over the regions known as the iqlims and over Beirut. Beirut remained under Shihabi rule from 1748 till 1776, when al Jazzar of Acre annexed it to his little empire.

Meanwhile, the Maronite country of northern Lebanon was under the Matawilah lords of the Himadi house during the first half of the eighteenth century. The Himadis also controlled the Sunni Muslim regions of northern Lebanon like al Dinniyah and 'Akkar. However, in 1759 the Maronites of Jibbat Bsharri, Bilad al Batrun, and Bilad Jbayl revolted against their Matawilah rulers, the Himadis, and expelled them from Jibbat Bsharri, following their expulsion from the Sunni muqata'ah of al Dinniyyah and 'Akkar. The Himadis, however, maintained their position in Bilad Jbayl until 1763. After the removal of the Himadis from Jibbat Bsharri, each of the Maronite village shaykhs rented the iqta' of his village directly from the Pasha of Tripoli, who had encouraged the Maronites in their uprising against the notorious Himadis.

As hostilities continued between the Maronites and the Himadis, however, the former sought the help of the Shihabis and asked them to come and rule their country.¹ The Shaykhs of Jibbat Bsharri went to the Maronite muqati'jis of

¹ Aynturini, MTL, XLVII, 45-46.

Kisrwan, the Khazins, in order that the latter might plead their cause with the Shihabis. Amir Mansur Shihab was at the time ruling in Jabal al Druze. The Himadis in their turn sought to draw Amir Mansur to their side. The Khazins, however, failed to help the Maronites of the north,¹ thus losing a very important opportunity to regain some of their waning political prestige. At that point the struggle in northern Lebanon entered the political arena of partisan contest in Jabal al Druze. The Himadis appealed to the Yazbaki faction² to keep Amir Mansur from helping the Maronites. As a result Amir Mansur did not show a genuine effort to support the Christians. He took a compromising stand and accepted the Maronites' request that they should receive the iqta' of their country through him, but did not back them with the military force that would keep the Himadis away.³

As the Jumblati faction was starting to assume the opposition role to Amir Mansur, they entered into negotiations with Sa'd al Khury,⁴ the Maronite advisor of the young Amir Yusuf Shihab, the son of the former governor Amir Milhim Shihab. The Jumblati faction promised Sa'd support for his master in seeking investiture from the Ottoman governor of Damascus for the Maronite country of Jibbat Bsharri, Bilad al Batrun, and Bilad Jbayl. Sa'd al Khury immediately went with Amir Yusuf to Damascus,⁵ after providing themselves with enough cash collected from the Maronites of northern Lebanon⁶ to induce the Pasha to grant the investiture. Thus, as the Amir Yusuf and his advisor were

¹Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Shayban, Tarikh, pp. 512-13; also Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 60-62.

⁵Ibid. Also 'Aynturini, MPL, XLVII, 45-46.

⁶Ibid. Hattuni, Nabdah, pp. 178-79.

able to present the Pasha readily with the yearly tribute of those muqata'ahs, he agreed to grant investiture.

Amir Yusuf and his advisor immediately put an end to the Himadis' rule in Bilad Jbayl and took disciplinary measures against them wherever they still showed resistance.¹ In 1773 the Himadis suffered a complete defeat at the hands of Sa'd al Khury, after which they never rose again in northern Lebanon. Amir Yusuf encouraged the Maronites to settle in the regions which previously the Himadis had forced them to leave. The state of insecurity prevailing in those regions under the Himadis had left the country desolate and poor. The land was so impoverished that Amir Yusuf found the revenues from all his domains still short of meeting the expenses of government.² He immediately set out to impose peace and encourage peasants to settle and cultivate the land. As for the Maronite chiefs who had supported him in his efforts to be invested governor, he appointed them muqati'jis over Jibbat Bsharri, Bilad al Batrun, and Bilad Jbayl.³

Thus after 1764 the Shihabis controlled Mount Lebanon from the Cedars to Jabal 'Amil. At first there were two governing Amirs, one in the north and one in the south, independent from each other until 1770 when Amir Yusuf succeeded in becoming the ruling Amir of both regions. After Amir Yusuf, his sons and Amir Bashir Shihab in their struggle for power again divided Lebanon between them into a northern and a southern region. In 1807 Bashir asserted himself over the two sections, which were not separated again until the downfall of the Shihabi dynasty in 1841. The incorporation of the Maronite country with the Mountain of the Druze had serious effects on the political institutions of Lebanon, as we shall see later. This encounter between Maronite and Druze, however,

¹Haydar, Lubnan, p. 62; 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVII, 46.

²Haydar, Lubnan, p. 64.

³'Aynturini, MTL, XLVII, 46. Also Hattuni, Nabdhah, pp. 178-79.

was not the first between the two peoples. The Maronites had taken to living among the Druze in the south since the days of the Ma'nis, and under the Shihabis Kisrwan was the most populated Maronite muqata'ah.

In 1776 Ahmad Pasha al Jazzar was appointed Vali of Sayda and made his seat in Acre. His ambition led him on a course of constant intrigue aimed at subjugating Mount Lebanon, especially since his power had increased by being appointed Vali of Damascus in 1785 in addition to Sayda. His attempt to deprive the Mountain of its freedom and autonomy failed, although he brought the Shihabis to their knees by playing them one against the other. The Jazzar's policy weakened Shihabi rule and kept political conditions unstable in Lebanon until shortly before the Vali's death in 1804.

After al Jazzar's death, Bashir Shihab successfully asserted his authority over Lebanon until 1832, when the Egyptian occupation of Syria forced him to ally his fortunes with the military prowess of Muhammad Ali and his son Ibrahim. Although at first this alliance with the victorious Egyptians gave him prestige, its long-run effects seriously imperiled Shihabi rule in Lebanon. It widened the gap between Bashir and the Druze chiefs which had already developed shortly before the Egyptian conquest. At the same time, the presence of the Egyptian military might in Syria made Egyptian interference in the internal affairs of the Shihabis inevitable. The Lebanese lost some of the freedom they had enjoyed during the preceding eras and were forced to serve as conscripts in the Egyptian expedition. The heavy pressures of the Egyptians on the Mountain people led them to revolt in 1840. Maronites and Druze fought the Egyptians with the assistance of the European expedition, composed mainly of the British and the Ottomans. Bashir II fell with his ally Ibrahim Pasha. The Ottoman government named in his place Amir Bashir Milhim Shihab, known in Lebanese history as Bashir III. This Amir failed to unite the Druze and Maronites under his authority, and in 1841 a civil war broke out between the two communities which brought the Shihabi dynasty to an end.

The Egyptian affair not only weakened the Shihabi dynasty but also caused the internationalization of the Lebanese question for the first time in history. Henceforth Lebanon became a center of concern for the European powers which were squabbling for the spoils of the Sick Man of Europe. The Ottomans themselves became very much antagonized by the Shihabis of Lebanon, who had proved a potential enemy to the Sultanate. When the Shihabis failed to solve the predicament of political struggle for domination between the Druze and the Maronites, the Ottoman government had no difficulty in removing the Shihabis from their position in Lebanon.

A new political organization of Lebanon followed the downfall of the Shihabi house. The new order was carried out by the Ottoman government and the European powers. Lebanon was divided into two administrative units, one under a Druze governor and the other under a Maronite. Each of the divisions was called Qaimmaqamiyyah. The Maronite Qaimmaqamiyyah constituted all the country from al Matn to Jibbat Bsharri. That of the Druze, south of al Matn to Jabal 'Amil. The problem in this arrangement was that the Lebanese were not really willing to divide their country. This resistance was made acrimonious by the presence of Maronite people under the Druze Qaimmaqam, because the old Jabal al Druze had become a mixed Druze and Christian area. A few Druze also were to be found in the Christian section.

In 1860 civil war broke out again between Druze and Christians. Lebanon was then reorganized by the Ottoman government and the Powers of Europe under a new constitution. An Ottoman Christian, non-Lebanese, was to govern Lebanon for a term of five years subject to renewal. He was to be appointed by the Sultan with the approval of the European Powers which were signatories to the Lebanese Organic Law. A central Council of 12 members elected by the people were to aid the Mutasarrif and advise him on matters of policy. The Council represented the religious communities living in Lebanon, with each having two

members. In 1864 the apportionment of seats was revised in favor of the two main communities, the Maronites and the Druze; the Maronites were given four members and the Druze three. The Lebanon was divided administratively into six departments (Qada's) with a prefect or mudir for each; the mudir was appointed by the Mutasarrif from the religious denomination of the majority of the population in his department. The iqta' system of the Imarah was formally abolished.

In concluding, we may observe that the dominant aspect of Lebanese society was the plurality of the groups which formed it. Up to the seventeenth century these groups lived in different parts of the Mountain with little interchange among them. This picture, however, changed during the seventeenth century in southern Lebanon, where the iqta' political institutions of the Imarah proved very congenial to a pluralistic social structure. Druze and Maronites, as the two major communities, lived together under these institutions amicably united. There were other small groups living under the Imarah as well, such as the Melkite Catholics, Melkite Orthodox, Shi'is, and Sunnis. The history of Lebanon since the seventeenth century can be summed up as the story of how these people interacted with each other and with the political institutions under which they lived.

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE SHIHABI IMARAH

Under the Shihabi Imarah the system of government was of the iqta' order. This was a system in which a number of hereditary lords exercised the right to rule and were subject in their relations to a hereditary overlord of the Shihabi dynasty. The institutions, or rules according to which government was conducted, were complex and, as yet, not fully described. In the following account we shall try to reconstruct these institutions as they existed during the Shihabi Imarah (1697-1842). The inquiry will also be made by isolating three factors for description and analysis, namely the principle of legitimacy, the institutions, and the ruling elites. First, though, some of the terms used in iqta' language should be defined.

Iqta' was also called iltizam, particularly by the Ottoman government and its viceroys.¹ In Ottoman official usage, iltizam was a universal term applying to other parts of the Sultan's land, especially to Egypt, though it had different denotations in different areas of the Empire.² In its more general sense it denoted a tax-farming tenure³ in which the holder collected the taxes

¹See acts of investiture, Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 552, 648, 679, 680, 720. Cf. Poliak, Feudalism . . ., pp. 48-49. See also Marsum from Ahmad Pasha al Jazzar to Amir Isma'il Abillama', "Taqlid Ahmad Basha al Jazzar li Amir Yusuf al Shihabi al Hukm 'ala al Shuf," MQ, XIII (1910), 318-19.

²Poliak, Feudalism . . ., pp. 48-49, 54, 55, 74-78.

³For the very early history of the term see Claude Cahen, "l'Évolution de l'Iqta' du IXe au XIIIe Siècle: Contribution a une Histoire Comparée des Sociétés Médiévales," Annales: Economiques, Sociétés, Civilisation, VIIIe Année (January-March, 1953), 25-52.

for an overlord, the Vali, or as in the case of Egypt, for the Diwan of Cairo, in the name of and for the Sultan.

However, the terms iltizam and iqta' will be used here in two different senses. Iltizam will refer to the tax-farming system in which a multazim also enjoyed authority over the subjects. This form of iltizam was particularly prevalent in the Syrian plains and the Egyptian valley. Unlike the iqta' system of Mount Lebanon the multazim was subject to more stringent control from the Vali, and the latter's jurisdiction was not always precluded from the benefice which the multazim held. Finally, and above all in importance, is the absence in iltizam of the plurality of chiefs who were personally loyal to an overlord who granted muqata'ahs and titles.

The term iqta' will refer to the system of government in Mount Lebanon, and which may also be applicable to Jabal 'Amil and Jabal Nablus. In the language of the time, no general term seems to have been used by the participants in the system or in the official documents to designate the whole system. The ruling Amir¹ was referred to variously as al Amir al Hakim, al Hakim, al Hakim al 'Am, and Wali.² The phrases Hukm Jabal al Shuf wa Kisrwan, and Hukm Jabal Lubnan³ were often used by Haydar and other chroniclers. Reference was also made occasionally to the "throne of Ibn Ma'n" (takht Ibn Ma'n) and the "throne of Lebanon" (takht Lubnan).⁴ However, a general term, 'uhdah (plural, 'uhad) was used for government by a muqati'ji. (The Arabic root is 'ahada, i.e., en-

¹The title "amir" will be capitalized when it refers to the Hakim and when immediately preceding the name of a particular amir.

²The term "al Hakim al 'Am" occurs in al Yaziji, Risalah, p. 9.

³See Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 649, 680.

⁴Al Turk, Nqula, Diwan al Mu'allim Nqula al Turk, ed. Fu'ad Afram al Bustani ("Lebanese Government Publication: Nusus wa Watha'iq"; Beirut: n.p., 1949), pp. 150, 211, 262, 272.

joined, charged, bade.) Muqata'ah was the term for the region under the government of a muqati'ji. Iqta' was used in an abstract sense only in the phrase "ashab al iqta'," that is, those who held the rights to govern a muqata'ah, which was another way of referring to the muqati'jis.¹

Legitimacy and Political Allegiance

The iqta' system of the Shihabi Imarah rested on very broad foundations. In general perspective, the arrangement of authority under the system fitted within the framework of Ottoman dominion. Theoretically, the Sultan was the highest authority over the rulers of Mount Lebanon and their subjects. The Amir of Lebanon sent the tribute (al mal al Sultani) in the Sultan's name to the Valis of Sayda and Tripoli.

The Amir al Hakim was also invested with authority in the name of the Sultan. For Jabal al Shuf and Kisrwan, investiture came by way of the Vali of Sayda, and for Jbayl and its dependencies, from the Vali of Tripoli. Sometimes, however, the Amir received his investiture from the Sublime Porte directly.² The period for which the investiture was granted was one year. That it was for one year can be definitely confirmed for the period after 1775, but there is no available evidence that this was also true in earlier periods.³ There were exceptions to the practice even after 1775, when Amir Bashir II received investiture for life in 1810 from Sulayman Pasha, and in 1820 from 'Abdallah Pasha.⁴ However, the fact that the Amir was given yearly investiture should not mean that the regulation of succession was in the hands of the Ottoman Valis, as we shall soon see.

¹The term "muqati'ji" is colloquial. The classical Arabic term "iqta'i" was not part of the common parlance of that time.

²Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 195, 196; idem, al Ghurar, p. 715. See also Poliak, Feudalism . . ., p. 56.

³Ottoman Valis were invested on a one-year basis in the eighteenth century, see Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society . . ., I, Part I, 201.

⁴Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 552-54, 680; also Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 100, 153.

Every year upon receiving the tribute (henceforth referred to as al miri), the Vali sent the Amir a khul'ah, a sable coat (fereji-i samur)¹ the symbol of authority, which the Amir put on with some show of public ceremony as soon as he received it. The khul'ah and a marsum² were sent to the Amir with the khazandar³ or the qadi.⁴ Accompanying this formality was also an exchange of papers, known as sanadat (writs),⁵ stating conditions of the agreement made between the Amir al Hakim and the Vali. The major point of such agreement was the amount of the miri.⁶ Although this amount was officially fixed from the time of the Ma'nis' rule, the actual sum paid to the Vali varied from time to time according to the power of one or the other of the parties to the agreements.

It is not unlikely that some questions of a political or administrative nature also entered into the text of the sanadat of the agreement. No examples of sanadat are available to illustrate the nature of their content, but the possibility of political dealings can be inferred from other sources. The sanadat al iltizam had to be sent by the Amir before he received the khul'ah.⁷

The reception of the khul'ah by the Amir al Hakim had a special effect on the Lebanese. As seen by Amir Bashir's poet, Nqula al Turk, the khul'ah "confirms the ties of loyalty"⁸ between the Hakim and the State. On the whole it gave the Lebanese the general feeling of satisfaction that the Ottoman State,

¹ See Marsums in Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 553, 649.

² It was referred to in common parlance as "buruldu."

³ Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 553, 649. Khazandar is a term used in some Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire for treasurer (defterdar), see al 'Awrah, Tarikh Wilayah . . ., p. 23, n. 1; also Asad Jibrail Rustum, "Syria under Mehemet Ali" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Oriental Languages and Literatures, University of Chicago), p. 77.

⁴ Haydar, Lubnan, p. 680.

⁵ Ibid.; also Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 87-88.

⁶ Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 657, 670.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 552-53, 648-49, 657, 679.

⁸ Al Turk, Diwan . . ., p. 230.

which represented to them a higher civil order, had legitimized the government of their chiefs. It also gave them a sense of peace, that is, a feeling that no disorder or war with the State was forthcoming. For a small community like that of Mount Lebanon the sanction of the Ottoman State meant also the recognition of its place by the outside and neighboring world. Imperial power over the whole regions surrounding Lebanon gave the Lebanese something in common with the rest and formed for the Lebanese the basis of a valuable intercourse with their neighbors.

However, on the level of actual performance, Ottoman-Lebanese relations were viewed by the Lebanese with some caution. They were always careful not to give the Ottoman government or its viceroys the pretext or chance to encroach on their tradition of autonomy. The Valis did not as a rule interfere with the internal affairs of the Ijarah, and with the exception of Ahmad Pasha al Jazzar (1776-1804), the independent power of the Lebanese Hakim had the edge over that of the Vali.

It is not easy to define the sense of legitimacy which the Ottoman presence lent to the autonomous Ijarah. The Ottoman government was virtually a fiction--the Sultan was recognized as the supreme lord, yet he was so far removed in distance and power that the Amir al Hakim was the actual supreme ruler in his land. As long as the Lebanese traditional right to conduct their own affairs was not violated by the Ottoman government or its Valis, the Lebanese respected the general order implied by Ottoman authority. The Ottoman State represented to the Lebanese an established higher order, abstract yet tangible. At the same time, there was not much trust in the political dealings of the State. When Amir Milhim Shihab, for example, had to yield his brother 'Ali as a hostage in Sayda, the Vali's seat, he made him stay in the French khan because, as Haydar commented, "There is no trust in al Dawlah."¹

¹Haydar, Lubnan, p. 41.

However, the major legitimating principle or source of authority was the social norms as they were expressed in the practices and traditions of the Lebanese in their various classes. These traditions were handed down from one generation to the next, and were held with great respect. They included veneration for the ways of the elders, respect for each person's place and station in the social order, and refraining from breaking the rules appertaining to each class and title. The people of Mount Lebanon viewed the division of society into a hierarchy of classes as the normal order in society which had always been in existence. Men were not equal, for each had a place determined by his birth. Men were born as commoners ('ammiyyah), shaykhs, muqaddams, or amirs; each class had its special place and rights in society.

A title of nobility applied to all the members of a patrilineal kinship group, not to one or a few members only. Marriages and social protocol were defined by the noble rank which a person held. It was in the light of these facts that the muqati'jis in the Imarah acted when they chose a Shihabi amir to govern over them after the death of the last Ma'ni Hakim. The Shihabis intermarried with the Ma'nis, like them were of amir rank, and were also political allies of the Ma'nis. To elect a Shihabi was therefore the natural course of action, according to the world-view held by the Lebanese of the seventeenth century. There was, then, an inborn sense of social order and custom, which was not easily broken by the passing of time. The continuity of traditions can be illustrated by the statement of the first Shihabi Amir at the time he succeeded the Ma'nis in 1697. Writing in that year to the Maronite prelates, he said:

We shall look after your interests and protect you; we shall also treat you according to your customs, letting nothing change for you. Except for the death of the late [Amir Ahmad Ma'n], you will suffer no changes [in your condition].¹

¹See letter in Ghalib, MQ, XXII, 110.

Like most other traditional cultures, Lebanese society under the Shihabi Imarah esteemed the inherited practices and the elders' ways of doing things. But respect for age and heritage alone would not have sufficed had there not also been a feeling that the accepted customs manifested justice and goodness. Thus it was not only acceptance and respect for tradition that legitimized the institutions of the Imarah, but also a sense of utility and benefit. It is not difficult to detect in the spirit of the times that the order under which the people lived gave them security in their lives and property as well as independence and liberty.

Respect for the Sultan, traditions, and recognition of benefit were thus the major factors upon which rested the legitimacy of the political institutions of the Imarah. The effects of these factors should not be underestimated, especially when it is remembered that the rulers of the Imarah had neither army nor police. A standing army or police force were not part of the iqta' system, as they were not part of the political institutions of medieval feudalism in Europe. The Amir therefore could not rely much on force and compulsion to produce conformity and obedience to his orders and policies. He had but a small number of retainers, who served essentially for administrative purposes. These were known as al Shurtah or Huwalah. Occasional resort was made to Albanian and North African mercenaries to help repel outside danger; and in the civil wars instigated by the Jazzar, mercenaries were employed.

The people in the iqta' system were not held together by force, nor by religious bonds. For the population was of mixed religious affiliation, which cut across social stratification. There were Druze and Maronites in both classes--muqati'jis and subjects.¹ The ruling family of Shihab was Sunni Muslim; and although conversion to the Maronite faith started in the family

¹There was one Orthodox muqati'ji family, the 'Azars of al Kurah; and one Shi'i, the Himadis.

ranks in the middle of the eighteenth century, the converts were not in line for succession.¹ The population was also quite mixed. The great majority were Maronite and Druze, and then came Christians of various other sects, Shi'is, and Sunnis.

Political loyalty and attachment cut across religious and sectarian lines. A man's allegiance was first to his muqati'ji and then to the ruling Amir, whether they were of his religious group or not. A subject came under the jurisdiction of the muqati'ji in whose muqata'ah he happened to live. In this strict sense the subject was considered to be of the 'uhdat of this or that muqati'ji. As it was usually the case that a subject's political affiliations were with those of his master, he was said to be of the 'uzwat'² of such-and-such a muqati'ji. In the one case the person was a subject, in the second he was a follower. A man was also said to be of the Yazbaki or Jumblati 'uzwat, which meant that he belonged to a faction which included a grouping of muqati'jis. A smiyyah was a more specific term referring to the iqta' bond³ and more often than 'uzwat, to the bond which held the members of a faction (gharad) to their chiefs. It meant, literally, taking another man's name; but in the iqta' sense it meant taking the name of the muqati'ji house as a definition of one's place in society. Socially and politically, the individual was identified as an adherent of the muqati'ji. The muqati'jis, in fact, used the term nasna, our men.⁴

¹Sayyid-Ahmad Milhim was the first Maronite Shihabi amir to become the Hakim, but for hardly a year, in 1778; Bashir II was the next among the Christian amirs to ascend takht Ibn Ma'n. However, due to the secrecy in which they kept the fact of their conversion, it is not possible to hold for sure that these were the first two Maronite Amirs to rule.

²This term is still used locally in Lebanon, but has no widespread application.

³See Isma'il Haqqi (comp.), Lubnan (Beirut: al Matba'ah al Adabiyyah, 1334H. [1918]), p. 180. Yusuf As'ad Dagher, Lubnan: Lamhat fi Tarikhihi wa Atharihi wa Usarihi (Juni, Lebanon: Matba'at al Mursalin al Lubnaniyyin, 1938), p. 583; also Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 15-16.

⁴See Blaybil, TRIM, LI, 506-07.

This relationship of attachment to the lord was also supplemented by agreements and covenants made sometimes between the subjects and the muqati'jis, and other times between the muqati'jis and the Amir. Examples of such covenants are included in the appendix. Covenants were actually a major feature of the iqta' system, a fact which should remind us that the system did not function mechanically or without hitches, and that constant human effort was required to keep it going.

To be of the 'uzwah of a muqati'ji placed moral obligations not only on the follower but also on the muqati'ji, who would come to the aid of the follower and protect him. This duty was usually expressed as haq al ri'ayah wa al himayah (to tend and protect). To maintain his integrity and position in the political life of the Ijarah, the muqati'ji was well aware that he had to have a strong following and a loyal one. Sometimes muqati'jis went so far in protecting their followers as to place political considerations above the accepted rules of good conduct on the part of the subject.

For instance, at the turn of the eighteenth century, Amir Faris Abillama' was annoyed by the unruly behavior of the Qintars and the Hatums, subjects of his 'uhdah, a feeling shared by the Hakim. Yet Amir Faris resisted the Hakim's demand to destroy them because he did not want to be weakened in relation to the Jumblatis¹ who, no doubt, had some following of their own faction in the amir's muqata'ah. Amir Faris was a Maronite, the Qintar clan was Druze. In another case a Christian from Dayr al Qamar, who was of the 'uhdat Shaykh Klayb Abu Nakad, became notoriously aggressive and unruly, regardless of the shaykh's warnings to him. Shaykh Klayb, however, steadfastly resisted the request of the Amir Yusuf, the Hakim, to destroy his subject. When Amir Yusuf lost his patience

¹Mikha'il al Dimashqi, Tarikh Hawadith al Sham wa Lubnan (1782-1841), ed. Lwis Ma'luf (Beirut: al Matba'ah al Kathulikiyyah, 1912), p. 75. (Henceforth Dimashqi, Tarikh.)

and ordered the shaykh to kill him, the shaykh pleaded with the Amir in this way: "Sire, I am your obedient servant and raise my men and children to serve you; I have warned the fellow several times, but to kill my men in my own hands, that is impossible for me."¹

This relationship of responsibility, ri'ayah wa himayah, was demonstrated even by an Amir who was famous for his ruthlessness, Amir Bashir II. In the war between the Amir and Shaykh Bashir Jumblat in 1825, the Amir had some mercenary soldiers sent to him by the Pasha of Sayda to put down the shaykh's uprising. The lieutenant with these soldiers advised the Amir in battle to use the canons and finish off his opponents, but the Amir replied:

Were I able to repulse them without wounding even a single man, I would not hesitate to do so; for they are poor subjects forced to be here by their shaykhs. It is enough what they have to suffer in being taken away from their work and thrown in the face of danger on the battlefield. Should I, who am enjoined by God and the State [al Dawlah] to look after them and protect their lives, kill them with my own hands?²

The relationship of himayah wa ri'ayah with respect to the subjects deserves special attention in any study aimed at assessing the salutary effects of iqta' institutions for the people of Lebanon, a task beyond the limits of this study. However, it may not be out of order to note here a passing comment made by Volney, who was in Lebanon few years before the French revolution broke out. Wondering about the density of the population in the arid mountain country of Lebanon, Volney wrote:

I can discover no other cause than that ray of liberty which glimmers in this country. Unlike the Turks [Sunni Muslims] every man lives in perfect security of his life and property. The peasant is not richer than in other countries; but he is free; "he fears not," as I have often heard them say,

¹Mikha'il Mashaqah, Muntakhabat min al Jawab 'ala Iqtirah al Ahbab, ed. Subhi Abu Shaqra and Asad Rustum ("Lebanese Government Publication: Nusus wa Watha'iq"; Beirut: al Matba'ah al Kathulikiyyah, 1955), p. 56. (Henceforth al Jawab.)

²Ibid., p. 101. See also the justificatory deed given by the same Amir to the Maronites of Dayr al Qamar. An idea of purpose of government is well reflected here, too. Ibrahim Harfush, "Min Athar al Amir Bashir al Kabir," al Manarah, II (1931), 612-13.

"that the Aga, the Kaimmakam, or the Pacha, should send their Djendis, to pillage his house, carry off his family, or give him the bastinado." Such oppressions are unknown among the mountains. Security, therefore, has been the original cause of population. . . .¹

And,

As they are not exposed to the violence and insults of despotism, they consider themselves as more perfect than their neighbours, because they have the good fortune not to be equally debased. Hence they acquire a character more elevated, energetic, and active; in short, a genuine republican spirit.²

Political loyalties of the subjects were not, however, limited to the muqati'ji or his house, but went beyond that to his faction (gharad). Each faction included several muqati'ji houses. The factions were alliances of long standing among the manasib under the Imarah. The term "manasib" (pl.) in the language of the time, while applying to muqati'jis only, had a subtle distinction from the term "muqati'ji," for it referred to the muqati'ji in his capacity as a political leader who not only was responsible for administering the government of the muqata'ah but who also had a role to play in the government of the whole Mountain.

The factions into which the manasib were divided under the Shihabi Imarah had no relation to the Qaysi and Yamani partisanship of old, which in Mount Lebanon ended in 1711 with the complete destruction of the Yamani faction. The new factions originated sometime during the reign of Amir Milhim Shihab (1729-1754)³ as a result of a struggle among the chief manasib, the Jumblats, the 'Imads, and the Abu Nakads. Those who customarily allied themselves with the Jumblats were thus known as Jumblatis and those who followed the 'Imads, the Yazbakis. Thus the manasib were divided into the following three gharads: the Jumblats were followed by a number of clans like the Abi Shaqra, Abi 'Alwan and others, but by no particular muqati'ji houses except that of the muqaddams of Hammana; the Yazbakis, at whose head were the 'Imads, comprised the Talhuq

¹Volney, Travels through Syria . . ., p. 73.

²Ibid., p. 74.

³See Haydar, Lubnan, p. 49.

and 'Abd al Malik shaykhs and some of other clans; the Nakad faction was followed by the shaykhs of al 'Id, Harmush, al Qadi, and some of the commoners clans like the Ghadbans and the Aman al Din.¹

Subjects, as a rule, followed their muqati'ji's gharad. There was not a complete correspondence, though, particularly among the powerful clans (al Tawa'if)² who were nevertheless not of the a'yan. These tawa'if steered a more independent course in their political activities than did the ordinary peasants. A member of these clans who happened to be in a Jumblati 'uhdah might follow the Yazbaki gharad, like the 'Abd al Samads of 'Ammatur; or he could be, on the other hand, in a Yazbaki 'uhdah, but of the Jumblati gharad, like the Abi 'Alwan clan.

The division of the country into three factions meant the primacy of certain muqati'ji houses over others, namely the Jumblats, the 'Imads, and the Nakads. But this was only a general and informal recognition of leadership of these three houses and was not institutionalized formally except in political protocol. The manasib were opposed to having a fixed relationship of control by one of them over the others. They protested vehemently when 'Abdallah Pasha of Sayda issued a decree in 1820 formally declaring Shaykh 'Ali 'Imad the chief of the shaykhs of al Shuf.³ Although the 'Imads were considered the heads of the Yazbaki gharad, the Yazbaki shaykhs joined in the protest. The French consul in Sayda wrote to his government on the occasion:

Une grande discussion vient d'avoir lieu entre les quatre familles des principaux cheks de la montagne qui ne veulent pas reconnaître pour leur chef, chek Ali Amad, chaque famille voulant être independante, ... Les divers cheks ont écrit à ce sujet au Pasha dont ils attendent la décision.⁴

¹Nasib Nakad, "Tarikh al Nakadiyin," MS, Jafeth Library, American University of Beirut, pp. 2-9. (Henceforth "TN.")

²See above, chap. i.

³France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Correspondance Consulaire, Seyde [Sayda, Lebanon], Tome XXVII, December 16, 24, 1820.

⁴Ibid.

The party structure, again, cut across religious lines. Christians, Druze, and even Muslims could belong to any of these factions regardless of their religions,¹ and common people followed their muqati'jis' affiliations. The Maronite muqati'jis, though, were not greatly affected by these party divisions. For instance, the Khazins were only loosely associated with the Jumblati faction,² and the house of Hbaysh still more loosely with the Yazbakis. The Abillama' amirs did not align themselves permanently with either side; rather, they took sides according to the dictates of the moment. The Shihabs were theoretically non-partisan, i.e., above party.³

As for the small Maronite shaykhs of Jbayl and its dependencies, they were hardly involved in this party structure at all. It was mainly the Christians of south Lebanon that were caught by the party spirit.

The weak attachment to the party among the Christian manasib might be explained by the fact that these factions were formed as alliances for the purpose of control of the political life in the Imarah. The Christian muqati'jis did not play an important part in the high politics which centered around the Amir al Hakim. The Khazins were despondent and resigned, and the Abillama' amirs, while somewhat more active than the Khazins, were still to a certain extent isolated and weak. The opposite was true of the Druze manasib, who showed a keen interest in the political life of the country and were most active.

Religious affiliation, it is clear, was not a factor in shaping the politics of the Imarah before the end of the eighteenth century. While secularism was not consciously held as a normative principle for action, in practice

¹See Nakad, "TN," pp. 32-36; also Arsanius al Fakhury, "Tarikh ma Tawaqa'ah fi Jabal Lubnan min Shahr Ayyar Sanat 1840 wa Sa'idan," MS, Jafeth Library, American University of Beirut, p. 33. See also Mashaqah, al Jawab, p. 11, and Yaziji, Risalah, p. 17.

²Hattuni, Nabdah, pp. 226-27.

³Yaziji, Risalah, p. 19.

iqta' institutions were based on a secular spirit. The following poem, written around 1842 by a Muslim¹ inhabitant of the Christian town of Zahli, suggests the earlier state of harmony among the different religious groups and bemoans the end of secularism in the writer's time.

The old days have passed,
 And new ones come on us like racing clouds.
 Since Fakhr al Din's time have the Druze and we
 Existed together without ill will.
 But now when mistrust and unseemly things
 have fallen among us, the passion grows,
 and intrigue and bitterness flourish well.²

Political Institutions

I have just discussed the general principles upon which the political system of the Imarah rested. It is in terms of these cultural values that we can describe the iqta' system of government as a Lebanese system, generated from within and shared by the whole. The foregoing, therefore, is a preface to the analysis of the political institutions, i.e., rules and practices in terms of which the system functioned. It is also hoped that this account will help underline a major assumption in this discussion that the iqta' system was essentially political. This point will, however, be further developed later on.

Hierarchy

The first important feature of the system is the gradation of authority. The gradation of authority under the Imarah consisted of two levels, muqati'jis and Hakim. Informally, however, some muqati'jis shared greater prestige and had more power than others. The most powerful of these, as has been mentioned earlier, were the Jumblats, the 'Imads, and the Nakads. Actually, one can view

¹Identified by Ma'luf as Hsayn Abu al Hassan, Ma'luf, TZ, p. 203. We have no material evidence upon which we can question its authorship. Corporate village feeling was known during that period.

²'Isa Iskandar al Ma'luf, Tarikh Madinat Zahli (Zahli, Lebanon: Matba'at Zahli al Fatat, 1911), p. 203, n. 1. (Henceforth TZ).

the hierarchy in two ways: as a gradation of social prestige, manifested by title; and as a system of authority in which the muqati'ji recognized a superior authority to which he was in part accountable.

Looking first at the hierarchy of title, one can envisage it in terms of a number of pyramids. At first glance the gradation appears like a step pyramid, similar to the Sakkara type but with three layers only. At the top of the pyramid is the title of amir, one step down the muqaddams, and at the base the considerable larger class of shaykhs.¹ The title of nobility, it should be noticed did not belong to the head of the family only but to every member of the clan. By the clan here is meant a patrilineal kinship group, each individual of which enjoyed the title at birth.² Thus the "Sakkara" pyramid was based on the hierarchy of houses, the top and bottom strata containing more than one house of equal title, while the middle contained only one house of the muqaddam rank.³

These titles of rank, however, were internally differentiated and thus formed a more graduated pyramid like the one of Gizeh. Within each stratum of the pyramid were houses of the same noble rank, but with different degrees of prestige according to the esteem which each house enjoyed in the eyes of the ruling Amir. In the small class of amirs, for instance, the Shihabs ranked highest in the social hierarchy; then came the amirs of Abillama', and then the Arslan amirs. This was all formalized by fixed rules of protocol. Thus the Amir al Hakim in writing to someone in these houses would use customary complimentary terms which were different for each house. He would also use

¹This is also the order in which they appeared in official documents, see Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 680, 720.

²A minor distinction is made in the house of Talhuq between its members. Some were known as the "little" Talhuqs, which indicates a lower status. See Nakad, "TN," pp. 2-9.

³The muqaddam rank gradually shrank until only one house was left of that title during the Shihabi Imarah, namely the Muzhir house of Hamana.

for his letter only a certain amount of the page--letters for the Abillama' amirs were written on half the page, and those to the Arslans had to go on one quarter.¹ Similarly in the courtesies demanded when receiving the members of the a'yan: if a Shihabi amir, for instance, entered the Amir al Hakim's presence, the Hakim immediately stood up even before the guest spoke the customary greetings. If the amir was one of the Abillama' or Arslan houses, on the other hand, he stood only after the customary greetings. One of the peculiarities of the protocol was that the Hakim had to stand up for the Shihabi amir everytime he entered during the day, no matter how many times.² The protocol becomes too elaborate for a full discussion here; in general it reflected gradual order of preference from top to bottom.

Basically the distribution of prestige among the different houses was not arbitrary or transitory, but more or less fixed and deliberate. To tamper with the order of rank would have meant to invite the displeasure of the manasib, who jealously guarded the balance of power and prestige.³

The Shihabi ruling Amirs did not create all the titles of nobility, nor for that matter did the Ma'nis. The titles of the Arslans and 'Alam al Din amirs went as far back as those of the Ma'nis and Shihabis themselves. The shaykhs of the houses of 'Imad, al Qadi, al Khazin and others were there before the Shihabis succeeded the Ma'nis in 1697. However, many of the houses who held title in the Shihabi Imarah received them by the Shihabi Amirs after the battle of 'Ayn Dara in 1711, like the Talhuqs, the 'Abd al Maliks, the 'Ids, and in 1712 the Jumblats.⁴

¹Nasif al Yaziji, "Fi Taqsim Jabal Lubnan," MS, Jafeth Library, American University of Beirut, p. 6. Also Nakad, "TN," pp. 2-9.

²Yaziji, Risalah, pp. 6-8; and Haqqi, Lubnan, pp. 143-80; also 'Isa Iskandar Ma'luf, Dawani'al Qutuf fi Tarikh Bani al Ma'luf (B'abda, Lebanon: al Matba'ah al 'Uthmaniyyah, 1907-1908), pp. 240-60. (Henceforth Dawani.)

³Nakad, "TN," p. 9; and Yaziji, Risalah, pp. 16-17.

⁴Haydar, Lubnan, p. 14.

The hierarchy of rank may be summarized as follows: At the top was the house of Shihab, followed respectively by the Abillama' and the Arslan amirs.¹ Then came the Shi'i shaykhs of the Himadi house² and the muqaddams of the Muzhir house.³ Below them were the following shaykhs in the higher order of their class:⁴ the Jumblats, the 'Imads, and the Abu Nakads. Then the Talhuqs, the 'Abd al Maliks, the Khazins, the 'Ids, and the Hbayshes, who were more or less of the same rank.⁵ These were followed⁶ by the Khuris, the Dahdahs, the Abi Sa'bs, the Karams, and the 'Azars.⁷ All of these were holders of iqta'.

In addition, the title of shaykh was enjoyed by a number of other houses with some claim to social prominence and a place in the clan history of the mountain, such as the house of Harmush, Hamdan, Abi Hamzah, al Qadi, Husn al Din,

¹Yaziji, Risalah, pp. 6-7; also Ma'luf, Dawani . . ., p. 249.

²Yaziji, "Fi Taqsim Jabal Lubnan," p. 10, also Risalah, p. 15.

³In protocol they are treated like shaykhs, see Yaziji, except for minor distinctions in public ceremony, see Nawfal ibn Ni'matallah Nawfal, "Kitab Kashf al Litham 'an Muhayya al Hukumah wa al Ahkam fi Iqlimay Misr wa Barr al Sham," MS, Jafeth Library, American University of Beirut, p. 39. It is maintained by 'Isa al Ma'luf and Istfan al Bash'alani that the muqaddams of Abillama' were amirs before 1711 and that the title of muqaddam was not one of social rank but of the kind of responsibility; for instance in the case of the Abillama', they maintain, it stood for their position as holders of iqta'. These two writers support their argument by documents going back to before 1711. See al Bash'alani, "Al Amir Haydar al Lama'i wa 'Asruhu," al Manarah, I, 221, 452, 453, and Isa Iskandar al Ma'luf, Tarikh al Amir Fakhr al Din . . ., p. 410, and TZ, p. 93, n. 2. This confusion of title was not unknown in the feudal history of Western Europe, see for instance Rushton Coulborn (ed.), Feudalism in History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 18.

⁴Nakad, "TN," p. 28; and Yaziji, Risalah, pp. 6-7; also Abu Shaqra, al Harakat fi Lubnan . . ., p. 6.

⁵Yaziji, "Fi Taqsim Jabal Lubnan," p. 10. They also appear in this order in a Marsum from the Pasha of Sayda, see Haydar, Lubnan, p. 681.

⁶Yaziji, "Fi Taqsim Jabal Lubnan," p. 10; and Nakad, "TN," pp. 2-9, 28-29.

⁷Yaziji, "Fi Taqsim Jabal Lubnan," p. 10. The small Maronite shaykhs of Jibbat Bsharri and Bilad Jbayl ranked low in the hierarchy like the 'Azars.

'Alam al Din,¹ al 'Uqayli, and a few others.² Those who served the Hakim in the capacity of mudabbir and qadi were also entitled shaykh.³ It is of interest to note that the qadi ranked very high in the social hierarchy, for he was treated in the official protocol like an amir. This was not the case, though, with the head of al Shurta, who was treated officially like a commoner. In fact, if he happened to be of the class of shaykhs, then he would lose the honors and prerogatives pertaining to his class.⁴ Another feature of the system was that the muqaddams, in part, enjoyed a special prerogative above that of shaykhs. Though by no means were they of great importance, it was still generally recognized among the people that they were one step higher than shaykhs.⁵

Conformity to the code of behavior governing the relations among these orders was strict, especially in questions of marriage and public ceremony.⁶

"There is strong respect for ranks according to protocol [bi i'tibar al 'usul] in this country," wrote in 1833 the great nineteenth-century poet Nasif al Yaziji, who was also a scribe in the service of Amir Bashir. He further observed, "Honor [al karamah] does not vanish because of poverty, nor will it be upraised because of wealth."⁷

The aristocracy of rank did not, however, correspond to a hierarchy of authority or of power. A shaykh might be more powerful than an amir; and while an amir enjoyed a higher title, this did not necessarily imply the right of jurisdiction over a shaykh. In their governing of their muqata'ahs, each muqati'ji

¹Not to be confused with the extinct amirs of 'Alam al Din.

²These were not muqati'jis.

³Yaziji, Risalah, p. 8; and Ma'luf, Dawani, p. 251.

⁴Ibid.; and Yaziji, Risalah, p. 8.

⁵Nakad, "TN," p. 28.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Yaziji, Risalah, pp. 16-17.

was independent from the others, regardless of title. A relationship of subordination among the manasib existed, as of right, only between the muqati'ji and the Shihabi Amir al Hakim. It was these relations between al Amir al Hakim, the muqati'jis, and the subjects (ra'aya) which formed the most basic political institutions of the country.

Shihabi Sovereignty

As the foregoing has amply suggested, the house of Shihab was the royal family of Mount Lebanon. Only a Shihabi who was descended from the line of Amir Haydar Musa (1706-1729), son of the daughter of Amir Ahmad al Ma'ni, was eligible for the highest political office in the Mountain. Before 1711 this right of sovereignty was challenged by the Yamanite faction and its supporters, including the Vali of Sayda, Bashir Pasha.¹ But with the victory of 'Ayn Dara in 1711 the right of the Shihabis was established beyond question.

Three factors determined the Shihabis' assumption of sovereignty in Mount Lebanon. First, they were legal heirs by marriage to the extinct Ma'ni house which had previously ruled the country, and also political allies, as they were of the same Qaysi faction.

In the second place, they were chosen by the manasib. The manasib of the seven muqata'ahs² met at al Simqaniyyah village in al Shuf and elected a Shihabi amir to be their ruler as a successor to the extinct Ma'nis. The amir they elected was Bashir Hsayn Shihab, descended from the Ma'nis on the maternal side. He was the nephew of Amir Ahmad Ma'n, the last Ma'ni Amir. However, the Sublime Porte, advised by Hsayn Ma'n,³ ordered that Haydar Musa Shihab, the ma-

¹See Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 10-15.

²al Munayyar, KTS, XLVIII, 672.

³Hsayn Ma'n was the son of Fakhr al Din II; at the destitution of his father he was taken to Istanbul as a young boy and entered the service of the State in the Ottoman bureaucracy. He was the real last Ma'ni because he died after Amir Ahmad, but was no longer part of Lebanese life. See Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 4-5.

ternal grandson of Amir Ahmad, should be the ruling Amir while Bashir should become regent for the young Haydar until he came of age. But with the complicity of the Vali of Sayda, Haydar ruled until his death in 1706, at which time Bashir was invited by the manasib to take the place which had been officially preserved for him.

Very little is known about this event except for the dull accounts of the chroniclers. Henry Guys, French consul in Beirut, in 1850 wrote a brief note on what had happened at al Simqaniyyah;¹ he had probably heard about it from oral tradition, though some could be confirmed by later events. At the time of the election of the first Shihabi Amir, the manasib had agreed upon certain conditions for the new rule. First, the Amir should not increase taxation nor impose new taxes without the manasib's prior consent. On regulation of taxation, the Amir consulted with the manasib; and when he had to impose new taxes against their will, they usually gathered for a meeting and decided to resist the new impost collectively.² Guys also noted that another condition was that the Amir should not augment his property. The manasib were shown by later events to be very particular on this point. For example, after defeating the Yamani and driving their muqati'jis out of the country, Amir Haydar took as his domain only five villages of the seized muqata'ahs; the rest he distributed among his supporters. In 1712, the greatest of the manasib of al Shuf, Shaykh Qiblan al Qadi, died without a male heir. In his will he left all his muqata'ahs to Amir Haydar. Keenly aware of how this would tip the balance of power in his favor, the manasib demanded that the wealth and the muqata'ahs of Shaykh Qiblan should be given to 'Ali Jumblat, the son-in-law of Shaykh Qiblan. The Amir had to concede and was compensated by a pecuniary payment. The same thing happened

¹Henri Guys, Beyrouth et le Liban: Relation d'un Séjour de Plusieurs Années dans ce Pays (2 vols.; Paris: Imprimerie de W. Remquet et Cie., 1850), I, 283-84.

²See Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 15-16, 41, 42, 171-73.

over again when the last Arslani amir died in 1770.¹ On the whole it can be assumed that the understanding at al Simqaniyyah was that the Shihabi Amir would rule in accordance with the established traditions of the country.

A third factor involved in the supremacy of the Shihabis was that they established their leadership by military success, demonstrated best at 'Ayn Dara. What the Shihabis defended at 'Ayn Dara was not a plot of land but the right to rule over the manasib of Jabal al Druze. It is important not to overlook the place of the warrior in the Imarah. All the Shihabi ruling Amirs were warriors who had seen action in the field. The manasib were also warriors who had to rally to the service of the Amir in case of war. The maydan, the court where knights practised skills in arms and sports, was a major feature of the palaces of the Amir and the manasib.

The principle of Shihabi sovereignty was embodied first in protocol, and second in political practice. In protocol, the Shihabi amirs came first in the hierarchy of prestige, as we have seen. They received special honors from the ruling Amir of their house and were given highest respects by the public. No person would ever precede a Shihabi on any official occasion or in any public ceremony. Furthermore, they were above parties, Yazbaki or Jumblati, for as Yaziji observed, "People are identified with them [the Shihabis], but they are not identified with anyone else."²

Shihabi sovereignty in practice was shown by the tradition which forbade any of the manasib, and the people in general, to fight or rebel against a Shihabi--except in the name of another Shihabi. Nasif al Yaziji wrote:

No one rises against them [in his own name]; but if the manasib of the country wished to rise against the ruling Shihabi Amir, they had to have

¹According to Haydar and al Shidiaq, the Arslanis who were known after that date were only distant relations to the Arslans, not true ones. It was in the name of these distant relations that the manasib made a claim to the legacy. See ibid., pp. 80-81; Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 39.

²Yaziji, Risalah, p. 19.

another Shihabi amir with them, even if he were a young boy, so that resistance could be made in his name.¹

In 1819 when the Yazbaki shaykhs, for instance, were attacked by Amir Amin Shihab, they defended themselves and defeated him; but they turned back without pursuing their victory over him because they did not have a Shihabi amir among their ranks.²

Another symbol of sovereignty is that the Amir al Hakim was the only person who could raise commoners to the rank of nobility, and only he could enfeoff (agta'a, yuqti'u) any person, whether a commoner or a man of title. Available sources do not mention any ceremony similar to the European feudal custom of dubbing on the occasion of granting a title or enfeoffment. The Amir instead simply wrote to the person receiving the honor the customary salutation: "dear brother."³ As was mentioned earlier, most of the a'yan in the Shihabi Ijarah received a title or a muqata'ah by the Shihabi Amir after 1711. Even those who held muqata'ahs before 1711 were granted additional muqata'ahs, like Amir Mrad Abillama' who received half of al Matn and Baskinta,⁴ and Amir 'Assaf Hsayn who was given al Qati', a muqata'ah⁵ taken away from the Khazins.⁶ Also Shaykh Qiblan al Qadi received new territory, namely the province of Jazzin.⁷ In practice there was no difference between those muqati'jis who were enfeoffed by the Shihabi Amirs and those who held their muqata'ahs from the days of the Ma'nis or earlier.

¹ Ibid., p. 20; also see Munayyar, KTS, II, 464.

² Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 143.

³ Yaziji, Risalah, passim.

⁴ Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 21, and Haydar, al Ghurar, p. 650.

⁵ Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 21, and Haydar, Lubnan, p. 14.

⁶ Hattuni, Nabdah, p. 10.

⁷ Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 21; and Haydar, Lubnan, p. 14.

Once a muqati'ji, a person always remained a muqati'ji so long as the system lasted. The Amir had no legal right to deprive a muqati'ji of his title or his muqata'ah. The fact that on a few occasions the Shihabi Amirs actually did deprive certain muqati'jis of some of their holdings was due to the weakness of those muqati'jis, like the Khazins, or to their being disgraced, as in the case of the Arslans in 1711.¹

Election of the Hakim

Succession to the office of Hakim in Mount Lebanon was subject to two conditions. First, to be eligible a person had to be a Shihabi descended from the line of Haydar Musa Shihab. Second, he had to be agreed upon by the manasib. As can readily be observed, the first condition left the candidacy open to a large number among the descendants of Amir Haydar, all of whom were potential heirs. Unlike the principle of fixed succession in medieval Europe, there were no formal or definitive rules which determined the new Hakim in advance. Another difference between the two was that while the practices of fixed succession in medieval Europe made it possible that the people might have a ruler whom they did not know and who was a complete stranger to them, in the Shihabi Imarah no such thing could happen. The institution of open candidacy not only meant flexibility in the system, but also precluded the possibility of having a stranger as a ruler. For one thing, since in the Imarah the rule of primogeniture did not apply and women were not eligible to succession, a daughter could not be married to a stranger who could then assume the rule as in Europe.

The elective process provided for the choice of a Hakim by the manasib within the limits laid down by the rule of succession among the descendants of Amir Haydar Shihab. As will shortly be seen, there were no rules as to who

¹Ibid.

among the manasib qualified as an elector; the most influential leaders among the manasib usually determined the outcome.

Having stated the two conditions for the election of a Hakim, it remains to show that in practice there was a tendency to favor the elder son. A quick look at Figure 3 shows that the line of succession was not regular; but a more careful examination proves that neither was it completely without pattern. Succession favored the elder son of the Hakim. The first time an explicit mention was made of this principle by a participant in the system, so far as we know, was when Jirjus Baz, the mudabbir of Amir Yusuf's sons, evoked it to assert the claim of his lords to rule.¹

A brief survey of succession among Shihabi Hakims helps to clarify these points (see Table 1). After Haydar, his eldest son Milhim ruled; but when Milhim's illness weakened his hold on the government, he was made to abdicate, and his brothers Ahmad and Mansur, who were next to him in age, were elected in 1754. Milhim's sons were still very young in 1754--Mhammad the elder was deaf and half-blind and therefore excluded from succession,² and Yusuf was then only about six. But in 1763, nine years after his father had stepped down, Yusuf was able to take over the government of northern Lebanon and in 1770 to rule all of Mount Lebanon, north and south. After Amir Yusuf there followed the great struggle between his sons and a candidate far removed from the line of succession by the elder, Amir Bashir Qasim 'Umar Haydar, known in Lebanese history as Bashir II. Only in 1807 was Bashir finally able to remove the sons of Amir Yusuf from the government for good.

Thus on the whole, those of the Hakims who fell in the line of succession by the elder ruled for a longer period than those from outside the direct

¹Mashaqah, al Jawab, p. 32.

²Haydar Shihab, Tarikh Ahmad Basha al Jazzar, ed. Antonius Shibly and Ighnadius Khalifah (Beirut: Maktabat Antwan, 1955), p. 221; also Shayban, Tarikh, p. 509.

TABLE 1

CHRONOLOGY OF SHIHABI HAKIMS

Name	Birth Date	Accession		Deposition or Abdication	Death
		Shuf	Jbayl		
Haydar	1685	1706	..	1729	1731
Milhim	1701	1729	..	1754	1760
Ahmad	1703	1754	..	1762	1770
Mansur	1714	1754	..	1770	1774
Yusuf	1748	..	1763
	..	1770	1770	1788	1790
Sayid-Ahmad Milhim	1743	1778	..	1778	1803
Afandi Milhim	..	1778	..	1778	..
Bashir II	1767	1788	..	1790	..
Haydar Milhim	1756	1790	1790	1792	1801
Qa'dan Mhammad	..	1790	1790	1792	1813
Hsayn Yusuf	1783	1792	1792	1793	..
Sa'd al Din Yusuf	1785	1792	1792	1793	..
Bashir II	..	1793	1793	1794	..
Hsayn Yusuf	..	1794	1794	1795	..
Sa'd al Din Yusuf	..	1794	1794	1795	..
Bashir II	..	1795	1795	1799	..
Hsayn Yusuf	..	1799	1800	1800	..
Sa'd al Din Yusuf	..	1799	1800	1800	..
Bashir II	..	1800
Hsayn Yusuf	1800	1807	1823
Sa'd al Din Yusuf	1800	1807	1846
Bashir II	..	1800	1807	1820	..
				(March 10)	
Hassan 'Ali	..	1820	1820	1820	1822
		(Mar. 15)	(Mar. 15)	(July 12)	
Silman Sayid-Ahmad	1779	1820	1820	1820	1851
		(Mar. 15)	(Mar. 15)	(July 12)	
Bashir II	..	1820	1820	1821	..
		(July 12)	(July 12)	(July)	
'Abbas 'As'ad Yunis	1773	1821	1821	1822	1846
		(July 22)	(July 22)	(May)	
Bashir II	..	1822	1822	1840	1850
		(May)	(May)	(Sept.)	
Bashir III	..	1840	1840	1842	..
		(Sept. 3)	(Sept. 3)	(Jan. 13)	

line. The latter, with the exception of Bashir II, ruled a total of 19 years from the days of Haydar to 1841. Even with the very long term of Bashir II, their combined rule fell short of that of the legitimate heirs. For instance, Haydar, Milhim, Yusuf, and the sons of Yusuf respectively ruled alone for 67 years and, sharing power with other Shihabis, for 14 additional years. All the rest ruled for 61 years and for 14 years sharing power. Seven of those not in the direct line of succession together ruled for no more than five and a half years; and none held power alone but always in conjunction with another Shihabi. Thus only three Shihabis outside the direct line ruled for extended periods: Ahmad, Mansur, and Bashir II.

The occasion for one Amir to step down and another to take his place depended on circumstances. To judge from the chronology in the following chart, there was more stability during the early period of the Imarah than during the last two decades of the eighteenth century. The frequent depositions and elections during this period were caused largely by the machinations of the Vali of Sayda, Ahmad Pasha al Jazzar.

Haydar abdicated in the interest of his elder son Milhim due to growing physical weakness. We hear of no challenge to this designation from the manasib, nor any sign of discontent. After Milhim, however, it was election, not designation, which determined the succession. In 1754 Milhim, as we have just seen, became ill. His confinement to his home, we are told, weakened his grasp on the reigns of government, so his brothers Ahmad and Mansur and a number of the manasib conspired against him.¹ At that point he abdicated in the interest of his two brothers. Although the chroniclers state that the Jumblati and Yazbaki parties originated during his reign and at his instigation,² they do not report

¹Haydar, Lubnan, p. 43; Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 30.

²Haydar, Lubnan, p. 49.

any conflict between the two parties upon his abdication. During the rule of Ahmad and Mansur, however, the factionalism between the Yazbakis and Jumblatis apparently was instrumental in electing the Amir al Hakim. When Amir Ahmad and Amir Mansur fell out, Ahmad was supported by the Yazbakis and Mansur by the Jumblatis. In 1762 the two came into conflict, and Amir Ahmad and the Yazbakis were defeated in a show of strength. Thus Ahmad was deposed and Mansur ruled alone.

Henceforth most, if not all, of the accessions and depositions were either determined by Yazbaki-Jumblati differences or were influenced by these considerations. The general procedure was that a party dissatisfied with the ruling Amir would start to establish relations with the Shihabi aspirant, or if there were no candidate at the time, tried to create one.¹ On the other hand, an ambitious Shihabi aspirant himself might also start the movement among the *manasib*.²

The ruling Amir could not dispose of his rivals of the Shihabi house, nor could he exile any one of them unless the rival had actually fought him. The political traditions of the land were very much opposed to political executions, particularly since it was considered improper for a Shihabi Hakim to maltreat a member of his own house. When Amir Yusuf in a moment of anger killed his half-brother Afandi, who was caught conspiring against him, he had to apologize promptly to all the members of the Shihabi family.³ Haydar reports:

The next morning Amir Yusuf called the Shihabi amirs who were then living in Dayr al Qamar, and apologized for killing his brother, saying that they [i.e., Afandi and Sayyid-Ahmad] were planning to kill him. Then he wrote to all the rest of the amirs who were not in Dayr al Qamar. For he knew that people were offended by what he had done.⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 63-64.

²See Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 239; and Haydar, Lubnan, p. 104.

³Munayyar, KTS, L, 205.

⁴Ibid.; and Haydar, Lubnan, p. 128.

For deliberation regarding the affairs of the Imarah, sometimes a funeral of one of the manasib, for instance, served as an occasion to bring the manasib together; or there did not have to be a special occasion. If some of the manasib wanted a change, they would arrange for a meeting. If the discontented party succeeded in rallying to its cause a good number of the manasib, as the Nakads did, for example, in 1778 when they rose against Amir Yusuf and persuaded the Jumblats to join them, then they could demonstrate to the Hakim that he could no longer rule.¹ A number of times the Amir did realize the high degree of discontent and abdicated in the interest of his rival, as did Amir Milhim in 1754, Amir Mansur in 1770, and Amir Yusuf in 1778 and 1788. On such an occasion the Amir usually called the manasib together for an assembly and, declaring his wish to step down, asked them to choose another Amir.²

If the manasib allied against the Hakim felt that their strength was not sufficient to force him out, they might either wait or rise against him, depending on their good judgment. With the help of one of the parties, the Amir could suppress an act of insubordination by the other party. Sometimes Jumblatis and Yazbakis would unite against an Amir without being able to oust him or even to risk battle with him. In such a case the Amir's strength lay in dissident members of the manasib, mercenaries he could hire, and his own energy and determination to put down resistance. He could also call on the help of the Vali. If an Amir abdicated or was deposed, the newly chosen Amir would send to the Vali for investiture.

In case the division of forces was equal and the parties could not agree on a candidate, they would take to arms and fight it out. This happened, for instance, in 1790 when the Yazbakis, Nakads, and Abillama's stood for Amir Qa'dan

¹See Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 77.

²Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 123, 147. Cf. Volney, Travels through Syria . . ., pp. 64-65. See also Yusuf Yazbak (ed.), Awraq Lubnaniyyah (3 vols.; Beirut: n.p., 1955-1957), 1957, pp. 209-12. (Henceforth AL.)

and Amir Haydar Milhim against Amir Bashir, who was supported by the Jumblatis and the mercenaries of al Jazzar. The latter fought for about a year and were finally defeated. Al Jazzar then had to send Amir Qa'dan and Amir Haydar the investiture. Similarly, Amir Bashir had to fight the sons of Amir Yusuf for a number of years before the question of accession to "takht Jabal Lubnan" could be determined.

Not all the manasib and muqati'jis were equally influential or took part in the election of an Amir. Although most of the muqati'jis enjoyed more or less similar positions, some of them were richer and more influential than others. The richest of them all were the Jumblats, and consequently they were also more influential most of the time. The influence of wealth could not be better demonstrated than in the cases in which the Jumblats paid the poorer 'Imad shaykhs to have their support against the ruling Amir.¹ The 'Imads and Nakads were next in order of power and fully engaged in the interplay of influence, especially in the problems of election. The Talhuqs and 'Abd al Maliks² were Yazbakis and generally followed the lead of the 'Imads, but this did not mean that they lacked an independent position. The Abillama' amirs often participated in the game of seating and unseating the Amir, but were not among the more active muqati'jis such as the Nakads, the 'Imads, and the Jumblats.³ The rest simply followed. They could also refuse to participate or take the part of any side.

It should be noted that it was the Druze manasib who had most influence and formed the body which determined the fate of the highest office in the Ijarah.

¹See Haydar, Lubnan, p. 129.

²The houses mentioned in the paragraph above were considered by al Munayyar as the leading manasib who elected and deposed Amirs. Munayyar, KTS, LI, 455.

³Shayban, Tarikh, pp. 449-50. For instance, these four houses alone signed the covenant made by the Manasib to elect Amir Bashir II in 1788. See document in Yazbak, AL, 1957, pp. 210-11.

They had great interest in politics; as Shayban al Khazin rightly noted, "They are the keenest tribes on earth."¹ The Abillama's were Maronites but had not always been Christian and until the mid-nineteenth century, in fact, were only partially Maronite; the Abillama' amirs started to convert to the Maronite faith together with the Shihabis around the middle of the eighteenth century. During the Ma'ni period the Khazins occasionally took part in the deliberations of the assembly of the manasib,² but not always. During the Shihabi Imarah, according to Shayban al Khazin, when they were invited to participate they did not respond and stayed away.³ The downfall of the Khazins and the disintegration of their place in the system before other muqati'jis could well have been the result of their failure to play a role in the game of power in the Imarah, rather than simply economic reasons.⁴

The Shihabis themselves took active part in the election game, and often rivals instigated the manasib to rally behind them against the ruling Amir. This was important for the manasib, since they could not make a move without finding a Shihabi in whose name they could rise.

Government by Muqati'jis

". . . This government may be considered a well-proportioned mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy," wrote Volney.⁵ The statement suggests the balance of powers that existed in the Imarah. Iqta' was essentially govern-

¹Shayban, Tarikh, p. 402.

²Ibid., pp. 441-42, 427-28. Also Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, III, 320-21; and 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVI, 442. According to al Munayyar, the shaykhs of Kisrwan were in the assembly which deliberated on the succession of the Shihabis to the Ma'nis. See Munayyar, KTS, XLVIII, 672.

³Shayban, Tarikh, p. 441, n. 1.

⁴Dominique Chevallier maintains that the Khazins' decline was due to economic factors, "Aux Origines des Troubles Agraires Libanais en 1858," Annales: Economies, Societes, Civilisations, XIV, No. 1 (1959), pp. 35-64.

⁵See Volney, Travels through Syria . . ., p. 65.

ment by muqati'jis, with an Amir at their head who served as a guarantee against disorderly relations among them. The Amir held the supreme authority but had no muqata'ah for himself to rule over.¹ Instead he stood for the principle of unity in a society of pluralist nature. He also rallied and led the muqati'jis in battle in case of an attack from outside or in offensive campaign.

The Amir also made sure that al mal al Sultani was collected and turned over to him and then sent to the Vali, who in turn forwarded it to the Ottoman treasury. This was one of the ways in which the Hakim maintained the independence of the Imarah from interference by the Ottoman authorities. Any refusal or failure to pay the miri to the Sultan was equivalent to a breach of the peace and resulted in disciplinary action by the government. The Hakim kept out his share of the miri to cover the expenses of his own government. The amount retained depended on the political power of the Hakim in relation to the Vali of Sayda. A strong Hakim paid of the collected miri less than a weak one.²

The financial administration of the muqata'ah was quite favorable to the interests of the muqati'jis. The muqati'jis were exempted from the miri on their holdings.³ Usually this exemption was given to each at the time of his enfeoffment, by written order of the Hakim.⁴ However, some shaykhs were charged miri on their property,⁵ and in addition to this, property acquired after the original muqata'ah was granted was also taxable.⁶ In addition to

¹The Hakim held five villages directly which were known as al Khas, but in the course of time he seems to have given them away.

²We have a record of how much a muqati'ji left for the Hakim of the miri which he collected, but not how much the Hakim retained of the sum before he turned it over to the Vali.

³Mudiriyyat al Athar al 'Ammah, MS, No. 2510, Beirut, Lebanese Government, Ministry of Education. (Henceforth MAA.) See also Hilu papers of September 1811, Patriarchal Archives of Bkirki, Bkirki, Lebanon. (Henceforth PAB.) Also 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVI, 444.

⁴MAA, MS, No. 2510.

⁵Ibid., MS, No. 2574.

⁶Ibid., MS, No. 7318.

this the muqati'jis and their subjects as well benefited from the obsolescence of the tax assessment which was made at the beginning of the eighteenth century by Amir Haydar.¹ By the second half of the eighteenth century, however, new lands were put into productivity and prices of silk and other products had increased considerably. The muqati'ji was also entitled to keep for himself to cover the expenses of his own government a certain amount of the miri known as naf', i.e., benefit. This amount was fixed by agreement between the Hakim and the muqati'ji.² For example, in the case of the Khazin shaykhs, it was five fiddahs per piaster³ (the piaster had 40 fiddahs).⁴ The muqati'ji also received gifts from his subjects, particularly the tenant farmers, on ceremonial occasions such as marriages and feasts. These gifts were known as 'idiyyah and consisted of sugar, coffee, soap, or products of the farm.⁵ The muqati'jis also put imposts on mills, on local trade, on the crafts, on weighing the silk product, and the corvée.⁶

The muqati'ji also had some expenses as part of his public responsibility. He had to arm his peasants⁷ and pay for their upkeep during war. His office also required that he keep a public appearance which showed signs of authority, like riding horses, keeping servants, and being liberal with his followers. When, in 1843, the government of Mount Lebanon was undergoing re-organization, a muqati'ji protested over the curtailment of the 'idiyyah, saying

¹Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 512-13.

²Yaziji, Risalah, pp. 8-9; Ma'luf, Dawani, p. 248.

³MAA (MS, number illegible).

⁴Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, III, 446, n. 2; Ma'luf, TZ, p. 99, n. 1.

⁵Chevallier, Annales, XIV, 50; Ma'luf, TZ, p. 102; Hattuni, Nabdah, pp. 219-20.

⁶See document on taxes of Hammana, Abu Shaqra, al Harakat fi Lubnan . . ., pp. 175-77; Haqqi, Lubnan, p. 180.

⁷Shayban, Tarikh, p. 446; MAA, MS, No. 4776.

that it was the requirements of al shahamah (honor, chivalry) that gave the muqati'ji the right to have more wealth than others, not greed.¹

Students of Ottoman history suffer because of the lack of clarity of the taxation system. The situation in Lebanon is just as confusing for the student. As far as possible, an attempt will be made here to make some order out of this confusion. Commonly the miri was used to designate the tax on the yield of land;² but in Mount Lebanon it was often used to refer to the sum of the taxes paid by a muqata'ah. This included the miri proper, that is, tax on mulberry, vines, cotton, and other items.³ As silk was the single major industry, most of the tax came from mulberry. In Kisrwan, for instance, 10 to 40 loads of mulberry leaves (a load was equal to about 75 kgms.) were taxed about two to nine piasters,⁴ while for a hundred feet of vineyard one piaster was paid.⁵

In their records, muqati'jis subsumed other taxes under the term miri, like al jaliyah,⁶ (a poll-tax), and al shashiyyah.⁷ A complete enumeration of the taxes paid by the village of Dar'un, for instance, mentions neither of these two taxes, nor do other available records of the muqati'jis of Kisrwan. This practice of keeping shorthand accounts was, perhaps, what led Volney to think that the Christians and Druze of Mount Lebanon did not pay poll-tax to the Sul-

¹MAA (MS, number illegible).

²See "Kharadj," Encyclopaedia of Islam, ed. M. Th. Houtsma and A. J. Wensink, II (1927), 902-03.

³Every item was designated as qalam, of which there were several differing in their number from time to time.

⁴Chevallier, Annales, XIV, 30.

⁵Volney, Travels through Syria . . ., II, 66.

⁶Al jaliyah (plural jawali), is another term for jiziah.

⁷Shayban, Tarikh, p. 446.

tan.¹ This was not so, at least so far as the Christians were concerned. Records of taxes from the iqta' period show beyond a shadow of doubt that the Christians of Mount Lebanon, both south and north, paid the jaliyah al sultaniyyah.² In the south they paid less than in Jbayl and its dependencies, for in the former they paid three and a half piasters for the married man, and three for the single.³ In the north they paid up to 14 piasters per head.⁴ The reader should be reminded here, though, that the payment of jaliyah did not make the Christian living under the iqta' system of the Imarah a dhimmi suffering social disabilities as in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. The Christian in the Imarah was free, carried arms, and enjoyed much the same conditions as his Druze counterpart.

The shashiyyah⁵ was a head tax imposed by the Amir al Hakim on the adult male population of all groups. It was started by Amir Yusuf in 1784 but not put into effect until 1797 by Amir Bashir II.⁶ Its amount was three piasters per head, but sometimes it was collected at higher rates. Another tax, known as khafar (customs) was collected in four places on the sea and mountain roads: Juni; al Na'imah, near al Damur; khan al Hasin; and khan al Mdayrij.⁷ Like the

¹Volney, Travels through Syria . . ., II, 360-61. Cf. William R. Polk, The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788-1840: A Study of the Impact of the West on the Middle East (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 38.

²Three of these records may be consulted, taxes of Hammana, see Abu Shaqra, al Harakat fi Lubnan . . ., pp. 175-77; and Nakad, "TN," document given in the Appendix II below. Finally, Yazbak, AL, 1957, p. 542.

³Abu Shaqra, al Harakat fi Lubnan . . ., pp. 175-77.

⁴Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 670, 682; Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 88; Ma'luf, TZ, p. 177; Mashaqah, al Jawab, p. 36.

⁵The shashiyyah was a measure of cloth for turbans which the Amir distributed on a compulsory basis and for which he charged the tax. The cloth gave its name to the tax.

⁶See Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 62-63, 97; also Munayyar, KTS, L, 447.

⁷Haydar, Lubnan, p. 580; Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 133.

rest of the miri this tax was collected by the muqati'jis and shared with the Amir,¹ but in 1812 it was terminated.²

The Hakims sometimes imposed extra taxes when they were faced with an emergency, or as a punishment for some muqati'jis and their subjects. This was known by the people as Bals, i.e., extortion, and by the Hakim as extra taxes, tawazi' and takalif.

The muqati'ji's functions were by no means limited to financial administration. He was a leader and a ruler. He judged his subjects, punished them, called them to arms, demanded support and loyalty from them and protected their rights. Regarding punishment, the muqati'ji's right to sentence was limited to imprisonment, beating, forced labor, or financial exactions.³ He could not try criminal cases or inflict capital punishment, for such cases were deferred to the Hakim who alone could try them.⁴ But just as the manasib had no authority to take the limbs or lives of their subjects, no higher authority had that power over them. The Hakim could not kill, amputate, beat, or imprison a member of the a'yan.⁵ The manasib were very strict about this matter. In 1711, for instance, they refused to allow Amir Haydar to kill their defeated and bitter enemy, Shaykh Mahmud al Harmush, even though he was a captive of war. They did not want to establish a precedent for the Hakim, and argued that tradition did not give a Hakim the right to kill a member of the manasib. As a result Shaykh Mahmud's punishment was to lose his tongue and toe.⁶

¹See below, Appendix II.

²Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 133; Ma'luf, Dawani, p. 257.

³Yaziji, Risalah, pp. 8-9.

⁴Ibid.; Haqqi, Lubnan, p. 144.

⁵Yaziji, Risalah, p. 7; Haydar, Lubnan, p. 14; Munayyar, KTS, XLVIII, 676.

⁶Ibid.; also Haydar, Lubnan, p. 14.

The fact that the Hakim could not inflict such a severe punishment as the penalty of death upon the manasib did not mean that he lacked effective power over them. On the contrary, he could inflict harsh punishment affecting their property, but not their persons. If the Amir wished to punish one of the manasib he would exile him, confiscate his property temporarily, cut down his trees or in some similar way damage his property.¹ The person of the muqati'ji was inviolate; the Amir could not insult him or show him disrespect at any time. No matter how angry he happened to be with a muqati'ji, if the gentleman appeared before him the Amir would have to observe all the customary honors and protocol. The same was true for correspondence between the Amir and the muqati'ji in disfavor.²

The muqata'ah was the domain of the muqati'ji exclusively. The Amir al Hakim had no direct relations with the subjects, and if he had any particular plan regarding the common people he had to put it into effect through the muqati'jis.³ The latter did not necessarily have to carry out the Amir's wishes, and in that case the Amir would simply have to regret his inability to do much about it. The muqati'jis usually protected their subjects from threats, coming from any direction whatsoever. Even in the Hakim's own capital, Dayr al Qamar, his jurisdiction was very tightly circumscribed. A person who committed some misdemeanor in front of the Amir's serail had only to run a few feet towards the Shaluf water fountain to be beyond the Amir's grasp, for then he entered the domain of his lords, the Nakad muqati'jis.⁴

The same thing was true of the subjects. If one of the subjects had a problem, he first went to the muqati'ji; then if not satisfied, he would go to

¹Yaziji, Risalah, p. 7; Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 37, 40; Munayyar, KTS, XLVIII, 676.

²Yaziji, Risalah, p. 7.

³Shayban, Tarikh, pp. 471, 525.

⁴Mashaqah, al Jawab, p. 34.

the Amir. This was especially the case in litigation. If a subject was not rendered justice with his fellow men by the muqati'ji, or if he had a case against the muqati'ji, he could take it to the Hakim's court.¹ The usual procedure was for the Amir to order the muqati'ji to settle the case amicably; and if the muqati'ji again failed to take action, the Amir would send his retainers, the huwalah, to quarter on the muqati'ji or the offending party until the case was settled.² The following example is one of the sort of cases which went to the Amir's court. A widow who was treated unjustly by the muqati'ji sued her lord in the Amir's court. The judge at that time, the Maronite priest Khayrallah, wrote the following letter to the muqati'ji:

From the priest Khayrallah to Shaykh Abu Hsayn Yusuf:

. . . the mother of Rashid al Zughby has appeared before our court and made the plea that a suit against her from the people of the village [?] was brought regarding the remainder of a certain account. Upon the latter's request you paid them some of that sum, and it is understood that you intend to pay the rest of the amount [to the people of the village] without having them prove their case by the law. . . . It has thus become necessary to send this [order] to you to have the sum you have paid returned. Do not give these plaintiffs a single piaster until they appear with her before the court. If they can prove their suit, then you will pay them, or else you will be responsible for the money paid already. . . .³

The people could also seek the Amir's arbitration in case of a difference between them and the muqati'jis over matters such as the miri, which was of great concern to the Amir.⁴ In a conflict between the people of Zuq Misbah and their Khazin shaykhs, the Amir's mudabbir, Sa'd al Khury, called the two parties before him to settle the issue:

¹Yaziji, Risalah, pp. 8-9.

²Ibid.

³MAA, MS, No. 4175. No date on manuscript, but it should be dated in the first two decades of the nineteenth century.

⁴See the conflict and agreement story of the people of Hammana and their muqati'ji, the Muqaddam Sharaf al Din Muzhir, Abu Shaqra, al Harakat fi Lubnan . . ., pp. 175-77.

To Shaykh Shibl [al Khazin]

We have received your letter and understood its content. You mention that the miri of Shaykh bu-Antun and that of Zuq Misbah only have not been paid yet. Regarding those of Zuq Misbah we have understood the issue in their case, but that of Shaykh bu-Antun, we cannot see how you have held it back . . . [illegible] after you finish [not clear] you should come yourselves or your brother Shaykh 'Abbud in order to see [?] how to settle the issue between you and our brothers the people of al Zuq. . . .¹

These cases, among other things, suggest how the Hakim's officers, in his name, dealt with the people through the muqati'jis and how the former exercised jurisdiction over the latter. The Amir, however, could not exceed his limits. If he sent his men, for instance, against a subject of the muqati'ji to capture him, the people of the subject's village, or any village through which the Amir's soldiers passed with the prisoner, would have the right to fight the soldiers and try to free the prisoner. In fact, they would have been considered cowards if they had not, and held in shame by their fellows.²

The Amir had the prerogative of claiming military service from the muqati'jis. If called, the muqati'ji rallied to the aid of the Amir at the head of his men. There seems to have been no set limit to the period for which the muqati'ji and his men had to stay in service. It apparently depended on the circumstances and on the muqati'ji's own interest in the fight. He might continue to support the Amir in his wars for a year, or might even decline to join him for one day. Refusal by the muqati'ji to enter the Amir's service could only result from the weakness of the Amir and his low prestige in the eyes of his muqati'jis. A muqati'ji, however, did not have to answer the Amir's war cry if the fight was between rival factions among the manasib over the question of succession.

Writing on Western feudalism, Joseph Strayer makes the following distinctions:

¹MAA, MS, No. 7450.

²Shayban, Tarikh, p. 471.

Feudal lordship occupies an intermediate place between tribal leadership and aristocratic government. It differs from the tribal leadership in being more formalized and less spontaneous. The feudal lord is not necessarily one of the group whom he rules; he may be a complete stranger. . . . It differs from aristocracy in being more individualistic and less centralized.¹

Similarly the iqta' system was neither an aristocratic kind of government nor a tribal one, but had some common points with both. First, a muqata'ah was not composed of a kinship group as in most tribes. It was rather formed of a relatively heterogeneous group of people of different families and sometimes of different religions as well, and ruled by a muqati'ji who differed from them only in his status and family to which he belonged. A muqata'ah was usually a large territory comprising 20 to 50 villages, approximately. Each muqata'ah was ruled by an aristocratic house, i.e., a patrilineal kinship group with a special status rank. The members of the ruling house did not rule collectively over the muqata'ah but divided it among themselves into separate 'uhad. Sometimes, however, a number among them ruled jointly in one 'uhdah. Each one of the members of the house, whether holding the office of muqati'ji or not, lived among the people in the muqata'ah, not in the Hakim's court.

The same house enjoyed the same title of nobility, whether shaykh, muqaddam, or amir. Among those raised to the title of the nobility, it seems that when one individual was thus raised, the rest of his clan somehow acquired the same title. This was the case, for instance, with the Nakads. Of the three brothers, Yusuf, 'Ali, and Najm, we are told that only 'Ali was given the title of shaykh and a muqata'ah in 1711,² but later one finds the descendants of the two brothers of 'Ali with the same title,³ and holding 'uhad, too. This was also the case of other houses in the Mountain.

¹Coulborn (ed.), Feudalism . . ., p. 18.

²Nakad, "TN," pp. 2-9.

³Ibid.; also Haydar, Lubnan, passim.

The muqati'ji's jurisdiction was one of two kinds: he might rule either over a landed estate, or over individual men without a geographic definition of his 'uhdah. Often he owned a very high proportion of the muqata'ah's land as his private property, but by no means all. The proportion of land which usually belonged to the muqati'ji in relation to that owned by the peasants cannot be determined with any exactness. Two points, however, can be made for certain, namely that private property was enjoyed by the muqati'ji as well as by the peasants, and that the muqati'ji's land was by far greater than that of the peasants.¹ By the early nineteenth century, though, peasant-owned property had increased over earlier periods.²

As can be understood from this, a large proportion of the peasants were laborers on the muqati'ji's land. The system of cultivation was tenancy, sharakah. By agreement, a propertyless peasant would cultivate as a tenant, a sharik, a certain plot of land allotted to him by the muqati'ji. The agreement, written or oral, was made for one year but could be renewed indefinitely.³ The peasant cultivated his lord's land and shared one half of the yield with him.⁴

A muqata'ah, originally given to one person, gradually became divided among the descendants of the original holder. This was a process in which authority, 'uhdah, as well as property became divided. Division of inheritance was limited to the male heirs. Women were barred from inheritance according to

¹Nakad, "TN," p. 37; also see Abu Shaqra for the property of the Jumblats, al Harakat fi Lubnan . . ., pp. 91-94; Mashaqah, who was very well qualified to speak about this subject, states that in the early nineteenth century the peasants owned one third of the land, while the other two thirds belonged to the a'yan and the clergy, see al Jawab, p. 154. Poliak, basing his account on Volney, states that the class of muqati'jis owned one tenth of the land, Feudalism . . ., p. 58.

²See Haydar, Lubnan, p. 692.

³Chevallier, Annales, XIV, 45-47.

⁴For details of this question see ibid.

both Druze and Maronite customary law,¹ to avoid conflicts over property arising from inter-clan marriages.² Thus the same muqata'ahs remained in the same clans. Customary law also permitted the father to distribute his property unequally among his children and to favor some over others arbitrarily.³

It is clear from available sources that authority was also divided among heirs.⁴ The 'uhdah, however, was not necessarily over a landed estate; it could be over individuals. A muqati'ji thus might be lord over a small number of people in one village but not over the whole village. Mazra'at Kfar Zibiyān village in Kisrwan, for instance, was divided equally among the eight sons of Nadir al Khazin, with each son being responsible for a small number of peasants.⁵ This practice was carried to such extremes that even homes were occasionally broken up, with, say, a son in one 'uhdah and a father and brother in another.⁶ This kind of arrangement naturally gave rise to complicated problems among the members of the same muqati'ji houses, many of which were settled by pacts and agreements made among them.⁷

The Amir nominally designated the heir to a 'uhdah, but there is no evidence that he actually determined who among the heirs should become muqati'ji. The inheritance was decided by the members of the house and simply confirmed by the Amir.⁸ On the death of a muqati'ji, particularly if he happened to be im-

¹Yaziji, Risalah, pp. 21-22.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 21.

⁴Shayban, Tarikh, pp. 440-43; also Istfan al Bash'alani, "al Amir Haydar al Lama'i wa 'Asruhu," al Manarah, I-II (1930-1931), II, 369.

⁵Shayban, Tarikh, pp. 440-43.

⁶Bash'alani, al Manarah, II, 370.

⁷MAA, MSS, Nos. 4305, 7318.

⁸Qustantin al Basha (ed.), "Jaridat Tawzi' Mal Kharaj Lubnan al Amiri fi 'Ahd al Amir Bashir al Shihabi," MQ, XXXIII (1935), 321-61. Yaziji, Risalah, p. 9; Bash'alani, al Manarah, II, 105.

portant, the Amir attended the funeral in person; and on that occasion he gave to the heirs a khul'ah as a symbol of authority.¹

A comparison of some of the 'uhad between 1711 and 1830 shows considerable fragmentation resulting from the division of authority among heirs. Though not every member of a muqati'ji's house received a 'uhdah, it is clear that potential heirs were not disinherited in favor of one son. In a muqati'ji house those who were not invested with an 'uhdah came under the authority of their ruling brothers.² Shayban al Khazin has left us a detailed account of how Nadir al Khazin (Abu Nawfal), who died in 1679, divided his large muqata'ah of Kisrwan among his eight boys. The eldest, Fayyad (Abu Qansuh), was given one third of the muqata'ah plus one additional village and the custom house (khafar) at Juni. The next oldest brother, Nasif, received one third of what was left. Another, Turbayh, was given four peasants in each of two villages. A fourth brother was given three villages, and then he was killed by his brothers who shared his domain. The remaining four sons did not ask for their inheritance during the lifetime of their father. After his death they received the remaining parts of the muqata'ah of Kisrwan to rule as one 'uhdah. This 'uhdah was to be known later as 'uhdat of the "sons of Abu Nawfal."³

Officially the Khazin 'uhad were three, exactly as they were originally divided by Abu Nawfal, but actually each had been parcelled into smaller muqata'ahs. The 'uhdah of the "sons of Abu Nawfal," for instance, was eventually divided into 15 'uhdah, to judge from the miri records they prepared.⁴ The Abillama' house started out originally in 1711 with two 'uhdahs, which had be-

¹ Ibid.; also Shayban, Tarikh, p. 474.

² Nakad, "TN," p. 12; Yaziji, Risalah, pp. 9, 12.

³ Shayban, Tarikh, pp. 440-43.

⁴ MAA (MS, number illegible).

come 19 by the 1830's.¹ The same proliferation of 'uhad took place among the Druze clans. 'Ali Jumblat, the first Jumblati muqati'ji, divided his muqata'ah among two of his five sons.² In a letter referring to an agreement on the shares in the miri, Shaykh Bashir Nakad indicated this proliferation when he wrote that "each [among the Nakads] will pay according to his share in the 'uhad."³ The Falhuq shaykhs in the 1830's had four 'uhad; but just how many men held each 'uhdah is not clear. The 'Abd al Malik house had 33.⁴

The major Druze houses, however, like the Jumblats, the 'Imads, and the Nakads, showed a marked tendency to offset this fragmentation of authority by maintaining one head or leader over the whole clan and its followers.⁵ This leader was usually referred to as ra's (head), or kabir 'uhdat, kabir smiyat, i.e., the elder of the house and its following.⁶ Although such leadership might have been granted only grudgingly by the other members of the house, it was often effective. The agreement, for instance, made among the manasib in 1788 regarding the election of Amir Bashir was signed by one head of each of the above-mentioned houses and collectively by the Abillama's.⁷ If dissension over leadership in the same house proved insurmountable, the usual result was that one leader and his group killed the other rival leader. Famous cases of this nature were those of Shaykh Bashir Jumblat who killed his cousins the sons

¹See miri records, al Basha, MQ, XXXIII, 343-44; Ma'luf, TZ, pp. 94, n. 1, 209.

²See Abu Shaqra, al Harakat fi Lubnan . . ., pp. 85-86, 87.

³MAA, MS, No. 4305.

⁴Adel Isma'il, Histoire du Liban du XVIIe Siècle à nos Jours, Vol. IV: Redressement et Déclin du Féodalisme Libanais (1840-1861) (Beirut: Matba'at Harb Bijjani, 1958), p. 239.

⁵Shaykh Shayban al Khazin gives special attention to this tendency of having one leader among the Druze in each house, see Tarikh, p. 450. See also Nakad, "TN," p. 47.

⁶Ma'luf, TZ, p. 128; also Munayyar, KTS, LI, 417; Haydar, Lubnan, p. 131.

⁷See text of agreement in Yazbak, AL, 1957, pp. 210-11.

of Shaykh Najm in 1793,¹ and Shaykh Bashir Abu Nakad who killed the sons of Shaykh Khattar Abu Nakad.² By these means the Druze manasib of each clan preserved a single and united political front which offset the continuous division in the 'uhad.

The political killing of members of the same house, though it did occur from time to time, was nevertheless not common, for the Amir would not let this go in his domain. The Amir punished any muqati'ji who killed a relative, or even any other person. The customary punishment was limited to destruction of the culprit's property and temporary exile. The Amir, however, exercised his power of punishment rationally and used his discretion in determining how far to go. The Amirs were tolerant, and, generally speaking, not much time passed before they forgave the culprit. Mediation by some of the manasib usually preceded the pardon. The Amirs even went so far as to compensate the punished person for lost property,³ just to give evidence of their renewed good will and to encourage him to resettle and rebuild his domain. Without such tolerance on the part of the Amir, the land would have become desolate through the destruction of the men on whose shoulders the system rested.

Rivalry among the manasib, however, was a political resource to which the Amirs often resorted. It gave the Amir a chance to interfere in the affairs of the manasib and keep them from uniting against him. There are many cases of the Amir's instigating factious sentiments and pitting one muqati'ji against the other and one member of the clan against his kin.⁴ He often succeeded in dis-

¹Haydar, Lubnan, p. 173; also Nawfal ibn Ni'mtallay Nawfal, "Kashf al Litham 'an Muhayya al Hukuma wa al Ahkam fi Iqlimayy Misr wa Barr al Sham," MS, Jafeth Library, American University of Beirut, pp. 118-19.

²Nakad, "TN," p. 15; and Haydar, Lubnan, p. 174.

³See for instance, Ma'luf, TZ, p. 104; Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 37, 42.

⁴Nakad, "TN," see Amir Mansur's attempt to raise Kin'an Abu Nakad against his cousins, see below Appendix II.

crediting some of the manasib through these quarrels, after which he further weakened them by punishment for unruliness.¹ Bashir II went so far as to enter into conspiracy with the Jumlat and the 'Imad shaykhs to destroy the Nakads and even helped them to carry out their plan in 1796.²

Minor conflicts among muqati'jis of the same house also developed over questions related to their subjects. For example, there were cases concerning a subject's running away from his master and taking refuge under another,³ and maltreatment by one muqati'ji of another lord's subjects.⁴

Nothing has so far been said in this discussion about the Amir's court and the men who helped him in the administration of his government, not because they do not deserve consideration, but rather in order to devote a special discussion to them. However, a word should be said here about the appointive office of qadi.

It was mentioned elsewhere in this chapter that the muqati'ji performed judicial functions, and that the Amir had a court in the capital, Dayr al Qamar. Serious cases, or any cases which the Amir wished to hear in person, he could hear; but most of the cases went to his court and were heard by the Amir's qadi. The Druze house of al Qadi had a near-monopoly over the office (from which they probably acquired their name); but there had been instances, even before the reign of Amir Bashir II, in which Sunni Muslims filled the office.⁵ The subjects, it seems, could also take their litigations regarding property title to qadis

¹See Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 42, 64, 65.

²Munayyar, KTS, L, 446; Haydar, Lubnan, p. 183; and Shidiaq, Akhbar, I, 190.

³See Shayban, Tarikh, pp. 446, 471-72, 474, 485.

⁴MAA, MS, No. 412.

⁵'Isa Iskandar al Ma'luf, "al Qada' fi Lubnan bi Zaman al Umara' al Shihabiyyin," MQ, XXXI (1933), 569.

in towns like Beirut;¹ they could not, however, take suits there against their own muqati'jis.

The Maronites had recourse to their clergy, who could judge in civil and personal matters among them. But in questions of a civil nature the judicial role of the clergy was more arbitration than formal litigation. Though they had the sanction of the Amir,² the clergy could judge only upon the request of the parties and with the explicit agreement of both disputing parties to abide by their judgment. This function they performed not only among the subjects but also for the Maronite a'yan.³

The codes of law to which the Maronite and Druze judges adhered were not the same. The Druze followed the Islamic shari'ah except for cases related to inheritance and marriage, in which they observed customs of their own differing from the shari'ah. The Maronites followed their traditional law and custom.⁴ Those Muslim judges who occupied the office of qadi at the Amir's court, like Shaykh Ahmad al Barbir (1747-1811), judged cases according to the Islamic shari'ah; but it is not known how they acted on cases of inheritance and marriage, which in Mount Lebanon were regulated by custom, not the shari'ah. We do know, however, that Shaykh Admad al Barbir greatly resented being appointed to the office and set conditions regarding the integrity of judges and freedom to judge cases according to the shari'ah.⁵ Yet it is not likely that the Druze would have concurred that these two crucial issues should be treated in accordance

¹Asad Rustum, "Al Shaykh Ahmad al Ghurr wa al Qada' fi Bayrut Qabl Mi'at 'Am," MQ, XXXI (1933), 404-08.

²Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 509; and Wajih Khury, "Al Qada' fi Lubnan 'ala 'Ahd al Hukm al Iqta'i," MQ, XXXI-XXXII (1933-1934), XXXI, 86-87.

³Ibid., p. 89.

⁴Ibid., XXXII, 206-07; and Yusuf Ziadah, al Qada' al Maruni wa 'Alaqtuhu bi al Shar' al Rumani (Juni, Lebanon: Matba'at al Mursalin al Lubnaniyyin, 1929), pp. 48-49.

⁵Ma'luf, MQ, XXXI, 569-70.

with the shari'ah, and it is not surprising that al Barbir made every effort to quit and did so at the first opportunity he got.¹

At the turn of the nineteenth century Amir Bashir II began to systematize the judicial function. He adopted the Hanafi Shari'ah, the school of Islamic jurisprudence observed by the Ottoman government. Maronites and Druze alike had to abide by its rules. However, he made concessions on matters of inheritance and marriage.² He also installed two courts for northern Lebanon, one at Ghazir and the other at Zgharta,³ to which he appointed Maronite clerics as judges. In these courts the clergy's judgment had the force of law because the clerical judges were officials of the Hakim. Thus at Ghazir, for instance, the Maronite clerical judge tried cases brought to him by Muslims as well.⁴ According to Asad Rustum, another court was installed at the village of 'Ammatur in al Shuf during the Egyptian occupation.⁵

To conclude, it can be seen from the preceding account that the iqta' form of government in Mount Lebanon was a well balanced system in which the powers of the muqati'jis checked each other, while the principle of subordination to a higher authority, the Amir al Hakim, kept public affairs well regulated and prevented a relapse into chaos. The iqta' institutions were essentially political in the sense that they pertained to regulation and exercise of authority. The concept of authority in the iqta' system was also related to the values in the political culture of the people of Mount Lebanon. The sub-

¹Ibid.

²Khury, MQ, XXXI, 264-65.

³Hattuni, Nabdah, p. 270; Churchill, Mount Lebanon, III, 259-60.

⁴Hilu papers, PAB.

⁵Asad Rustum, Bashir bayn al Sultan wa al 'Aziz, 1804-1841 (2 vols.; Beirut: Mansurat al Jami'ah al Lubnaniyyah, 1956-1957), I, 5.

jects freely offered obedience to the ruling class of muqati'jis and the Hakim. The gradation in the levels of authority may have been pervaded by patterns of political influence by which a small number of muqati'jis concentrated more power in their hands and exercised influence over others of their class, and demanded compliance from other manasib to follow their leadership. However, on the whole the relative independence of the muqati'ji in the government of his 'uhdah was a major feature of the system.

CHAPTER III

TRADITIONAL ORGANIZATION OF THE MARONITE CHURCH

In 1578 the Roman See renewed its relations with the Maronite Church, putting these relations on a firmer and lasting basis. Maronite contact with Rome before the Council of Trent (1545-1563), was subject to long periods of interruption. Except for nominal and often interrupted relationship with Rome starting in 1215, the Maronite Church was completely isolated from the Christian world. In the middle of the fifteenth century relations with the Holy See were formally resumed but were mainly limited as before to the Papal acts of investiture which each Maronite patriarch solicited after his election.¹ Franciscan missionaries were in contact with the Maronites before 1578,² and they contributed toward combating monotheletism and Jacobism among the Maronites.³ However, the relations between the two Churches were not clearly defined before the mission of Eliano Battista, Pope Gregory XIII's messenger to the Maronites.

The Maronite Church at the time Battista visited Lebanon was a small and quite disorganized religious establishment existing under dire economic and political conditions. For centuries the Church had been living under the oppres-

¹For Maronite relations with Rome before Battista's mission see Salibi, Oriens Christianus, XLII (1958), 92-105. Also Henry Lammens, "Frère Gryphon et le Liban au XVe Siècle," Revue de l'Orient Chrétien, IV (1899), 68-104. Tobia Anaissi, Bullarum Maronitarum (Rome: n.p., 1911).

²Lammens, Revue de l'Orient Chrétien, IV, 68-104; Duwayhi, TTM, pp. 425-45.

³For example the career of Ibn al Qila'i who became a Franciscan friar, see Salibi, Maronite Historians . . ., pp. 23-87.

sion of the foreign Muslim rulers of the land as well as the heavy weight of ignorance among its clergy. The clergy little differentiated in character from the lay population, were poor and uninstructed, and enjoyed very little social or political deference from the people.

The condition under which the Maronite Church existed were a part of the fate of the Maronite people as Christians in a traditional Muslim society, as well as an isolated mountain community. In Islamic society, the non-Muslims were a dhimmah people, i.e., they did not have the rights of equal social status with the Muslims and were not eligible to take a part in the political life of the community like the Muslim inhabitants. Dhimmah status in that period retained its original meaning as the condition of non-Muslim inhabitants in a Muslim occupied territory. Dhimmah people paid the jiziah, a head tax, and in return they were tolerated and protected by the Muslim masters of the land. They were marked out as an inferior group by specific features of dress and social disabilities. The dhimmah people were excluded from responsible political office and from participating in the armed defence of society. In other words, the dhimmah people were deprived of the responsibility for their social existence. The only right granted them to control their affairs was management of their religious life and the administration of justice in personal matters according to their own religious law.¹

Here an attempt will be made to describe the organization of the Maronite Church under these external conditions before the middle of the eighteenth century, i.e., before the reform movement succeeded in changing its structure. Such an account, it is hoped, will serve as a point of reference with which the later progress of the Church and its social and political role can be compared.

¹Duwayhi, *TTM*, p. 128; also Antoine Rabbath (comp.), *Documents Inédits pour Servir à l'Histoire du Christianisme en Orient, XVI-XIX Siècles* (2 vols.; Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1905-1910), I, 639-42.

By the sixteenth century the organization of the Maronite Church had a semblance of hierarchical order with a supreme head and a number of inferior ranks below him. However, this should not mean that the Maronite Church worked as a functionally differentiated bureaucracy. It was actually more simple and personal than it appeared, for instance, to Dandini. Dandini observed that the formal aspects of the order were hierarchical, but he also noticed some flaws in practice.¹

The formal organization of the Church consisted of a patriarch, who was the supreme head of the Church, and the bishops, whose number was not fixed but ranged from nine to fourteen at different periods.² Below the bishops came the secular priests and monks. The principal of a monastery, the abbot, was not yet a separate office, because in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the few monasteries which the Maronites had were usually presided over by one of the bishops.³

Personal relations prevailed among these different officers of the Church. The relationship obtaining between patriarch and the bishops lacked clear definition of function and jurisdiction.⁴ The patriarch, for example, could have complete power over the bishops in certain cases, and in others he

¹Dandini, Voyage to Mount Libanus, p. 293.

²Ibid., pp. 293, 299; also Shaykho, MQ, XVII, 758; also Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 482-87.

³Dandini, Voyage to Mount Libanus, p. 295. The Church had at that time and still has various other clerical ranks than the ones mentioned above. These, however, are ranks related to internal order among the clergy, see Pierre Dib, "Maronites (Eglise)," Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, ed. E. Amann, X, Part I (Paris: 1928), 122-28.

⁴This condition is also confirmed by the modifications the Maronite hierarchy introduced in the text of the Lebanese Council. The Arabic version of the Council, which was published in 1788, differed from the original Latin version. The change in text is often made to fit the old order rather than to promote consistently the power of one party against another. For comparison between the Arabic and the Latin versions see Bakhus Fighali, "Watha'iq Tarik-hiyyah 'an al Majma' al Lubnani," MQ, XLV-XLVI (1951-1952), XLV, 554-56.

could have none. There was no rule laid down in writing, nor was there always conformance to custom. Much depended on the personal relationships of acquaintance and kinship. Some bishops led quite an independent course of action, disregarding the patriarch, while others were completely under his control. The patriarch usually acquiesced in this state of affairs and let the bishops go their own way.¹ Although in practice the control of the clergy was not always within his reach, the patriarch did not lack a firm idea of his supreme place in the organization. In the early eighteenth century the patriarch gained more power than his predecessors had ordinarily possessed. He had enough power to try to resist the reform movement and the attempt to limit his authority.

Before the Maronite community started to expand and flourish in the late seventeenth century in Kisrwan, the bishops resided with the patriarch in Jibbat Bsharri at the monastery of Qannubin and a couple of other monasteries in its vicinity. Generally the patriarch directed and assigned duties to them as he saw fit at the moment.² Not all bishops, however, lived under such conditions. Some of them were able to cut out for themselves dioceses almost like fiefs. One such bishop in the seventeenth century went so far as to prevent the patriarch from visiting his diocese.³ Opposition to the patriarch by some clerics could also be violent at times. When Eliano Battista visited Mount Lebanon in 1578, he found that one bishop had raised a priest to the rank of bishop without asking for permission and authorization from the patriarch, an incident which embroiled their relations for many years.⁴ In defense of his

¹See for instance document written in the seventeenth century, Harfush, MQ, V, 690-91.

²Tuma al Labudy, "Sirat al Mutran 'Abdallah Qar'ali," ed. A. Rabbat, MQ, X (1907), 799. Also Hattuni, Nabdah, p. 145; and Labat, Memoires . . ., p. 367.

³Duwayhi, TA, pp. 365-66.

⁴Shaykho, MQ, XVII, 762.

act the bishop claimed that the custom in Mount Lebanon did not require the patriarch's authorization. Also, when Battista asked the patriarch to convene the clergy for a Church council, the patriarch dared not mention the explicit purpose of his call; rather, he summoned the clergy under the pretext of a feast.¹ Even with such careful invitation, many bishops failed to attend or to sign the resolutions of the council. In the council which Battista held in 1580, only seven² out of the 12 bishops³ signed the resolutions.

Opposition to the patriarch and the Papal delegate went much further than that; some of the recalcitrant bishops and priests showed a readiness to report the patriarch to the Pasha of Tripoli and to accuse him of conspiracy with the Franjis against the Turks.⁴ Rumors were also spread by the dissenters that Battista's mission was undertaken for no other purpose than to change the faith of the Maronites and the religion of their fathers.⁵ In the face of this opposition, the patriarch had to ask Battista to go. He tactfully urged him to leave Mount Lebanon ostensibly because of the currently spreading plague.⁶ Later the patriarch wrote to Rome seeking the continuation of the efforts for reform and apologizing for the unfriendly attitude toward Battista. "For we by ourselves," he wrote, "cannot carry out the task of reform. Our word is not respected here the way yours is in your country."⁷

The patriarch was not always able to settle disputes among the clergy. Often the clergy raised complaints against their fellows to non-Christian rulers,

¹Ibid., XVIII, 304.

²Ibid., p. 307; also Rabbath, Documents Inédits . . ., I, 152-69. Cf. Bulus Mas'ad, "Al Majma' al Maruni al Mun'aqid fi Sanat 1580," MQ, XXXIV (1936), 439-40.

³Shaykho, MQ, XVII, 758.

⁴Ibid., pp. 754-55.

⁵Ibid., XVIII, 308.

⁶Ibid., XVII, 754-55.

⁷Ibid., XVIII, 682.

and as a result in several councils the Church had to make regulations against resort to temporal rulers. In 1637, for instance, a monk who quarreled with a bishop and another monk of the Qizhayya monastery reported his adversaries to the Muslim governor, who applied the most brutal tortures to the bishop and the monk from Qizhayya.¹ In 1705 two bishops asked the French consul of Sayda to break up the election of the new patriarch whom they opposed. It was the consul who reminded them that it was not within the limits of his jurisdiction to take such action.² The patriarch had to secure an order from the Pope in 1610 threatening with excommunication "all those who prevent prelates from using their authorized powers, and all those who stand in their way or resort to the arms of temporal rulers against the clergy."³

It took the Maronite Church centuries after Battista's visit to reform itself and to regulate clerical relationships. Before the eighteenth century when the patriarch and most of the church prelates were living together in one small place, it was difficult to draw a clear line between their different functions. The affairs of the Church were conducted more or less through the personal relationships prevailing among different prelates. As a result of this parochialism, serious difficulties arose when the Maronite people and some of the prelates spread out to Kisrwan. Had the reform movement not coincided with this population expansion, it would have been hard for the Church to meet the new challenges with its parochial structure.

The reform movement did not take place quietly but gave rise to serious and sometimes violent conflicts within the Church. As early as the days of Pa-

¹Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, III, 386-87. For clerical resort to rulers, see also René Ristelhueber, Traditions Francaise au Liban (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1918), pp. 216, 217.

²Ibid., p. 218.

³Duwayhi, TIM, p. 189; also Duwayhi, TA, p. 302.

triarch Istfan al Duwayhi (1670-1704), tensions arising from the new situation caused the bishops to move to depose the patriarch;¹ and later in 1710 a movement appeared among the bishops which actually led to the eventual deposition of Patriarch Ya'qub 'Awwad (1705-1733). In that year the bishops held a council by their own initiative, deposed Patriarch 'Awwad, and elected a new patriarch. A special deputy of the Pope had to go to Lebanon to examine this case. After his inquiry, he recommended to the Holy See the reinstatement and confirmation of the deposed patriarch.² Similar movements, nevertheless, recurred not much later. Five bishops contested the authority of Patriarch Sim'an 'Awwad (1742-1756) and issued orders prohibiting their parishioners from recognizing the authority of the patriarch. While they did not depose the patriarch this time, they nevertheless elected a patriarchal deputy to take charge of the powers of the patriarch until the dispute was settled. Again the Holy See had to interfere to restore the powers of the patriarch.³ The last such insurrection took place in the 1770's over questions of jurisdiction and the famous case of the heretic nun, Hindiyyah. Confusion in the performance of judicial function was also prevalent and followed no defined rule before the Council of 1744 passed a resolution regarding judicial organization.⁴

Most bishops stayed with the patriarch in Qannubin or in the few monasteries in Jibbat Bsharri. Various chronicles and other accounts mention three monasteries during the sixteenth century and a good part of the seventeenth century.⁵ In the seventeenth century monasteries were started in Kisrwan; but only

¹Duwayhi, FIM, p. 17.

²Tubiyya al 'Anaysi, Silsilah Tarikhiyyah li al Batarikah al Intakiyyin al Mawarinah (Rome: Matba'at Sinato, 1927), pp. 47-49. Also Ristelhueber, Traditions Francaise . . ., pp. 221-46.

³Dib, Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, X, Part I, 88.

⁴See Resolutions in Aouad, Droit Privé . . ., Annexe 11, p. 309.

⁵Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, III, 310; see also Dandini's report, Dandini, Voyage to Mount Libanus, pp. 293ff.

two were built there in the first half of that century,¹ and 10 were built in second half.² The eighteenth century produced the largest number of new monasteries in Mount Lebanon.

Before Pope Gregory XIII opened the Maronite College in Rome in 1584, the higher, as well as the lower, clergy had scarcely any learning to speak of. "Their priests," wrote Dandini, "are as ignorant as the common people, for they can but only read and write."³ He mentioned that there were only three or four priests who had returned from Rome when he made his visit in 1596 and those were familiar with theology and philosophy.⁴ Those who were literate could use some Arabic and to a lesser extent read Syriac. Except for the limited contribution toward learning made possible by the Maronite College, the Maronite clergy continued to be of very little education until the middle of the eighteenth century.

The Maronite clergy led a celibate life with some exception among the secular priests. Some bishops were married; but most, if not all, had entered the clerical profession after being widowed.⁵ Patriarch Yusuf al Khazin (1733-1742), also, entered the clerical life after his wife had died. After the second half of the eighteenth century, though, there seem to have been no more such cases reported. The organized Order of Lebanese Monks were forbidden by law from getting married. Only the secular priests were allowed by law to marry, and as a general rule they did, "because people look not favorably upon them if they be not married, especially such as are young. . . ."⁶ As a result

¹Harfush, MQ, V, 183ff; also Hattuni, Nabdah, p. 28.

²Ibid., pp. 28-29.

³Dandini, Voyage to Mount Libanus, p. 291.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Harfush, MQ, V, 690.

⁶Dandini, Voyage to Mount Libanus, p. 293.

of the law of celibacy among bishops, a great number of the Church prelates were recruited from the monks.

Before the reform, religious office in the Maronite Church was sought by a variety of means including fraud, bribery, and even resort to powerful rulers.¹ To be sure, the Council of 1580 convened by Battista adopted ordinances regulating the recruitment and ordination of clerics. In the resolutions adopted we read: "Henceforth, no bishop, priest, deacon, or others will be ordained or raised to any clerical rank by bribery or other similar means; . . ."² also, "everyone who seeks a clerical rank by means of deceit, or robbery, or without the permission of the patriarch or against his will, will be excommunicated and loses his rank."³ But during that early period these resolutions could hardly be said to have had the effect of law. Even the election of the patriarch was not always free from such means as bribery, as is clearly indicated by Patriarch Istfan al Duwayhi himself.⁴

These widespread irregularities were partly the result of the Maronites' practice of permitting the lay population to vote in the election of the higher ranks of the clergy. The manner of patriarchal election went through various phases from the sixteenth century on. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the patriarch was elected by the people, the notables, and all the clergy by some sort of popular agreement.⁵ Late in the seventeenth century the people seem to have been dropped from the electorate, apparently leaving only the no-

¹Duwayhi, TA, p. 276.

²Mas'ad, MQ, XXXIV, 435.

³Ibid., p. 436.

⁴Duwayhi, TA, p. 366, n. 1. See also 'Anaysi, Silsilah . . ., pp. 49-50; and Ristelhueber, Traditions Francaise . . ., p. 217.

⁵Shaykho, MQ, XVIII, 684; and 'Anaysi, Silsilah . . ., pp. 33, 37-40; also Ghibra'il, Tarikh al Kanisah . . ., II, 382, 383, 391.

tables and higher clergy.¹ In 1733 the bishops went so far as to ask the shaykhs to stay out of the electoral body, thus limiting it to themselves.² Although the shaykhs recognized the exclusive right of the clergy to elect the patriarch, they continued to influence the results of elections. After the Lebanese Council, election was regulated by law.

In the case of promotion to the rank of bishop, before 1736 the approval of the patriarch was mandatory. While it was theoretically the right of the patriarch to appoint new bishops, in practice it was not quite clear how bishops were elevated to their offices. As will be seen later, the Khazin muqati'jis could appoint up to four bishops, and other families also could secure the elevation of a member of their clan to the office. The college and/or individual bishops could exert some influence, too.

There was no rule defining the jurisdiction of the bishops before the Lebanese Council. Bishops had titles like "Bishop of Damascus," "Bishop of Ba'albak," "Bishop of Hamah," etc.; but this did not mean that the bishop presided over the diocese indicated by the name of the town, or over any diocese for that matter. Damascus, for instance, had only a handful of Maronites; yet there was a bishop designated by that name, who, in actual fact, presided over a community in Kisrwan. Most of these titles were fictitious, including the title of the Maronite patriarch, "Peter Patriarch of Antioch." On the other hand, it is significant that these titles represent the Maronite view of the history of their Church.

Before the reforms instituted by the Lebanese Council, bishops were rarely appointed to particular dioceses, the government and jurisdiction of which became their responsibility. Some of the bishops stayed with the patri-

¹A letter from Duwayhi to the Pope, Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, III, 29. Also Duwayhi, TA, pp. 365, 366; cf. 'Anaysi, Silsilah . . ., pp. 41-43, 46.

²Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 600.

arch and helped him manage the affairs of the Church at large and his particular diocese.¹ Others attended to the care of monasteries in which they resided. Only a few were entrusted with the care of souls, and even these bishops, with pastoral duties, were usually still at the disposal of the patriarch. Only rarely did a bishop have a fixed tenure on a particular diocese; most of them were sent on religious missions by the patriarch as he saw fit; mainly to collect the tithe.² This state of affairs, however, did not inhibit some bishops from establishing themselves over certain dioceses in an independent manner like fiefs.³ The result was a great deal of disputation and trespassing by prelates upon each other's functions or flocks,⁴ and in later years resentment of the patriarch's prerogative of assignment of religious duties to bishops as he liked.⁵

The organization of monks in the Maronite Church was no more orderly than that of the Church hierarchy. Before 1700⁶ there was only one order of monks in Mount Lebanon, known as the Antonines. They lived in conditions of complete poverty and had no rules to follow other than vows of celibacy and poverty. Each monastery was separate from the others, with no supreme or central body presiding over the order. Each isolated monastery had its own supe-

¹In addition to his responsibility as head of the Church, the Maronite patriarch served one of the eight Church dioceses like an ordinary archbishop.

²Labat, Memoires, p. 367; also Ghalib, MQ, XXII, 27.

³For this general account, see the following: Shaykho, MQ, XVII, 758; also ibid., XVIII, 972; Ghibra'il, Tarikh al Kanisah, II, 65-66; Dandini, Voyage to Mount Libanus, p. 293; Salim Khattar al Dahdah, "Al Abrashiyat al Maruniyyah wa Silsilatu Asaqifatuha," MQ, VII-VIII (1904-1905), VII, 643.

⁴Ibrahim Harfush, "Majma' Dayr Hrash wa al Majami' al Maruniyyah," MQ, VI (1903), 895.

⁵Blaybil, TRLM, LI, 280; also Duwayhi, TTM, p. 266.

⁶Blaybil, TRLM, LI, 280, 294. Also 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVII, 62-63.

rior, often a bishop, who lived most of his clerical life with the rest of the monks in the same monastery.¹ During the seventeenth century and part of the eighteenth, a number of manasteries contained monks and nuns within the same premises.

Kin relationship prevailed in recruitment of candidates for the higher clergy. Usually a patriarch raised a nephew, a brother, or a cousin to clerical office. This informal institution lasted much longer than other practices in the Church and continued, though to a lesser extent, after reform. In one diocese, for instance, three out of four known archbishops during the eighteenth century belonged to one family, with nephews twice inheriting the office from uncles.² In still another diocese during the same century one archbishop inherited the office of his brother, and his nephew succeeded him after his death. Even during the nineteenth century, when kin relationship had already been weakened in the Church, two dioceses were still monopolized by two families, namely the Khazins and the Bustanis.

Even the office of the patriarchate was sometimes subject to inheritance by relatives. At the time when Dandini visited Mount Lebanon, three patriarchs from the same family succeeded each other on the See of Antioch. Dandini wrote:

I confess, indeed, I had regard to complaints that were made of the former patriarchs for having rendered that dignity as hereditary in their family; as they had already had two brethren that had been patriarchs, the matter was reduced to such a point that the archbishop and abbot of Chsaia [sic; the convent of Qizhayyah] must infallibly succeed his uncle, because of the great places he enjoyed, and also of the spiritual relation he had to him; who had added to the family of the patriarch all the nobles and persons of quality of that country, by holding their children to baptism:

¹Blaybil, MQ, LI, 280.

²Based on the account given by al Dahdah, in MQ, VII, 641-47, 1022-29. However, figures for the eighteenth century are not very accurate since at that time divisions of dioceses was not completed, and because sometimes more than one archbishop held the title to one and the same diocese. See also under Harfush, MQ, V, 783-93 regarding the family of Muhasib and Dayr Mar Shalita.

moreover, the archbishopric and abbey of Chsaia must have been given to his brother, who would also be patriarch in his turn, and then the nephews would tread in the same steps.¹

Dandini wrote this after the death of the second patriarch of the Rizzi family, anticipating the election of the patriarch's nephew, who actually was elected. However, the rest of the nephews did not "tread in the same steps," for after the Rizzi case the office of patriarch was not occupied again by members of the same family consecutively. In general, Dandini was quite surprised by the entrenched family relations in the higher offices of the Church. In the two monasteries of Jibbat Bsharri, Qizhayya and St. Anthony, he noticed that the patriarch had two nephews in one monastery, "one of whom was archbishop and abbot of the same monastery and suffragan of the patriarch"; and in the second monastery "he had three other brothers, which were archbishops."²

Social status was another criterion, along with kinship, for selecting the higher clergy. The notables were predominant in the higher ranks of the clergy. (The word "notables" is used here in a general sense to refer to the leading families as well as the nobility.) The muqati'ji titles among the Maronites do not date farther back than the seventeenth century, and its members did not start to seek religious office before the eighteenth century. Thus any pattern of social stratification can be drawn more fruitfully if limited to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During the eighteenth century the Maronite Church had eight patriarchs, six of whom were members of the notable families. As regards the archbishops (excluding the archbishops of the diocese of Aleppo), 15 out of 20 known bishops belonged to that class.³

¹Dandini, Voyage to Mount Libanus, pp. 299-300.

²Ibid., p. 299.

³The figures for the archbishops are based on Dahdah's account, see Salim al Dahdah, MQ, VII, 641-47, 748-55, 1022-29, 1099-1105; ibid., VIII, 151-54, 401-09.

Kinship, property, and social status explain the recruiting pattern of the Church higher officers and its dependence on the political leaders of the community. The Maronite muqati'ji class, being political chiefs, exercised a right of protection and patronage in regard to the Church. Also as monasteries were owned in part by kinship groups, the owners had the right and power to elevate a member of their kin to the supreme position, usually as an abbot, bishop, or archbishop.¹ In defense of this right one such family wrote to the Pope: "The monasteries are our monasteries, founded by our fathers and grand-fathers, and we will admit to them whomever we want to admit. We remain, . . ." the letter concludes, "obedient to the Holy See in all matters religious."²

The Church did not have sufficient revenue to pay its clergy or find seats for their residence. Several patriarchs are said to have left deficits during their tenure in office,³ while many bishops had to cultivate the land to make a living, distracting as this was from their clerical duties.⁴ Church revenue came from the tithe which the bishops collected for the patriarch from the people, and from some property owned by the Church. Much of the revenue went as alms to the poor who came to the Church monasteries. In later years, however, especially the nineteenth century, the orders of monks appropriated large lots of land and contributed to the Church funds.

The reason for the notables' prominence in the Church is not hard to find: it lay in the fact that the means of Church administration were separate from the organization of the Church itself. The poverty of the Church made it quite dependent on the propertied classes for the monasteries and churches for

¹See Harfush, MQ, V-VIII, passim.

²A letter from the Khazins to the Pope, in Mas'ad and al Khazin, UT, I, 413.

³Ibid., II, 600; ibid., III, 525-26, 528; also Fighali, MQ, XLV, 264.

⁴See letter of bishop 'Umayrah to the Pope, in Ghalib, MQ, XXII, 444-45.

its clergy. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century there were no special seats for the dioceses, and the bishops lived either in their family monasteries or with the patriarch. As the Maronite population spread out and grew in numbers, there was increasing need for new monasteries and churches, which the church organization itself was unable to provide. The members of the clergy whose families thus undertook the task of building new monasteries for the Church usually became bishops.

Kisrwan, which became the most heavily populated Maronite area in the eighteenth century, was governed by some Maronite muqati'jis of whom the Khazin house held the most property and influence. The Khazins built monasteries and encouraged the building of village churches. Leading Maronite families such as the Mubaraks, the Muhasibs, and the Istfans and others built their own monasteries, too. Thus one notices that more bishops belonged to these families than to any other family in Mount Lebanon. These monasteries were intended to remain under the control of the builder's family and his descendants.¹ One such builder stated clearly in his will that he had built the monastery as a succor for his family in case of need.² The monastery not only provided the members of the family with higher religious office but also brought them revenue from its lands. The Church could not exclude the original patrons from such benefits of office and property. Also the Church regulation that all of a bishop's wealth and contributions should go, after his death, to the monastery in which he had resided,³ made the bishops as well as their relatives see to it that anyone who presided over a monastery be appointed from their own family, so that they could continue to benefit from what they considered to be their own property rights.

¹See Harfush, MQ, VII, 183, 312-20, 690.

²Ibid., VIII, 347-48.

³See Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 604.

As a result of these conditions, kin relationships were strengthened inside the Church, and those who had monasteries in their names almost monopolized the offices of bishops and abbots. Thus out of 21 known archbishops, four kinship groups filled 14 of the seats during the eighteenth century. Of the 21, 15 were also notables.

Before the reform movement there was not always a sharp distinction between the lay and the clerical population. The Church prelates earlier had given clerical titles to village chiefs and to the notables in the community, a practice which was followed as late as the seventeenth century.¹ The purpose of these titles, which were of the lower clerical order, like "shammas," "shidiaq" (deacon), and the like, was to give the authority of these chiefs a religious character and thus bolster their power. They were also given to them so that the notables might have access to the deliberations of the clergy and the conduct of the affairs of the Church such as election of prelates. In the mass and other religious occasions the notables would be given special places with the clergy rather than with the congregation.²

The clergy, on the other hand, often took up secular occupations, for instance, tax-collecting, farming, medical practice, and village chieftainship. Eventually the Church had to adopt regulations, in 1644 and earlier, prohibiting the clergy from undertaking secular office, and also the lay population from forcing the clericals to perform these functions.³ The reform movement put an end to this problem and sharpened the distinction between the clerical and the lay occupations, which raised morale and increased respect for the clergy among the people.

¹See 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVII, 36; for reference to these chiefs cf. Dandini, Voyage to Mount Libanus, p. 300.

²'Aynturini, MTL, XLVI, 165.

³Harfush, MQ, VI, 894. See also Duwayhi, TTM, pp. 189, 291.

In earlier periods the clergy were not particularly venerated by the people, contrary to the first impressions of some contemporary travelers. In fact, the clergy were apparently so exposed to insult while carrying out their secular functions¹ and on other occasions, that a special order and law were stipulated in 1644 threatening with punishment those "who beat or insult a priest, a deacon, or a monk."² Even the patriarch was not spared but was sometimes exposed to similar treatment, regardless of the dignity of his office. An account of Patriarch Yuhanna al Safrawi (1648-1656), written by the priest who was his confessor, indicates what kind of social status the patriarchs enjoyed:

He was a man of great humility. Usually he greeted other people before they greeted him, even those who were most humble in the eyes of men. . . . He also used to hear men swear at him, without getting ruffled or angry nor did he punish the wrong doer. When people reproached him for this leniency, he used to answer: Christ was also cursed, may God forgive the sinners.³

Another patriarch, Ya'qub 'Awwad (1705-1733), had to hide in caves because of the harsh treatment he received at the hands of his relatives⁴ and various other people.

From the days of the Mamluks the Maronite Church, as well as the Maronite people, stood in need of protection. This situation defined the political conditions of the Church as it entered the history of the Imarah of Jabal al Druze in the seventeenth century. The protection which the Church needed was generously extended by the Ma'nis, the Shihabis, the Druze muqati'jis, and the Maronite muqati'jis of Kisrwan. The French government also occasionally extended its diplomatic aid to the Church.

¹ Harfush, MQ, VI, 894.

² Ibid.

³ Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 624.

⁴ Jirmanus Farhat, "Tarikh Dayr Mar Antonius al Mulaqab bi Qizhayya," ed. Ni'mtallah al Kafri, MQ, IV (1902), 365-66.

Before the eighteenth century the Maronite Church, while still in Jibbat Bsharri, had no protection from oppression of rulers, unlike the Melkite Orthodox Church which had a legal status in the Ottoman Empire. The Maronite patriarch was neither officially recognized nor covered by Ottoman law. In those days the Maronite patriarchs and clergy in Jibbat Bsharri were directly subject to the governors of Tripoli. The patriarchs had to profess obedience to these governors in person immediately after their election to office.¹

The Maronite clergy therefore resorted to whatever sources of protection they could reach. They turned sometimes to the rulers of Jabal al Druze and sometimes to the Catholic monarchs of Europe, particularly those of France. In 1647 they were able to procure a letter from the King of France, Louis XIV, in which he promised them protection.² Regardless of the official character of this letter, however, its importance should not be overestimated as it was not directed toward the establishment of a French protectorate over the Maronites of the Ottoman Empire. A political commitment on the part of the French government to protect the Maronites would have proved an expensive proposition, the possible advantages of which were not sufficient to offset the likely losses of French trade in the Ottoman Empire.³ The French monarch's promise amounted to employing his good offices with the Ottoman Government on behalf of the Maronites for the alleviation of violent oppressions inflicted upon them by their local Ottoman governors.⁴

While French diplomatic intercession was useful to the Maronites, it

¹ Shaykho, MQ, XIX, 768.

² See text in Aouad, Droit Privé . . ., pp. 295-96. French protection was also extended to the Maronite Lebanese Order of Monks by royal edict, see Ristelhueber, Traditions Francaise . . ., p. 293.

³ Pierre Rondot, Les Institutions Politiques du Liban (Paris: Institut d'Études de l'Orient Contemporain, 1947), pp. 104-05.

⁴ See text in Aouad, Droit Privé . . ., pp. 295-96.

was slow in coming when needed. Paris and Istanbul were both too far from Mount Lebanon to ward off effectively the oppression imposed on the Maronites by Muslims of the area. For instance, the effect of the French ambassador's intercession with the Sublime Porte to stop the Himadis' maltreatment of Patriarch Duwayhi took four years to reach the Maronite patriarch,¹ and by then he had already fled the country.

During the second part of the seventeenth century the struggle for power over the region between the Pasha of Tripoli and the Himadis made the Maronites go through very hard times. The Pashas of Tripoli, the Himadi clan, and others raided and looted their lands. During that period and under the Himadis, arbitrary persecution, overtaxation, and raids were frequent in the villages and monasteries.² To escape persecution and extortions, the patriarchs sometimes had to hide in caves and other inaccessible spots.³ During the seventeenth century, four patriarchs had to flee their country and take refuge in the country of the Druze;⁴ Duwayhi took flight twice.⁵

Patriarch Ya'qub 'Awwad (1705-1733) was able to reach an agreement with the Himadis which moderately improved conditions for the Maronites and their clergy. The Himadis agreed to receive a fixed sum of money from the patriarch and to regulate their formerly arbitrary taxation practices. Before this agreement, the Himadis had imposed 20 kinds of taxes on their Maronite subjects.⁶ These included kharaj; jawali; 'awniyyah; corvée; taxes for the provision of

¹Ibid., p. 95.

²Duwayhi, TA, p. 330, n. 10; also Duwayhi, TTM, p. 440.

³Ghibra'il, Tarikh al Kanisah . . ., II, 564; also Duwayhi, TTM, p. 16; also Labat, Memoires . . ., p. 419; also Ristelhueber, Traditions Francaise . . ., p. 148.

⁴Ghibra'il, Tarikh al Kanisah . . ., pp. 487, 492, 507-08.

⁵Duwayhi, TA, p. 375; also Hattuni, Nabdhah, p. 113.

⁶Aouad, Droit Privé . . ., pp. 96-97.

arms; for growing tobacco; for summer residence, and for winter residence; taxes on flocks and vegetables; travel tax; and several others. 'Awwad's agreement with the Himadis, however, though salutary, gave the Maronites and their clergy only a temporary and small respite from oppression. Their condition in northern Lebanon was not basically affected until 1763, a year which started a new era in Mount Lebanon.

It would not be fair to claim that Ottoman justice did not ever reach the Maronites or their clergy; for although the Maronite Church had no legal status vis-à-vis the Ottoman government, when the Maronite clergy appealed to Ottoman authorities at times they did receive fair treatment.¹ In a way it was the Ottoman administration's failure to reach such inaccessible regions as the country of the Maronites that was largely responsible for the sufferings the Maronite Church endured at the hands of local, somewhat autonomous, Ottoman Pashas and Muslim chiefs.

It would also be a mistake to consider all the ills which befell the Maronite clergy as the work of the non-Christian rulers of their country. Sometimes the patriarch was just as helpless among his own people. In 1609, for instance, the Maronite muqaddam of Bsharri forced the patriarch to flee his seat at Qannubin and seek refuge in the country of the Druze; and having been unable to win the support of the Maronites of Bsharri, the patriarch could not use religious sanctions against the muqaddam.² In another instance a muqaddam of Bsharri looted a monastery in his district and killed one of its monks.³ As discussed earlier, the clergy themselves in their own quarrels raised complaints

¹A case in sight is the quarrel between the Maronite clergy and other Christian sects who dispossessed them. The Maronite patriarch went in person to the Pasha of Damascus and pleaded his case and received justice as a dhimmi person. See Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, III, 36-37.

²Duwayhi, TA, p. 301.

³Ibid., p. 315.

to Muslim rulers against each other and thus brought great suffering upon themselves.¹

These difficult conditions in Jibbat Bsharri caused the patriarchs to move, in the first part of the eighteenth century, the seat of the Church from its fifteenth century see at Qannubin monastery in Jibbat Bsharri to KISRWAN in the Imarah of Jabal al Druze. The fact that Qannubin was no longer a safe place for the patriarch is clear from the evidence that four out of five patriarchs in the first half of the eighteenth century had to spend part of their terms in the Imarah of Jabal al Druze. Finally, patriarch Yusuf Istfan (1766-1793) took permanent residence in KISRWAN and was followed by the rest of the patriarchs until 1809, when Patriarch Yuhanna al Hilu (1809-1823) returned to Qannubin. Hilu's successor, Patriarch Yusuf Hbaysh (1823-1845), started the tradition still in force to this day by which the patriarch takes residence in northern Lebanon in the summer and in KISRWAN during the winter.

The change of the patriarchal seat from Jibbat Bsharri to KISRWAN marked the growing importance of the Maronites in the Shihabi Imarah and the influence of the Maronite muqati'ji house of Khazin in the Church. The Khazins had a special interest in making KISRWAN the seat of the patriarchs. The rise of the Khazins in KISRWAN under Fakhr al Din opened that region to Maronite colonization, and by the beginning of the eighteenth century the whole district had become almost completely Maronite territory. The encouragement which the Khazins gave Maronite peasants to settle in their region, and their assistance to and protection of the clergy, gave KISRWAN the largest Maronite population in Lebanon for almost the entire eighteenth century. KISRWAN also became the center of Church life even before the establishment of the patriarchal see in the region, since KISRWAN had the largest number of churches, monasteries, priests, monks,

¹Ibid., pp. 335-36.

and bishops during that period. At least four dioceses had their archbishops residing in KISRWAN during the eighteenth century, in addition to the bishops.¹ The seat of the Lebanese Order of Monks, one of the most flourishing orders, was also in KISRWAN in the monastery of al Luwayzah and that of Tamish.

The Khazins, being the rulers of KISRWAN and the most illustrious and powerful Maronite house at that time, exercised a kind of protectorate over the Church. At first the clergy were more than happy to be sponsored and supported by a Maronite house, not only because they had been in a condition of bondage under the Matawilah, but also because the Khazins were faithful Maronites and, like the rest of the muqati'jis of Jabal al Druze, were genuinely concerned about their subjects and looked after their interests. In a letter to the Pope in 1657, the patriarch described the Khazin protectors in these words:

Prince [i.e., Abu Nawfal al Khazin] of all the Catholics in Mt. Lebanon and the Orient, protector of the Church: its patriarch, bishops, monks, priests, churches, monasteries, and the faith of Christians in these regions. He shields the Maronite community and Church from the ills which are visited upon them by rulers and others.²

The Khazin political relations with the Church were in many ways similar to the iqta' relationship between the muqati'jis and their subjects. The Khazins extended their protection to the Church and in return expected the Church's recognition of their patronage and certain other benefits from it. The iqta' principle was clearly demonstrated in the appointment of some archbishops in monasteries within the Khazins' 'uhdah. The archbishop had to submit a statement confirming his consent to the iqta' relationship. Written in 1763 the statement reads as follows:

As regards their honors the sons of Shaykh Kattar [al Khazin] we shall do their bidding and stand in their service; we shall also do their favor

¹The dioceses of Damascus, Ba'albak, Beirut, sometimes Tripoli, and until 1725, that of Aleppo, see Ferdinan Tawtal (ed.), "Watha'iq Tarikhiyyah 'an Halab," MQ, XLIII-LVI (1948-1962), LI, 349.

²Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, I, 231.

in whatever they require us to do. In return they¹ will extend to us their aid and protection and preserve us in all matters corporeal.

As to the shaykhs, their cousins, we shall behave ourselves in a way to be always equally in their favor and subject of their approval, as God and our conscience command.

We also promise their honors, Shaykh Najd and his brother Shaykh Khaz'al in the name of God and our Lady the Virgin Mary that under all conditions and in all their dealings with us, good or bad, we should never rise above them to seek justice from higher authorities. We trust in the mentioned shaykhs and they will be our protection, support and shield us from evil in all times, to the exception of all other men.²

The exchange of benefits was undertaken in a practical manner according to the iqta' practice. A cleric received office with the approval of the Khazins. He benefited from the privileges of that office whether a principal or a bishop. Also, the cleric's authority became sanctioned and respected among the people by virtue of the Khazins' political authority over him. A bishop or any other Church prelate who stood in a special relationship to the Khazins was given due respect even by non-Christian muqati'jis, a fact which helped build up the prestige of the Church.

On their side, the Khazins used the clergy's prestige among the people to add an element of religious support to their civil authority. In the way of material returns the Khazins received special benefits and revenues from these monasteries, called 'awayid.³ They also obtained benefits of the type they regularly received from their peasants, for instance, a measure of coffee and sugar and the like from every nun or monk whom they permitted to join a monastery under their control.⁴

¹In the Arabic text, the first sentence is written in the plural form whereas the second is written in the singular which may mean that there was only one son to Shaykh Khattar. In the translation the plural form was followed in both cases for the sake of consistency.

²Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 604.

³Ibid., p. 596, see letter No. 11. For a detailed list of these benefits see statement written in 1780, Ghalib, MQ, XXII, 21, n. 1.

⁴Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 597, 592, 599, 601.

The Khazins' influence over the Church was not limited to monasteries under their control but extended to the entire Church organization. They influenced the election of the patriarch and his later behavior in office, and they had power to choose three archbishops for three dioceses in Kisrwan. The Maronite shaykhs of the houses of Khazin, Hbaysh, and a few others from Jibbat Bsharri formed a part of the electoral body which, before the nineteenth century, chose a patriarch along with other Church prelates. The signatures of these lay notables had to appear on all the elected patriarchs' requests for investiture from Rome. In 1704 the letter sent by the elected patriarch to the Pope for investiture carried the signatures of 10 bishops, 14 Khazin shaykhs, 3 Hbaysh shaykhs, and 2 other notables.¹ When, in 1670, Istfan al Duwayhi was elected by the bishops and some of the notables of Jibbat Bsharri² without the approval of the chief Khazin at the time, Shaykh Abu Nadir al Khazin, the latter objected to the election and refused to recognize its legitimacy. For this reason Rome delayed in sending the Pallium in confirmation of the election of a Duwayhi; and the newly elected patriarch, embarrassed and perplexed by the problem, had to appease the Khazin muqati'ji by visiting him and asking his forgiveness and approbation.³

As another example, in 1633, Patriarch 'Umayrah, the first student of the College in Rome to be elected to the patriarchal office,⁴ sent one of his bishops to Rome to seek Papal investiture. However, he had had the temerity

¹ 'Anaysi, Silsilah . . ., p. 46.

² Duwayhi, TA, pp. 563-66; also Ghibra'il, Tarikh al Kanisah . . ., II, 505-06.

³ Ibid.; and Duwayhi, TIM, p. 13.

⁴ The manner of his election is not quite clear. 'Anaysi is very brief on this point, see Silsilah . . ., p. 40. Duwayhi stresses the difficult political conditions in Jibbat Bsharri at that time, but he does not mention specifically who elected the patriarch. See Duwayhi, TA, p. 330. In another place Duwayhi writes that 'Umayrah simply ascended the patriarchal See, Duwayhi, TIM, p. 449.

to ignore the Khazins and Hbaysh shaykhs and had not solicited any letters from them nor sought their approval for his election. When the bishop arrived in Rome, therefore, he failed to procure the investiture because the Maronite clerics there objected that there were no letters of recommendation. As the bishop admitted that the patriarch had not sought the shaykhs' approval, he was sent back without a Pallium. Finally, realizing the seriousness of this situation, Patriarch 'Umayrah had to bow to the notables and seek their approbation.¹

Starting early in the eighteenth century, the Khazins made a concerted effort to impose their control more effectively over the Church. They tried to make the patriarchs leave their seat in Jibbat Bsharri and settle permanently in KISRWAN; but as the patriarchs did not give up Qannubin for good until the middle of the century, the Khazins conspired to bring the bishops to KISRWAN for the periods of patriarchal election.² Thus in 1704 they succeeded in making the bishops convene in KISRWAN for the election of a new patriarch, but not entirely without opposition.³ The election which took place then elevated to the See of Antioch the archbishop of Aleppo, Bishop Jibra'il al Bluzawi. The archbishops of Aleppo at that time were the proteges of the Khazins and resided in KISRWAN. The successor of al Bluzawi was elected at Qannubin under the strong pressure of the French consul of Tripoli, who wanted to curb the Khazins and demonstrate his influence over the Church. The rest of the patriarchs of the eighteenth century were elected in KISRWAN.

In 1733 a bishop from the Khazin family was elected patriarch for the

¹From document written in the seventeenth century by a Maronite bishop, reproduced by Harfush, MQ, V, 689-90, 691, n. 5.

²Michel Chebli, Une Histoire du Liban a l'Époque des Émiris (1635-1841) (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1955), p. 149. Also Ristelhueber, Traditions Française . . ., pp. 206-09.

³Ibid.

first time, and another Khazin bishop, Tubiyya al Khazin, contested the election which followed and had himself elected by illegal means. However, as the Pope cancelled his election, he was instead made a patriarchal secretary. After the death of the patriarch who was appointed by the Pope, Tubiyya al Khazin finally was elected to the See of Antioch in 1756.

The Khazins' influence in the Maronite Church also determined the choice of three archbishops¹ and possibly other ordinary bishops on different occasions. The family's prerogative in choosing prelates started in the middle of the seventeenth century and lasted for just about a hundred years. The dioceses concerned, namely Damascus, Aleppo, and Ba'albak, were almost like fiefs of the Khazin house. The Khazins had the right to name the candidate and the patriarch made the appointment formal.² Sometimes the Khazins could also raise archbishops to the dioceses of Beirut and Tripoli,³ thus controlling almost completely the appointments of the archbishops. When one of these archbishops tried to shake off the influence of the Khazins, they did not take kindly to the display of independence; for instance, in 1737 the Khazins resorted to violence to intimidate the archbishop of Aleppo into better obedience and iqta' tutelage.⁴

In matters related to the administration of the Church affairs the Khazins also shared in decision-making with the higher clergy.⁵ Khazin signatures appeared on Church decrees and orders alongside those of the patriarch and bishops

¹See letter from Archbishop Jirmanus Farhat to Shaykh Sirhan al Khazin, Tawtal, MQ, LI, 329. Also Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, III, 397, 538; also Yusuf Khattar Ghanim, Barnamaj Akhawiyat al Qiddis Marun, II (Beirut: al Matba'ah al Kathulikiyyah, 1903), 168, 303.

²Al Labudy, MQ, X, 799.

³Ibid.

⁴See Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 527, 530-31. Cf. ibid., III, 520-21; also ibid., I, 469.

⁵Cf. decrees published in Ghibra'il, Tarikh al Kanisah . . ., II, 564.

apparently to give the Church orders effectiveness and political sanction.

Although the Khazins imposed their influence over the Church, the Church never enjoyed more freedom than it did while under their protection. The same could be said for the activities of the Church in the Shihabi Imarah. At no other time in history did the Maronite Church flourish as it did during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Kisrwan and Jabal al Druze. But the muqati'jis' policy toward the Church was practical: they provided the Church with their protection and the Church paid them in return by moral and material support. For instance, through its relations with the Pope and its good offices with the French consuls, the Church was instrumental in securing for the Khazins a French royal edict making Abu Nawfal al Khazin and his sons after him French consuls in Beirut, and bequeathing on him French citizenship and honors.¹ This office greatly increased the influence and prestige of the Khazins, not only with the Maronites but also with the Imarah chiefs. The patriarchs also interceded with the Pope to give the Khazin rulers titles of honor and medals in order to enhance their standing among the Catholic population. In one of these letters, Patriarch al Duwayhi states the policy of the Church very clearly in this respect:

We submit to the attention of your Holiness that the Khazins are the notables of our community, and that the Popes before your Holiness . . . used to bequeath to them a golden icon and a chain of silver.

Now Shaykh Abu Nasif (al Khazin) has passed away and has been succeeded by his son Khalid. We wish that you honor him with the same signs which his father and grandfather enjoyed before him in order that the Maronite community shows greater deference toward him and that he becomes more obedient to your Holiness and more concerned about the interests of the Maronite community.²

Influence in the Church was also important to the Khazins with respect to the judicial authority which the clergy held in some civil and personal mat-

¹Duwayhi, *TMM*, pp. 233-34; also Mas'ad and Khazin, *UT*, I, 230-32. See also Ristelhueber, *Traditions Francaise . . .*, pp. 138-39, 140-41, 158-59.

²Mas'ad and Khazin, *UT*, II, 527, 530-31.

ters. A preponderant influence over the Church meant for the Khazins a measure of control over the judicial power in their country. Other ways the Khazin muqati'jis gained from supporting the Church included pecuniary compensations every time they raised a cleric to one of the monasteries or higher ranks of the clergy. But the Church also benefited materially from the Khazins' practice of increasingly alienating their property and turning it into mortmain (waqfs).¹

The non-Christian rulers of Jabal al Druze left the Maronite Church to its own affairs in a remarkable demonstration of religious freedom and respect. Before the nineteenth century, the Shihabis did not interfere in the business of the Church except when the higher clergy sought their aid in keeping order within the organization. For instance, the patriarch, and the bishops, appealed to the Shihabi rulers to help discipline recalcitrant clerics into line or to settle disputes among the clergy themselves. The Druze muqati'jis also respected the freedom of the Maronite Church. The alliance, or convergence of interests, of the muqati'ji class and the clergy continued strong until the end of the eighteenth century. The unity of interest between the clergy and the muqati'jis, Druze and Maronites, will be further discussed in another context.

As for the Shihabi and Abillama' houses who changed to Christianity from Sunni Islam and the Druze religion, their interests in Church affairs did not increase after the conversion. None of them ever sought religious or clerical office as did the Khazins.

There can be no doubt that the early history of the Maronite Church and Maronite community was, in the early Ottoman times, quite humble. The community lived in conditions of isolation and bondage, and had no social or political weight in the life of Mount Lebanon. The parochial character of the Church organization before the reform movement could not slow the trend of communal dis-

¹See Shahin al Khazin, "Awqaf al 'Ailah al Khaziniyyah 'ala Dhatiha." MQ, V (1902), 115-22.

integration and loss of character. A state of incoherence and a lack of unity and identity came to characterize both the civil and religious life of the Maronite community. Maronites were leaving their Mountain to live among the Muslims and others, concealing their true religion. They wore Muslim dress and entered Muslim mosques and, while secretly making Christian vows, publicly professed Islam. They were already identified among the Maronites of the Mountain as the "White Maronites," after the Muslim white turban which they wore.¹

The danger of losing one's faith and identity in another people's land was not the only serious problem facing the Maronite community, which had maintained its group identity throughout its religious history. In its very home, before the reform movement, the Maronite community was in danger of losing its character. The Maronites were becoming increasingly susceptible to the influence of schismatic Christian sects living among them, mainly the monophysite Jacobites. At the end of the sixteenth century a Papal delegate described the Maronites' condition in clear terms:

With the passing of time and because of mixing with nations and sects of different religions, some false ideas found their way into their books, and, similarly, irregularities entered their rituals and liturgies. The reason for this being the scarcity of teachers to correct them, rather than a lack of readiness on their part to accept the teachings of the Roman Church. We have put down these writings which are contrary to Catholic truths in a separate book so that his Holiness the Pope would be able to see them for himself. We copied them literally from the books which were shown to us by the patriarch, one of which was a Gospel which he wrote in his own handwriting twenty-five years ago with commentaries of his own composition on its margins. In these commentaries he states that Christ has one will and one act and other such things.

But these and other falsehoods that are found in their books do not constitute their true faith. Their scribes copied them without giving much thought to the matter. If you were to ask them about their true faith they would answer that their belief is that of Rome.²

¹Regarding the white Maronites see Duwayhi, TA, p. 300; also Duwayhi, TTM, p. 451; and Shaykho, MQ, XVII, 761-62; also Rabbath, Documents Inedits . . . , I, 639-24.

²Shaykho, MQ, XVII, 759, from the report of Battista, in 1579. It is evident that Battista is glossing over the issue of the early non-Catholic ideas among the Maronites.

Similar views were expressed by Patriarch Istfan al Duwayhi.¹

The structure of the Church organization, as is clearly shown above, was inadequate to build up solidarity and group identity among the Maronites. The claims which some Maronite writers in recent times have made regarding the power and prestige of the clergy before the eighteenth century² are not merely exaggerated but are completely unfounded. The survival of the Maronites as a separate religious group would have been seriously imperiled had conditions continued much longer without change.

The parochial and personal relationships upon which the Church organization was based were an obstacle to the care of the spiritual and social needs of the community. Before the beginning of the eighteenth century the Church organization seemed quite functional and adequate for the limited needs of the community. Later, however, the whole picture changed, as we shall see in the next chapter.

In the second place, the financial dependence of the Church on the wealthy and ruling class made the Church dependent in administration as well. So long as the means of Church administration remained in the hands of the temporal leaders, the Church could not be considered master of its own house. If the Church was to act freely and effectively in the community, the conditions determining its existence would have to change.

¹ Ibid., p. 455.

² See for instance Aouad, Droit Privé . . ., pp. 18, 26, 89, 102; also Wajih Khury, MQ, XXXII, 203; also the pamphleteer, Ferdinand Tyan, The Entente Cordiale in Lebanon (London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd. [1916]).

CHAPTER IV

THE REFORM MOVEMENT AND THE CHURCH BUREAUCRACY

Reform in the Maronite Church started with the efforts made by Rome about two decades after the Council of Trent (1545-1563), a fact which may indicate the effects which the Council had on the revival of Church life and on the Maronites. In 1578, Pope Gregory XIII sent the Jesuit monk Eliano Battista to the eastern Mediterranean with the special mission of strengthening the relations of the Maronites with Rome and reforming their Church and religious practice.

Battista started the course of reform in the Maronite Church by educating the clergy and by reforming the Church organization. With his efforts a college was opened in Rome in 1584 for the education of Maronites who planned to become clerics. It was the second school opened by the Popes for the eastern sects; the first was started in 1577 for the Greeks. The Maronite college continued in operation until 1799 when it was sacked by the occupying forces of Napoleon.¹ As for the reform of the Church organization, Battista held a council in which he tried to regulate the relations of various Church offices in accordance with fixed laws laid down in the text of the council. Three other councils were held in the Church in the last two decades of the sixteenth century. There is no consensus among Church historians about the total number

¹See Pierre Raphael, Le Rôle du Collège Maronite Romain dans l'Orientalisme aux XVIIe et XVIIIe Siècles (Beirut: Université de Saint Joseph de Beyrouth, 1950), pp. 53-63.

of councils held; estimates range from 13 to 17.¹ Of those mentioned, 14 can be considered certain, and the rest, which are much in doubt, can easily be ignored.² Only four out of these 14 were confirmed by the Popes, and all four of them were held with the supervision and active participation of Papal messengers or delegates. But this fact should not discourage the historian from considering the other 10 councils, for they provide us with a more true picture of the actual organization and practices of the Maronite Church through the ages.

The four confirmed councils are the following: the Council of 1580, the Council of 1596, the Lebanese Council held in 1736 by Monsignor Yusuf al Sim'ani (Assemani) in the capacity of a Papal delegate, and the last one, convoked by the Maronite Patriarch Yuhanna al Hilu and the Apostolic delegate Louis Gondolfi in 1818. About seven of the 14 councils were held by the patriarchs without the aid or presence of Papal delegates; none of these was confirmed, though they were mostly held in response to request by the Holy See. Three councils were held with the active participation of Papal representatives, but were nonetheless denied confirmation. To this day the Maronites show resentment and suspicion regarding the Holy See's reluctance to confirm their councils.³ Ill feeling was displayed on both sides--the Holy See was quite annoyed at the Maronites' stubborn independence and their flagrant violation of the Lebanese Council's resolutions, while the Maronites viewed with a jealous eye the Papal encroach-

¹See Bulus Mas'ad (ed.), al Majma' al Baladi (Beirut: al Matba'ah al Kathulikiyyah, 1959), p. 2. (Henceforth Mas'ad, MB.)

²Ignored here are the councils attributed to Patriarch Musa al 'Ikkari in 1557, Patriarch Yusuf al Rizzi in 1596, and Patriarch Istfan al Duwayhi. Regarding these councils see, Mas'ad, MB, p. 3.

³Ibid., preface.

ments on their age-old autonomy.¹ But on the whole, these feelings were usually contained on both sides, and came to the open during periods when councils were held.

The periodicity of Church council meetings clearly reflects that the eighteenth century was the time of reform. The first Maronite council was held in 1580 and the last in 1856. Between these two dates, three councils were held in the last two decades of the sixteenth century, one in the seventeenth, eight in the eighteenth, and two in the nineteenth century. The first three showed the impact on the Maronites of the initial Roman effort to revive Catholic sects in the east. Their aim was to strengthen ties with the Roman See, establish true Catholic practices and creed, educate the clergy, and put some order into the Church organization. The major measures of discipline which the Popes wanted to inculcate in the Maronite Church concerned the hierarchical order in the Church organization. Efforts were made to impose the authority of the higher offices over the lower ones, to regulate the pattern of clerical recruitment, and to differentiate the functions of various offices.

The fact that only one Church council was held in the seventeenth century should not mean that ties between Rome and Qannubin were slack during that period. On the contrary, during that time two Latinized clerics who had graduated from the Maronite College in Rome, became patriarchs, the first such patriarchs in the history of the Maronite Church. The two were Patriarch Jirjus 'Umayrah (1633-1644) and Patriarch Istfan al Duwayhi (1670-1704). The enlightened guidance of these two patriarchs contributed toward reform and greater coherence of the Maronite community. However, the educated clergy who returned from Rome to Mount Lebanon during the seventeenth century seem to have taken no initiative toward changing the structure of the Church organization. Their

¹[Yusuf al Sim'ani], Tarikh al Majma' al Lubnani, published in UT, II, 487ff. (Henceforth Sim'ani, TML.) Also Mas'ad, MB, preface.

efforts were directed more toward providing better pastoral care for their parishioners and education for the village folk.

Although the reform movement started with the mission of Battista, it took a century and a half after Battista for the spirit of reform to catch root among the Maronites themselves. During the eighteenth century a struggle started among the higher clergy between the forces which pushed for change and rationalization of the Church organization and the conservatives who wanted things to remain as they were.

Many social and religious factors, as will soon be seen, converged to make the eighteenth century the major period of reform. The eight councils which were held during this century took place within a period of 54 years, between 1746 and 1790. This short period witnessed the most violent disturbances and intense conflict that ever raged in the ranks of the Church. The conflict was between the protagonists of reform who wanted to put the resolutions of the Lebanese Council into effect, and the proponents of tradition who were more interested in keeping the old practices. New situations and new needs created by the sweeping reforms of the Lebanese Council contributed still more to the intensity of the conflict. As the Lebanese Council produced the most comprehensive and authoritative statement of reform in the Maronite Church, an historical account of the origin, purpose, and circumstances of the Council is needed here.¹

In 1734, the newly elected patriarch, Yusuf al Khazin, and the Church prelates, bishops, and heads of the Lebanese Order of Monks² held a meeting to settle some of their conflicts. As they were not able to reach agreement, however, they appealed to the Holy See to send a Papal delegate to Mount Lebanon

¹In recent years there have been new changes made in the constitution of the Church.

²Lwis Blaybil, "Nabdhah Tarikhiyyah 'an al Rahbaniyyah al Lubnaniyyah," ed. Antonius Shibli, *MQ*, LI (1957), 297.

to preside over a Church council and help solve the conflicts in the Church.¹ The prelates asked specifically for Yusuf al Sim'ani, a Maronite clergyman and scholar in the service of the Holy See in the Roman Court, because of his familiarity with the language and customs of his people. This opportunity was immediately taken up by the Congregation of Propaganda as an occasion for a thorough reform in the Church. Before al Sim'ani left for Lebanon, the Propaganda, with his aid, laid down the entire substance and form of the council,² taking into consideration, however, some resolutions of previous Maronite councils.

In September 1736, al Sim'ani arrived in Mount Lebanon to find the Church prelates divided into two groups. On one side were the protagonists of reform, supporting al Sim'ani; at their head were Bishop 'Abdallah Qar'ali, Bishop Tubiyyah al Khazin, the European missionaries in Lebanon and Syria, and Tuma al Labudy, the principal general of the Lebanese Order of Monks. On the opposing side were the patriarch, Yusuf al Khazin, Bishop Ilias Muhasib, and Bishop Hanna Istfan. The patriarch was backed by Shaykh Nawfal al Khazin, who was at that time muqati'ji and French consul in Beirut, and by some other members of the Khazin house.

The Papal delegate, al Sim'ani, then appealed to the temporal powers to counter the Khazins' opposition. As an Apostolic delegate, he had access to two sources of temporal power, the Shihabi Hakim of Jabal al Druze, and the French general consul in Sayda. Before the Council meeting, the Apostolic delegate visited the Amir in Dayr al Qamar on a special, unrelated, matter of business. The Amir had delegated to the Pope the right to raise a suit against the banks of Florence where Amir Fakhr al Din had deposited his money. As his de-

¹Ghibra'il, Tarikh al Kanisah . . ., II, 579; also Sim'ani, TML, p. 493.

²Ibid.; also Mas'ad, MB, see preface. Dib, Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, X, Part I, 80.

scendant, Amir Milhim Shihab was trying to withdraw the money from Florence and put his case with the Holy See. Al Sim'ani carried a report to the Amir from the Pope on this matter. At the same time he took the opportunity to ask that the Amir use his influence with the patriarch to get more cooperation from the head of the Church of Antioch. The Amir actually did send a letter to the patriarch, the bishops, and the Khazin shaykhs asking them to obey the Apostolic delegate.¹ But according to the political rules of the time, the Amir could not do more, for he had no right to interfere with the prelates or to take action against any of the shaykhs' subjects without the latter's intercession.²

Al Sim'ani's request to the Shihabi governor was not unprecedented; Rome had appealed to the Shihabi Amirs to help settle its business with the Maronite hierarchy before and after al Sim'ani's appeal. In acting thus, the Roman Curia was not following a consistent policy in its relations with the Maronite clergy, for on one hand it exhorted against clerical involvement with the temporal rulers and on the other hand it appealed frequently to the Shihabis against the Church hierarchy. Thanks to the political institutions of the country and the prestige of the Maronite shaykhs, the Shihabis used their influence with great restraint and caution. As a result, the Church remained fairly free in the exercise of its authority.

Al Sim'ani also appealed to the French consul in Sayda, who was the superior of the consul in Beirut. The latter office was occupied by Nawfal al Khazin. The French consul reproached Shaykh Nawfal al Khazin for his opposition to the Apostolic delegate and brought home to him the implications with respect

¹Sim'ani, TML, p. 483.

²Patriarch Istfan (1766-1793), when engaged in a later dispute with Rome, claimed that Amir Milhim had sent 10 soldiers and forced the patriarch to agree to al Sim'ani's terms. See Fighali, MQ, XLV, 265, in a letter from Mgr. Jirmanus Adam to the Pope, based on the conversation of the former with the patriarch.

to his position as consul if he persisted in his policy.¹ At that point Shaykh Nawfal had to moderate his stand and then tried to mediate differences existing between the patriarch and his opponents. In any case, the stalemate which had been holding up the council meeting was overcome and the convocation started on 27 September 1736.

Discussion in the meetings was limited. What the Council amounted to was the presentation of the prepared text to the delegates; very minor points were modified as a result of deliberation. At the conclusion of the sixth and final meeting, all those present signed the document. It was clear that al Sim'ani had succeeded in bringing the Maronite clergy to external conformity, but had failed drastically in winning their confidence and good will. Many were later heard to comment that they had signed the Council text to oblige the Apostolic delegate and the French consul.²

Al Sim'ani, however, was determined to see some of the reforms immediately implemented before his return to Rome, and thus he proceeded to do the job himself. He started by separating the mixed monasteries. He could not finish the task, though, for his assumption of executive authority irked the patriarch and brought the two into renewed open hostility. The patriarch ordered al Sim'ani to stop all action and interference in the affairs of his community. Then he sent a circular letter to all the monks and prelates admonishing them not to respect any measure taken by the delegate, and he absolved those whom al Sim'ani had suspended.³

The attitude of the patriarch put an end to al Sim'ani's hopes. It was clear that he was not going to achieve the objective for which he was sent without the good will and consent of the patriarch. The reason why he did not show

¹ Sim'ani, TML, p. 497.

² Shayban, Tarikh, pp. 524-25.

³ Sim'ani, TML, pp. 528-29.

great ability in leading men may have been due to the rigidity of the terms of his mission, which left him little room for maneuver. He returned to Rome without attempting any further reconciliation. His departure in disagreement with the patriarch was, perhaps, his biggest mistake, for his whole effort and the Council itself was put in a state of suspension. The patriarch raised his case with the Holy See through one of his able Church legates, Ilias Sa'd. In Rome the Holy See examined the case as presented by the patriarch's legate, and decided to uphold al Sim'ani and to reject the patriarch's plea. In 1741 the Lebanese Council was confirmed by the Pope and thus became the formal constitution of the Maronite Church, though its implementation was gradual and took over a century.

Traditional attitudes and unfavorable environment made the implementation of the Council resolutions very difficult, not to mention the hostile attitude of the Maronites toward the manner in which the Council was conducted. There were inherent problems in the reorganization plan made by the Council, and these baffled the reformists in the Church as well. The Holy See, however, persisted in its request that all the reform measures should be put into effect. This steadfast policy on the part of Rome encouraged those who were interested in reform to continue the effort, and for the next 50 years the Church was engaged in a relentless struggle. As a result, seven councils were held within the short time span of 54 years following the Lebanese Council, all of which revolved on the measures introduced by the Lebanese Council. The effect of this endeavor was to apply the reform measures gradually, instead of as al Sim'ani had wished.

The Lebanese Council did not aim at the destruction of the autonomy of the Maronite Church; it simply intended greater rationalization of the Church's organization. To combat this modernizing trend, the conservative forces in the Maronite Church appealed to national pride and the history and character of their

Church. They declared that their duty was to preserve that with which their fathers and grandfathers had entrusted them. National pride and opposition to Latinization are still felt in the Maronite Church to this day.¹

The Council resolutions were divided into four parts. First the principles of the Catholic faith were laid down in some detail in five chapters. The second part dealt with the Sacramental rites and rituals, in 14 chapters, while the third section of six chapters was devoted to the organization of the clergy. The fourth part dealt with miscellaneous Church questions.² The Council resolutions were originally written in both Arabic and Latin, and al Sim'ani kept copies in both languages of the various points raised or modified. But the resolutions were not printed in Arabic until 1788, when the first Arabic copy was published in the Catholic monastery of Mar Yuhanna al Shwayr in Mount Lebanon. It was printed at the expense of Shaykh Ghandur al Khury, Amir Yusuf's mudabbir, and distributed by him freely. However, this Arabic version of 1788 was modified in many ways by the higher clergy to make some of the Council rules read more like the actual practice in the Church.³ For this reason the Holy See ordered a new Arabic translation directly from the Latin, which was completed in 1900 by Bishop Butrus Najm.

Although the Lebanese Council stipulated that the Church hierarchy was to hold councils once every three years, only nine councils have been convoked from that period to the present time. It often took special prodding from the Holy See to make the Maronite clergy call for a Church Council. The Council of

¹See Mas'ad, MB, preface. The controversy during the second centennial of the Lebanese Council is an example of this, see Mikha'il al Rajji, "Hawl al Majma' al Lubnani," MS, mimeographed personal copy of the author. Cf. Bulus Mas'ad, Al Rad 'ala Mikha'il al Rajji (Aleppo: al Matba'ah al Maruniyyah, 1937).

²Yusuf Najm (ed. and trans.), Al Majma' al Lubnani (Juni, Lebanon: Matba'at al Arz, 1900).

³Regarding these differences, see Fighali, MQ, XLV, 239ff.

1818 in which final steps were taken to implement the law regarding episcopal sees, first laid down in the Lebanese Council, was another important synod.

Causes of Reform

The preceding historical synopsis of the reform effort may leave the impression that what took place in the Church was exclusively due to the desire of Rome to revive Catholicism in the east. This is true, but not the whole truth. For a comprehensive understanding of the causes of reform, one also has to take into account developments in Mount Lebanon which created new needs in the community not met by the old parochial organization of the Maronite hierarchy. The Maronites' expansion into distant places and mixing with non-Maronites and non-Christians, the growth in numbers of the clergy and the increase in Church property and revenue, the ideas of Western-educated clergy, and the freedom enjoyed by the Church under the Shihabis, were all factors determining the outcome of the encounter between East and West in the Maronite Church. The following explains how these developments within the Maronite community proved compatible with the efforts of Rome and the reform movement.

One can see in the very early attempts at reform, those made by Battista in 1578, some conditions in the Church favorable for reform. The Maronite patriarch, for instance, found in Battista's efforts a beneficial policy which would break the isolation of the Maronites from Western Christendom. The Pope, who represented the outside and larger world, was a strong legitimating force for the sanction and support of the patriarch in his small isolated community. The latter also found in the Papal delegate a means to uphold his authority over the clergy and the community. The order and discipline which Battista tried to establish in the Church corroborated the legal authority of the patriarch. For instance, Battista's efforts to bring a reconciliation between the patriarch and some of his insubordinate bishops proved to the patriarch that he could strengthen his authority as the head of the Church.

When the opposition to Battista in the Church became strong and the patriarch was obliged to ask him to leave the country, the patriarch was hoping that under more favorable conditions in the future Battista could come back. He actually made an effort in that direction and wrote to the principal-general of the Jesuit Order in 1578 asking him to send Battista back to Lebanon to finish his mission. In this letter he wrote:

He [Battista] has read some of our books and has found that they are without count and have many mistakes in them. [I would like to have him come back] to call on my flock in my company and the company of some of my bishops, to organize the community and put it in line with the wishes of his Holiness the Pope. For we by ourselves are not able to undertake the task, for our word is not respected here the way yours is in your country.¹

Although the foregoing shows that there were some favorable factors for reform, on the whole the existing conditions in the Church, as well as in the Maronite Mountain community, militated against the progress of the reform movement at that time. In the first place, the Maronites were watched carefully by the Muslim masters of the land, and any ostentatious demonstration of contact with the Franjis was bound to bring upon them considerable misfortune. All contact with the Western world was then maintained through the Muslim town of Tripoli which formed the gate to the Maronite hinterland. In the second place, the Maronite community, at that period and well into the seventeenth century, formed a small group of people who lived together within a very limited radius. Almost all relations among them were local and personal. Thus they could hardly be expected to feel the need for the rationalization of the Church structure. Much of the opposition to reform came from the fact that the new rules and regulations went contrary to established practice and seemed to the people and clergy to have no *raison d'être*. Third, at that time the Maronites themselves could not be considered wholly committed to Catholicism. Strong local feeling of independence and faulty understanding of the Catholic faith worked to limit their relations with Rome.

¹Shaykho, *MQ*, XVIII, 682.

Up to the beginning of the eighteenth century the efforts of Rome were in line with the interests of the patriarch and the rehabilitation of his authority. The only disturbing issue during the seventeenth century between the Holy See and the Maronite patriarchs was the question of the Latin missionaries, like the Franciscans, Capuchins, and Jesuits. The patriarchs saw these missionaries as agents working to undermine their authority by Latinizing the Maronites, especially in Jerusalem where the missionaries were strong and the Maronites constituted almost the only Catholic element among the natives, small as it was. Intense conflicts developed, decrees were issued by the patriarchs to their flocks forbidding them to deal with the Latin missionaries,¹ and there was much correspondence with Rome on this question. Finally the Holy See had to issue orders to stop the missionaries from interfering with the Maronite people.² The Council of Hrash in 1644 was an illustration of this conflict and was particularly called to combat Latin missionaries' encroachments on the Maronite Church. Several other councils, too, dealt with this question.

By the eighteenth century new developments led to a different phase in the reform movement. First, the number of Maronite clericals educated in Rome had increased and their mission in Mount Lebanon started to give fruit after more than a century of work. However, distance, the hazards of the trip, and absence of a preparatory school in Mount Lebanon made it impossible for as many students to go to Rome as the Holy See would have liked. For instance, of 15 students who went to Rome in 1639, only three succeeded in getting through the course.³ Afterwards, three to five students only were sent at a time. The number of students, for example, who went to the Maronite College in Rome be-

¹Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 563; also Mas'ad, MB, pp. 87, 93.

²Ibid.

³See account of the students left by al Duwayhi, and published by Shaykho, MQ, XXI, 209-16, 270-79.

tween 1637 and 1685 was 70. Of these 16 failed in their endeavor, and 54 returned home to serve their people.

In 1685, the centennial of the College was celebrated in Rome, and in that celebration 24 graduates were honored by the College in absentia for their distinguished services.¹ Three of these had become patriarchs, one of them Syrian Catholic and the other two Maronite, Jirjus 'Umayrah (1633-1644) and Istfan al Duwayhi (1670-1704). Twelve others had become bishops, and nine were honored for their distinguished learning and services to the community.² These graduates of Rome introduced the first seeds of learning to Mount Lebanon and prepared for the literary revival in the Arab world which germinated in Lebanon. While a number became oriental scholars in Europe,³ many of the students went home to serve the flock and teach village children. In Lebanon their mission consisted of preaching and writing religious works for the clergy and the lay population. Books on religion, theology, ethics, philosophy, and the history of the Maronite community and Church were some of their achievements.⁴

During their educational sojourn in Rome the students of the Maronite College acquired new abilities, new habits, and new ideas which they planted in Mount Lebanon. Many of them determined upon missionary work; as one of them stated on the eve of his departure from Rome, "I want to extend the scope for the Catholic faith as much as I can . . . after my return home."⁵ From the careers which they followed it is clear that missionary work in educating both the flock and the clergy in Mount Lebanon was the major activity of this early group of students.

¹Ibid., pp. 277-79.

²Ibid.

³See Raphael, Le Role . . ., passim.

⁴See list of manuscripts in Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 153-201. Many of these works, not yet published, are preserved in the library of the Lebanese monks in their monastery in Rome.

⁵Ghalib, MQ, XXII, 345.

The outlook of the new generation of clergy and their plans for advancement were bound to clash with the existing practices and structure of the Church. The student quoted above, Monsignor 'Umayrah, later wrote a letter to the Pope describing the obstacles confronting the religious worker in the Maronite Church and foreseeing the clash which was to erupt a couple decades after his death. He stated in his letter that the need for workers was great, for the crop was plentiful but the workers few. He mentioned the hardships to which a bishop was exposed, such as oppression from non-Christian rulers and lack of reverence from his own people. Then he described the chains shackling the modern cleric in a traditional Church.

I feel weary and unable to fulfil the duties of my episcopal rank. . . . I cannot devote time to the needs of souls in a state of peace of mind, nor am I able to write or translate religious books from Latin, for I am obliged to tend to my land and other occupations not worthy of the noble rank of my office, instead of the episcopal duties and responsibilities. . . . All these things and similar ones make me impatient and anxious, and my mind is perplexed.

He did not even have the episcopal costume in which to conduct mass, he added.¹

Monsignor 'Umayrah suggested one way to improve this sad state of affairs, namely for the bishop to have a fixed salary which would enable him to attend to the duties of his office without distraction. He turned to the Holy See to aid the Church in this objective. In later times, though, other bishops with similar problems focused on the reorganization of their Church hierarchy, instead of turning to the Holy See, to provide for the livelihood of a Church officer.

The migration of Maronites from northern Lebanon to Jabal al Druze was another factor contributing to the reform movement. As we have seen in chapter i, the Maronite population grew in number very rapidly during the eighteenth century; they spread out into new territories to the south in Kisrwan and Jabal al Druze. The needs of the more widely dispersed community required priests and bishops to live among their flock wherever they happened to be. In staying with the

¹Letter published in Ghalib, MQ, XXII, 444.

flock, away from the patriarchal see, the prelates and priests felt it was necessary for them to have a measure of autonomy in their relations with the patriarch. The new situation induced the Church prelates to attempt changes in the order of the Church.

Another factor which called for the reorganization of the Church was the growth of the orders of monks. The relations between the orders and the Church hierarchy needed regulation if the increasing conflicts between them were to be ameliorated.

The issues leading to most of the conflict in the Church institutions can be limited to the following main ones, though there were others as well. First, the question of decentralizing the Church administration: autonomy was sought for bishops and priests to serve the distant flock. This was a question of jurisdiction. The Maronite patriarchs had previously followed a practice, no doubt the result of the early and humble beginnings of the community, in which they personally conducted most of the Church affairs, with the bishops as simple officials whom they could send on missions and various errands. Few bishops could complain about this state of affairs when they could not see in the Church structure any alternative choices and other prospects open for them within a small and poor community. Before the seventeenth century there was hardly a Maronite community in Mount Lebanon which could afford to support a bishop of its own; and in Jibbat Bsharri where most of the Maronites lived, the patriarch was in charge.

As the community grew in size and importance, however, new conditions presented greater possibilities for the bishops. They could serve in several dioceses, especially in Kistrwan and Jabal al Druze, and make some living in that way. Continued subservience to the patriarch was greatly resented. Complete dependence on the head of the Church raised problems for the bishops who served the flock and for their priests as well. In the first place the patri-

arch, as has been mentioned previously, did not appoint a bishop to a diocese with a fixed tenure. The frequent changes in duties prevented the bishops from devoting their attention to one definite group of the community and also made it impossible for them to secure a steady flow of revenue from the flock. These conditions caused resentment among the clergy.

A second difficulty stemming from the inadequacy of the old organization was the problem of the holy oil, which was necessary for the priests and prelates to carry out their functions. The practice had been for each bishop and priest to go to the patriarchal see for the oil,¹ for which the patriarch exacted a certain price. This was one of the sources of his revenue. By the eighteenth century it had become obvious that this custom was getting increasingly impractical. It took a priest several days to reach the patriarchal see every time he went for the oil, and as a consequence he had to leave his flock unattended.² The view of the proponents of reform was that this practice should cease and that the function of blessing the oil should be turned over to archbishops who would distribute it to the priests and monks.

The issue came up in the first day's meeting of the Lebanese Council. The statement read to the delegates prescribed that the patriarch should distribute the holy oil to the bishops, who in turn would take the responsibility of distributing it to the priests of their dioceses.³ This, however, was different from the original Latin copy which prescribed that the archbishops should bless the oil.⁴ It was obviously a compromise, but even such a compromise was not acceptable to the patriarch, for he would not accept any limitations on his authority or revenue. He walked out of the meeting. The Council was in deadlock for 13 days during which efforts were made to mediate the differences between the conflicting parties. The patriarch unwillingly conceded and returned

¹Sim'ani, TML, p. 488.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., p. 487.

⁴See Figbali, MQ, XLV, 555.

to the meetings. Later in his suit against the Council, the patriarch raised this point with the Holy See and asked whether the Council ruling should be followed.¹ The Papal Bull confirmed the Council resolution:² the patriarch was to distribute the holy oil to the bishops without any charge whatsoever. He agreed to this, but not without bad feeling.

The above issue was related to the question of the episcopal sees and decentralization of administration. As was mentioned earlier, a major reform item was the establishment of separate and defined dioceses with a Church-owned episcopal see in each. The Holy See was strongly on the side of the reformists on this question and looked very critically at the unusual prerogatives of the patriarch by which he could act as he wished regarding the bishops and their functions. In a Papal Bull on the matter issued in 1742, strong terms were used:

The Maronite patriarchs on the See of Antioch assumed something like a legal right to send as their deputies archbishops who are appointed to one diocese to another one in Kisrwan and Jabal Lubnan, without being discharged from the responsibilities of the see over which they originally presided . . . an ancient custom in their Church. This practice is not based on any legally proven right but on personal power or some other grounds. They also used to charge fees in money and other forms at the time and place of distribution of the holy oil, claiming that it was necessary for their livelihood and the responsibilities of their patriarchate. The claim to these rights was annulled in the mentioned council [the Lebanese] on the grounds that they were not legitimate but repudiated by the holy laws.³

When this issue came up at the Lebanese Council, the Patriarch Yusuf al Khazin reacted violently. Even after he had signed the Council resolutions with the rest of the delegates he refused to acquiesce in al Sim'ani's attempt to restore one of the bishops to his diocese in accordance with the new rules. He told al Sim'ani that the flock was his and he would do with it as he liked.⁴

¹See Bull by Pope Benedict XIV published in Mas'ad, MB, p. 106.

²Ibid., p. 108. Cf. the Council of 1755, Rashid al Khury al Shartuni (ed.), al Majami' al Maruniyyah (Beirut: al Matba'ah al Kathulikiyyah, 1904), p. 10.

³See Mas'ad, MB, p. 106.

⁴Sim'ani, TML, p. 510.

Having lost these two privileges, the patriarchs later tried to restore some of their lost prerogatives by arbitrary interpretation of the pastoral message. Pastoral messages were letters the bishops were supposed to receive from the patriarch regularly and announce to their congregations. The patriarchs tried to charge a fee for these messages and sometimes insisted that a bishop could not visit his diocese without a pastoral message. The bishops complained of this practice to the Roman Curia and were able to procure a decree forbidding the patriarchs from such action.¹

The new division of functions and definition of jurisdiction among the Church prelates had repercussions on the Church which were not unforeseen by the Lebanese Council; it was now clear that in order to function, a rational organization must have salaried personnel. For a long time this was the most difficult question standing in the way of Church reform. The difficulties stemming from this problem exposed the weaknesses of the Lebanese Council. For the Council was a blueprint more appropriate for the condition of the Church in European countries than in Mount Lebanon. The bureaucratic structure planned by the Council was too expensive for a subsistence economy like that of Mount Lebanon. A nineteenth-century Lebanese historian, Shayban al Khazin, perceived the problem of the Lebanese Council with practical insight. Where, he asked, could the funds be found for the income of the prelates as prescribed in the Lebanese Council? An archbishop, according to the Council, would have a retinue of about 10 assistants.²

It was clear that the Maronite clergy would not and could not follow the Council's resolutions regarding the income of patriarch and bishops. But after the reorganization of the Church, neither could they keep the earlier means of finance, for the Council struck at the foundation of the old order

¹Mas'ad, MB, p. 124.

²Shayban, Tarikh, p. 522.

when it cancelled some of the existing sources of the patriarch's revenue. This situation caused much confusion and friction among the higher clergy until in 1769 a number of bishops met, without the permission of the patriarch, and decided to send him a memorandum asking that each archbishop should live in the diocese which was in his name and have a fixed salary.¹ The patriarch's answer was quite cynical: he replied that he had not tampered with the bishops' income, for he had left it as it was since the days of Saint Marun (d. 707). This was probably true, but it was in complete disregard of recent developments and the Lebanese Council. The bishops then sent their complaint to the Holy See. The Pope exerted new pressure on the patriarch and issued an order in which he fixed the income of the patriarch and that of his bishops.

As suggested earlier, one of the causes for reform, and a problem which was discussed in the Lebanese Council, was the Order of Lebanese Monks. The monks disliked the fact that the patriarch had a great deal of power concentrated in his hands, because he used these powers to limit their expansion and activities. The patriarch, as well as the bishops and priests, on the other hand, were unhappy about the monks' encroachments on their domain in providing service to the parishes. The monks were popular among the people and drew them away from their regular priests. The priests complained to their superiors and the latter put a lid on the monks' activities. As a result, the Lebanese Order was one of the most active and enthusiastic supporters of al Sim'ani and the reform movement.²

Some Ideas of Reform

The ideas of the reform movement represented an outlook entirely new to the Lebanese scene at that time and by their very nature undermined the tradi-

¹Ghibra'il, Tarikh al Kanisah . . ., II, 629.

²Shibli, MQ, LI, 318.

tional institutions upon which the Church rested. The first thing which attracts the attention of the historian is the existence of two markedly opposed attitudes among the clergy. On the one hand were those who stood for new ideas and for progress, and on the other their conservative opponents upholding the traditional ways of their predecessors.

The historian Shayban al Khazin, who was closely connected with the internal affairs of the Church, illustrated clearly the split between the modernists and the conservatives, having himself been associated with the latter. From the day the bishops spread out and started to take up residence away from the patriarchal see, he wrote, the modernists claimed that such separation meant freedom (itlag al hurriyyah) and spiritual growth; but in fact it proved to be the heart of the trouble and was causing the destruction of the community. Naturally, he continued, other Christian communities would follow the steps of destruction like the Maronites.¹ Shayban was obsessed with a feeling of decline in the Church and in the political institutions of the country. Decline in the Church, he thought, was the result of the freedom given to the bishops.² Its symptoms were free expression of views and constant disagreement among the prelates. The deterioration of the social order according to the views of Shayban will be discussed later in another context.

Shayban al Khazin was an experienced man and well informed on the affairs of his country. He showed a degree of insight rare in Mount Lebanon during his time, yet his fears in this case were not as serious as he imagined them to be. For under the impetus of reform the Church showed much activity, intellectual venture, and enterprising spirit. A rationalized organization within a traditional setting, as the Church was in the days of Shayban, disturbed the minds of thoughtful men inclined toward tranquility and security. The struggles,

¹Shayban, Tarikh, p. 521.

²Ibid., p. 451.

conflicts, and fights generated by the introduction of reform and by the new demands of a growing community distressed Shayban al Khazin and many others like him, who tended to see in these activities premonitions of doom.

The argument between modernists and conservatives was also sharply drawn in a polemic between Bishop 'Abdallah Qar'ali, one of the leading reformists of the Maronite clergy, and another monk. He wrote:

You will perhaps object and say that one should adhere to the old and established, not to the new and modern; but this will not serve your purpose, for those who enter the monastic life have a choice of the way they want to live after the permission of their superiors. . . . The new law is not incompatible with the rites of the Church.¹

Achievement values defined the new outlook and undermined the old. The concept of merit was advanced as the basis of recruitment and promotion to Church offices. In particular this was directed against the practice of filling offices through kin relationships, which, as we have seen, was very prevalent in the Church. The advocates of the new outlook sought legitimization of their ideas in the Holy Book. Resolution 17 of the Council of Ghusta, 1768, reads,

As is stated in the Holy Book kin relationship does not lead to the glory of God.² . . . Offices and ranks in the Church should not be subjected to inheritance by blood relations, but rather on the basis of merit which is more suitable to the glory of God and for the interest of the faithful.³

Measures were also taken at the Council of Ghusta to ensure that those who presented themselves to be ordained were really qualified. A board of examiners was set up, but for various reasons it could not function for long, and the archbishops took over its function.⁴

Freedom of the Church from interference by commoners, nobles, and rulers was another principle advocated by the reformers. For example, a group of vil-

¹Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 410-11.

²Shartuni, MM, p. 37.

³Ibid., p. 27.

⁴See letter of Archbishop Mikha'il Fadil to the monks, Blaybil, TRLM, LI, 530.

lagers who had been incited against the Council of Ghusta by one of the recalcitrant bishops who did not attend the meeting, went to the Council to plead the bishop's cause. In answer to their intrusion, the delegates issued a statement threatening the villagers with excommunication if they meddled in affairs strictly under Church jurisdiction: "We will not allow you to interfere in these matters, for such interference leads to temptation and is against the rules of the Church which strike with excommunication those who violate the law."¹ Then they made clear to the people that Church affairs were not subject to inheritance and that the Church was not the property of individuals; that the Council was not meeting to discuss private cases but to deliberate and decide on public matters, and "equality in what belongs to the public causes no harm to anyone."² The Church was thus a free and independent organization in the view of the reformists, and anyone who caused an outside element to encroach on its freedom committed a great sin subject to severe penalty. If temporal rulers interfered in a Church decision and forced the clergy to settle a matter or pass a judgment, it was maintained, that judgment would be considered nullified. The same applied to promotion to clerical office effected under threat of force.³

The most elaborate system of ideas advocated in the Church councils, especially in the Lebanese Council, dealt with the tenets of the Catholic faith. No attempt will be made here to discuss these theological ideas, as they are outside the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that they are standard Catholic dogma in accord with the beliefs of the Church of Rome. The Maronites did not develop religious dissent on theological grounds except in two instances: before their relations with Rome were made firm, and later, in the 1780's during

¹Shartuni, MM, p. 25.

²Ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 21-22, 24; Ghibra'il, Tarikh al Kanisah . . ., II, 578.

the controversy over the heresy of the Maronite nun, Hindiyyah, whose case occupied the Maronite Church for a decade, exposing its association with Rome to serious threat and the community to possible schism.

The Formal Structure of Church Bureaucracy

The Maronite Church can be described as a Catholic, autonomous, national church in Lebanon. The Church organization as it emerged in the beginning of the nineteenth century after the reform movement had effected major changes, was an elaborate bureaucracy.¹ Rationalization of the Church organization was very thorough, at least in its formal structure. Every single detail was prescribed in written rules and regulations, from those related to the head of the Church to those concerning the lowest clerical rank. There were rules defining the position, function, and duties of the higher prelates and those of the priests and monks; rules regarding procedure, records of Church members, finance, titles, priestly behavior in church and community, and the most minute details such as cleanliness of the church building and smoking habits of priests and monks. Here, only an outline of the structure of Church bureaucracy will be discussed, mainly as it took shape early in the nineteenth century, particularly after 1818.

At the head of the Maronite Church is a patriarch who rules over all the Church organization. But the Maronite patriarch is not an absolute ecclesiastical chief; he is subject to the Roman Pontiff and the constitution of his Church. The Maronite patriarchs have accepted, with varying degrees of loyalty, the sovereignty of the head of the Church of Peter since 1215, and since that period, with some long interruptions in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Maronite recognition of Papal authority has been maintained.²

¹The following account is based mainly on the text of the Lebanese Council.

²See above, chap. iii, p. 96.

The autonomous status of the Maronite Church raises the question of the place it occupied in the Universal Church of Rome. The Maronite patriarchs were expected to offer signs of obedience to the Pope and seek investiture personally from him after their election to office. However, it seems, early in their relations with the Maronites the Popes recognized that it was not possible for the Maronite patriarchs to seek investiture and offer signs of obedience in person as did the European prelates. Thus they were content to have the patriarchs send a messenger to Rome to seek the Pallium from the Holy See.¹ While the patriarchs themselves never sought the Pallium from Rome in person, they were always careful to make reference to their willingness to do so at any time.

This arrangement had more to it than the simple recognition of difficulties in communication. It was a concession by the Holy See to the special status of autonomy for the Maronites. To this day, Maronites are proud of this autonomy.²

The authority of the Pope extended to such matters as the determination of what constitutes heresy, when and if it should arise in the Maronite Church. The Pope alone had the right to award perfect Indulgences to churches, monasteries, and fraternities.³ Minor Indulgences, though, could be awarded by the patriarch himself. The Pope also had the right to suspend a patriarch or any other prelate, if the Holy See discovered that he had become guilty of some heresy or great wrong. The right to suspend a higher prelate of the Church was reserved to the Pope, to the exclusion of all others including the patriarch and the assembly of bishops.⁴

¹ See Papal Bull of 1579, Mas'ad, MB, p. 130.

² Ibid., p. 189.

³ Ibid., p. 48. In 1612 the Pope delegated this right to the patriarch, see decree in Ghibra'il, Tarikh al Kanisah . . ., II, 458-59.

⁴ Ibid., p. 553; also Fighali, MQ, XLV, 558-61.

The Roman Pontiffs often sought opportunities to increase their control over the Maronite clergy and to bring the Maronite hierarchy to greater conformity, and the patriarchs tried to resist. For instance, the Lebanese Council, which was prepared in Rome, stated that the Maronite patriarch should not proceed on any matter of importance without the prior consultation of the Holy See; but the Arabic version of the Council proceedings, as modified by the Maronite hierarchy, adds the stipulation, "in matters related to the faith,"¹ thus implicitly ruling out other regular patriarchal policy. After the Lebanese Council, orders from the Holy See went to the patriarchs prohibiting them from appointing new bishops without the permission of the Pope;² but the patriarchs ignored that order.³ In general, though, the influence of the Holy See on the Maronite hierarchy went far beyond these specific functions, especially in the great role the Popes played in reforming the Church.

The Patriarch

The Maronite patriarch is elected for a life term by a majority vote of all the bishops. The secular leaders and lay population were formally excluded from participating in Church elections. When the new patriarch was elected, all the bishops present knelt down and kissed his hand as a sign of obedience. The newly elected patriarch immediately sent for the Pallium from the Pope. The Papal investiture was one source of legitimacy for patriarchal authority. The authority of the Maronite patriarch was also legitimized by Maronite tradition which maintained that the patriarch was the deputy of the Apostle Peter over the Church of Antioch, and in line with this tradition the Maronite patriarchs

¹ Ibid.

² Shartuni, MM, pp. 10-11, 38.

³ Patriarch Istfan himself, who presided over the Council of Ghusta, violated this law and appointed two bishops against the will of the Holy See. Cf. the decree of the Propaganda of 1786, reproduced in Blaybil, TRIM, LI, 698-99, n. 1.

have always signed their names in Syriac "Phatrus Phatriarkho d'Antiokhio," Peter Patriarch of Antioch. The Shihabi Hakims, too, respected the authority of the patriarch and protected and supported the authority of the Church, both tacitly and with written statements.¹

The patriarch had to be at least 40 years old to be eligible to the office, and had to reside in the patriarchal see at Qannubin in Jibbat Bsharri, the regular see since the fifteenth century. During the eighteenth century, however, most patriarchs resided in KISRWAN. Starting in 1818, they returned to Qannubin, and Patriarch Hbaysh (1823-1845) started the custom of spending the summer in Jibbat Bsharri and the winter in KISRWAN.

The function of the patriarch was to make Church policy, preside over its councils, impose discipline on the clergy, appoint bishops and other clericals, and judge personal and civil suits. With the exception of the councils convoked by Battista, Dandini, and al Sim'ani, the patriarchs were responsible for most of the resolutions of Church councils. It was up to the patriarch to discipline not only the clergy but also lay members of the Church who denied their faith, those who maltreated the clergy and who sought the aid of secular rulers against them.² He could only use moral sanctions to enforce his judgment in disciplinary cases. Nor did his powers of legal adjudication carry means of enforcement; as we have seen earlier, it was simply a matter of arbitration.

The patriarch made new appointments of bishops whenever there was a vacancy. He could appoint bishops independently of any Church or lay influence, but the more usual practice was for the patriarch to consult with the bishops and in the case of the appointment of archbishops, to consult with the parishioners of the vacant diocese.

¹See letter of Amir Ahmad Shihab on behalf of the governing Amir, to Amir Isma'il Shihab in 1768, reproduced in Harfush, MQ, VI, 890, n. 1.

²Shartuni, MM, pp. 29-30.

The Maronite patriarch fulfilled the function of archbishop in one of the eight dioceses of the Church. At first the diocese of Sayda came under his jurisdiction, but due to its distance from the patriarchal see, an exchange was made in 1833 between the diocese of Sayda and that of Jbayl in which the patriarch took the latter.

In conducting the affairs of the Church, the patriarch had a number of assistants, the major ones being the two or more bishops who stayed with him in Qannubin. One was a patriarchal secretary and the other deputy to the patriarch, both positions of importance. These two officers exercised great power as advisors to the patriarch, and it was not unusual for one of them to be elected to the See of Antioch after the death of the patriarch. These two officers also managed the Church affairs during the interim period between the death of a patriarch and the election of a successor. But they were forbidden by law to make major Church decisions or new clerical appointments during this interim period.

The revenue of the patriarch was derived from several sources. In 1784, by orders of the Holy See, the patriarch was assigned a fixed annual income of 2,500 piasters to be contributed by the eight dioceses including the patriarchal bishopric of Jbayl and al Batrun. Each was assigned a sum in proportion to its wealth.¹ The patriarch also received the tithe collected for him from the congregation by the archbishops. His other sources of revenue were the returns of his diocese, the property of the patriarchal see at Qannubin, and offerings made annually by the heads of the monasteries.² Estimates of the annual patriarchal revenue in the nineteenth century, made by European writers with intimate knowl-

¹See Mas'ad MB, p. 125; the amount to be contributed by each diocese is also listed; also Tawtal, MQ, LI, 358-59.

²For these apportionments, to be paid by the Lebanese Order monasteries, see Blaybil, TRLM, LI, 504-05.

edge of Mount Lebanon, suggest that the income of the patriarch was enormous. Poujoulat makes it 500,000 piasters,¹ and Churchill maintains it was 5,000 livres.²

Bishops

In the first part of the nineteenth century the number of bishops and archbishops varied from 10 to 12, only seven of whom were archbishops. The Church had eight dioceses, each of which had one archbishop, with a permanent seat for his residence. The diocese of Jbayl and al Batrun, as was mentioned previously, was presided over by the patriarch. The eight dioceses were those of Aleppo, Tripoli, Jbayl and al Batrun, Ba'albak, Damascus, Cyprus, Beirut, and Sayda.³ With the exception of Aleppo, all these dioceses were located in Mount Lebanon regardless of the names they carried. (See Figure 4.)

There were three steps to the election of a bishop: nomination, confirmation, and finally ordination. Nomination was made by the people and the notables of the diocese, but in the case of the titular bishops, by the patriarch and/or the assembly of bishops. The manner in which this took place was described in detail by Colonel Churchill.

When a bishop dies, the Patriarch writes to the principal people of the village [diocese] under the jurisdiction of the deceased prelate, requesting them to assemble together, and nominate a priest to the vacant see; should there be an unanimity of voices, the Patriarch confirms their selection; if on the contrary they cannot agree, he desires them to send him the names of three priests, and from this list he selects one for the Bishopric.⁴

Legally, the patriarch only had to consult the bishops for the appointment, but

¹ Poujoulat and Michaud, Correspondance, VII, 316.

² Colonel Churchill, Mount Lebanon: A Ten Years of Residence from 1842-1852 (3 vols.; London: Saunders and Otley, 1853), III, 79.

³ See Appendix III, below.

⁴ Churchill, Mount Lebanon, p. 78; also Tiyyan papers of 1809, Patriarchal Archives of Bkirki, Bkirki, Lebanon. (Henceforth PAB.)




Figure 4
The 7 Dioceses
of the MARONITE
CHURCH IN
LEBANON

in practice the patriarchs continued to consult the people on matters that affected them directly. After the concerned sides agreed on a candidate, the patriarch confirmed him; then the candidate was formally ordained by the patriarch in the presence of the higher clergy and the lay public.

To avoid the possibility of bribery and irregularities in Church promotion, the Lebanese Council passed a law forbidding the bishops to pay anything for their appointments. Only an authorized fee was permitted at the time the newly appointed bishops registered their names.¹ Archbishops were elected for life and the patriarch could not remove one of them from his office or suspend him without serious cause, in which case he had to consult with the assembly of bishops. The bishops themselves were prohibited by the councils from interfering or transgressing on each other's flocks.

The bishops had several functions. They served as an electoral college to choose the next patriarch, and as a consultative assembly to advise the patriarch in Church affairs. However, most of their time was occupied with their pastoral mission: to direct, supervise, and guide the clergy in their diocese. Finally, the bishops tried cases of religious and civil nature² and imposed discipline in case of religious abuse by members of the congregation and in personal matters. Discipline was applied in such cases as the harming of others, running away from home and parents, mistreating the clergy, and similar things. The bishop also had to look after the good education and behavior of his priests and see to the education of the new generation aspiring to the clerical life. He also provided education facilities for the village children in his diocese.³ The archbishop recruited new priests and made appointments in

¹Mas'ad, MB, p. 46.

²The best account of these activities is that of Patriarch Yuhanna al Hilu in the minutes of his episcopal visits, Hilu papers, PAB.

³Mas'ad, MB, p. 42.

the villages. Additionally, the bishops had the right to ordain new priests and recommend clerics from their dioceses to the patriarch for promotion to higher office.

Another function of the bishops was to collect the tithe for the patriarch. The archbishop's revenue came from his share of this tithe; Council resolutions mention that the patriarch left to the archbishop one-tenth of the tithe.¹ Other sources of revenue were associated with his services in the diocese, such as mass, baptism, weddings, funerals, and the like. Usually priests performed these functions, but the well-to-do people usually asked a bishop as well to attend to their religious services. The bishop had the additional right to commute or relax rules, especially in cases of marriage.

Directly under the archbishop came the numerous secular priests who served the flock in villages and small towns. In 1840, according to Bishop Nqula Mrad, there were 1,205 priests in the Church.² These clerics lived on the returns from the religious services they performed for the villagers, who supported their priests in kind, such as contributions of wheat and bread.³ Usually, however, the secular priest was a poor man and had to cultivate some small lot of land around his house from which he could supplement his income. Priests were also the teachers in villages where they taught children the three R's and religious catechisms under an oak tree or in the church courtyard.

The Orders of Monks

Within the Church organization there were still other hierarchies, those of the orders of monks. There were three of them, the native Lebanese Order (al

¹Shartuni, MM, pp. 29-30.

²Niqula Murad, Notice Historique sur l'origine de la Nation Maronite et sur ses Rapports avec la France, sur la Nation Druzes et sur les Diverses Populations du Mont Liban (Paris: Le Clère, 1844), p. 46. Cf. Guys, Beyrouth et le Liban . . ., II, 177.

³Mas'ad, MB, p. 94.

Baladi), the Aleppine Lebanese Order, and the Order of Mar Ash'ia. The three orders had for their patron Saint Anthony. Some monks with no organization or rules survived in small numbers until the nineteenth century and were known as al 'Ibbaq, or hermits, but these were of no consequence.

The orders of monks represented one of the most remarkable achievements of the reform-minded clericals; for, in addition to playing a leading part in the reform of the Church hierarchy itself, they established and supported a new, relatively progressive organization which occupies an interesting part of the history of Mount Lebanon in general and of the Maronite Church in particular.

The Lebanese Order was started in 1696 by three young monks, 'Abdallah Qar'ali, Jibrail Hawwa, and Jirmanus Farhat. Missionary work was stated to be the foremost goal of the Order.¹ A few years later under the leadership of Qar'ali, the group changed the emphasis in the Order's purpose to works. The genius of Qar'ali lay in his ability to see the actual limitations to a new movement in an inhospitable environment and the necessity of the highly idealistic mission's reconciliation to the actual situation. A missionary movement could not function successfully without sufficient funds, and the monks had none. Qar'ali perceived that very clearly and, as a realistic solution, launched a plan to establish monasteries with land to work on and to serve the community during the time which could be spared.

In the year 1700 the Maronite patriarch, Istfan al Duwayhi, confirmed the brotherhood and its laws; in 1706 the order was given the name of the Lebanese Order of Monks (al Rahbaniyyah al Lubnaniyah); and in 1732 it was confirmed by the Holy See, with the aid of al Sim'ani, one of its most powerful supporters. In 1768, by an understanding with the Church hierarchy, the Lebanese Order split into two orders which became known as the Native Lebanese (al Baladi al Lubnani)

¹Tawtal, MQ, LI, 343; also Karam, Qala'id . . ., II, 51-52. See also 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVI, 569; and Blaybil, MQ, LI, 292-93.

and the Aleppine Lebanese (al Halabi al Lubnani). The division was caused by strife between the monks of the towns and the monks of the mountain, who had been vying incessantly among themselves for leadership. At the time of the division there were 251 monks in the Order, of whom 190 joined the Baladi order and 61 joined the Aleppine. Only one monk from Aleppo joined the Baladi order; the rest were all from Mount Lebanon. The Aleppine order had 35 members from Aleppo and 21 from towns like Beirut and Tripoli.¹

The Order of Mar Ash'ia, founded in 1700² by Bishop Jibra'il al Bluzawi (later Patriarch Bluzawi), adopted the rules of the Lebanese Order of Monks. An estimate of their numbers made in the second part of the eighteenth century is 100;³ however, this may not be very accurate. They had 13 monasteries at that time.⁴ Although modeled after the Lebanese Order, the Order of Mar Ash'ia was not very well organized, nor its monks as well educated as those of the other two orders. In addition, there were other Christian orders in Lebanon which adopted the laws of the Lebanese Order, such as the Melkite Catholics, the Shwayr order, the Armenian Catholics, and the Chaldean Catholics.⁵

The Lebanese Order is by far the most important of the three and will be discussed here separately. The organization of the Order was highly rational. Unlike the Church organization, it was not hindered by strong traditional forms which pulled back every time an element of modernization was introduced. The Order had the advantage of starting with no past behind it, but rather according to premeditated plan drawn by the founder and put into written form. The corpus of its rules is enormous. It was written by Qar'ali under the name of

¹Ibid., p. 303.

²Ibid., p. 283; also 'Anaysi, Silsilah . . ., p. 47.

³Ghalib, MQ, XXVIII, 594.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Blaybil, MQ, LI, 283-84.

"al Misbah al Rahbani fi Sharh al Qanun al Lubnani," that is, "The Monastic Lantern in the Commentary on the Lebanese Laws."

The monks' organization consisted of a central committee of five members, the principal-general of the order (al ra'is al 'am) and four secretaries (mudabbirs). Due to the importance of the Order of Monks, the principal-general was declared second to the bishop in rank in the Church hierarchy.¹ The five offices of the central committee were elective, and for a limited period of three years, subject to renewal. In 1769 the general council of monks decided that the office of the principal-general should not be renewable except after elapse of at least three years. This rule was followed for a short period of time and then it was practically ignored, many principals continuing in office without the required three years interruption. The only lay involvement in the elections were occasional attempts by interested persons to help the candidates of their liking. Once the members of the committee were elected, they immediately proceeded to appoint principals for the monasteries belonging to the order. (These will henceforth be called abbots in order to avoid confusion with the office of principal-general; the Arabic term is ra'is al dayr.)

The life led by the monks in these Orders was collective in form. The daily life of the monks was completely under the supervision of the abbot, and no monk was allowed to have any money of his own or personal property. The Lebanese Order included in its ranks nuns as well, and was the first in Mount Lebanon to build a convent for nuns segregated from monks, in the year 1736.

This small hierarchy in the Church was autonomous, but not independent. All three orders of monks came under the authority of the patriarch, and in some respects under the archbishops. The patriarch had general authority over the orders, and the archbishops in such matters as recruitment and promotion to Church offices and in services to the community.

¹Ibid.

The orders of monks were very wealthy corporate bodies, and one estimate (a rather liberal one) in the mid-nineteenth century had them occupying "nearly a fourth of the entire surface of the Mountain."¹ Whether this was very close to the truth or not cannot be determined; but what was doubtless true is that in just a century's time from their founding, the orders of monks had become one of the largest propertied sectors of Lebanese society.

Before discussing the various ways in which the monks acquired their property, it may be helpful to give a brief idea of the reasons why the ascetic monks sought and acquired so much material wealth. The orders of monks were not merely religious organizations but also business corporations, owned and directed by their own personnel. From the very day of the Lebanese Order's inception, as we have seen, the idea of working for a living won out over the ideal of pure missionary work. The philosophy upon which the founder built the Order was based on asceticism and work. Qar'ali's philosophy of work was clearly stated in one of the rules he laid down in al Misbah al Rahbani.

Hand labor should be equal to the physical ability we have, neither more nor less. God will ask each of us for the labor of his hands in proportion to the physical ability he put in us. He will also hold us responsible if we work beyond our ability and make our bodies useless tools unable to work. . . . A monk of sound body should always be working, spiritual or corporeal work, in order not to fall victim to idling and the evils and vices which idling breeds. Not to work is the antithesis of all virtuous deeds. . . . A monk should not take up a task except that which his principal asks him to do, else his action becomes a sin against the law.²

This new outlook made labor a religious duty commanded by God. Work was also viewed as a planned activity directed by the head of the monastic organization, as an essential means to adapt individual effort to the collective goals of monastic life.

Cultivable land is scarce in Mount Lebanon and her population was grow-

¹Churchill, Mount Lebanon . . ., III, 88-89.

²Antonius Shibli, "Al Zira'ah wa al Sina'ah bayn al Ruhban," MQ, XXXI, 862.

ing fast by the second part of the eighteenth century. As collective bodies the organizations of monks were able to cultivate lands that the peasants with their meager means could not bring under cultivation. Propertyless young peasant children, and disinherited ones, found a refuge and economic security in the monasteries.¹ This explains the fact that the Lebanese Order of Monks was predominantly constituted of clergy with peasant background. However, the monks not only worked on the land but also in crafts such as printing, an art they introduced to Lebanon. There were among them carpenters, blacksmiths, cobblers, builders, teachers, weavers, painters, cooks, and other household workers.² They were not paid for their work, however, and performed it only for the monasteries, not for the lay population.

The monks acquired property in various ways. It is to be remembered that when the Lebanese Order started, around the year 1700, they had nothing to build upon and the patriarch gave them two dilapidated monasteries which they were to live in and rehabilitate. By the middle of the nineteenth century the Order (both divisions) possessed some 50 monasteries with a large amount of property attached to them. The entire monastic body in Mount Lebanon had about 80 monasteries for monks and nuns.

The major means to this wealth was labor. The monks were organized workers. Starting with but little at first, plus donations from the faithful, they used their savings for the purchase of more land. As a matter of fact, few of the Lebanese population other than the monks were able to save in those days. Living on very little themselves and with few social commitments requiring expense, the monks could use the product of their collective work to augment their wealth. In fact, they were the recipients of social benefits. They were

¹ See Shayban, Tarikh, p. 524; also Faris al Shidiaq, Kitab al Saq 'ala al Saq fi ma huwa al Fariaq (Paris: Benjamin Dupart, 1855), passim.

² Shibli, MQ, LIII, 479.

paid, for instance, for their religious services and for the education of children. Most of this compensation for the monks' work was not in cash but in land; a village would ask the monks to teach the children and in compensation the village as a whole granted them a plot of land as their own property.¹

The monks could also draw income from the gifts the faithful regularly made to them on special occasions and feasts. Furthermore, they were able to procure many Indulgences for their monasteries and churches from the Pope.² These Indulgences attracted to the monasteries large numbers of the common folk.

Donations of waqfs (mortmain) by various people among the faithful, especially the Khazins and other propertied families,³ increased the wealth of the orders and the Church. Many also donated land and other material rewards in return for prayers by the monks and priests for the good rest of their loved ones' souls.

As for the muqati'jis, they also were very favorably impressed by the organizations of monks. The monks demonstrated to everyone in the country that they were hard workers and could really increase the country's productiveness and hence the revenue of the muqati'jis. Thus various Druze and Maronite muqati'jis like the Shihabis, the Abillama's, the Nakads, and the Khazins encouraged the agricultural activities of the monasteries. Business dealings between the monks and the muqati'jis became very complex in the late eighteenth century. The monks entered into tenancy relationships with the muqati'jis. The muqati'ji would ask them, like the peasants, to cultivate his lands and in re-

¹ See some of these contracts between villagers and monks in Blaybil, TRLM, LI, 529; ibid., LII, 551.

² Ibid., pp. 297, 305-06, 526, 538-39, 700-701, 702.

³ Hattuni mentions 17 monasteries turned into waqfs, six of which were for the interest of the donors, and the rest for other people, Hattuni, Nabdah, pp. 263-64. See also Shahin al Khazin, "Awqaf al 'Ailah al Khaziniyyah 'ala al Tawa'if al Laji'ah ila Lubnan," MQ, IV (1901), 973-78; idem, MQ, V, 115-22.

turn to share in the produce. In addition, these tenancy contracts usually had wider terms. After a designated number of years, say 10, it would be agreed, some of the land would become the property of the monks, especially in the case of previously uncultivated lands. The muqati'jis, it seems, were so interested in the monks' reclamation of lands that they gave them land on very easy terms, such as exemption from miri on reclaimed land.

Another reason why the muqati'jis encouraged the activities of the monks was the resulting flow of labor into their regions; for the security which the Maronite peasants felt in the neighborhoods of monasteries drew them to settle by convents. The monks could also provide employment for these peasants, as they were unable to cultivate all their property by themselves. The orders were bent on expansion and bought land wherever it was available on good terms. All these activities increased the miri for the muqati'jis. As was mentioned earlier, Amir Yusuf Shihab attempted to stimulate agricultural production in the north by encouraging the monks to settle there and take over dilapidated monasteries and churches with abandoned land. He went so far as to donate to them lands deserted by the Matawilah.¹

For these reasons many of the muqati'jis preferred to see monks serving their subjects rather than the village secular priest, for the secular priest, as an individual working by himself, was not the productive force the organization of monks was. Therefore, the ruling families often supported the monks against the pressures of the Church hierarchy, which resented the monks' encroachment on the domain of the secular priest.²

The impression which the economic activities of the monks made on some

¹This account of land dealings of the monks is based mainly on title-deeds and contracts between them and the muqati'jis and others reproduced in full in Blaybil, TRLM, passim.

²See the decree of the muqati'jis of Abillama' to the people of Zahli and the monks, ibid., p. 506, n. 2.

of their countrymen is well illustrated by the following story of an attempt to purchase land from the Matawilah in the south. The abbot of Dayr Mashmushah of the Lebanese Order used a middleman to convince a Matawilah family to sell a field which the monks wanted. The middleman told the Matawilah family that "the monks are good in heart and simple people; if you sell them this field and then later decide you would like to have it back, they would not hesitate to sell it back to you." "These black ones give cause for fear," was the owner's answer, "for they never entered into a place which they later quitted."¹ However, hard pressed for money, the owner sold the field to the monks, who still own it to this day.

Church Bureaucracy and the Political System

From the start, bureaucratization of the Church organization struck at the root of tutelage to the notables and muqati'jis. Acquisition of the means of administration such as episcopal sees, along with monasteries, land, churches, and regular income, plus the greater degree of discipline within the hierarchy, helped to free the Church and give it more independence and organizational integrity. With the lessening of the Church's economic dependence upon the ruling families, political dependence diminished as well.

Before discussing the growing independence of the Church, something should be said about the climate of opinion within the Church regarding its relations with the political system. From the seventeenth century, ideas about freedom from temporal rulers had been entertained by members of the higher clergy. This tendency had its strongest early expression in the ideas and actions of Patriarch Jirjus 'Umayrah (1633-1644). He showed his attitude and wishes for independence from the temporal rulers as early as 1633 when he was a candidate for the patriarchal office. Then he managed to get himself elected

¹Ibid.

to the See of Antioch without the aid or consultation of the Maronite notables. He was determined to keep them from interfering in Church affairs, probably because he was a witness of the hardships suffered by his predecessor at the hands of the Maronite chiefs of Jibbat Bsharri, and, possibly, on account of his own Western outlook, having been a student of the Maronite College in Rome. As noted above, when applying for investiture from Rome he went against the established practice in the Church and refused to enlist the support and endorsement of the notables. But Patriarch 'Umayrah came too early to see his ideas realized. He was forced by the realities of Lebanese society to bow to the notables after his attempt had failed.

However, ideas aiming at the freedom of the Church from temporal influence were aired in the Council of Hrash convoked by 'Umayrah's successor, Patriarch Yusuf Halib. In this council, resolutions were passed prohibiting the clergy from soliciting the aid and intercession of the temporal rulers in Church affairs and from receiving secular jobs from them. A later assertion of independence occurred in 1744, when a patriarch revoked a legal ruling because it was made under pressure from rulers and therefore, he argued, did not take place under free consent of both parties.¹ But the most forceful statement reflecting the growing feeling of independence from temporal leaders was formulated in the Council of Ghusta in 1768. The tenth rule of the council read as follows:

Whoever, clerical or laic, resorts to temporal rulers [hukkam al siyasah] in Church affairs, or solicits their aid to gain a Church office, or in any other matter that comes under Church jurisdiction, will be put outside the Church laws and will immediately bring upon himself the penalty of excommunication and the divine curse, as is stated in the Lebanese and other Church councils. The same shall apply to those who aided and abetted him in whatever way. We [who are meeting in this council], too, for the sake of strengthening and supporting the freedom of the Church [al huriyyah al kana'isiyyah] and to put an end to these harmful doubts common in our community [ta'ifatuna] will add further appropriate penalties.²

¹See Ghibra'il, Tarikh al Kanisah . . ., II, 578.

²See text in Shartuni, MM, p. 21.

Then followed a list of penalties laid down for this purpose.

In the two councils held in 1818 and 1856, equally strong statements were made on this subject. In the former, the patriarch asked for a "conclusive order from the Roman Curia which would enable him to excommunicate whoever resorts to rulers or uses bribery to bring the might of temporal rulers against the orders of the patriarch and their legal superiors."¹

The reform movement on the whole worked against the notables' supremacy over the Church. The Western education and outlook of the clergy gave them a new view of their role and place in society. Monsignor 'Abdallah Qar'ali, one of the founders of the Lebanese Order of Monks and the greatest legal mind in the history of the Maronite Church, clearly reflected the changed attitude and relations between the notables and the clergy. As an archbishop of Beirut (1724-1742), he learned that a Khazin shaykh in his diocese was using magic in search of a treasure. Qar'ali thought the shaykh's behavior blasphemous and, disregarding the superior rank of the shaykh, immediately placed the penalty of temporary excommunication upon him. This action upset the whole Khazin house who became furious at the bishop's indiscretion. They realized that a threat of this nature against one of them was in principle a threat against their social status as a whole. Pressure was put on the archbishop to withdraw his stand and absolve the shaykh, but to no avail. It became clear to the Khazins that Archbishop Qar'ali should be disciplined. Thereupon the penalized shaykh, armed with the support of his whole family, went to the archbishop with every intention of intimidating him into submission. The first remark the shaykh uttered was an indication of the disparity of their social ranks. "A man of your status and place," he said, "dares to behave to a man of my status the way you have behaved?" As the shaykh went on telling him what he thought of

¹Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 573.

him, Archbishop Qar'ali courteously listened without speaking a word until the other had no more to say. Then soberly Qar'ali explained to him that he had committed a blasphemy against God and his fellow men, and that the bishop had to make him atone for this sin. The attitude of the religious man had such an effect on the shaykh that his whole manner changed immediately, and he himself submitted and asked the bishop's forgiveness. Qar'ali pursued his victory and made the shaykh pay a pecuniary penalty in atonement for his sin.¹

The Khazins were aware of the threat to their privileges presented by the reform movement and showed some resistance to it, an attitude which was clearly demonstrated during al Sim'ani's mission to reorganize the Church. A strong group of the Khazins stood behind the patriarch at the time and encouraged him against al Sim'ani, Qar'ali, and the reformers. The threat to the Khazins was quite real, as one can see from the fact that by the end of the eighteenth century, Catholic missionaries in Mount Lebanon were already publicly asserting that even in temporal matters the people should obey the Church of Rome.²

Regular income for the clergy and Church-owned episcopal sees were two measures which were incompatible with the privileges of the notables. By virtue of their property and ownership of monasteries, the leading families had been entitled to Church offices like archbishop and abbot. Thus the strongest opposition to al Sim'ani and his reform efforts came from these families, namely the Khazins, the Muhasibs, and the Istfans, all of whom possessed some monastery or other and claimed a disproportionately high number of bishops and archbishops. Archbishop Ilias Muhasib, whose family apparently never failed to place one of their number as archbishop or abbot in their monastery, led, with Patriarch

¹An eye-witness account by Qar'ali's secretary, Tuma al Labudy, see Labudy, MQ, X, 801-02.

²Shayban, Tarikh, 530-31.

Yusuf al Khazin, the group of conservatives against al Sim'ani's reform measures.¹ From the Lebanese Council in 1736 to the Council of Luwayzah in 1818, much of the reform effort went toward solving this question, and the measures taken regarding the appointment of bishops and archbishops were directed against the Khazins' patronage prerogatives.² In the final settlement of this question of dioceses, made in 1818 by the Council of Luwayzah, the only two bishoprics which did not build sees for their dioceses were those of the two Khazin archbishops, Damascus and Ba'albak, who still lived in their family monasteries.

The Khazins resented seeing the Church, which they had protected and strengthened, free itself from their domination. Two nineteenth-century Khazin historians made sharp remarks about the degeneration of the Church after the reform movement and criticized the measures of al Sim'ani in particular, refusing to see that the modern and formalistic rules which he introduced to the organization of the Church applied to "a small and insignificant sect like ours (i.e., the Maronite sect)."³ In 1809 when the newly elected patriarch, Yuhanna al Hilu, established residence in Qannubin, the official but earlier abandoned see, the Khazins objected to the move and tried to get the patriarch to return to their muqata'ah. Shaykh Bsharah al Khazin, who had been urged by the Holy See to help implement reform in the Church, wrote to Rome objecting against the patriarch's move to reside in the official residence. Immediately after the conclusion of the Council of Luwayzah, he wrote to the Holy See that the bishops made it impossible for the patriarch to restore his see to Kisrwan. Then expressing his impatience with the reform measures taken at the Council, he claimed that the arrangements which the Church prelates made at the Council of Luwayzah

¹Dib, Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, X, Part I, 81; see also Sim'ani, TML, II, passim.

²See for instance, Hilu papers of 1814, PAB.

³Shayban, Tarikh, pp. 514, 516.

"were no good at all."¹ The Khazins' irritation and sense of loss were clearly demonstrated in Bsharah's letter; he further complained that the prelates had removed a Khazin cousin of his from office as abbot of a convent in Kisrwan,

although we have in our possession title-deeds signed by al Sim'ani which confirm that the mentioned convent belongs to our family, . . . they [the prelates] are also planning to put under their charge other monasteries which belong to our family. We hope that your fatherly concern would move to redress the wrongs that have taken place.²

Both the Khazin and Hbaysh houses put strong pressure on the Council of Luwayzah to maintain their property claims in the Church.³

In the eighteenth century the Holy See had to intervene to prevent the Church from being dominated by a Khazin dynasty. After the death of Patriarch Yusuf al Khazin in 1742, his cousin Tubiyya al Khazin, counting on his ingenuity and the influence of his family, succeeded in raising himself by devious means to the See of Antioch as a rival patriarch. When the majority of the bishops elected another man as patriarch, Tubiyya al Khazin elevated two priests to the rank of bishop and with their votes got himself elected patriarch. At this point the Holy See annulled both elections and as a compromise designated Sim'an 'Awwad as patriarch, which was a rare exception to the long established practice of election in the Maronite Church.⁴ However, Tubiyya was made patriarchal deputy, and after the death of Sim'an 'Awwad he was elected patriarch. It was in reaction to his aristocratic and extravagant manners, observed Shayban, that the bishops elected the scholarly Yusuf Istfan after him.⁵

In 1845 the Church prelates were again faced with the candidacy of a

¹ See letter in Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, I, 609.

² Ibid., I, 610.

³ Ibid., II, 588.

⁴ Anaysi, Silsilah . . ., pp. 53-54; also Ghibra'il, Tarikh al Kani-sah . . ., pp. 585-94.

⁵ Shayban, Tarikh, p. 527.

Khazin. They had to choose between Bulus Mas'ad, a commoner from KISRwan and graduate of 'Ayn Warqa with higher education in Rome, and the aristocratic Bishop Yusuf al Khazin. A struggle ensued between the two parties among the bishops. Those for al Khazin insisted that the election should take place in KISRwan,¹ while the other party wanted to meet at Qannubin. A compromise was reached and the prelates met in the monastery of Mayfuq in al Batrun where they elected Yusuf al Khazin, and then went to Qannubin to mediate the popular discontent in Jibbat Bsharri.² However, popular discontent and agitation there went up again, with rumors that horsemen from KISRwan were coming to Jibbat Bsharri to force a Khazin patriarch on the people.³ The people were also disturbed by the patriarch's alleged friendly relations with the Druze.⁴

The success of Yusuf al Khazin in the election was enhanced by the interference of the French consul in Beirut, Eugène POUJADE, and the political turmoil that was then spreading over Mount Lebanon between the Druze and the Maronites.⁵ The French consul, as well as some of the prelates, was of the opinion that electing a Khazin would be more advantageous in meeting the rising tension in view of the fact that the Khazins traditionally had had good relations with the Druze muqati'jis (especially the Jumblati faction).⁶

In 1854 Patriarch Yusuf al Khazin died, and Mas'ad was elected. Mas'ad's career was long and eventful, but as it commenced around the end of our period

¹Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 7616, 7626, PAB. Also Ghibra'il, Tarikh al Kanisah . . ., II, 768.

²Ibid.

³Mas'ad, MB, pp. 184, 185; also Eugène POUJADE, Le Liban et la Syrie 1845-1860 (Paris: Librairie Nouvelle, 1860), pp. 127-85. Also see Karam, Qala'id . . ., II, 215.

⁴POUJADE, Le Liban . . ., p. 186.

⁵Ibid., pp. 182-85.

⁶Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 7616, 7626, PAB; also POUJADE, Le Liban . . ., pp. 127-59. See also Yusuf al Dibs, Tarikh Suriyyah, VIII (Beirut: al Matba'ah al 'Umumiyyah, 1905), 783-84.

in this study, no separate discussion about him will be given here. Suffice it to say that in his national policy he continued the line of Patriarch Hbaysh, whom, as his secretary, he had influenced considerably. He struggled to settle the problem of freeing the Christians from Druze domination and encouraged the peasantry in their struggle against muqati'jis.¹ With respect to the discussion of reform, Mas'ad carried out the earlier process of reform; and in the Council of 1856, which he convoked, he increased the pressure against the Khazins and against all patronage in the Church.²

The freedom of the Church from the aegis of the ruling class was reflected in the changes in the recruitment of its higher officers. Looking at the Church elite in historical perspective, we can notice that there was a marked difference in recruitment patterns between the eighteenth century and the nineteenth. For example, out of a total of eight patriarchs who occupied the office in the eighteenth century, six were members of notable families. As for the archbishops (excluding the archbishops of Aleppo), 15 out of 20 known bishops belonged to the same class. By way of contrast, in the nineteenth century we find that two patriarchs out of a total of six were notables; while of the 17 archbishops, seven only came from that class.³

Relations between the Church and the two converted Maronite houses of Shihab and Abillama' were somewhat different and should be treated separately from the situation concerning the Khazins. In spite of their central position within the political system, these two houses did not show as much interest in

¹Regarding his role in the struggle between the Khazin muqati'jis and the peasants, see Malcolm H. Kerr (ed. and trans.), Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism, 1840-1868: A Contemporary Account by Antun Dahir al 'Aqiqi and Other Documents ("American University of Beirut, Faculty of Arts and Sciences Publication: Oriental Series No. 33"; Beirut: Catholic Press, 1959).

²Mas'ad, MB, pp. 35-36, 42, 51-52.

³The identification of archbishops for these periods is based on Dahdah's account, see Dahdah, MQ, VII, 641ff.; ibid., VIII, 151ff.

the Church as did the Khazins. None of them had ever tried to enter the clerical profession, and their activities in Church politics were fairly limited. On the other hand, like the rest of the muqati'jis of Jabal al Druze, the Shihabis and Abillama's found their initial encounter with the Maronite clergy favorable and encouraging. They contributed, in terms of economic and social support, to the advancement of the Church establishment within their domains.

Early in the eighteenth century, especially the Lebanese Order of Monks, started to become active in the religiously mixed areas like al Matn, al Shuf, and Iqlim Jazzin. The Shihabis, as well as the other muqati'jis, encouraged their economic venture. But this encouragement went beyond economic support and reached the point of actually building up the prestige of the clergy among the people. The ruling families fully backed the clergy and protected them against aggression both from their people and from others. Written orders went from the muqati'jis to their Maronite subjects commanding them to obey the clergy in religious matters. One of these orders, written in 1772, was sent to the

shaykhs of the people of Zahli and our people [nasna] in the Biqa'. . . . We inform you that we have issued a decree to the respected brother 'Ammanu'il al Rishmawi that he may choose for his monks a place to build a church to serve you in matters of your religion. We want you to show obedience to them and would not permit any action against them or opposition.¹

In another case similar conditions were put in the contract made between a muqati'ji and the monks. The muqati'ji declared:

Whoever in those regions is one of our followers [tawabi'na, a term in the iqta' system which meant those who are under our government] will also follow the monks in matters of their religion, make themselves serviceable to them, and respect their property. No one shall ever oppose them in any way. They will also be permitted to ring bells. . . .²

The orders of monks became politically and economically integrated into

¹Letter reproduced in Blaybil, TRLM, LI, 506-07.

²Ibid., p. 499.

the iqta' system. They were given complete protection for their organization, property, and religious practices. Another contract reads:

They will have from us the right of protection. Our influence will also be made available to uphold their authority and integrity. We shall also remove whatever is obstructive and against their laws, whether it is caused by us or others. . . . In case anyone complains against their association, we would not listen to his complaint or suit, but shall stand in their aid [i.e., the monks] and close ranks with them.¹

The importance of this willingness on the part of the muqati'jis to share their authority with the monks in religious and personal matters cannot be overlooked. It clearly indicates that for a certain time, at least, the religious and political elements in the country were complementary and supported each other.

The clergy, like other subjects, were under the government of the muqati'jis in civil matters, but they had special privileges, such as the sharing of judicial authority. The clergy's judicial authority extended to religious, personal, and some civil cases, particularly those concerning title to land.

Relations between the monks and the muqati'jis, however, did not long continue to be very friendly and conducive to the interests of both parties. By the late eighteenth century the muqati'jis were starting to look with jealousy on the growing wealth and extensive land held by the monks. At times they tried to take back the land which they had turned over to the monks, and this caused friction and litigation.² The monks in turn were getting weary of the various taxes imposed on them by the muqati'jis, and tried to seek the help of the Hakim against the powers which the muqati'jis had over them. Thus in 1812, for instance, the principal-general of the Lebanese Order of Monks secured an order from the Hakim in which the latter deprived the muqati'jis of the right

¹Contract between Amir As'ad and Amir Faris Shihab on the one hand, and the principal-general of the Lebanese Order of Monks and his secretaries on the other; reproduced in Blaybil, *ibid.*, pp. 685-86.

²Hilu papers of 1817, 1819; also Blaybil, *TRLM*, LI, 354-55.

to levy taxes on the Order's monasteries, and authorized the abbots to collect and forward the miri to him.¹ The loss to the muqati'jis here was one of both prestige and finance, since they had traditionally deducted a certain amount of the tax for themselves. The amount which the muqati'jis had previously kept then reverted to the monasteries' funds.

As for the Shihabi Amir, the head of the political hierarchy, his relations with the Church were marked by mutual respect. Following the traditions of their predecessors, the Ma'nis, the Shihabis granted protection and freedom to the clergy in their lives, property, and religious practices.² The political institutions of the country gave the Church another guarantee of liberty in that the Hakim could not extend his authority directly over the subjects of the muqati'jis, and as a consequence the Hakim could not have oppressed the clergy even if he had wanted to do so.

Despite the situation just described, the Shihabi Hakim as supreme head of the country was bound to be involved in Church affairs to some extent.³ At first this involvement came at the invitation of the Church itself. The Shihabis' tolerant attitude and the confidence they inspired among their subjects encouraged the Church to approach them for arbitration in disputes among the higher clergy. The Holy See, in fact, frequently took advantage of the Amir's responsiveness to its requests to ask his intervention in imposing order and reform in the Church.⁴ As early as 1722, the Curia wrote to the Shihabi Hakim to help

¹Ibid., p. 542; ibid., LIII, 202. For other instances see Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 2280, 8075.

²See written statement given by Bashir I to Bishop Butrus Makhluf, Ghalib, MQ, XX, 110.

³See for example Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 579; also Blaybil, TRLM, LIII, 334; also Harfush, MQ, VI, 891.

⁴Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 606-07; and Hattuni, Nabdhah, p. 208.

settle a prolonged dispute between two bishops.¹ In 1736, as was previously mentioned in discussing the Lebanese Council, the Apostolic Delegate sought the support of the governing Amir to make the Maronite hierarchy cooperate in the Council. In 1818 Rome appealed not only to the Shihabi Amir but also to the Druze muqati'ji, Bashir Jumblat,² because his power was almost equal to the Amir's at that time.

Not only Rome but also the Maronite higher clergy appealed to the Shihabis to help settle their differences. The clergy's access to the Shihabis was first achieved through the muqati'jis of the Maronite faith; but later, during the second part of the eighteenth century, they dispensed with mediation. The clergy approached the Shihabis mainly for three general purposes: they brought forward matters of interest to the community; second, they sought the support of the Shihabi Amir in their own disputes;³ and third, the higher clerical authorities tried to secure the aid of the Amir to bring into line some of the recalcitrant subordinates.⁴ As a rule the policy of the Shihabs was on the side of the Church authority, that is, they stood for order in the Church and backed the higher authorities in cases of disorderly conduct on the part of lower-ranking clergy. The same applied to the role they played vis-à-vis the Holy See and the Maronite hierarchy: they supported the Holy See in most cases. The Shihabis were responsive to the requests of Rome because of their desire to have friendly relations with European powers, and the Pope, as head of a state and a man of great influence among Christian powers of Europe, was a valuable

¹ Letters reproduced in Muzhir, Tarikh Lubnan al 'Am, I, 387.

² Hilu papers, 15 February 1817; also Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 566-80.

³ For instance, see Shayban, Tarikh, pp. 514-26; Dagher, Lubnan . . ., pp. 392-93.

⁴ See Yusuf Ziadah, al Qada' al Maruni wa 'Alaqatuhu bi al Shar' al Rumani (Juni, Lebanon: Matba'at al Mursalin al Lubnaniyyin, 1929), pp. 72-74.

friend to them. Second, the Shihabis favored the reform movement and the establishment of order in the Church. Third, particularly in the early nineteenth century, the Shihabis needed the Holy See to check on the ambitious activities of the Maronite Church.

However, either because of the political rules of the game in Mount Lebanon, or because they did not like religious matters to assume too much importance in what was essentially a secular government, the Shihabis played a very restrained role in the affairs of the Church.¹ There was also, of course, a limit to the extent to which the Church itself would permit interference in its affairs. On many occasions, in fact, the intercession of the Shihabis or other chiefs went unheeded by the Church. It did not pay al Sim'ani, for instance, to enlist the aid of Amir Milhim Shihab; on the contrary, it aroused the anger of the Khazins to see al Sim'ani appeal over their heads to the Amir. Shaykh Nawfal al Khazin protested to al Sim'ani that in appealing to the non-Christian temporal ruler, he was flouting the customs of the country and violating the rules of the Church.² Again in 1817, the combined efforts of Amir Bashir Shihab, Shaykh Bashir Jumblat, and the Apostolic delegate did not succeed in making the patriarch move an inch away from his stand concerning the Council of al Luwayzah.³

With Patriarch Yusuf al Tiyyan (1796-1808), a new phase of Church-state relationship started to develop in Mount Lebanon. This period was marked by the Church's venture into the political arena on its own. The religious establishment had grown so much that the clergy was no longer willing to be relegated to a secondary place in society. By the end of the eighteenth cen-

¹See Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 569-70.

²Sim'ani, TML, p. 509.

³Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 579. For Patriarch Hilu's resistance to the interference of Bashir in Church affairs, particularly in matters of clerical promotions, see Hilu papers, MSS, Nos. C 127, 267.

ture, the Church had become the largest, the most organized, and the wealthiest organization in the whole of Mount Lebanon. Its interests as an organization became intertwined with those of the political system. It was obvious that the Church was in a position to take the initiative in relations with the state, to its advantage as will be seen later.

There can be no comparison between the fortune of Patriarch Istfan al Duwayhi (1670-1704), for example, and that of Patriarch Yusuf Hbaysh (1823-1845). Al Duwayhi had to hide in caves and seek refuge in the country of the Druze to the last day of his life. Hbaysh was a national and religious leader, received with full state honors whenever he visited the ruling Amir. He would be welcomed with popular acclaim in the villages on his way, and near the palace music would play at his appearance and a squad of soldiers would salute him while the Amir went out to the palace court to receive him.¹ The difference between the two scenes--the scholarly Duwayhi before Shaykh 'Isa Himadi and Hbaysh at the palace of Bayt al Din--is remarkable.

To summarize, reform in the Maronite Church was stimulated and advanced by the Roman See starting in the late sixteenth century and becoming most active in the eighteenth. Social developments in the Maronite community, such as population expansion and migration, and better education made reform an urgent question in the eighteenth century. In effect the reform measures rationalized the Church bureaucracy and invigorated its religious and social role.

Reform in the Maronite Church had a serious and lasting effect on its position vis-à-vis the ruling aristocracy. By organizing its affairs, the Church was better able to untangle itself from the temporal powers. When the Church established its own sees, monasteries, and fixed salaries for its clergy, it had taken control of the means of its own administration, thus depriving the

¹See Bulus Qar'ali, "Al Batriyark Yusuf Hbaysh: Kalimah fi Siyasatihi al Ta'ifiyyah wa al Dawliyyah," Al Bayraq (Beirut), 24 October, 1949.

muqati'ji class and other notables of their former powers over it. The achievement of financial independence had a marked effect not only on the course of its action, but also on its recruitment of clergy. While in the eighteenth century the higher clergy belonged to the more influential class of notables, in the nineteenth the proportion of commoners in the higher Church offices was much greater than that of the notables.

Independence and freedom in the Church gave rise to competition for prestige and power between the clergy and the a'yan. The muqati'ji class were not pleased with the appearance of an organized and powerful body in the country free from their power and control. They naturally distrusted the clergy because they had no certainty regarding the behavior of this emerging energetic group. The clergy in their own turn disliked the persisting influence and presumptions of the muqati'ji class, particularly their financial exactions. The two groups were obviously in competition for power and leadership in the community.

CHAPTER V

IDEOLOGY AND COMMUNICATIONS

The Maronites as a people may be considered as a national group. They reflect ethnic distinctiveness, a single religion, and a long history; they lived in one compact area and once had a distinct language of which they kept some vestiges in their religious books and memories up to the recent past. In addition to this, they enjoyed in the past a political history and life of their own, the memory of which they translated into a national myth. The Maronite Church, the most enduring and stable organization in the history of the Maronite people, played a significant role in preserving, developing, and propagating the ideas of Maronite nationhood. This national tradition was written down mostly by the clergy, in the form of popular poetry, chronicles, treatises, and religious books. The Maronite view of the history of Lebanon enjoys a certain coherence and purpose, which to this day dominates the interpretation of Lebanese history and constitutes the basis of Lebanese nationalism. As Kamal Salibi has observed, the early Maronite historians wrote history not as a scholarly pursuit but "as an expression of national pride."¹

In view of the fact that the Maronites lived under the iqta' political system of the Imarah in Mount Lebanon and participated freely and actively in the course of its history, a survey of their views of themselves and of the Imarah, and the bearing of this self-image upon the fate of the iqta' system seems appropriate here. We shall give a quick summary of Maronite ideology:

¹Salibi, Maronite Historians . . ., p. 15.

the Maronites' beliefs regarding their origin, ethnicity, values, struggles as a community, and place in history. No historical analysis will be attempted regarding the historical truths or falsehoods of the Maronites' views; it is only the way they interpreted life around them and their self-image that concerns us here.

Founders of Maronite Ideology

Ibn al Qila'i

The first Maronite writer who represents a coherent view of the values of the Maronite community is Jibra'il Ibn al Qila'i (d. 1516), Maronite bishop of Cyprus. Ibn al Qila'i has many qualities which recommend him to the attention of the historian. Born in Mount Lebanon, he was educated by the Franciscan friars, whose order he eventually joined after he had been sent by the friars to study in Rome. Thus he was the first Maronite to receive a European education.¹ He returned as a missionary to his people, who were torn apart in a religious struggle between Catholicism and Jacobism, and immediately took the lead in combating Jacobite missionaries. He preached Catholicism, wrote the history of the founder of the sect and the history of the Maronite people, and traced the early relations between the Maronites and the Church of Rome. Although sometimes Ibn al Qila'i wrote in prose, his favorite medium was popular poetry, al zajaliyyah, which means a poem composed in the vernacular Arabic. He relied mostly on oral tradition as well as religious manuscripts in Lebanon and Rome.

Ibn al Qila'i asserted that Mount Lebanon was the national home of the Maronites. When the Arab Muslims occupied Syria, the Maronites were already

¹Ibid., Salibi gives the most comprehensive account of Ibn al Qila'i. For Ibn al Qila'i's ideas, see his poem, zajaliyyah, entitled "madiha 'ala Jabal Lubnan," published in Bulus Qar'ali, Hurub al Muqaddamin: 1075-1450 (Bayt Shabab, Lebanon: n.p., 1937). Also summary of the poem in 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVI, 541-52.

living in the Lebanon and held out against occupation by sheer might. They were faithful adherents of the Church of Rome and obedient to their patriarch, who lived among them in Mount Lebanon. They were strong warriors and defenders of the faith, and they made their country a haven for every oppressed person. Mount Lebanon as the homeland of the Maronite was not a vague or a general idea. Ibn al Qila'i defined it in geographic terms, comprising the mountain and coastland extending from al Shuf in the south to al Durayb in Bilad 'Akkar.

The history of his country and people was a song of heroism which Ibn al Qila'i was happy to relate, preaching the moral lessons of its verses. This history is an epic, Madihah, in which he tells of the rise and fall of the Maronites. Ibn al Qila'i tells the story to teach his people a lesson, to emulate the glorious past and avoid the causes of decline. In the time of their glory, the Maronite chiefs, prelates, and people were all united in one struggle to preserve their home, lives, and beliefs. Virtue, courage, and religious orthodoxy characterized that period. Fortified in their mountains and united in the faith, the Maronites had little to fear from Islam in their long-drawn-out struggle. Orthodoxy and heroism in war against Islam were the two major commitments of the Maronite community as seen by Ibn al Qila'i.

The manner in which Ibn al Qila'i interpreted the events of the past gives a clear idea of how central the concept of true Catholic faith is in the lives of the Maronites. The Madiha is an epic of the struggle of a nation, not only against an enemy from the outside but also from decadence from within, namely heresy. The Maronites continued to prosper and be victorious in their war against Islam for as long as they remained orthodox. For example, as Ibn al Qila'i sings their victories:

[Then] thirty thousand warriors
 Descended from the mountains like rain,
 And the Moslems, out on a stroll,
 Found death waiting on the battlefield.¹

¹Salibi, Maronite Historians . . ., p. 70.

However, these victories did not last long before the seeds of heresy crept into the heart of the Maronite land and gave rise to schism and moral turpitude. The Maronites started to stray from orthodoxy under the influence of two Jacobite monks who misled some of them into heresy. Heresy, in the poet's opinion, led to worldly and military defeat.

King Barquq heard of that;
He sent soldiers with banners
to lay siege in Mount Lebanon.
The country was internally split,
And its inside was soiled with heresy.
Its ruler was puffed up with pride,
And it lacked both loyalty and faith.¹

As a result of their defeat on the battlefield the Maronites fled from Kisrwan to the northern parts of their country in Jibbat Bsharri, where they were concentrated in the days of Ibn al Qila'i. The amir of the Maronite country, awed by the disaster, summoned the patriarch and asked him to go to Rome and seek indulgence from the Pope to redress the wrong that had taken place and atone for the Maronites' disbelief. Thereupon the patriarch visited Rome in the year 1215. (This is the date, it is believed by Maronites, when the Maronite patriarch was summoned to attend the fourth Lateran Council of the Catholic Church.) The interpretation which Ibn al Qila'i gives this patriarchal trip which united the Maronites with the Church of Rome is heavily weighted with the struggle of his community, its suffering, religious turpitude, and hope of eventual redemption with the help of Rome.

In the picture presented by Ibn al Qila'i, the Maronites appear ruled by their princes and muqaddams and by their religious prelates who shared political power with the lay leaders and participated in their election to office. Ibn al Qila'i, however, gives us no idea of what the Maronites of those days expected of their ruler, except for being true to the Catholic faith and courageous in war.

¹Ibid., pp. 72-73.

Ibn al Qila'i died fighting Jacobite heresy in Mount Lebanon, which made great inroads into the Maronite community during his lifetime. Though he did not live to see his efforts succeed in purging the country of Jacobism, his memory and influence were enduring and his epic, its images and ideas, were sung long after him by Maronites young and old.

Patriarch Istfan al Duwayhi (1629-1704)

The Maronites who studied at the Maronite College in Rome were intellectually overshadowed by the figure of Patriarch Istfan al Duwayhi. Al Duwayhi was more of a historian than Ibn al Qila'i and showed interest in the historical event per se. But he was also much interested in the history of the Maronites and particularly in demonstrating their unbroken orthodoxy and association with the Roman See. Unlike Ibn al Qila'i, he was neither a propagandist nor a missionary obsessed with the idea of saving his nation and the souls of its men. He was a man of responsibility, being the head of the Maronite Church. Al Duwayhi's works include a book on the history of the Maronite community¹ in which he was mostly concerned with the image of the patron saint of the sect and with its leader, Patriarch Yuhanna Marun, and the early history of the community in Mount Lebanon. A major theme of the book is the perpetual orthodoxy of the Maronites and their early connections with the Church of Rome. His second book was a general Middle Eastern chronicle² in which he devoted much attention to events affecting the Maronites and to their local history. Al Duwayhi also wrote a few other works, such as a chronological list of the

¹Istfan al Duwayhi, Tarikh al Ta'ifah al Maruniyyah, ed. Rashid al Khury al Shartuni (Beirut: n.p., 1890).

²Istfan al Duwayhi, Tarikh al Azminah, 1095-1699, ed. Ferdinan Tawtal in MQ, Vol. XLIV (Beirut: al Matba'ah al Kathulikiyyah, 1951).

Maronite patriarchs since Yuhanna Marun¹ and an account of the students who attended the Maronite College in Rome.²

There are some shifts of emphasis in the themes which al Duwayhi dealt with, compared with those of Ibn al Qila'i's epic. In al Duwayhi's works, the Maronites' long heroic struggles with Islam are toned down. This is perhaps due to the fact that at the time in which he lived and wrote, the Maronites were under direct Muslim rule and enjoyed less freedom and independence than they apparently had in earlier times. In Jibbat Bsharri, for instance, the seat of the patriarchate, the Maronites were actually living in humiliating circumstances. Although they were well off in Kisrwan under the Ma'nis, still there was no glory or heroism to extol.

The emergence of the Maronites in Lebanon, and their hostile relations with the Christians of Syria and the Muslims, were themes recurring in al Duwayhi's writing, too. As with Ibn al Qila'i, one finds that the Maronites retained a dim but friendly memory of the Crusaders and, to a certain extent, identification with their cause. As for the earlier writer's theme of heresy, al Duwayhi played that down. In Duwayhi's time there was no question of disloyalty to the Church of Rome among the Maronites, and it hurt them to be accused of not having maintained an unswerving loyalty to the Catholic Church or of not having been the first Eastern Christians to associate with Rome.

The dominant image transmitted from one Maronite generation to another is that they are a distinctive religious and national group in the East, surrounded by hostile people. Al Duwayhi was no exception to this. The first Maronite patriarch, he tells us, escaped from Syria and took refuge in the Leb-

¹Istfan al Duwayhi, Silsilat Batarikat al Mawarinah, ed. Rashid al Khury al Shartuni in MQ, Vol. I.

²Istfan al Duwayhi, Tarikh al Madrasah al Maruniyyah fi Rumiyyah, ed. Lwis Shaykho, MQ, Vol. XXI.

anon because of persecution by Melkites. He and the Maradah of Lebanon joined causes. Little is known historically about the Maradah except that they were a warrior group placed in Mount Lebanon by the Byzantine emporor in the seventh century to harrass the Arab conquerors of Syria.¹ For al Duwayhi as for Ibn al Qila'i before him, the Maradah and the Maronites were one and the same people. Identification with the Maradah was an important national tradition among the Maronites, and even in recent times skepticism on this point has produced hurt feelings. In 1902, the Jesuit historian Henry Lammens received a letter from the Maronite historian, Archbishop Yusuf al Dibs, in which the Maronite prelate strongly protested that Lammens, who had always been a friend to the Maronites, should throw doubt on the ethnic origin of the community. In the same letter he wrote a concise account to prove that the Maradah and the Maronites were the same people.²

Al Duwayhi reflected the popular Maronite belief that in their past they were powerful fighters who resisted Islamic assaults on their mountain and collaborated with all outside expeditions against Islam, including the Crusades.³ He was acutely aware of their lonely lot in the Orient where they were the only Catholic community. In a letter to a Roman cardinal, al Duwayhi sought comfort through confession: "We are the only people in all the East who hold fast to the orthodox faith. . . ." adding, "We are surrounded by heretics and non-believers who hate us to the point of death because we are united with you."⁴ The Maronites were pleased to receive condolences and sympathy from no less a personage than Pope Leo X himself, who described them as "roses among thorns." The

¹On the Maradah, see Adel Ismail, Histoire du Liban XVIIe Siècle à Nos Jours, Vol. I: Le Liban au Temps de Fakhr-ed-Din II (1590-1633) (Paris: Librairie Orientale et Américaine, G.-P. Maisonneuve-M. Besson. Succ., 1955), pp. 169-89.

²Yusuf al Dibs, "al Maradah wa al Mawarinah," MQ, V, 914-23.

³See letter in Aouad, Droit Privé . . ., pp. 297-98.

⁴Letter published in Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, III, 33.

Maronites never forgot that appellation and continued to repeat it for generations, not only their historians and clergy but also men like Jirjus Baz, the Maronite who rose to the highest position of power in the Imarah.¹

Very curiously, though, al Duwayhi had very little to say about the Imarah of Jabal al Druze and its significance for his Church and people. Not only was he on many occasions a well-received refugee in the Imarah, but also the Maronites who lived in the Imarah were on an equal footing with the Druze. The Khazins, who participated in the government of the Imarah, appear in his writings simply as a Maronite notable house lauded for its achievements and efforts to advance the interests of the Maronites. Only on two occasions does he set forth his feelings about the Ma'nis. In his account of Fakhr al Din, he mentions the Muslim ruler's good deeds toward the Christians, who in his times became powerful and free from the dhimmi status. On another occasion, commenting on the Hakim Amir Ahmad Ma'n and his escape from death in a conflict with the Turks, al Duwayhi expresses his pleasure that the Amir was saved and attributes this event to God, explaining that God wanted the Amir to live and continue his contributions to the advancement of the Christians. The government of Jabal al Druze was a friend and a help to the Maronites, but it was not a Maronite government, and thus remained outside their history proper. In al Duwayhi's outlook the Maronites and Druze were different peoples; and although at that time they were friendly, he could think of a time, namely during the Crusade and Mamluk periods, when the two peoples were at odds.

Historically, it is known that Fakhr al Din extended his rule to the Maronite territory of the north and beyond; yet this event was not given much attention in Maronite histories and sometimes it was overlooked. Neither in Tarikh al Ta'ifah nor in Tarikh al Azminah does this event assume an important

¹In a letter to Rome in 1804 in which Baz discusses the affairs of the community with the Holy See, Blaybil, TRLM, LII, 325-27.

role but is related in much the same way as other historical events. This plainly demonstrates that to the Maronites the Ijarah was still an alien government, an outlook which changed in later Maronite views. The integration of the northern Maronites into the Ijarah had an intellectual aspect as well as a political one. Some attention will be paid to this point in this survey of Maronite ideology.

Yusuf Marun al Duwayhi (d. 1780)

For the middle of the eighteenth century another Maronite cleric, Yusuf Marun al Duwayhi, gives us an idea of the Maronite self-image in history. Yusuf al Duwayhi was a priest of the patriarchal see and one-time assistant to the archbishop of al Batrun. He studied at the Maronite College in Rome and then returned to Lebanon, where his strong views on clerical matters and Church politics stood in the way of his promotion to higher clerical positions. Like Patriarch Istfan al Duwayhi he opened a school for children and left all his money to it.

Yusuf al Duwayhi had read Ibn al Qila'i, Ibrahim al Haqilani,¹ Mirhij Namrun al Bani,² and Istfan al Duwayhi. His own account is particularly interesting for the coherent national sense it reflects.

In his treatise (risalah) called "On the Prestige of the Maronite Community,"³ we learn that the Maronites are a national and religious community who, in the past, enjoyed an independent government under their own chiefs.

¹A Maronite student of the Maronite College, see Raphael, Le Rôle du Collège . . ., pp. 87-92.

²Also studied in Rome and wrote a treatise on the origin of the Maronites, in Latin, ibid., pp. 105-08. See his book on the Maronites in the Vatican Library under: Antonio Fausto Naironi, Dissertatio de Origine nomine ac religione de Maronitarum (Roma: n.p., 1679).

³This treatise was used in its original form by al 'Aynturini in his history which was published by Father Ighnatius Tannus al Khury. Except for the abridgement of the traditional introduction, the treatise was published in its entirety. 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVI, 556-70. The word "prestige" in the title is literally "honor" (sharaf).

They are the Lebanese Maradah who were living in Mount Lebanon even before Patriarch Yuhanna Marun went to them. When Yuhanna Marun reached Mount Lebanon,

he was well received by the Lebanese, because they had seen that he was to their liking, orthodox in faith. Since then this appellation [Maronites] was given to the Lebanese, who were saved from the heresy of monotheletism by [the patriarch], and it has lasted since then.¹

The Maronites broke with the Melkites, Yusuf al Duwayhi tells us, because the Emperor Justinian² compromised with the Arabs at the expense of the Maradah of Mount Lebanon, agreeing with the Muslim ruler 'Abd al Malik to expel the Maradah from the Mountain. But the Lebanese rebelled against this treaty and against the emperor.

Religious and national issues are intertwined here in al Duwayhi's interpretation, making it impossible to define the community in religious or national terms separately. Much like Ibn al Qila'i, Yusuf al Duwayhi saw the Lebanese in perpetual struggle with the Arab Muslims, with their fortunes highest as long as they stuck to the orthodox faith. Maronite self-image also comes out here very clearly: tried in war and found brave. A strong sense of independence is also reflected. There was a great succession of princes in past centuries in our Lebanese mountain, al Duwayhi tells us, their armies numerous and their standing high. When (presumably in the eighth century) Caesar treated them unfairly, he goes on, they immediately rebelled. Control over their own government remained in Lebanese hands until 1609; and even though the Maronites fell under foreign rule in that year, he maintains, they nevertheless are still in command and enjoy pre-eminence in Lebanon.³

There is a strong sense of unity in his presentation. His whole image of the history of his community is characterized by continuity and unity. From

¹Ibid., p. 560.

²This is supposed to have been Justinian II (685-695), ibid., p. 557, n. 1.

³Ibid., p. 558.

the very beginning the Maronite Lebanese had their religious and civil chiefs ruling and looking after their interests. There is no break from the early Maradah chiefs and Patriarch Yuhanna Marun down to al Duwayhi's day; the name and date of every prince and patriarch of the Maronite community of Lebanon is given. It is hard to imagine that such a coherent self-image in the Maronite community could be submerged for long under the particularistic principles of the iqta' system.

Yusuf al Duwayhi does not mention how or why the Maronites came under foreign rule in 1609, nor does he mention the power to which they yielded. Historically we know that the Maronites lost their presumed independence in Mamluk times, and in 1609 they were under Turkoman rulers as before. The only political event around that period is the assumption of government in north Lebanon in 1621 by Amir Fakhr al Din II, who appointed a Maronite aide, Shaykh Abu Safi al Khazin, over it. It is strange that Yusuf al Duwayhi does not make any reference to Fakhr al Din or to the Imarah of Jabal al Druze. The Druze Imarah seems to have been outside the subject of his discussion, yet the question is not that simple. The Imarah had a large number of Maronites in the middle of the eighteenth century, and by then Maronite Kisrwan had been an integral part of the Imarah system for a century and a half under the Maronite muqati'jis of the Khazin house. The Maronites could not have been indifferent to the Imarah, yet all that al Duwayhi wrote about it was a reference to the Maronite manasib of the Khazin house. He discussed them not with respect to their place in the Imarah but in the context of his history of Maronite rulers down to his day, showing pride in the fact that this Maronite house had revived some of the power and prestige of the Maronite people, who had lost their complete independence in the seventeenth century.

The conclusion which one may draw from these Maronite writers with respect to the Imarah is that since it was a government by Muslim and mainly Druze

rulers, it could not then be considered by the Maronites as part of their history as a distinct community. Yusuf al Duwayhi died in 1780, after the Shihabis had united north and south Lebanon under their rule; yet he made no reference to this important event in his treatise. This might have been, on the other hand, because he finished his treatise sometime in the period between May 1742 and March 1743,¹ that is, before the unification took place. We do not have anything from his pen after that date to indicate whether he modified his views or not. Up to the end of the eighteenth century the Maronite world-view was consistently exclusive, failing to assimilate or accommodate other groups into the history of the Maronite community.

Antonious Abi Khattar al 'Aynturini (d. 1821)

'Aynturini and his contemporary, Shayban al Khazin (1750-1820?), were the first lay Maronites to write on Maronite and Lebanese questions. All the preceding writers were of the clerical profession. Al 'Aynturini was a hereditary shaykh presiding over the village of 'Aynturin in Jibbat Bsharri. In the last decade of his life he rose to political eminence in his region and participated in the revolt of the Maronites against Amir Bashir II. With the failure of the revolt he was captured, tortured, and died soon after in 1821.

Although al 'Aynturini was a lay writer, his history, Mukhtasar Tarikh Jabal Lubnan,² is a continuation of the clerical tradition of his predecessors.

¹It is almost certain that this is the date of the treatise, for in his treatise Yusuf al Duwayhi included a list of the Maronite patriarchs from the days of Patriarch Yuhanna Marun, the founder, to his own day. The last patriarch he mentioned was Yusuf Dargham al Khazin (1733-1742); also, he noted that Patriarch Khazin had died but did not mention the name of his successor, Sim'an 'Awwad, referring to the latter as Bishop 'Awwad. This should mean that by the time he finished writing his treatise 'Awwad had not yet been elected patriarch. The time span between the death of Patriarch Khazin, 13 May 1742, and the election of 'Awwad on 16 March 1743, then, must be the period in which Duwayhi finished writing his treatise.

²Published by Father Ighnatiush Tannus al Khury, in al Mashriq, Vols. XLVI-XLVII.

He was familiar with their writings and used some of them¹ in addition to other Maronite and Muslim works. In preparing his history he was helped by the principal of 'Ayn Warqa College, Bishop Yusuf Istfan, a prelate learned in the affairs and history of his community. The latter played a role similar to that of al 'Aynturini in the abortive revolt against Bashir II and met a similar fate.

The Maronite world of al 'Aynturini is essentially the one portrayed by the clerics. He shows some awareness of the histories of the Middle Eastern area and of Europe and views them from the vantage-point of a Lebanese Maronite. History to 'Aynturini begins with religion, with the Biblical accounts of the creation and the crucifixion of Christ. Then there is the history of the Islamic peoples beginning with the Prophet Muhammad. The history of Lebanon as a Middle Eastern country is the history of the strife between the adherents of the two faiths, strife in which Islam emerged the victor. Christian status as a result became one of dependence, dhimmah. Al 'Aynturini wrote of some fanciful contract which he claimed was the one made by Muhammad with the Christians in which the Prophet gave them very good terms. The terms were so liberal and generous that the reader cannot help thinking that what al 'Aynturini was describing was not the original contract made by Muhammad but the actual free status of the Maronites in Mount Lebanon at the time he was writing.

Following in the steps of his predecessors, al 'Aynturini is mainly concerned with the history of the Maronites in Lebanon. The Lebanese are portrayed as a distinct community of Maronites who have had their religion, ethnic character, civil and ecclesiastical leaders since an early period going back to

¹'Aynturini used the whole treatise of Yusuf al Duwayhi, as was previously mentioned, and wrote a summary in prose of the *Madihan* of Ibn al Qila'i, as well as other writings such as those of Bishop Jirmanus Farhat. It is surprising that Kamal Salibi in *Maronite Historians . . .*, pp. 39-40, makes no reference to the *Mukhtasar Tarikh Jibrayel al Qila'i al Lihfidi*, published in 'Aynturini. Salibi read the *Muktasar Tarikh Jibra'il al Qila'i* in another source and wondered about its authorship, although if he had read the *Muktasar* in 'Aynturini he would have seen that al 'Aynturini himself wrote the summary of the *Madihah* of Ibn al Qila'i.

the seventh century and the Arab conquest of Syria. From the days of Yuhanna Marun to the time of al 'Aynturini himself, there is no gap but a continuous life history in struggle with a hostile environment. Maronite north Lebanon, the center of his attention, passed through the vicissitudes of history until in the middle of the seventeenth century it almost completely lost its independence. From that period on he is concerned with recounting the struggle of the Maronites with their Muslim neighbors and particularly with their Shi'i overlords, the Himadis. This description culminates in the revolt against the Himadis, whom he accuses of having offended the Maronites in their religion, lives, and property. The revolt succeeded and gave the Maronites of the north a new measure of control over their own affairs.

At this point 'Aynturini starts to relate events in the life of the Maronite community with the Ijarah. In order that the Maronite leaders, village shaykhs, who rebelled against the Himadis might make sure that their independence was guaranteed, they sought the help of their compatriots, the Khazin muqati'jis of Kisrwan, to intercede for them with the Hakim, Amir Mansur Shihab. The Maronite shaykhs wanted the Shihabis to be their overlords and to guarantee their independent iqta' privileges against outside danger. The Khazins tried but failed to win the Hakim to the Maronite shaykhs' request, because the Himadis also used their friendship with the manasib of the Ijarah to frustrate the Maronites' plan. But at this point a Shihabi amir, the son of the former Hakim, Amir Yusuf Shihab, with his Maronite advisor, Shaykh Sa'd al Khury, rallied to the support of the rebel Maronites. They sought the government of northern Lebanon from the Ottoman Valis of Damascus and Tripoli, then purged the country of enemies of the Maronites.

There can be little doubt that it was only at this point that the Maronite historians started to reflect a sense of unity with the Ijarah of the Shihabis. 'Aynturini does not conceal his admiration for and devotion to Amir Yusuf, whom he calls the chief of his family, "'ayn 'aylatihi."

With a Shihabi Hakim, the Maronites started to show more interest in the Imarah, and 'Aynturini's writings mark that change. For the first time in the history of the Maronite people a Maronite writer gives an account of the ruling families in the Imarah. Al 'Aynturini includes in his book the histories of the aristocracy, Christian, Druze, and Muslim. Though he by no means looks at the Druze as constituting one people with the Maronites, he nevertheless is conscious of the fact that they are under the same dynasty and inhabiting non-Ottoman territory. (When he refers to the territories outside the boundaries of the Imarah he calls them the lands of the State, al Dawlah, as compared with Lebanese territories.) It is clear, however, that the image which al 'Aynturini has of Lebanon in its two parts is united only by the Shihabi dynasty, not by the people. On the whole, 'Aynturini's account takes cognizance of the common political relations between Maronites and Druze, yet fails to consider the two peoples as one or to suggest that they should have one government.

Throughout the writings of these historians the theme is clear that the Maronites are a separate people with distinct beliefs, system of religion, and common history. Religion is so intricately involved in the national history of the Maronites that it would be almost impossible to distinguish the one from the other. For the Maronite, conformity to the creed is the criterion of belonging to the community, and it defines the place of man with respect to other people. To dissent in belief is to put oneself outside the community. In a letter to a former friend of his who converted to Jacobism, Ibn al Qila'i wrote:

And should you say, "I am a Maronite," I will answer, "You lie! You are a spy among the Maronites! . . ." For you are like the beast which became wild again after it had been tamed. . . .¹

Similar emphasis on conformity to the faith was expressed much later, in the 1820's. A young Maronite, As'ad al Shidiaq, a graduate of 'Ayn Warqa, and of a notable Maronite house from south Lebanon, became a convert to Protes-

¹Ibid., pp. 29-30.

tantism. Realizing the dangers of religious schism in the community, and unable to change the new ideas of the young As'ad, Patriarch Hbaysh tried as a last resort to bring him to an external conformity at whatever price. He asked As'ad to declare publicly his disbelief in Protestantism, promising to let him go free if he would. But this would be a lie, answered As'ad. Yes, said the patriarch, I will also absolve you from the sin of lying if you will declare what I ask you to declare.¹

The Maronites were not only keenly aware of their community as based on the same faith, but also as having the same homeland, a Christian one. For centuries there had been a mystique among the Maronites concerning a territory which had belonged to them before the Muslims took it over. The memory of their defeat and expulsion from the Matn and KISRWAN areas to JIBBAT BSHARRI by the Mamluks in the fifteenth century not only was strong among the learned clergy but also had roots among the common folk. For instance, in KISRWAN during the seventeenth century a Maronite group from the north was starting to settle in a MATAWILAH village. When they wanted to build a church, these people had to seek permission from the Matawilah. Though desperate for this permission, they still refused to build their church anywhere but on the ruins of an older church, or what they believed to have been an older church.² Similar attitudes were demonstrated in a number of other places in the Mountain where the Maronites started to settle in the seventeenth century.³

Al 'Aynturini's account is a nineteenth century one, as he wrote in the last 16 years of his life, before his death in 1821. If, therefore, we take his views as representative of the way the Maronites in northern Lebanon thought of themselves and the world, important conclusions should follow. The main one

¹ Butrus al Bustani, Qissat As'ad al Shidiaq (Beirut: n.p., 1878), p. 38.

² Bulus Qar'ali (ed.), Tarikh 'Awd al Nasara ila Jurud KISRWAN, pp. 20-21.

³ Dagher, Lubnan, p. 209.

is that even by the early nineteenth century the Maronites of northern Lebanon had not significantly changed their world-view or reached new ways of thinking which would include non-Maronite people in their political life as a community. They seem to have preserved a sense of distinctness as a community quite separate from the Druze.

It is possible that the tragic end of their champion, Amir Yusuf Shihab, and the change of government to another Shihabi line put them on a course of conflict with the Druze early in their newly established relations with the Shihabis. This view gains more ground when we know that the Maronites constituted the major force of opposition to Amir Bashir Shihab II, the rival and successor of Amir Yusuf, for the first three decades of his rule. The world-view of al 'Aynturini reflects the mode of thought of the Maronites of northern Lebanon more than it does that of the south, where the Maronites had been living for a long time under the iqta' system of the Imarah. The integration of the Maronites of the south into the Imarah system was more complete, and their condition is represented more in the writings of Shayban al Khazin and Tannus al Shidiahq than by 'Aynturini, as we shall soon see. Nevertheless, the new and driving force of the Maronites was generated among the northern Maronites; and under the system of communications established by the Church it affected and stirred those of the south into national awareness.

In the 1820's the relations of the Maronites with Bashir II changed from hostile to friendly, and Bashir relied on them more than he had before. By the 1840's the Maronites in the Imarah had gone through such a change of fortune that they were quite openly challenging the political supremacy of the Druze in the Imarah. The attempt to reach a Maronite outlook which would assimilate the Imarah into Maronite communal life and history came from the pen of a cleric from Kisrwan, Bishop Nqula Mrad.

Bishop Nqula Mrad (d. 1862)

Mrad was a graduate of the Maronite college of 'Ayn Warqa, and entered the service of a Maronite muqati'ji before he joined the clerical profession. He rose to prominence in the Maronite community when he was still a priest and was chosen by Patriarch Hbaysh for critical political missions in Istanbul and Paris.¹ Then he was made patriarchal deputy in Rome and was elected bishop in 1843. Bishop Mrad was also very active in the civil war in Mount Lebanon between the years 1841 and 1845.

In his treatise, Notice Historique sur la Nation Maronite, which he wrote on his political mission to seek the French government's support against the Ottomans, Mrad affirms that the Maronites were always Catholics, the first Catholics in the east. Ethnically, they are the Maradah who defended Christianity against the onslaught of the Muslims in Syria and preserved their mountain independent and pure of all heresy. Again the Maronite self-image as a people with distinct and separate character from their neighbors is strongly reflected in the thinking of Bishop Mrad: "roses among thorns," Catholics in the midst of schismatic Christians and non-believers, these are the Maronites of Lebanon.

Mrad wrote at the time when it was the official policy of the Church to support and uphold the cause of the Shihabis and their restoration to the government of Lebanon. Bishop Mrad himself was appointed by the patriarch to fight for the cause of Lebanese unity under a Maronite Shihabi Amir. His official duty was to campaign in Europe for the Maronite cause, and his mission started in Istanbul and then moved to Paris and London. Thus his writings form part of a nationalist effort to justify a Christian Imarah for the whole of Lebanon. For this purpose he had to base his argument on two points: that a Christian Imarah existed in the past, and that non-Christian communities in

¹Yusuf Dagher, Batarikat al Mawarinah (Beirut: n.p., 1958), pp. 88-89.

Mount Lebanon, including the Druze, were a small and inconsequential minority.

The first argument constitutes the major contribution of Bishop Mrad to nationalist ideology. He was the first Maronite to lay down the modern Lebanese nationalist thesis--the political unity of the whole of Mount Lebanon under the Imarah. In this argument he also extends his line of thought to the earlier times of the Ma'nis and claims that the history of Lebanon as a united polity dates back to their period. No mention is made of the religion of the Ma'nis or of the iqta' leaders who ruled the country under them. However, when he treats of the Shihabi Imarah, Mrad is more confident. With the Shihabis converted to the Maronite faith, together with the Abillama' house, he could claim that the Hakim of Mount Lebanon was always a Maronite under the Shihabis and that the country's ruling aristocracy was Maronite, too.

Having demonstrated that Lebanon was ruled for a long time by a Christian Hakim and aristocracy, it was not difficult for Mrad to argue from that point that the Druze were an undeserving minority rebelling against the legitimate rulers of the country. He reflects a sense of Maronite superiority over the Druze in his writings. The Druze are a minor group in the country, their numbers are very small, he argues, and they are quite insignificant compared with the Maronite population. He draws a chart to demonstrate this point.¹

Matawilah	
All Christians	Druze Mixed with 40,000 Christians

The Druze, in his opinion, are inferior in all respects. They are religiously confused and socially backward, generally lazy with no skills or trades other

¹Murad, Notice Historique . . ., p. 48.

than tilling the ground. It is interesting here to notice how national images have become reversed--it is now the Durzi who is distinctly a peasant laborer, rather than the Maronite. Except for a few of them who have intimate contacts with the Maronites, Mrad goes on, the Druze can neither read nor write. Besides, they are dependent upon the Maronites, for "they cannot live without the Christians of the country who are familiar with all the occupations prevalent in Europe."¹

Most significant yet in all Mrad's ideas is that he brings to their natural conclusion the earlier Maronite writings. The bearing of Mrad's argument is this: that being a national group with their own history, the Maronites should also form a state. The Maronites, he argues, have had their own government for a very long time and therefore should continue to have it. All the disturbances and events which have taken place in Lebanon and have deprived the Lebanese of their natural government, the Imarah of the Shihabis, are illegal. As for the Druze of the Lebanon, he seems to relegate their place in polity to a dependent minority.

The government which he was trying to convince the European powers to re-establish in Lebanon was an independent one and, he argued, should continue to be so. With almost complete disregard of the true history of the Imarah, Mrad maintains that the Amirs of Lebanon were independent and did not have to pay tribute to the Ottomans except in recent years, and even then, not as a sign of political tutelage but as a means to ward off the dangers of the Ottomans' increasing aggressiveness. The history of the Imarah he views as a long struggle by the Amirs to keep their country's independence from the Ottomans. Like many others of Mrad's theses, this one is without historical foundation, but very suggestive regarding the Maronites' self-image at that time. Some of these views, like the identification of the Imarah with the whole of Mount Leb-

¹Ibid., p. 22.

anon and the unity of Lebanon under one independent government, first of the Ma'nis and later of the Shihabis, remain the basis of the modern version of Lebanese nationalist history.¹

Shayban al Khazin (1750-1820?)

Maronite ideology was preserved, developed, and transmitted by clerics. However, there was another element in Maronite ideology which, through drawing from the same source and not entirely independent of the clerics' views, was different in certain aspects. This other source reflected the views of those Maronites whose own personal history was tied to that of the government, or the Imarah system. These were the Maronite muqati'jis and political and administrative aides to the Amir. Representative of this class of Maronites were Shayban al Khazin² and Tannus al Shidiaq (1791-1861).

Shayban belonged to an old Maronite muqati'ji house which had ruled the Maronite muqata'ah of Kisrwan in the Imarah since the days of Fakhr al Din II. He himself served the Amir of Lebanon, Yusuf Shihab, and was well informed about the affairs of his country. In his history³ Shayban was mainly interested in writing a chronicle of his own house. What recommends him for attention in this context is the fact that in writing about his family he also wrote about the Imarah and the Maronites. Shayban's history is divided into three parts, the first dealing with the Imarah, the second with the Khazin muqati'jis, and the third with the affairs of the Maronite Church.

¹For instance, Michel Chebli, Une Histoire du Liban à l'Époque des Emirs (1635-1841) (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1955); Hitti, Lebanon in History . . .; Muzhir, Tarikh Lubnan al 'Am; Ismail, Histoire du Liban For the Lebanese nationalist party, the Kata'ib, see Jamil Jabr al Ashqar, Al Harakah Kata'ibiyah (Beirut: Mabda'at al 'Ummal al Lubnaniyya, n.d.).

²His approximate dates after the estimate of his editors, Nasib Wuhaybah al Khazin and Bulus Mas'ad, are 1750-1820.

³Known and published as Tarikh Shayban, UT, III.

The first thing to draw the attention of the reader in Shayban's account of the Imarah is that he differs in his approach from the other Maronite writers who have been discussed so far. His major focus is on the political affairs of the Imarah as a secular government, whereas the religious orientation and Church history assume a secondary role in his mind. In a sense he can even be considered an anti-clerical, for he is critical of the clergy and seems angry at the growing wealth of the monasteries and their waqfs, which he claims was one of the causes behind the decline and impoverishment of his own family.

The main object of his attention is neither the Church nor a particular community, but rather the Imarah, in whose sphere everything else revolves. Whatever events are discussed, they are viewed in terms of their relationship to the Imarah, including those of Jibbat Bsharri and other Maronite regions. The major concern and struggle of the Imarah government, as he presents it, is to keep the influence and power of the Ottoman State at a distance from the political affairs of Mount Lebanon. In the Imarah the Druze, Maronites, and Shi'i chiefs are all engaged in the political game indifferently of their religion. Everyone is accepted at his face value and for his ability to influence events, not because he belongs to one or the other particular community. Politics and government, in his view, are the exclusive privilege of the aristocracy, with the clergy and the people as subjects.

Shayban not only represented the secular outlook of Maronite chiefs in the Imarah of Jabal al Druze but also reflected the spirit of his day, that is, the beginning of the decline of the old order of the iqta' political system. Lebanese historians of Shayban's time and earlier periods hardly ever presented a personal view or an analytic observation; to know their personal views one has to read carefully and try to discern their interests through what they chose to write about or to exclude from their accounts. On the other hand, Shayban was very personal in his expression. He was always disputing the assertions of ear-

lier historians and presenting his own opinions. But his greatest contribution was his analysis, in the story of his own family, of the rise and decline of the iqta' system. In this account he foresaw the end of the system some three generations before it actually broke up. Destruction (al kharab), he warns, is on our threshold, and in many parts it has already taken place and soon will spread to the rest.¹

Shayban's analysis of the system is a criticism of the institution of succession, in his iqta' house and in other houses which he thought shared the same conditions as his own, such as the Abillama's and the Himadis. He expresses a belief in an iron law of governance, namely, that of single united leadership. All animate life, from bees to flock animals to men, angels and even the devils, must have a head to rule over their collectivities. The world is divided into single groups, and each such group should have a single head. Shayban's view of politics is one of a pluralistic polity like the muqati'ji system in Mount Lebanon. For one man to rule over all is impractical--not even Moses with his divine source of authority could rule without dividing his men into small groups with a chief over each.² Thus Shayban is satisfied with the division of power in Lebanon between the Amir and the muqati'jis, though he grumbles at the increase in the Amir's power and the growing division and weakness in the muqati'ji houses.

The source of trouble is in the muqati'ji houses themselves and their internal organization. The seed of decline, to his understanding, started with the first great Khazin muqati'ji, Abu Nawfal al Khazin. Abu Nawfal disregarded the "iron law" in his will when he divided not only his land among all his children but also political authority. He divided the government ('uhad) among three

¹Shayban, Tarikh, p. 447.

²Ibid., p. 449.

of them, and they later divided it among their descendants. Shayban advocated the seniority rule in inheritance and succession, but he was also willing to accept designation, provided only one person held the top position. The consequence of fragmentation of land and authority among different members of the family, he argues, is to create different interests among the members of the same family. Men's minds follow their interests, and with the variant interests among the Khazin individuals, their ways of thinking differed accordingly. This division, he continues, leads to dissension in the family, weakness and decline. Besides, Shayban observes, these divisions have also harmed the peasant in Mount Lebanon, whose well-being is an essential condition for the success of the iqta' system.¹

With Shayban we witness the beginning of the breakdown of traditional outlooks. In reflecting on the Imarah he could detect serious flaws in its order, and showed an awareness of a more formal and more perfect system of government. He commented, for instance, that Mount Lebanon was a country without an army to protect it, nor did it have a legal code or courts of law. Shayban knew that these functions were carried out in the Imarah by other means; his criticism shows that he was not satisfied with the way they were performed and that he could envisage different systems.

Tannus al Shidiaq (1794?-1861)

Our second secular writer is Tannus al Shidiaq. Tannus was a descendant of a Maronite family whose members distinguished themselves in the service of the Amirs of Lebanon. He himself was occasionally employed by political chiefs in various political capacities. Although he was educated by the clergy at 'Ayn Warqa, Shidiaq did not lose sight of his family's traditions in the Imarah. His outlook and attitude toward the Imarah were like that of Shayban,

¹Ibid., p. 447.

different from the clerical outlook dominant in northern Lebanon. Unlike Shayban, however, he was concerned more distinctly with a political community, the Lebanese community, not with religious communities or a ruling house. As Albert Hourani observes,

his specific subject is . . . Lebanon itself. . . . He sees Lebanon not simply as a territory unified and ruled by one princely family, but as a whole structure of families each with its own sphere of authority, and all intricately balanced and connected with one another.¹

Al Shidiaq has a coherent concept of Lebanon as a pluralistic society geographically and politically united. He looks upon geographic Lebanon in two ways: one is that of a territory, the other is the geographic limits of the Imarah. There is the Phoenician Lebanon which consists of the mountain range plus the coastal towns, a concept closer to present-day Lebanon than any other view current in his days. His second idea of Lebanon is one strictly corresponding to the political and administrative units of the Shihabi Imarah, particularly under Bashir II.

Historically, al Shidiaq assimilates, to a great extent, the Maronite world-view with the concept of the Imarah of Jabal al Druze. He traces the history of the Lebanese people to the time of the Phoenicians, and calls the sea coast towns Phoenician towns. Thus he is the first to introduce into the Lebanese national ideology the "Phoenician" concept, which took stronger expression later in Lebanese nationalist ideas. He also draws from the clerical world-view, and though he does not mention Yusuf al Duwayhi among his sources, he actually copied from the latter's treatise and followed the list of Maronite chiefs name by name in the same order given by al Duwayhi. For him as for the others, the Lebanese are the Maradah, an orthodox Catholic sect who lived in Mount Lebanon and fought the Muslim Arabs from the seventh century on. Thus the origin and place of the Maronite community, its unity and continuity, are pre-

¹Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.), Historians of the Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 233.

served in al Shidiaq's work as they were reflected in the clerical outlook.

Shidiaq's outlook is that of a "citizen" of the Imarah, a secular political outlook. He represents the Maronite who, without being unaware of his particular community's heritage, looks at that heritage as part of a larger whole. It is this sense of national unity, perhaps, which prompts him to define the significance of Mount Lebanon in antiquity to both great religions, Islam and Christianity.¹

The history of the Maronite Church is almost completely overlooked in his account except for occasional references to Church councils or important religious events. Unlike Shayban, Shidiaq is very reserved and hardly ever ventures an idea as a personal one. Many momentous events took place in Mount Lebanon during his lifetime, such as the civil wars of the mid-century, yet these fail to move him out of his natural reserve. During these trying events, though he had no doubt as to where his loyalties belonged, he still showed no religious fanaticism and could not completely conceal his preference for the earlier secular politics.

Yusuf Karam (1823-1889)

Between 1841 and 1861 the iqta' political system and the Shihabi Imarah broke down. This period was also marked by a civil war between the Christians and the Druze. During this era of civil war the Maronite world-view found its most vivid embodiment in the person of a young Maronite leader who emerged out of the wreckage of the old system. That leader was the national hero Yusuf Karam.

Karam was born of a family of small shaykhs in the Maronite stronghold of Ihdin in Jibbat Bsharri. His father, Butrus Karam, was the first in his family to hold the 'uhdah of Ihdin, and Shaykh Abi Khattar al 'Aynturini was Yusuf's

¹Shidiaq, Akhbar, I, 6.

grandfather on his mother's side. Like all the children of his generation Yusuf received his education from the clergy in his village. His Arabic was excellent and he could speak and write in French. Early in his life he showed aptitude for leadership and desire for ruling. Before the death of his father he started to compete and struggle to inherit the 'uhdah of Ihdin instead of his older brother. Yusuf also managed to attract attention to himself during the Qa'imma-qamiyyah period in the whole region of Jbayl and Jibbat Bsharri. He was chosen by the people of these regions to represent them and seek redress for their condition from the government.¹ In 1858 he interceded with the patriarch to use his influence and settle the dispute between the Khazin shaykhs and the Kisrwan peasants who rebelled against the authority of their muçati'jis. He warned, on the eve of hostilities between the Christians and the Druze, that such civil strife had the effect of shackling the power of the Christians through internal dissension.

However, Yusuf Karam did not become nationally known and famous until the hostilities broke out in 1860, when he led a large band of Maronite young men to south Lebanon. The effect of his march was not serious, and he was detained in the Maronite village of Bikfayya in the Matn partly by indecision and partly by the Ottoman Vali's opposition to his advance. Still more, he was encumbered by an irresponsible French consul at that time, who made a farce of the Maronite loyalty to the French.

It was not, however, the effect of his expedition that gave Karam a significant political importance. It was rather the fact that he was the only Christian leader to emerge at that time who really could offer something for the people. Unlike the war of 1841-1845, in 1860 the conflict was mostly religious, and the old ruling class of the Imarah like the Shihabis and the Abil-lama's showed no leadership at all. As a result, the advent of Karam aroused

¹See Butrus Karam, Qala'id . . ., II, 221.

the Maronite population and they brought him a considerable following. Witnessing his popularity, the Ottoman government's conciliatory commission recognized Karam's leadership and appointed him the Christian Qa'immaqam, or governor.

What is noticeable and significant in this episode is that for the first time in Mount Lebanon a young man of no high rank or position in the country could assume the highest political office. Second, also without precedent, a new popular leadership emerged in Lebanon. Karam had a following devoted to him not only from his 'uhdah or his family's domain, but from all over the country, not bound by iqta' loyalties or ties. He was particularly attractive to the young generation of men who followed his leadership and command.¹ He himself felt that he was something of a new type of leader in the country and expressed this feeling in a description of his role. He wrote that he was "leaving behind me for my dear countrymen a secure way . . . putting ahead of their eyes new principles and new traditions to follow. . . ."²

The fate of Lebanon at that time did not depend on Karam, in spite of the fact that he had shown ability during his short career; and it was clear that only an international settlement could re-establish peace and order among the Lebanese torn by internal dissension and civil strife. Karam's tenure as governor came to an end as soon as the European Powers and the Ottoman government reorganized the political institutions of Lebanon in 1861 under the Mutasa'rifiyyah regime. Stimulated by popular acclaim, Karam aspired to become the Hakim of Lebanon, and when the Mutasa'rifiyyah agreement precluded Lebanese from occupying the office of governor, he turned against the new arrangement. He opposed the newly appointed governor, was sent into exile to Istanbul, but soon returned to lead the forces of discontent among the Maronites and to fight the new governor. Again he lost, and was sent once more to exile in Algeria;

¹Hattuni, Nabdah, p. 365.

²Karam, Qala'id . . ., II, 214-17.

then he moved to France and other parts of Europe, seeking in vain permission to return home. He died an exile in Italy in 1889.

Karam personified the intractability of the Maronite nationalist goal: a Maronite Imarah in a country formed of various national and religious groups. He himself believed that non-Christians would be willing to accept a government under him, perhaps falsely encouraged by overtures from the Matawilah who stood united with the Maronites throughout the period of civil war. His extreme nationalism and determination to become Hakim in a situation thoroughly adverse to his aspirations brought defeat and frustration. He also brought upon himself the unrelenting opposition of his former sympathizer and supporter, the Maronite patriarch, against whom he bore a permanent grudge. A man of experience and responsibility and the head of a Church and community, Patriarch Mas'ad could not support Karam's vain and endless adventures and his determination to wreck the European Powers' arrangement--which, after all, was proving rewarding for the Maronites and beneficial for the whole country.

With respect to his ideas, Karam represented the line of thought laid down by Bishop Mrad. However, in his later years and as a result of his observations of Europe, he started to draw from the current ideas of European thinkers and to meet, by a different route, the ideas of Ottoman liberals who were residing in European cities. Here, however, we shall be concerned only with his early ideas and how they came about as a result of the Lebanese intellectual climate.

First, Karam was very keen about the idea of authority drawn from the people. He justified his bid for power by the support the people gave him and by the ideas of Maronite nationality, namely the independence of Lebanon and the supremacy of the Maronites. In his expression of this national sentiment, Karam rose to the status of a full-fledged national leader, writing: "Every leader (ra'is), ecclesiastical or civil, is face to face with death every moment of

his life, but the life and development of the people continuously marches with the ages and produces leaders all the time."¹ He had no doubt that he was the chosen leader of his people and strongly aspired to be at the head of the country. In the early part of his career the clergy, too, supported him, rejoiced at his successes, and felt sorry for his failures.²

In line with Mrad and other Maronite writers discussed above, Karam believed in the historical independence of Lebanon. From the time of the Muslim conquest of Syria, he maintains, Lebanon was able to preserve its autonomous status. In the Ottoman period the Lebanese paid a fixed tribute as a means to keep the Ottomans from interfering in the internal affairs of their country. When he talks about the Lebanese he means the whole of the Ijarah, ignoring the historical division between north and south Lebanon. Karam regarded himself as the champion of this independence and on this ground criticized the constitution of 1860, which, he argued, violated this long-established Lebanese independence and deprived the Lebanese of their traditional way of defending themselves against Ottoman aggression. By this he meant, of course, their political system of self-rule, by a ruling family of the Lebanese themselves.

Like Mrad, Karam thought of the Ijarah as a Christian government. In the Ijarah which he aspired to head the Druze would have been relegated to a secondary position. Although the Druze emerged as the military victors in the civil wars of 1841-1845 and 1860, Karam was not willing to concede to them any political prominence, nor even the right to rule the mixed areas where they had always had their home and political bastion. The political division of Lebanon, whether communal or geographic, was totally unacceptable to him, and he strongly repudiated the Qa'immaqamiyyah system which divided the country between 1843 and 1860. The Lebanese could not afford to be divided, for if they were, they would

¹Ibid., I, 233.

²Hattuni, Nabdah, p. 375. Also al Dibs, Tarikh Suriyyah, VIII, 726-33.

not be able to withstand the oppression of their powerful neighbors whom they had successfully resisted throughout history. Lebanon is the land of refuge for the minorities of the east, he maintained, and by saying this he perhaps also included the Druze. But the Druze were a minority in Lebanon and to give them political power out of proportion to their numbers would have been dangerous and unfair. The Maronites occupied all important fields of public activity and constituted three-fourths of the entire population, he claimed; Druze political precedence would have been an unbearable anomaly. His unwillingness to admit that the Druze were still a great power, greater than their numbers warranted, was at the root of his frustrations as a political leader.

Karam represented Maronite nationalism of northern Lebanon in its strongest temper. Not only in his life career but also in his writings he formulated the idea of Maronite nationalism. The Maronites, he wrote, "are the sons of one homeland [watan wahid], and the members of one Church, and they have one nationality [jinsiyyah]."¹

To summarize and conclude, the study of writings by the Maronites shows that they were strongly aware of themselves as a distinct group with their own history, religion, and national character. They were religiously devoted to the territory of Lebanon with which their early struggles, victories, and defeats were identified. Though they viewed themselves as an independent people with their own rulers, no clear statement emerges in these early accounts as to the necessity of having a state of their own, though by implication they wished to have Maronite rulers. Not until the first part of the nineteenth century was such a claim made, interestingly enough at the time the clergy had become increasingly active and influential in the affairs of the Ijarah. This view was held by Bishop Mrad and, as we shall see later, by the Church as a whole. In the early period as well as later on, the clergy were the bearers of Maronite

¹Karam, Qala'id . . ., II, 212-13.

ideology, and they were also the first to develop the nationalist theme of a Maronite State.

The Communication of Ideas

As can be observed from the preceding section, the clergy in Mount Lebanon were the bearers of the community's world-view and from them it was disseminated to the lay population through the ages. It is perhaps this fact that gives the Maronite clergy what recent Maronite writers call "profoundly popular" and "essentially national" character.¹ The role of the Maronite clergy in maintaining the faith, the identity, and the solidarity of the Maronites in the face of adverse conditions of both political and intellectual opposition in Ottoman Syria, cannot be underestimated.

Threats to the continued cohesive sense of identity among the Maronites came from several sources. The Christians of Syria were non-Catholic and hostile to the Maronites, whose ancient union with Rome was detested by the Greek clergy of the Melkite Church. There was even a time when the Jacobites sought converts among the Maronites in the heart of their country. Protestant missionaries appeared on the Lebanese scene, too, in the early part of the nineteenth century, threatening the unity of the Maronite community. Threat from schismatic Christians was not all that the Maronites had to put up with; they had to meet the challenge of the Catholic missionaries as well.

Catholic missionaries such as the Jesuits and Lazarites tried to preach among the Maronites and persuade them to change to the Latin rite. This deeply disturbed and aroused the Maronite clergy, who put up a strong resistance to the encroachment of the Latins and, as early as the seventeenth century, prevented them from performing religious activities and services among Maronite flocks. The struggle against the Latinization of the Maronite Church continued

¹Aouad, Droit Privé . . ., p. 7.

for centuries, and though the Maronites accepted from Rome the benefits of education and reform, they resisted the Latin rite and preserved their religious organization from Latinization by the sheer power of their self-centered sense of national identity and pride. Council after council enacted rules against non-Maronite Catholic clergy, prohibiting the people from receiving religious service from their hands. The Council of Hrash in 1644 was held explicitly to curb the Catholic clergy. The Maronite clergy carried the campaign to Rome and were able to secure Papal orders against the encroachments of the missionaries.¹ The Maronite clergy looked after their flock very carefully, trying not to lose even one of them, and for that purpose laid down very stringent rules against intermarriage with non-Maronites, including Catholics.²

The Maronite clergy were also ready for the Protestants when they appeared in Lebanon in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Patriarch Hbaysh immediately sent a circular to the Maronites forbidding them to have any contact whatsoever with the Protestants. And to counteract Protestant missionary work, he started a Maronite mission and gave strict orders to the clergy to hold meetings after mass for the education of the people in the Catholic teachings and gospel.³ The home mission, which he called the Evangelical Missionary Society, was started in 1840 and placed under three well-educated clerics, graduates of 'Ayn Warqa. One Maronite, also a graduate of 'Ayn Warqa, As'ad al Shidiaq, who became an enthusiastic convert to Protestantism, fell a victim of this campaign against the Protestant missions and died in a monastic dungeon.

Another challenge which the Maronite clergy had to face came during the period of Maronite migration from north to south Lebanon in the late sixteenth

¹See Mas'ad, MB, pp. 87-93.

²See Shartuni, MM, p. 24.

³Hattuni, Nabdhah, p. 310.

and early seventeenth centuries. Being surrounded by hostile Muslims, the Maronites in towns concealed their true faith and professed Islam; they became known as "White Maronites" because they wore the white turbans worn by Muslims. The Maronite patriarch, however, bought the freedom of these Maronites from the Pasha of Tripoli and made it possible for them to profess their true faith. A similar challenge, resulting from the migration movement, was to provide for the care of the Maronites who had migrated to new and distant places in the mountain and elsewhere. Without clerical attention, these migrants could gradually have passed into other religious sects, as is quite evident from the family histories of some Lebanese Christians who resided in villages with different religious affiliations. But the Church emerged strong and successful from the struggle against these difficulties.

How was the Church able to undertake such a great task as preserving the unity and character of the community in different ages and periods of hard trials? What means did the Church have to cope with its task? Actually, it had powerful resources to meet the challenges with which it was faced: it had an extensive organization. First, the bureaucratic structure of the Church was the means by which it disseminated its ideas and promoted its prestige among the people. The second important instrument of Church ideology was the school system.

In the preceding chapter concerning the reform of the Church organization, it was shown how, as a result of the population movement, the Church had to reorganize its structure to meet the people's need for pastoral care. Decentralization made it possible for distant villages to have their own priest no matter where they happened to be. We have also seen how decentralization brought better religious services to the Maronite flock when it became possible for the bishop to have a special diocese in which he could reside. Bishops were the best educated clerics in the Church and ipso facto the most learned men in

the entire country. Gradually, over the years it became possible for them to raise the standards of religious life. Reform in the Church also improved the quality of service which the priest could offer, and imposed better discipline among the people. These efforts left a marked effect on the behavior of the Maronites in their relations with the clergy. The people's respect for the clergy and the influence of the latter upon them impressed many observers and travelers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.¹

The priest in the village was a symbol of the continuous presence of religion and the Church. He conducted mass and the personal ceremonies like marriages, baptisms, and funerals. He taught children the catechism and sometimes reading and writing. He was of central importance in the handling of family problems and regularly acted as a consultant for his flock.² He also had authorization to settle marital cases and to waive the law in minor questions like marriages between first cousins.³ The central importance of the priest in the village was reported by Colonel Churchill, who lived about 10 years with the Lebanese, but whose anti-clerical and anti-Catholic prejudices strongly weighted his judgments. He wrote:

In fact, in worldly as in spiritual, nay, in all family matters, amongst Maronites, the priest rules supreme. Constantly prowling about from house to house, not an incident, however trivial, escapes his vigilance. . . . No Maronite peasant dares to marry without getting the consent of the priest. . . . Custom and ancient usage have made it hereditary throughout the entire population; and, lest education might in the least degree dissipate the prestige which time has so thoroughly implanted in the breasts of these simple people, the very school-books which are placed in the hands of their children, are carefully compiled so as to increase the natural awe with which they regard their spiritual guides.⁴

¹Volney, Travels through Syria . . ., II, 20-21; and Churchill, Mount Lebanon . . ., III, 83. Also Henry Harris Jessup, Fifty-Three Years in Syria (2 vols.; New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, n.d.), I, 158.

²Churchill, Mount Lebanon . . ., III, 83.

³Daghir, Batarikat al Mawarinah, p. 80.

⁴Churchill, Mount Lebanon . . ., III, 83.

In 1844 there were 1,205 of these priests in Mount Lebanon¹ among a population of about 250,000 Maronites, or a ratio of roughly one priest for every 200 lay Maronites.

While the priests revived the faith of the people and gave them religious education, in their turn they received instruction and help from the archbishops of their dioceses. It was these bishops with their prestige and education who succeeded in converting to the Maronite faith the two top families in Lebanon, the Shihabis and the Abillama's, whose conversion added strength and prestige to the Maronite community in Mount Lebanon. Educated clerics like Bishop Yusuf Istfan (later patriarch), the priest Mikha'il Fadil (later bishop and then patriarch), and some others of the higher clerics of the monk orders, were responsible for the proselytization of the Shihabis and Abillama's.²

The Shihabis were originally Sunni Muslims, while the Abillama's were Druze. Both houses were of the rank of amirs. Proselytizing started with the Shihabis in the middle of the eighteenth century, and later during that period the Abillama's also started to change their faith, a process which continued with the latter throughout the nineteenth century. The first act of conversion took place in 1754 among the sons of the ruling line of Shihabis, the sons of Amir Milhim. These conversions, it is sometimes suggested, were made for political reasons, that is, to meet the growing political importance of the Maronites. This seems to the present writer a far-fetched explanation. During the middle of the eighteenth century the Maronites had no political power to compare with that of the Druze, who constituted the real ruling class. The Maronites of north Lebanon were also outside the Ijarah at that time and were

¹Murad, Notice Historique . . ., p. 46.

²Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 31, 38; and Antonius Shibli, "Nabdah Tarikhiyyah fi Tanassur Ba'd al Umara' al Lama'yyin," MQ, XXVIII (1930), 431-34. 'Isa Iskandar al Ma'luf and Salim al Dahdah, "Tanassur al Umara' al Shihabiyyin wa al Lama'yyin fi Lubnan," MQ, XVIII (1920), 543-52.

suffering from the oppressive rule of their Himadi overlords. The Shihabi who would most have been suspect of such a maneuver, Amir Yusuf Shihab, was not one of the converts;¹ and although he remained Muslim he received unswerving support from the Maronites, even against the Maronite Amir Bashir Shihab II.² Furthermore, the conversions of the Shihabis and the Abillama's were then politically harmful to their relations with their subjects and the Ottoman government, and they maintained the utmost secrecy about their conversion and religious practices. However, in the case of the Abillama's a possibility remains that their conversion was motivated by the personal relations which they maintained with the Shihabis.

It was the intellectual and educational advancement of the Maronite clergy that was the positive factor in these conversions, for the men who succeeded in winning the new believers had a Western education, the best in Lebanon. Two other indirect reasons may help account for their success. First was the fact that Lebanon was politically autonomous and its people enjoyed religious liberty; and second, the religious isolation of the Shihabis from the Sunni Muslim world, in the midst of Maronites and Druze, may have contributed to their willingness to change religion.

The monks also played an important role in the rehabilitation of the religious life of the Maronite community. Every monastery with its monks proved to be an active religious center in the community. They were particularly important in distant and difficult places in the mixed areas which the priests usually avoided. Due to the competition between the regular clergy of the Church

¹Pierre Dib contends that Amir Yusuf was Maronite, see Pierre Dib, L'Eglise Maronite, Vol. II: Les Maronites sous les Ottomans, Histoire Civile (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1962), p. 170.

²We can now conclusively maintain that Amir Bashir was a Christian who followed one time the Latin rite and in other times the Maronite rite. Tiyyan papers, MSS, 227, 228; also France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Correspondance Consulaire, Tripoli, 7 June, 1807.

hierarchy and the orders of monks, especially the Lebanese Order, the patriarchs permitted the monks to serve only in defined areas where they were not likely to give the priests much competition. A look at the areas where they carried out religious services shows their concentration in the religiously mixed regions, a fact which indicates the monk's missionary importance. In mixed areas of al Shuf and Jazzin they served in 55 places, whereas in Kisrwan, the region with the most pure and numerous Maronite population, they served in only 11 places. In another mixed area, al Matn, monks were active in 25 localities, and in 26 in Bilad Jbayl and al Batrun, districts where the Maronite population was mixed with Matawilah and once ruled by them. In many of these centers where they carried out their mission, the population had been quite ignorant about the teachings of their religion before the monks' arrival.¹

The monks were popular among the people. They also contributed in their own right to the migration movement, for the peasants went to live in the vicinity of the monks' monasteries because of the security and work which the latter provided.² Another attraction which the monks possessed lay in the linguistic factor, for they stressed Arabic in their services, whereas the priests leaned heavily on Syriac liturgies and prayers. The use of Arabic made the monks more intelligible to the peasants than was the regular priest, and consequently more popular. The monks made a major contribution to the Church in introducing the Arabic language into its mass and other services, and the founders of the Lebanese Order, like Qar'ali and Farhat, were pioneers in the advancement of the Arabic language.

There were two other ways by which the Church hierarchy and the orders

¹Regarding the cases of Qartaba and Wadi Shahrur, see Blaybil, TRIM, LII, 551.

²See Antonius Shibli, "Al Zira'ah wa al Sina'ah bayn al Ruhban," MQ, XXXI (1933), 863-64. This applies to Melkite Catholic monasteries too, like the monastery of Mar Ilias in Zahli, see Munayyar, KTS, I, 199, n. 1.

of monks stimulated religious life among the people and increased clerical influence: Papal Indulgences and religious societies. The Popes and the Maronite patriarchs bestowed a number of Indulgences on churches and monasteries. Though the regular Church hierarchy benefited from these Indulgences and from special powers to absolve the sinners, it was the Lebanese Order which was granted the larger number of Indulgences for its churches and places of worship. In 1734 the Pope bestowed for the first time a number of Indulgences on the Lebanese Order; then he expanded them in 1775, 1779, and 1786. Aside from the special Indulgences, special powers of redemption were conferred on all of the Order's churches in 1779.

The Indulgences, the monks' asceticism, and their use of the Arabic language made them very popular among the peasant population of Lebanon, who flocked to their churches and monasteries from distant places. When the Church prelates tried to limit their activities because they encroached on the regular organization, the monks suspended all their activities and refused to offer any religious services to the people for several days, to demonstrate to the higher clergy the extent of their popular support. The excitement of the people forced the Church to rescind its orders,¹ thus yielding to the monks in the contest of strength.

Religious Societies

The Church and the monks also founded religious societies for the lay population, the most important of which were the following: Shirkat al Habal Bila Danas,² Shirkat al Wardiyyah, Shirkat al Qiddisin, Jam'iyat al Mursalin al Injiliyin, and other smaller ones. Shirkat al Qiddisin was founded in 1725

¹Blaybil, MQ, LI, 296.

²A comprehensive account of the organization and condition of this fraternity is available in Yusuf al Dibs (ed.), Kitab Qawanin Akhawiyyat al Habal Bila Danas (Ihdin, Lebanon: al Matba 'at al Lubnaniyyah, 1865).

and al Wardiyyah around the same period; the latter was put under the jurisdiction of the patriarch in 1732.¹ Both these societies were popular. The society of al Mursalin al Injiliyin was founded in 1840 as a means to counteract the Protestant missions in Lebanon and was entrusted to three clerics who were graduates of 'Ayn Warqa. The three clerics, Yusuf al Rizzi, Yuhanna al Sayigh al Islambuly, and Yusuf 'Attiyah, were well known for their good education and skill in oratory. The Wardiyyah and the Mursalin al Injiliyin were directed by the patriarch and his bishops while the others were mainly directed by the monks, who also took an active part in the first-mentioned two societies. But though these associations were supervised and guided by the clergy, with the exception of al Mursalin they were under the direct leadership of lay people. The minutes of one chapter of the Society of al Habal Bila Danas in the village of Zuq Mikha'il shows that these societies were highly organized, with regular meetings, officers, and records.²

No comprehensive account can be given of the membership of these societies or their size. However, some figures are available and may give an idea of the relative size of membership. For instance, in 1727 the Lebanese monks were able to recruit in al Qati' (see Figure 1) 1,200 members for the Society of al Wardiyyah in 25 days.³ The chapter of the Society of al Habal Bila Danas in Zuq Mikha'il in 1838 had 40 members.⁴ Members were common folk, and also came from the upper classes.⁵ Amir Haydar Abillama' himself was known as the Father of al Wardiyyah.⁶

¹Ghibra'il, Tarikh al Kanisah . . ., II, 574-75; see the text of the Papal message in this regard.

²Manuscript of the minutes read with the permission of its owner, Father John Naffa' of Our Lady of Lebanon, Chicago.

³Blaybil, MQ, LI, 296.

⁴Naffa' manuscript.

⁵PAB, Hbaysh papers, 3213; Haydar, Ahmad Basha al Jazzar, p. 240.

⁶Kerr, Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism . . ., p. 36.

The Printing Press

In addition to all these activities, the Church controlled the printing presses and the schools. The press up to the late nineteenth century was the exclusive possession of the clergy, whether Maronite or Protestant. The Maronites had their first printing press in Lebanon in 1610, the Melkite Catholics acquired theirs in 1733, and the Melkite Orthodox in 1751.¹ After 1610 the Maronites added to their presses those of Mar Musa al Habshi and Tamish. Still, printing facilities were very limited, and the Maronites themselves depended on Rome more than on their own printing presses. For instance, in 1830 the clergy had printed in Rome 1,750 copies of a liturgy book.² Increase in the printing output was achieved in the second part of the eighteenth century and considerably more in the first part of the nineteenth.

The books printed in these presses were almost all religious, like the Psalms (which also served as a reading text in schools), prayer books, the Gospel and Epistles and certain books of the Bible.³ The influence of the press around the end of the eighteenth century, though still limited, sufficiently impressed Volney to write that among the Christians

this influence of the press is so efficacious, that the establishment of Mar Hanna alone, imperfect as it is, has already produced a sensible difference among the Christians. The art of reading and writing, and even a sort of information, are more common among them at present, than they were thirty years ago.⁴

Volney also observed:

Unfortunately their output [the presses'] has been of that kind, which long retarded the progress of improvement, and excited innumerable discords in

¹See Hitti, Lebanon in History . . ., pp. 456-57; and Shaykko, "Usul al Tiba'ah," MQ, III (1901), 78-79ff.

²See Blaybil, TRLM, LII, 563-64; and Shibli, MQ, LI, 310.

³Ibid.; also Blaybil, TRLM, LII, 563-64; Volney, Travels through Syria . . ., II, 196-99.

⁴Ibid., p. 454.

Europe. For bibles and religious books being the first which proceed from the press, the general attention was turned towards theological discussion whence resulted a fermentation which was the source of schism of England and Germany, and the unhappy political troubles of France.¹

His presentiment of the effect of the propagation of religious books came true half a century later.

School System

No less effective was the school system in spreading Maronite ideology and clerical influence, for the school system was entirely clerical and almost all Maronite. Great credit should be given to the Holy See for spreading education among the Maronites. As can be recalled from the previous chapters, the Maronite College at Rome was opened as early as 1584, and continued until it was closed in 1799. Though there was some tradition of literacy in Karshuni and Syriac among the Maronites before this period, education and schools did not go back to an earlier period.²

The first record we have of a Maronite school is that of Huqa in Jibbat Bsharri, opened by Patriarch Yuhanna Makhluḥ in 1624.³ In 1670 Patriarch Duwayhi moved the school from Huqa to Qannubin where he put the school under his direct supervision and participated in the teaching.⁴ The clerics who studied in Rome and returned to Lebanon made a large contribution to the spread of schools and the religious mission in Mount Lebanon during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as we learn from the biographical account of these students written by Patriarch Duwayhi and from later accounts.⁵ After his return from Rome,

¹Ibid.

²In 1578 Battista wrote that those who could read and write among the Maronites could be counted on the fingers. See Shaykko, MQ, XVIII, 679.

³Duwayhi, TA, pp. 320, 322.

⁴Aynturini, MTL, XLVII, 28.

⁵See Shaykko, MQ, XIX, 141-46, 293-302, 623-30.

Duwayhi himself opened a school in his village, Ihdin. Another seventeenth century Maronite school was that of Zgharta, also in Jibbat Bsharri, and opened by a graduate of the Maronite College who later turned it over to the Jesuits. Two years after the Jesuit order was dissolved in 1773, the school returned to the bishop of Ihdin under whom it continued its work until the nineteenth century.¹ It is not known how many students these seventeenth century schools generally had, though it is likely that much depended on the teacher who happened to be in charge. When Istfan al Duwayhi was running the school of Qannubin, about 60 students were in attendance, quite a large number for that time and place.²

Only the Zgharta school continued in operation through the nineteenth century, from the seventeenth century. Other schools, however, were started in the eighteenth century, and some of the best go back to this period, like 'Ayn Warqa (1789)³ and that of 'Ayntura. Eight other lesser schools were opened by the clergy in the second part of the eighteenth century in Jibbat Bsharri, KISRWAN, and the mixed areas. In the early years of the nineteenth century additional schools were opened of which the most important were Kfarhay (1811), Kfayfan (1808), both in Bilad al Batrun; and al Rumiyyah (1818), Mar 'Abda Harhariya (1830), and Rayfun (1832) in KISRWAN. About 27 other smaller schools were opened in various places during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In addition to this, in eight monasteries the monks taught classes to children from neighboring villages.

With respect to the Catholic missionaries, the Jesuits opened and directed

¹Regarding the school of Zgharta, see 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVII, 30; also Dibs, Tarikh Suriyyah, VIII, 549; Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, I, 472-525.

²'Aynturini, MTL, XLVII, 28.

³See Khayrallah Istfan, Zubdat al Bayan aw Khulasat Tarikh um Madaris Suriyyah wa Lubnan: 'Ayn Warqa (New York: Syrian-American Press, 1923). Although it was started in 1789, the college was not put into operation until 1797 by the joint efforts of Bishop Yusuf Istfan and Patriarch Yusuf Tiyyan.

the schools of Bikfayya (1833), and Ghazir in 1843 and two smaller schools in Beirut and Zahli. As for the schools of Zgharta and 'Ayntura, the missionaries and the Maronite clergy alternated in directing them.

The clergy bore almost all the burden of the school system. The Lebanese Order (native) was responsible for the opening of 17 schools of the total number, and the Aleppine Order for six. The rest were opened and directed by the Church hierarchy. The major schools like 'Ayn Warqa, Mar 'Abda Harhariya, Rumiyyah, and Rayfun were directly under the supervision of the patriarch. The clergy were also aided in their educational enterprise by a few members of the Maronite aristocracy, who sometimes contributed land for school building. Greater contribution, however, came from the villagers themselves, who would invite the clerics, especially the monks of the Lebanese Order, to open schools in their villages. The peasants contributed land and property usually sufficient for the maintenance of a teacher, while the monks would provide the teacher and in turn gain the property for their establishment. Also many of the clerics, bishops, and priests bequeathed their property and worldly acquisitions to the benefit of schools or for the opening of new ones, as is clear from the documents left from that period.

With the exception of the few best schools, all the rest were merely concerned with teaching the three R's and the Church catechism. At 'Ayn Warqa, Mar 'Abda, Rumiyyah, Kfarhay, and Kfayfan, subjects ranging from calligraphy to literature, logic, philosophy, theology, and European and oriental languages were taught. However, there was no vocation in Lebanon for those who learned these more advanced subjects other than the clerical profession. Thus it was in that profession that the fruits of this higher education were felt most. Almost all the higher clergy who played an important part in the political life of Lebanon in the first half of the nineteenth century were either graduates of the Maronite College of Rome, like Patriarch Tiyyan, or of 'Ayn Warqa. Bishop

Yusuf Istfan was the principal of 'Ayn Warqa, while the following were some of the politically important clerics who graduated from that college: Bishops Butrus al Bustani, Yusuf Rizq, Yusuf Ja'ja', and Nqula Mrad; and Patriarchs Yusuf Hbaysh, Yusuf al Khazin, and Bulus Mas'ad. Those who did not want to join the clergy had virtually no opportunities to use their educational advantages. To find new scopes and opportunities which their education merited, they had to make a break with their culture, as is born out by the case of As'ad al Shidiaq and Butrus al Bustani,¹ who adopted Protestantism.

Literacy and arithmetic were all the education that the average Lebanese really needed during the Imarah period. It was the knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic that raised some Maronites to positions of political importance as aides and secretaries to the Hakim and sometimes to the Ottoman Valis in Syria. Observing the importance of literacy among the Maronites, Volney wrote:

The art of writing has become more common among the Maronites, and rendered them, in this country, what the Copts are in Egypt, I mean, they are in possession of all the posts of writers, intendants, and kiayas [kakhia] among the Turks, and especially of those among their allies and neighbors, the Druzes.²

It was these skills, too, especially arithmetic, which were needed by the people in their everyday life. In a book left by a Maronite shaykh to his son, the writer ends every page with the same advice: the boy should give his undivided attention to arithmetic and to his mulberry trees.³ Calligraphy was particularly important and much desired, because of the value put on it by the Amir and the aristocracy, who always needed scribes. Faris al Shidiaq, in his criticism of clerical education, became particularly annoyed over the emphasis put on calligraphy and the ruler who encouraged the people's interest in it.

¹Not to be confused with Archbishop Butrus al Bustani.

²Volney, Travels through Syria . . ., II, 32.

³Shahin, MO I.TV 526, 531, 652.
²Volney, Travels

Noting this excessive interest, he wrote, "The people used to prefer good calligraphy to all the other manual arts. They considered him who excelled in it above his equals in virtue."¹ But in spite of Shidiaq's criticism, education in literacy was useful to the people, and the education provided in the top Maronite schools of Lebanon was the best available.

There is no clear account available which indicates the number of students in these schools during this period. However, one can assume that not many had 60 students at one time like Duwayhi's school.² Usually, a very small number of young boys went to school on a regular basis. For instance, 'Ayn Tura had only eight students in 1736,³ and in 1858 the number had increased to about a hundred.⁴ Some of these schools provided scholarships for a small number of students which took care of their living expenses and education; the school of Kfarhay, for example, provided for 12 students.⁵ Bishop Nqula Mrad tells us that in 1844 each of the four main schools in Lebanon had about 25 students.⁶ Hattuni's estimate of the total number of students in Kisrwan at the time he wrote his book in the 1880's, was about 600.⁷ Another indication of the number of those who went to school can be gathered from the number of those who graduated. We are told, for instance, that about 50 students graduated from 'Ayn Warqa between 1789 and 1818.⁸ Between 1808 and 1874, 260 stu-

¹Faris al Shidiaq, Kitab al Saq 'ala al Saq . . ., p. 17.

²Dayr Sayidat al Luwayzah is said to have had at one time 80 students, see Ghalib, MQ, XXVIII, 580.

³Ibid., p. 578.

⁴M.H. "Sahifah min Tarikh Lubnan fi al Qarn al Tasi' 'Ashar," MQ, XXI (1923), 828.

⁵Daghir, Lubnan . . ., p. 160.

⁶Murad, Notice Historique . . ., p. 18.

⁷Hattuni, Nabdhah, p. 27.

⁸Duwayhi, TTM, p. 266.

dents graduated from Kfayfan.¹ These figures clearly show the limited number of persons these schools could teach.

Nonetheless, for a small mountain country of the Asian-Arab part of the Ottoman Empire, these achievements of the Maronite Church remain extraordinary. They instilled in the people a consciousness of themselves as a community, and strengthened their ties with the Church organization. This was made possible by means of missionary work, religious organization, religious societies, and education.

The lively clerical activities of the Maronites eventually were bound to upset the narrow world-view prevalent in Mount Lebanon. In contrast to the traditional iqta' outlook, the world-view transmitted by the clergy emphasized group solidarity on the basis of ethno-religious ties. The propagation of such ideas gradually undermined the iqta' relationship as well as partisan loyalty to the iqta' faction. In Kisrwan where the peasants and their muqati'jis were Maronites, the peasants expressed the new world of their consciousness as one of freedom and equality. In 1858 the common people were sufficiently articulate to invoke these ideas in their struggle against the muqati'jis.² In the Druze areas socio-religious factors coalesced to align the Maronite peasants against their Druze muqati'jis. Thus instead of being Jumblati or Yazbaki, the Maronites of the south were questioning this traditional alignment and reorganizing on a Christian-Druze basis. New leadership representing the new world-view emerged from the ranks of the people and the clergy, as will be seen in the following account.

¹Butrus Sarah, "Dayr Kfayfan," MQ, XXVI, 891.

²Letter from the people of a number of villages in Kisrwan to Patriarch Mas'ad, see Kerr, Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism . . ., p. 98.

CHAPTER VI

THE OFFICE OF MUDABBIR

The mudabbir was the advisor, chief administrator, and secretary to the Amir. This office goes back to the early Ma'ni period and was also known in the Ottoman Vilayets. The word mudabbir was a special Lebanese term for what was more commonly known as kakhya or kikhya, both of which are corruptions of the Turkish ketkhuda.¹ Mudabbir and kakhya were two interchangeable terms in Lebanese usage.

In the Ottoman Vilayets, the ketkhuda was the Vali's chief administrator.² Military and financial affairs did not fall within his jurisdiction, according to Gibb and Bowen.³ His actual powers could be large or small according to his personal ability.

Under the Imarah, the office varied from time to time in its functions and was less limited in its powers. The kakhya was an administrative factotum who acted as a scribe, a financial controller, a political advisor, a regular administrator, and a military commander.⁴ All these functions are known to have been centered in the hands of mudabbirs at one time or another.

¹Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society . . ., I, Part I, 201.

²Asad Jibrail Rustum, "Syria under Mehemet Ali" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Oriental Languages and Literatures, University of Chicago, 1923), pp. 76-77. Also Edward William Lane, The Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians (London: Everyman's Library, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1954), p. 114. Also Ibrahim al 'Awhrah, Tarikh Wilayat Sulayman Basha al 'Adil, ed. Qustantin al Basha (Sayda, Lebanon: Matba'at Dayr al Mukhallis, 1936), pp. 266, 266, n. 1.

³Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society . . ., I, 201.

⁴Muzhir, Tarikh Lubnan al 'Am, I, 357, 361.

By the middle of the eighteenth century the office of mudabbir was increasingly confined to higher matters of state, while other officers like the scribes and financial controllers were left in charge of writing and handling accounts. Although the mudabbir was always a key figure in the administration, his political importance as well became most evident during the second part of the eighteenth century.

The term administration, as it will be used here, refers to the management of the Hakim's work, in other words, administrators under the Imarah were the Amir's household officials. Under the Imarah there were no appointed officers to carry out the Hakim's orders in the country. Officers appointed by the Amir like the qadi and the mudabbir were, strictly speaking, servants of the Hakim assisting him in carrying out his business. The powers they enjoyed were delegated to them by the Hakim himself. The huwalah, i.e., the retainers, were the Hakim's only instrument for the execution of his orders; for the rest he had to deal with the muqati'jis, who were the masters of their own subjects.

Our knowledge of the administration during the early part of the Shihabi Imarah is very limited and can only be inferred from scattered references. Even the office of mudabbir, as to its duties and limitations, was not discussed in the chronicles. Thanks, however, to the recently published memoirs of Rustum Baz,¹ an official in the service of Amir Bashir II, we have a relatively more detailed statement on the administration under Amir Bashir II.

Basically, Bashir's administration was the same as those of his predecessors, except for the Bureau of Public Works (Diwan Ashghal Lubnan),² which was probably installed later during the Egyptian period. It was apparently

¹Rustum Baz, Mudhakkirat Rustum Baz, ed. Fuad Afram al Bustani (Beirut: Mansurat al Jami'ah al Lubnaniyyah, 1955).

²Ibid., p. 127.

more elaborate in its form and operation. At the top of the Hakim's administration was the kakhya or mudabbir, with four scribes working under him. The Bureau of Public Works also had a chief and four secretaries. By the 1820's the Amir's three sons were assisting him in carrying the burden of government, and they too had a number of secretaries. Control of the Amir's financial affairs, income and expenditure, was managed by two specially appointed officers. There was also a khazindar who kept the Amir's arms, ammunition, and household effects like tobacco, sugar, coffee, and soap. The Amir's retainers consisted of about a hundred men, with about 10 of them as officers (blukbashi). The rest were household servants and slaves.

Here we are concerned, however, with the impact of the appointive offices of mudabbir and secretaries on the iqta' institutions, rather than with the administration per se. Thus we shall be concentrating on the life careers and backgrounds of these servants of the Amir. In view of the great impact the office had on the political institutions of the Imarah, it is curious that hardly any attention has as yet been paid to this important office in studies on the history of Lebanon.

The impact of this office on the iqta' institutions and the political fortunes of the Maronites was great. The office of mudabbir, as well as the rest of the administrative offices under the Shihabi Imarah, was virtually monopolized by the Maronites. Around the end of the eighteenth century an Austrian historian, who seemed to know Lebanese history and the Lebanese form of Arabic from personal contact with the country, wrote regarding the mudabbirs and the Maronites:

The Hakim's ministers, or kakhyas, are always Maronites, who also hold the reigns of government. They make decisions, settle issues, and rule as they see fit without being prohibited in any respect by the ruler of the time. I have come to know this by personal experience when I was staying at Dayr al Qamar, which is now the capital of the country, and by observing two kakhyas who held the office consecutively for the same Amir, one after the other. The extent of their power is so great that they not only pass the death sentence and other punishments according to their discretion, but

also rally fighting men and call for war. The Hakim has only to confirm their policies and give their advice the force of law.¹

The Maronites themselves often regarded the mudabbir as the civil head of the community.²

Not until the struggle started between Amir Bashir II and Amir Yusuf (and his sons after him) were Druze brought in. At the start of his career as Hakim, Bashir began to employ Druze as mudabbirs. The reason for his recruitment policy was related to the fact that he was entirely dependent on the Druze manasib, particularly the Jumblats. In the second place, although the Druze seem to have had no reservations regarding the Maronites' hold on the office before the last two decades of the eighteenth century,³ their attitude began to change as they saw the political consequences of the office for their prerogatives. Nonetheless, the tenure of the Druze mudabbirs proved to be too short to amount to anything politically.

When Bashir first came to power in 1788, he took as mudabbir Shaykh Mhammad al Qadi and with him a Maronite from South Lebanon, Faris Nasif.⁴ But hardly a year had passed before Shaykh Mhammad was killed by al Jazzar at the suggestion of Amir Bashir himself, who had accused Shaykh Mhammad of intriguing with his opponents. Some chronicles intimate that the instigation came from Faris Nasif because of his rivalry with Shaykh Mhammad.⁵ Faris Nasif remained with the Amir until 1794; then he was replaced by the Druze Shaykh Najm al 'Uqayli, in 1795. Shaykh Najm held the office until 1797.⁶ However, he con-

¹ Yazbak, AL, 1956, pp. 323-24.

² See the address by the Maronite a'yan to Shaykh Ghandur al Khury in 1786, Dagher, Lubnan . . ., p. 538.

³ Shayban, Tarikh, p. 506.

⁴ Haydar, Lubnan, p. 149.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Dahdah, MQ, XXII, 571; Haydar, Lubnan, p. 181.

tinued to be an informal advisor to the Amir.¹ Another Druze who served Amir Bashir in the same way as an informal advisor was Hassan Ward.²

We have no record of any other Druze who held the office during the Shihabi Imarah. The chronicler Tannus al Shidiaq mentions, inaccurately, that Shaykh Bashir Jumblat was made mudabbir of Amir Bashir in 1798 when the Amir and the Jumblati shaykh returned from 'Akka.³ This could not have been true since, as one of the most prominent muqati'jis, it would have been an insult to Bashir Jumblat to be made a servant of the Hakim. The office always went to people who were not of high social background, mostly Christians; and those Druze who held the office were not of the muqati'ji class but of modest social status. Shaykh Bashir, however, was the man who exercised most influence on Amir Bashir, not as a mudabbir but as the power behind the throne.

During the Ma'ni period also, the Maronites were given the office, but not exclusively. Muslims, for instance, held the office during the reign of Fakhr al Din II⁴ and were actually more important mudabbirs than the Maronite ones who served the same Amir. Especially under Fakhr al Din it was important that the mudabbir be a Muslim knowledgeable in the affairs of the Ottoman government and able to meet with its officers and dignitaries. No Maronite could perform such a function at that period. That is why, perhaps, some of Fakr al Din's kakhyas were Janissaries.⁵

¹Ibid., pp. 181, 580-81.

²Ibid., pp. 194, 195.

³The confusion is apparent from Shidiaq's mistake of the year in which they returned from 'Akka, which was not 1798 but 1795; see ibid., p. 179. Haydar also has a similar note in which he says that Shaykh Bashir was considered to be of a kakhya position, ibid., p. 651, but not a kakhya. Polk followed Shidiaq on this point and concluded that Shaykh Bashir actually became the mudabbir of Amir Bashir in that year; Polk, The Opening of South Lebanon, pp. 17, 258, n. 32.

⁴Khalidy, 'Ahd al Amir . . ., pp. 5, 69, 86; Haydar, Ghurur, pp. 659, 667, 729.

⁵Ibid., p. 628.

There are good reasons why the Amirs, particularly the Shihabis, chose their mudabbirs and administrative officers from the Maronite community and not the Druze. Political considerations came first in importance in this question. The most powerful muqati'jis under the Shihabi Imarah were Druze, and as we know from earlier discussions, the muqati'jis were fairly independent of the Hakim. Their political interest lay in maintaining such measures of independence as they enjoyed and in keeping constant vigilance against possible extension of the Amir's powers. They were thus precluded from being political advisors or servants to the Amir, since they were not in a position to offer him free and unprejudiced advice, or to be personally attached to him. The Amir needed individuals who owed him all the political prestige they had and would be personally loyal to him. The Maronites could fulfill these conditions. They were loyal subjects whose well-being depended on the protection and freedom given them under the Imarah, and very few among them enjoyed independence similar to the Druze muqati'jis. Being a part of the system, the Maronites were also well informed about the political institutions and political life of the country.

It might be asked here, why not choose for the office a Druze who was not of the manasib. The reason is that the Druze in general were too much involved in factious attachments to be useful and personally loyal advisors to the Amir. But there were other reasons.

Another factor which favored the Maronites in being selected for administrative posts was literacy. We have already seen how the advancement of education was spear-headed by the Church as early as the seventeenth century. The most valuable asset for a person in acquiring an administrative job was good calligraphy.¹ The Hakim, as well as the muqati'jis, needed scribes to

¹See for instance 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVI, 445; Mashaqah, al Jawab, p. 28. On the importance of calligraphy see Shibli, MQ, LIV, 652.

write down accounts and handle correspondence. Catholics, Jews, and Copts fulfilled these functions for the Valis in Syria and Egypt. Muhammad 'Ali, for instance, sent to Syria for some Melkite Catholics who excelled in calligraphy, and gave them lucrative positions in his administration.¹ The traveler Volney notices with insight the political importance of education provided by the clerical schools in Mount Lebanon:

The most valuable advantage that has resulted from these apostolical labours is that the art of writing has become more common among the Maronites, and rendered them, in this country, what the Copts are in Egypt; I mean, they are in possession of all the posts of writers, intendants, and kiayas [kakhayas] among the Turks [i.e., Muslims] and especially of those among their allies and neighbours, the Druze.²

There may have been other reasons for the fact that the Maronites were favored for offices in the administration, but these seem the most pertinent. However, there were conditions peculiar to Mount Lebanon which made the office of mudabbir more politically important for the Maronites than for other Christians serving in the same administrative capacity under Ottoman Valis in Syria and Egypt. Under the Imarah a secular spirit pervaded in the political practices, and therefore the Maronites were not in a precarious position because of their religion. In contrast to this, in the cities where they, and other Christians, worked for Valis, no sooner would they have made some progress than they would be removed and persecuted by their employers.³ Another contributing factor, not found outside the Imarah, was the fact that the Maronites were part of the political life and government of the Lebanon, unlike Christians in the other parts of the Ottoman Empire, who were dhimmah people. Thus only in Mount

¹Rustum, "Syria under Mehemet Ali," pp. 75, 76.

²Volney, Travels through Syria . . ., II, 31-32. In the same vein see Tannus al Shidiaq, Akhbar, I, 102; and Faris al Shidiaq, Al Saq 'ala al Saq . . ., p. 17.

³Regarding the fate of these individuals see Duwayhi, TA, pp. 348, 349, 350; and Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, III, 55. Also Shayban, Tarikh, pp. 391, 393-94; and 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVI, 445-46; and Tannus al Shidiaq, Akhbar, p. 102.

Lebanon was it possible for the Maronites to augment their political power.

The political fortunes of the Maronites advanced by means of the Maronite occupation of the office of mudabbir. This advancement took place in two ways: first, by way of transference of a number of Maronite mudabbirs to muqati'jis, which meant the change in station from appointed servant to a hereditary chief; second, by the increase in the powers of the mudabbirs around the end of the eighteenth century.

The Mudabbir and the Iqta' System

The first thing to be noted about the impact of the office of mudabbir on the Maronites' political fortunes is the link between the office and the iqta' system. Almost all Maronite muqati'jis (with the exception of the converted ones) were raised to the class of muqati'jis through having served the Hakim as mudabbirs, or in some other administrative capacity. The Maronites, it should be recalled here, emigrated to south Lebanon as peasants after the Ottoman conquest of Syria, and under the Ma'nis some of them were raised to the class of shaykhs and made muqati'jis. None of them could trace his origin, as one of the a'yan, to the period before the conquest, or for that matter, before the end of the sixteenth century, as could some Druze and Sunni Muslim families, for example the Tannukhs, the Ma'nis, and the Shihabis.

The first two Maronite families to become muqati'jis were the houses of Hbaysh and Khazin. The Hbaysh family were emigrants from north Lebanon to Kisrwan in the beginning of the sixteenth century. In Kisrwan they served the 'Assafs, the Turkoman lords of the region at that time. Duwayhi reports that they were employed as mudabbirs by the 'Assafs.¹ They served the Ma'nis later in the same capacity and the Ma'nis made them muqati'jis in 1680.²

¹Duwayhi, TA, pp. 238, 238, n. 1; also Shidiaq, Akhbar, I, 96, 97; 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVI, 443-44; Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, III, 98-99.

²Shidiaq, Akhbar, I, 98.

The Khazins, too, were peasant emigrants from the north, and apparently had some clerical connections as they were descended from a certain deacon Sarkis. In 1598 the two sons of deacon Sarkis entered the service of Amir Fakhr al Din II¹ as kakhyas.² After 18 years of such employment, they were granted a muqata'ah, Kisrwan, in 1616.³ Thus the Khazins were the first Maronite people to hold direct authority as muqati'jis under the Imarah. They continued for a good time thereafter to serve as kakhyas and secretaries, and remained muqati'jis until the Imarah was abolished.⁴

Other Maronite muqati'ji houses show similar humble background and were enfeoffed after having served the Hakim. The Khuris, though peasants, had connections with the clergy, which gave them a good tradition of learning.⁵ The founder, Salih, later priest Salih, received favors after the battle of 'Ayn Dara; for some act of bravery Amir Haydar rewarded him by exempting him from the taxation on the village of Rishmayya.⁶ Though his family were known as shaykhs from that period, they were not addressed by the Hakim as shaykhs until a member of the house was appointed a mudabbir in 1763.⁷

¹Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, III, 310, 311; also Ma'luf, Tarikh al Amir Fakhr al Din . . ., pp. 71, 72; Muzhir, Tarikh Lubnan al 'Am, I, 266; Qar'ali, Tarikh 'Awd al Nasara . . ., p. 39.

²Duwayhi, TA, 311, 312; Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, III, 301-02; Shayban, Tarikh, pp. 354, 436; Ma'luf, Tarikh al Amir Fakhr al Din . . ., pp. 71, 72; Haydar, Ghurur, p. 726; Muzhir, Tarikh Lubnan al 'Am, I, 266.

³Haydar, Ghurur, pp. 649-50. Cf. Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, III, 301-02, 311-12.

⁴Shidiaq, Akhbar, I, 86; Shayban, Tarikh, p. 484; 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVI, 442.

⁵The priest Salih studied in Rome, see Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 191.

⁶Shidiaq, Akhbar, I, 104; Dagher, Lubnan . . ., p. 256.

⁷Ibid., p. 583; see also Qustantin al Basha (ed.), "Jaridat Tawzi' Mal Kharaj Lubnan al Amiri fi 'Ahd al Amir Bashir al Shihabi," MQ, XXXIII (1935), 324.

The Dahir shaykhs of al Zawiyah in north Lebanon were descended from a family with strong clerical connections¹ and served the Vali of Tripoli, who granted them the muqata'ah of al Zawiyah.² Later when the Vali turned against them and killed Shaykh Kin'an al Dahir in 1741, Amir Milhim Shihab, whose influence sometimes extended to that region, confirmed the family's control over the muqata'ah and addressed them as shaykhs.³

The Dahdah shaykhs also became muqati'jis after having been employed as mudabbirs, first for the Shi'i muqati'jis, the Harfush amirs, and the Himadi shaykhs; then in 1761 for Amir Mansur Shihab as secretaries.⁴ When Amir Yusuf took over the government of Jbayl, the Dahdahs entered his service as scribes and accountants,⁵ and he made Mansur Yusuf al Dahdah shaykh over a muqata'ah in Jbayl.⁶ In 1771 Amir Yusuf granted the Dahdahs the muqata'ah of al Ftuh.⁷ However, they continued to serve the Hakims after that date in the capacity of scribes, accountants, and mudabbirs. The last one among them to occupy the office of mudabbir was Shaykh Mansur al Dahdah, from 1817 to 1828.⁸

There was another category of Maronite shaykhs who did not acquire their title and muqata'ahs via administrative office with Amirs. These were some of the Maronite shaykhs of northern Lebanon whose country came under Shihabi rule in 1763 and was united with that of Jabal al Druze under one Amir,

¹Dibs, Tarikh Suriyyah, VIII, 498-99; 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVI, 445.

²Ibid., pp. 445-46; Shidiaq, Akhbar, I, 102.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 110.

⁵Ibid., p. 112; and Haydar, Tarikh Ahmad Basha al Jazzar, pp. 293f.; also M.H., MQ, XXI, 818-38.

⁶Haydar, Tarikh Ahmad Basha al Jazzar, p. 293.

⁷Shidiaq, Akhbar, I, 112.

⁸Dahdah, MQ, XXII, 571.

Yusuf Shihab, in 1770. They were the Karams, the 'Awwads, the Turbays, the 'Isa al Khury, and others. However, in one fundamental respect, these small shaykhs differed from the muqati'jis of the original seven muqata'ahs of the Imarah. They were appointed by the Amir, and though they could inherit muqata'ahs, they were more vulnerable than the muqati'jis in the south in that they could with less difficulty be removed by the Hakim. They were also poorer and lacked the direct contact and influence which the manasib of the south had with the Amir al Hakim.

The creation of muqati'jis among the Maronites was a major contribution toward the integration of the Maronite population into the iqta' system of the Imarah. Also, the rise of some Maronites to the status of ruling class had a deep effect on the pride and national feeling of the Maronites and made them feel more firmly part of the Imarah. Druze and Maronites, muqati'jis and subjects alike, joined together in the affairs of one polity united under one Amir.

The practice of transforming the Amir's servants to muqati'jis has been discussed here to show the process by which Maronites climbed to power in the Imarah from the early Ma'ni period onward. It is clear from the preceding discussion that the Maronites' path to power came through being favored by the Hakims for administrative and advisory jobs. This in turn elevated some Maronite houses to the ruling class of muqati'jis. Maronite individuals also continued to serve as mudabbirs and servants to the Hakim. The mudabbirs acquired great political power in the course of time and left an indelible mark on the institutions of the Shihabi Imarah, as we shall soon see. In this discussion we are concerned mainly with these mudabbirs.

The office of mudabbir differed from the position of muqati'ji in many respects. It was first of all an appointive office, and those who held it did not enjoy independent status, wealth, or power other than that granted to them by the Hakim. The mudabbir had no estate or subjects over whom he ruled. The

Amir could dismiss him at will, and he was supposed to carry out the orders of his lord. But during the course of time the mudabbirs acquired a great deal of prestige and influence in the Imarah, which had a serious impact on the Hakim and the muqati'jis. The changes in the iqta' system caused by the growing independence of the mudabbirs can, perhaps, best be seen by studying the careers of two important mudabbirs between 1763 and 1807, namely those of Sa'd al Khury and Jirjus Baz.

The Mudabbir Shaykh Sa'd al Khury (1722-1786)

When Amir Milhim Shihab stepped down from the government of Jabal Lubnan in 1754, his two sons were still children. The elder, Mhammad, was physically defective, and the next, Yusuf, was about seven years old. In 1761 Amir Milhim died, after he had appointed a Maronite shaykh from Rishmayya in al Shuf, Shaykh Sa'd al Khury, as a guardian for his sons. The relationship of Shaykh Sa'd to Amir Milhim is not made clear in available sources, except for the fact that he tutored the children.¹ The Khuris, as was mentioned earlier, had an old tradition of clerical education which, no doubt, was the source of their connections with the Shihabis.

Amir Yusuf was in the direct line of succession, a fact not lost on Shaykh Sa'd, a man of great wisdom. When he was appointed guardian he was about 39 years old, whereas his ward, Amir Yusuf, was only about 14. Amir Ahmad and Amir Mansur, who were ruling the Mountain jointly, fell out in 1761, and Amir Yusuf, following what must have been the advice of his guardian, took sides in the conflict with the one who eventually lost, Amir Ahmad. The victor, Amir Mansur, confiscated Amir Yusuf's property, and the boy had to flee. After the manasib had mediated between the two, the Hakim pardoned Amir Yusuf, who returned to al Shuf. However, the Hakim did not return the property of Amir

¹Haydar, Lubnan, p. 60.

Yusuf, as had been agreed between him and the mediating party, which was a rebuff to the manasib. Amir Yusuf became angry and again left Dayr al Qamar.

Shaykh Sa'd was not a party to the short-lived reconciliation, and stayed away in Baskinta with the Abillama' amirs, the maternal uncles of Amir Yusuf. He took the Hakim's rebuff to the manasib as a chance to instigate them against Amir Mansur and to win their support for his ward. The major figure among the manasib involved in the affair was Shaykh 'Ali Jumblat, and Sa'd concentrated his efforts on him. Shaykh 'Ali listened favorably and made a pact with Shaykh Klayb Abu Nakad against Amir Mansur and in favor of Amir Yusuf.¹

It was during this time (1759-1763) that the Maronites of north Lebanon revolted against their Himadi overlords and sought to bring in the Shihabis. This was the opportunity for Sa'd and his allies among the manasib. Sa'd arranged for the support and some cash from the Maronites and with the backing of some of the manasib secured the government of northern Lebanon for his ward, Amir Yusuf. Shaykh Sa'd thus not only secured the government of Jbayl for Amir Yusuf, but also brought Maronite north Lebanon under the Shihabi Imarah. Only seven years later, in 1770, Amir Yusuf became the sole ruler of north and south Lebanon.

Sa'd was destined to become one of the most important mudabbirs of the Imarah. By virtue of his personal relationship with Amir Yusuf, he enjoyed wide powers and used them very effectively. The Amir relied on Sa'd's advice and leadership almost completely, and it was by his mudabbir's help that he reached the height of power.² Amir Yusuf never disagreed with Sa'd on anything, wrote Amir Haydar Shihab, and Shaykh Sa'd made the Amir do whatever he wished

¹Ibid., pp. 60-61.

²See Yazbak, AL, 1956, pp. 325-26.

done.¹ Another contemporary chronicler testified to the same effect:

. . . all the moves and acts of Amir Yusuf were made with the advice and policy decisions of Shaykh Sa'd al Khury, and can only nominally be attributed to the Amir. For the Amir was not skilled in the management of [public] affairs, whereas Shaykh Sa'd was a wise man and enjoyed great insight in [public] matters.²

As can be concluded from these comments, Shaykh Sa'd was not a behind-the-scenes man, but very much in the public eye. He not only advised the Amir in the privacy of his palace but also handled relations with the manasib in matters of government and settlement of disputes.³ Moreover, he performed the function of commander of the Amir's forces. For instance, when the Himadis, former overlords of Jbayl, tried to make a comeback in 1772, the Amir sent Sa'd at the head of a force of Lebanese and of North African mercenaries to repulse them. Shaykh Sa'd led the expedition, rallied the people of Jbayl and Jibbat Bsharri behind him, and defeated the Himadis. Shaykh Sa'd acted as commander of the Amir's forces in battle on other occasions as well. In the fight against the Vali of Sayda, Ahmad Pasha al Jazzar, in 1785, he led the Amir's forces and defeated the mercenary army of al Jazzar. The war was not fought to conclusion, though, because some of the manasib conspired with al Jazzar against Amir Yusuf. When Sa'd discovered this, he quarreled with them and returned home with his forces.⁴

In matters of policy, Shaykh Sa'd handled questions concerning the relations of the Amir and the manasib, and the dependent rulers like the Harfush house of Ba'albak and the Shihabi amirs of Wadi al Taym. He was also entrusted with matters of state such as dealing with the Valis and their differences with the Amir. Shaykh Sa'd was informally recognized by the Valis, who wrote to him

¹Haydar, Lubnan, p. 60.

²Munayyar, KTS, I, 208.

³See for example MAA, MS, No. 7450.

⁴Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 64-65.

regarding their relations with the Amir.¹ It was, in fact, on an occasion when he was settling some question of the Imarah with the Valis that he became sick and died, in 1786.

Sa'd's great influence in the Imarah made the manasib themselves turn to him on several occasions to plead their cases with the Amir. Occasionally such contacts annoyed some others among the manasib. When Shaykh Sa'd, for instance, pleaded successfully with Amir Yusuf for the Nakad Shaykhs, the Jumblats became furious because it was done against their will.²

The manasib felt that Sa'd was concentrating too much power in his hands and they feared that he would encroach on their own. Therefore, during his last years he became the object of their hostility. Their attitude toward him was clearly manifested in 1780 when Amir Yusuf imposed a new tax. The Druze manasib called for a meeting among themselves and rose up

to expel Amir Yusuf from Dayr al Qamar and kill Shaykh Sa'd because . . . he was [the man] who conducted policy, and everything that Amir Yusuf did was actually his doing and also attributed to him [by the public]. Everybody hated that.³

The rebels were appeased when the new tax was annulled; but this was not the end of attempted conspiracies against the Amir and his mudabbir.

In 1786 Shaykh Sa'd died and his son Ghandur carried on his functions as mudabbir for the Amir Yusuf. Shaykh Ghandur had earlier been brought into the Amir's service by his father in order to gain experience and training. He was described by a contemporary chronicler as having his father's wisdom but not his affability. He was proud and ambitious.⁴ However, he continued his father's policies, especially toward al Jazzar. He advised Amir Yusuf to stand

¹Ibid., II, 66; and Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 138-39.

²Munayyar, KTS, I, 204.

³Haydar, Lubnan, p. 127.

⁴Munayyar, KTS, I, 208.

up to the challenge of al Jazzar and not to succumb to the latter's constantly increasing demands for more tribute.¹ He reasoned that with the money they had to pay al Jazzar they could as well fight him. This war against al Jazzar was, however, lost; and Shaykh Ghandur and Amir Yusuf also lost their lives in al Jazzar's prison in 1791.

The example of Sa'd and his son Ghandur was not lost on the Druze manasib. It was a clear case of what great power a capable mudabbir could wield and how the manasib's prerogatives could be encroached upon. Sa'd and his son did not really make a deliberate attempt to change or trespass on the traditional rights of the manasib; it was only the fact of their closeness to the Amir and the influence which they had acquired through that relationship that caused the suspiciousness of the muqati'jis. We know of only one instance in which Ghandur overstepped his limits: when he made the Druze occasionally take their suits to the Melkite Catholic bishop, Jirmanus Adam, whom he had appointed judge.² This caused resentment among the Druze.³

Amir Bashir was the main opponent of Amir Yusuf, the Hakim, and led the opposition which brought about the defeat of Amir Yusuf and his powerful mudabbirs. Bashir's bid to become Hakim in turn depended almost entirely on the Druze manasib. He himself had no material means and was far out in the line of succession. Thus, as was mentioned earlier, he employed Druze and Maronite mudabbirs at the same time during the early years of his rule. It is hard to suppose that his employment of Druze mudabbirs was accidental, because it was by then an established tradition that the mudabbirs were hired from the Maronite community of Mount Lebanon.⁴ But at that time the office had become of obvious

¹Haydar, Lubnan, p. 142.

²Shayban, Tarikh, p. 457.

³Ibid., p. 458.

⁴This tradition was explicitly stated by Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 246.

political importance and no politically conscious group like the Druze could have missed the point. However, Maronite mudabbirs reasserted themselves again and reached the epitome of their power in the following period in the person of Jirjus Baz.

Shaykh Jirjus Baz (1768-1807)

Neither Amir Bashir nor the Jazzar gained much by getting rid of Amir Yusuf and his mudabbir. The country was fed up with the Jazzar's machinations and was ready to fight both him and the new Amir, whom he favored. Only the Jumblat faction at that time remained loyal to Amir Bashir. The rest of the manasib put forward Amir Qa'dan and Amir Haydar as Hakims. Under the leadership of these two, a campaign was carried on against the Jazzar for two years. Finally, al Jazzar had to concede and the war was terminated. However, the two Amirs soon encountered difficulties caused by the Jumblats and were advised by some of the manasib to turn over the office to the sons of Amir Yusuf.

Amir Yusuf's sons were still infants, but they had a capable mudabbir, Jirjus Baz. Jirjus Baz was a Maronite from Dayr al Qamar. His father was in the service of Amir Yusuf, and his mother was the sister of Shaykh Sa'd al Khury. When Jirjus reached adulthood, his father and Sa'd put him in the service of Amir Yusuf. He was not well known in the critical years when Amir Yusuf was facing serious difficulties. However, after the death of the Amir and his mudabbir Ghandur, Jirjus appeared on the scene as the guardian and mudabbir of the young sons of Amir Yusuf Hsayn, Sa'd al Din, and Salim.

In 1792 when Qa'dan and Haydar became ruling Amirs, Jirjus sought and secured from them the government of Jbayl for his wards. Within a very short time Jirjus attracted the attention of the whole country to himself and his wards. He became popular with some of the manasib because of his generosity, political skill, and charm. From Jbayl he soon started to contact the manasib of Jabal al Shuf and tried to win them over in favor of the sons of Amir Yusuf.

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The chronicler Hananiyya al Munayyar wrote about these events:

All the Jbayl country and its dependencies came into the hands of Jirjus Baz and into his charge. From there he started to write to the princes and shaykhs trying to win their favors for his lords. He became liberal in spending on gifts and presents. He was blessed with excellent qualities and high spirit. So people became inclined toward him and sought his friendship. . . . Amir Qa'dan and Amir Haydar had no real supporters in the land as other ruling Amirs did. Thus when Jirjus Baz started to make the call in favor of the sons of Amir Yusuf, people rallied to them and looked down on them [i.e., Amirs Qa'dan and Haydar].¹

With the scheming of Jirjus and the active opposition of the Jumblatis, the two Amirs could not continue ruling. At the suggestion of friends of Jirjus, Shaykh Bashir Nakad and Shaykh 'Abdallah al Qadi² invited Jirjus to bring his lords to Dayr al Qamar and rule over the country. It was also hoped that Jirjus would be able to curb the Jumblatis.

Thus in 1793 the government of all Mount Lebanon came under the sons of Amir Yusuf, Hsayn and Sa'd al Din, who were directed and controlled by Jirjus Baz. Amir Hsayn was made ruler of the Shuf and Amir Sa'd al Din of Jbayl, with Jirjus and his brother, 'Abd al Ahad, as their respective mudabbirs.

That was a time of great instability, the country divided between the partisans of Amir Yusuf and then his sons, on the one hand, and on the other, the partisans of Amir Bashir. The Jumblatis supported Amir Bashir, and killed their cousins, the sons of Shaykh Najm Jumblat, because they were inclined to favor Amir Hsayn and Sa'd al Din. The Nakadis and, with some oscillation, the Yazbakis, supported the sons of Amir Yusuf. These parties, it was clear, could not settle their differences by themselves since al Jazzar had proved himself a strong party in the Amir's election.

As soon as Amir Hsayn and Jirjus arrived in Dayr al Qamar, the Jumblatis put up resistance and Jirjus took steps against them. The showdown was temporarily avoided by the mediation of the Druze 'Uqqal; but soon another Jumblati up-

¹Munayyar, KTS, L, 438-39.

²Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 89.

rising followed, which was put down.¹ This temporary success was still a long way from real consolidation of power. It was actually al Jazzar and Bashir with whom Jirjus had to contend. The Jazzar was on the watch. Amirs Qa'dan and Haydar had humiliated him by their successful resistance; and the coup which brought the sons of Amir Yusuf to power provided a new occasion for him to interfere once more and make up for his lost prestige. At first he had to send a khul'ah to Amir Hsayn and Sa'd al Din because they enjoyed the support of the two former Amirs and the rest of the people. But before long after the Jumblati moves, he sent Amir Bashir with a mercenary force from 'Akka to take over the government.

From then on, until 1800, the Mountain was to witness a see-saw game with one party gaining, another losing, with rapid frequency. It was during this struggle between Amir Bashir and the sons of Amir Yusuf that the abilities of Jirjus Baz passed the test. To secure the government for his lords, Jirjus had to prove himself capable of meeting the Ottoman Valis and handling the business of his Amirs directly with them. Previously he had only had to contact the Valis by writing and through special messengers, but with the increasing tempo of the civil war he had to go and meet them personally.

In 1795 the Vilayet of Damascus was taken away from al Jazzar and 'Abdallah Pasha al 'Azm was appointed in his place. Taking advantage of this new development, Jirjus went with his lords to meet the new Pasha in 1796. Soon, however they discovered that the Pasha was weak and not capable of helping them against al Jazzar in their endeavor to regain the government of Lebanon. Thus Jirjus took the risk in 1797 of going with Amir Yusuf's sons to the Jazzar, the man who had executed their father. A number of Maronite supporters like the two brothers of Jirjus and Shaykh Sim'an al Bitar also accompanied them to 'Akka.

¹Haydar, Lubnan, p. 173; Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 89-90.

In 1799 al Jazzar, angered by Amir Bashir's ambivalent attitude toward Napoleon's siege of 'Akka, sent Jirjus and his lords to Mount Lebanon with a force of 6,000 horsemen and 4,000 footmen.¹ This great force was sufficient to ensure their success, and Amir Bashir with his supporters left the Mountain. Then soon afterwards they reassembled in the Mountain, and there was fighting between Bashir and Jirjus with their respective supporters, including the mercenary force of al Jazzar. In this war Jirjus depended heavily on the forces which the Jazzar put under his disposal, and had very few of the manasib left with him. Even the Yazbakis were willing to settle for an agreement between Amir Bashir and Amir Yusuf's sons. However, at first Jirjus refused to compromise, and as a result most Yazbakis stayed away, except Shaykh Jahjah al 'Imad who remained with Jirjus. But as the fighting seemed without any conclusive prospects and because Shaykh Jahjah fell in battle, Jirjus agreed to conclude an agreement with Amir Bashir, and in December of the year 1800 an agreement was signed by both.

The agreement between Amir Bashir and Jirjus Baz gave Lebanon a seven-year period of tranquility from 1800-1807. By its terms Bashir was to rule over the original seven muqata'ahs of al Shuf and Kisrwan, while Amir Yusuf's sons would rule northern Lebanon with Jirjus Baz and his brother 'Abd al Ahad as their mudabbirs. The agreement was given additional sanction by Patriarch Yusuf Tiyyan.² According to one source Bashir asked the Patriarch to give the oath to the two parties so that Jirjus would be bound by it.³ This took place in the Maronite church of Dayr al Qamar. Whatever the details of the agreement were, it is clear that the Jazzar was outdone for the second time by a national

¹ Ibid., p. 101.

² [Salim Baz], Al Shaykh Jirjus Baz (Beirut: Sadir Rihani Press, 1953), p. 11.

³ Rustum Baz, Mudhakkirat, p. 10.

consensus among the manasib, and this was to prove his undoing so far as his influence went in Mount Lebanon.

Although by the terms of the agreement Jirjus was to stay in Jbayl with Amir Yusuf's sons, judging from the events related in the chronicles he seems to have stayed in both places, Jbayl and Dayr al Qamar, keeping company with the Hakims of both regions. In 1802 he moved to Dayr al Qamar where he sought a Shihabi amir's palace, and his name starts to appear in the chronicles as the mudabbir of Amir Bashir. One good account of the Baz case, by Mikha'il of Damascus, maintains that Amir Bashir was not overly sure of Jirjus and was afraid to have him stay in Jbayl out of reach.¹ This might have been partly true, but hardly a sufficient explanation, since Jirjus played a powerful role as mudabbir in Dayr al Qamar; he did not simply pass time there.

Jirjus' power did not diminish after the December 1800 agreement, as one might suppose would have been the case. At first sight his position appeared almost damaged. He deprived himself of the political and military backing of al Jazzar. The major Nakadi shaykhs of Dayr al Qamar who had been his foremost supporters were earlier destroyed by Bashir and the rest of the manasib, as we shall soon see. Furthermore, Jirjus could not once more establish control over his former allies, the Yazbakis. It is surprising that the Yazbakis did not honor the agreement of December, especially since they were a willing party to it; instead they went ahead with their political intrigue against the Amir, and Jirjus too. The only Yazbaki exceptions in this case were Shaykh Isma'il Talhuq and Shaykh Shibly 'Abd al Malik.² As a result of the attitude of the Yazbakis, Jirjus had to consent with Bashir and fight their schemes.³ By following an adverse policy and alienating their only support at

¹Dimashqi, Tarikh, p. 81.

²Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 115.

³Archives of the Maronite Monastery in Rome, letter sent to Rome in August, 1803.

the Hakim's court, namely Jirjus Baz, the Yazbakis did themselves great harm and never quite recovered after that date, as will be seen later.

In the absence of Yazbaki support, the power which Jirjus Baz retained must have rested on the following grounds. First, it came from the moral force of the agreement which he concluded with Amir Bashir in the names of Amir Yusuf's sons. The two Amirs ruled Jbayl and had adherents in the Shuf, too. Second, Jirjus himself had successfully built up a considerable following, mainly among the Christians of Dayr al Qamar, Kisrwan, and Jbayl. Third, he established good connections and mutual confidence with the Ottoman Valis.

The Christian following was created by many factors. The Maronites of the north, Jbayl and Jibbat Esharri, had long been loyal followers of Amir Yusuf and Sa'd al Khury. In the same way they stood for the sons of Amir Yusuf and their Maronite mudabbirs, the Baz brothers. Patriarch Tiyyan also enjoyed the confidence of Amir Yusuf and Sa'd from the days when he was still a young priest.¹ He was also on very good terms with Jirjus Baz, and keenly understood the importance of these Maronite mudabbirs for the welfare of the community and the political fortunes of the Maronites.

Jirjus himself was active in the Church politics² and backed the Church and the orders of monks. He showed a lively religious spirit in his writings to the Congregation of the Propaganda in Rome. In one letter he thanked the Holy See for its love and concern for the Maronite community. He used in that letter the epithet given by the Popes for the Maronite community, namely "roses among thorns" of persecution and among other non-orthodox religious communities.³ Then in describing his efforts for the well-being and reform of the Church, he

¹Ibrahim Harfush, "Mufawwad ibn Sallum al Tiyyan min Bayrut," al Manarah, VIII (1937), 96.

²See Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, I, 612-15.

³Congressi Maroniti, XV, 333, Archivio Congregazione de Propaganda Fide, Rome. (Henceforth Congressi Maroniti, Propaganda.)

indicated his position in the country and the capacity in which he took action to support the Church:

. . . For I have been at the head of this community, indeed of all the Christian communities of Mount Lebanon and its dependencies, by the good grace of their highnesses our princes [Amir Yusuf's sons]. It is my duty, legal and moral, to approve and act to fulfill your Sacred Council's commands and [uphold] the order of our Maronite Church.¹

Jirjus also showed definite support and encouragement for the Maronites living under the Druze muqati'jis. For instance, he gave full backing to the priest and Maronite peasants of al Dibbiyyah, a village in southern Lebanon, who were imprisoned by the Amir at the suggestion of Shaykh Bashir Jumblat for a squabble in which a Druze 'aqil was beaten up. Not only did he have the men released from the Hakim's jail, but he also quarrelled with Shaykh Bashir on their account, and the whole incident took on a religious character.²

Christian support for Jirjus came also from the Khazin shaykhs of Kisrwan for political reasons. In 1800 Bashir put his ambitious brother Hasan as an overseer of Kisrwan, the muqata'ah of the Khazins. Not only jealousy but open friction developed between the Khazins and Amir Hasan. The Baz brothers also did not like Hasan's presence there, especially because he had often been charged by his brother to govern the northern regions for him in the past. Jirjus deemed it politic to create a net of alliances which would check Hasan's influence. In 1802, for instance, he arranged a marriage between his brother 'Abd al Ahad and a Khazin girl. The good relations between the Khazins and Jirjus is clearly indicated in a letter he wrote to the Khazins saying, "You especially are in the good favor of their highnesses above others."³

As for the people of Dayr al Qamar and their attachment to Jirjus Baz,

¹Ibid., MSS, Nos. 332, 333.

²Salim Baz, Al Shaykh Jirjus Baz, p. 22; also Rustum Baz, Mudhakkirat, pp. 10-11.

³MAA, MS, No. 6707.

it could be attributed to more than one cause. First, Jirjus was an inhabitant of Dayr al Qamar, and he was known and accessible to all his fellow villagers. Second, the bad relations prevailing among the manasib and the Druze muqati'jis of Dayr al Qamar enhanced Jirjus' political position. Dayr al Qamar was the major town in Mount Lebanon and the capital of the Ijarah. Nevertheless, the Hakim who resided in Dayr al Qamar had no direct authority over its inhabitants because they were the subjects of the Abu Nakad muqati'jis. Shaykh Bashir Abu Nakad and his brothers were partisans of Amir Yusuf's sons and Jirjus Baz.¹ Amir Bashir's main supporters, the Jumblatis, hated the Nakads for their partisanship to their enemies the sons of Amir Yusuf, and because of the Nakads' independence from the Jumblati and Yazbaki factions. Thus in 1796, when Amir Bashir was the Hakim in Dayr al Qamar, and the sons of Amir Yusuf were out of the country, he and the rest of the manasib of both Yazbaki and Jumblati factions conspired against the Nakads in order to remove them completely from the scene. The Nakad Shaykhs were caught in the trap and were assassinated by the Jumblat and 'Imad shaykhs. Although a few of the young Nakad children were able to escape, the blow was almost the coup de grâçe so far as the power of the Nakad muqati'jis was concerned.

The Nakadi affair had the impact of improving Jirjus' standing at Dayr al Qamar. The destruction of the Nakads, who were the muqati'jis of Dayr al Qamar, left the people without their leaders; naturally they could not immediately fall in line for the assassins of their leaders but looked for a new chief with whom they had some kind of natural affinity, and Jirjus was the answer. Shaykh Jirjus was one of them and belonged to their religious group. He was also the ally of their former masters the Nakads and a strong mudabbir. Mikha'il Mashaqah, a native of Dayr al Qamar, commented that after the destruction of the Nakads, the Christians of that town became increasingly devoted to

¹Munayyar, KTS, I, 440-42.

Jirjus, who gave them protection even from the Hakim himself. He went so far, Mashaqah continues, as to release their prisoners from the Amir's jail, thus exasperating the Amir as well as the Druze manasib.¹ Jirjus was actually performing for the people of Dayr al Qamar what their traditional masters, the Nakad muqati'jis, had done for them, assuming the same functions and prerogatives. Thus, although he lost in the Nakads strong allies, he made up for the loss by replacing them himself.

The third source of the power of Jirjus Baz was his good connections with the Ottoman Valis. Al Munayyar makes a brief but emphatic reference to the elements of Jirjus' power, including his relations with the Valis, thus:

Jirjus reached the epitome of power and state pomp. He was known to the State and its Vezirs. No one among his equals ever reached a fraction of what he had attained. The reigns of the government of Amir Yusuf's sons were in his hands, and he was a friend of Shaykh Bashir [Jumblat]. Thus he had powers of coercion [lahu ghalabatun] in the land even over Amir Bashir, the Hakim.²

We have seen earlier how Jirjus dealt with the Jazzar regarding his lords' investment with the government of the Mountain. After the December 1800 agreement, neither Jirjus nor Amir Bashir dealt directly with the Jazzar. Not until the latter's death in 1804 were Jirjus' connections with the State Vezirs in 'Akka resumed, but they had not ceased during that period with the Vali of Damascus.

After the Jazzar's death, Ibrahim Pasha was appointed Vali of Damascus and Sayda. On his arrival in Damascus, he asked Amir Bashir to send him Jirjus Baz. When Jirjus arrived, the Vali gave him a state reception with great honors. The event was described by the chronicler Amir Haydar Shihab:

After he had received the orders, Amir Bashir sent to him [the Vali] Shaykh Jirjus Baz, to Damascus. Ibrahim Pasha received him with all honors. Before

¹Mashaqah, al Jawab, pp. 31, 35.

²Munayyar, KTS, II, 485. In the same sense see MAE, Correspondence Consulaire, Tripoli, 20 May, 1807.

he arrived [in town] Kinj Yusuf and the dalatiyyah [delis] went out to meet him. He entered Damascus with great prestige and honors. Ibrahim Pasha would ask his opinion in all matters of policy. He made his camp at the Mulla Isma'il, the chief of the dalatiyyah. The Pasha fixed a large income for him and he had one hundred cavalrymen in his company. When he passed in Damascus [streets] he rode his horse with complete accoutrement. He became close to Ibrahim Pasha and handled [public] affairs [for him] and was immensely liked by the Pasha. . . . Whatever he requested from the Vali was granted and he protected the Christians of Damascus from many losses. . . .¹

In view of the fact that in Damascus Jirjus Baz was a dhimmi, these honors and powers which he enjoyed are exceptionally interesting. However, Ibrahim Pasha went from Damascus to the Vilayet of Sayda and took Jirjus with him on his state visits to 'Akka, Nablus, 'Ajlun, and Safad.²

When Sulayman Pasha became Vali of Sayda (1804-1818), Jirjus established very good relations with him and his Jewish advisor, Haim Farhi. His visits to Sulayman Pasha were also marked with the honors due a state dignitary.³ The Imarah's affairs with Sulayman Pasha were left to him to handle.⁴ Not only the Vali of Sayda was among his friends but also the governor of Tripoli, Mustafa Agha Barbar. Jirjus and Barbar lent each other much political support in their respective relations with others.

Jirjus' power and prestige were also enhanced by the successes of his military expeditions. First, he got rid of the Matawilah chief, Shaykh Hsayn Himadi, who was conspiring to restore Jbayl to Himadi rule. In 1804 he led an expedition against the Sunni Muslim chiefs of 'Akkar and al Dinniyyah, 'Abbud Bey and Shaykh 'Abbas al Ra'd, who had attacked the region of Jbayl during Jirjus' absence in Damascus and 'Akka. He defeated 'Abbud Bey and made him seek a peace settlement, and Shaykh 'Abbas al Ra'd was driven by his example

¹Haydar, Lubnan, p. 415.

²Ibid., pp. 424-25.

³See Dimashqi, Tarikh, p. 81.

⁴Rustum Baz, Mudhakkirat, p. 8; Al 'Awrah, Tarikh Wilayat . . ., pp. 40-45; MAA, MS, No. 6468, p. 229.

to do the same without actual fighting. Pecuniary punishment was imposed on them and Jirjus returned triumphantly to Dayr al Qamar.

Similarly, in 1806, Mustafa Barbar sought the help of Jirjus Baz and Amir Bashir to subdue the chief of the Nusayris of Safita, Shaykh Saqr al Mafuz, who officially came under the jurisdiction of the governor of Tripoli. On this occasion too, Jirjus led the expedition and forced Saqr al Mahfuz to seek peace. During all these expeditions Jirjus was acting as the deputy of the Hakim in his leadership, and therefore many of the muqati'jis and their men followed him.

The achievements of Shaykh Jirjus Baz were also greatly enhanced by his charm and good qualities. Friend and foe testified to the excellence of his character. Haydar, who was not particularly friendly toward Jirjus, described his character in the following way.

He was clever, with a generous soul and hand; easy of manners and [gifted] with pleasant talk. His person charmed the people and they followed him. . . . He was also a wasteful person who spent money carelessly on good living and luxury. People would take advantage of his permissiveness, to the extent that if one of his retainers received a gift meant for the Shaykh, whether a horse, a sword, or a suit, then later said that he had [kept it for himself] the Shaykh would say: With God's blessing keep it. He liked fun and song. . . . He was forward, dauntless, and heeded no one. Thus he had many friends and many enemies. His brother 'Abd al Ahad came close to him in these qualities, but he did not have his sharp wit.¹

Jirjus Baz did not come from a socially ranking family; his house enjoyed no title or power.² His only claim to inherited social prestige came from being the nephew of Shaykh Sa'd al Khury. His father was not a distinguished servant of Amir Yusuf while in the Amir's service. He probably served as a scribe from whom Jirjus learned the calligraphy for which he was famous. By his relations with Sa'd al Khury and Amir Yusuf, he gained his first connections with the

¹Haydar, "Nuzhat," p. 267. In the same sense see also Mashaqah, al Jawab, p. 31.

²In a letter written by the Maronite a'yan in 1785 to Shaykh Ghandur al Khury Jirjus' signature appears as next to last. See letter in Daghir, Lubnan, p. 538. It must also be born in mind that he was also young then, only 17 years old.

ruling class; but the rest should be attributed to his personal qualities which brought him to the top.

The increasing power and prestige which Jirjus commanded were quite unsettling to Amir Bashir,¹ who could do nothing to stop him.² For Jirjus not only was on good terms with the Vali of Sayda and the governor of Tripoli and had a popular backing in the country, but was also in concert with the most powerful muqati'ji, Shaykh Bashir Jumblat. Apparently the unstable behavior of the Yazbaki leaders made Jirjus turn his back on them and cultivate his relations with the Jumblatis. In a word, the web which Shaykh Jirjus wove was evidently a superb one.

Shaykh Jirjus' position seemed incomparable to his contemporaries, not only with respect to his strong allies but also in his domination of the Hakims of Jbayl and influence over Amir Bashir, the Hakim of al Shuf. Haydar, who was best informed about Jirjus,³ wrote about his relations with the sons of Amir Yusuf, the Hakims of Jbayl, the following:

They [the Hakims] were under age and lacking also in judgment. Jirjus Baz was their mudabbir, by the capacity of the office as a servant, but only so in name. In actual fact he was the man served, for they were under his orders in all matters which concerned their persons or other people. They never acted without his permission, even in matters that had to do with their dress, sport, slaves, arms, and expenditure. They also had no power to enjoin or absolve; he even kept their rings with him, writing and signing official correspondence of the Diwan in their names as he wished, without their knowledge or permission. Thus he was not accountable for what he did, whereas they were.⁴

In describing his position in Dayr al Qamar, al Dimashqi wrote:

This man enjoyed great prestige and glory such as no one ever had before or after him. . . . This made him careless of the misfortunes of time. He

¹MAE, Correspondance Consulaire, dispatch from Tripoli, 20 May, 1807.

²Munayyar, KTS, LI, 485; Haydar, "Nuzhat," p. 267.

³Amir Haydar's daughter was engaged to Amir Hsayn, the son of Amir Yusuf, before the latter was deposed by Bashir. Haydar, "Nuzhat," p. 271.

⁴Ibid., p. 266; see also MAE, Correspondance Consulaire, Tripoli, May, 1807.

made his residence in Dayr al Qamar and decorated the house¹ which he had bought. He became the authority [al mutakallim] on all matters in the country. Whatever questions arose with amirs, shaykhs, or others, it had to be raised with him first, and what he enjoined came into effect. . . . Whatever the Shaykh [Jirjus] wanted done was done, and he became the decision-maker [bi yadihi al hal wa al rabt]. The Amir [al Hakim] had of the government its name only.²

Thus, the situation in Dayr al Qamar, if not exactly the same as that of Jbayl, was at least comparable with it. Poets, not only Maronite but also Sunni Muslims from Beirut, eulogised Jirjus and sang his success.³

As for the image which Jirjus had of himself, one may have an idea of it from his own writings. As was mentioned above, he considered himself the head of all the Christian communities of Mount Lebanon. He also signed his name in 1804 as "Miqdam Diwan Jabal Lubnan,"⁴ a title not previously known, which could be roughly translated as the head of the government council of Mount Lebanon. His delight in the glory he achieved can be observed in a letter he wrote to a friend describing the pomp with which he was received in Sayda, Sur, and 'Akka on his visit to the Vali, Sulayman Pasha, in 1806.⁵

A man like Shaykh Jirjus Baz, however, should have had the wisdom to realize the consequences of his powers and actions in terms of the basic institutions of the country. He was naive and too trustful of others, and lacked the caution which a man of great power should never lose sight of. One of the major defects of his character, which cost him his power and life, was his failure to grasp the relationship between his status and power, and the established institutions of the country. In a system in which power was a quality of status,

¹Jirjus bought the palace of Amir Ahmad Shihab in Dayr al Qamar and lived in it with his family.

²Dimashqi, Tarikh, pp. 79-80. In the same sense see, Haydar, "Nuzhat," p. 267.

³See poem by Sayyid 'Umar al Bakri, in Salim Baz, al Shaykh Jirjus Baz, p. 16; also al Turk, Diwan al Turk, a poem by Ilias Iddi, p. 217.

⁴Congressi Maroniti, XV, 332, 333, Propaganda.

⁵See letter in Dimashqi, Tarikh, p. 81.

he failed to see that his status did not measure up to the great power he enjoyed. That he failed to appreciate this distinction is clear from his lack of suspicion with regard to his political allies among the muqati'jis and also the Hakim. This proves that he was not quite aware of the far-reaching consequences of his actions although there were many instances which clearly showed that he was getting into conflict with the established order.

First, he competed in an ostentatious show of power and prestige with the ruling Amir in the capital. His wealth, the pomp of his public appearance, his encouragement of recourse to him for help and protection, and the signs of authority which he displayed could not have passed unnoticed by the Hakim who only a few years earlier had been at war with him. Still less could they have been overlooked by the manasib. One manifestation of his grandiose ambition was his purchase at the capital, Dayr al Qamar, of the palace of a Shihabi former Hakim, the entrance to which he then decorated with a lion engraving above the gate.¹ When Amir Hasan was instigating his brother, Amir Bashir, against Jirjus Baz, he pointed out these displays as signs of lack of respect for the Amir.

Second, he trespassed on the traditional political prerogatives of Hakims and muqati'jis.² As we have seen earlier, he was directly involved in the election of Amir Hsayn and Amir Sa'd al Din as Hakims, and his influence in that was decisive. He went so far as to argue with Amir Bashir that Amir Yusuf's sons were in the right line of succession while he, Bashir, was not.³ Regardless of the force of his argument against Bashir, he was hardly the man to advance it, since in the political traditions of the Ijarah the mudabbirs were servants of the Hakims, not their makers. There is no reason why, in the

¹Salim Baz, Al Shaykh Jirjus Baz, p. 19.

²See Yazbak, AL, 1956, pp. 325-26.

³Mashaqah, al Jawab, p. 32.

light of this, the Hakim and the manasib should not have felt uneasy about Jirjus' position and have tried to rid themselves of him.

Jirjus' actions and policies ran counter to the prerogatives of the Hakim.¹ He freed people from jail without Bashir's permission, settled public issues, and made his own alliances with the manasib which put the Hakim at a disadvantage. He took a share of the Amir's income and interfered in the order of his business, a state of affairs well described by al Dimashqi:

But as for Amir Bashir, he was under a state of compulsion [hal al qahr] with the Shaykh [Jirjus], who had shown no reverence toward him; especially since he interfered in what was not his business. For it was [part of the arrangement of 1800] that the Amir ruled the Mountain [i.e., al Shuf] alone, while the government of Jbayl belonged to the mentioned Shaykh. He [Jirjus] started to share with the Amir such extraneous income as might come from gifts and other things,² so that not even one quarter of that income reached the Amir. This came about [because he] judged some cases brought before him, and left some other ones to the Amir. At any rate, whatever the Shaykh wanted done was done. . . . And he [the Amir] was holding his peace, showing him all signs of respect and good will. Most of the time he shared his dinner table with him [the Shaykh]. He [the Amir] always pretended that he was pleased and willing to accept every thing [the Shaykh] said. He [Jirjus]³ felt strong with the Amir's overt signs of love, considering them to be pure.³

One of the bones of contention between the Hakim and Jirjus was the government of KISRWAN. Jirjus did not like to see Amir Hasan made overseer of KISRWAN, a region adjacent to the domain of his lords, Amir Yusuf's sons. He worked diligently against Hasan trying to weaken his position and to remove him from the post. The Khazins were Jirjus' allies from an early date⁴ and greatly resented Hasan's presence in their traditional territory. Jirjus supported their cause and strengthened his alliance with them. Amir Hasan became quite annoyed about this alliance and publicly denounced it.⁵

¹See MAE, Correspondance Consulaire, dispatch from Tripoli, 20 May, 1807.

²It should be observed here that part of the legitimate income of the mudabbirs came from this source, though Jirjus seems to have greatly augmented the usual share.

³Dimashqi, Tarikh, pp. 79-80.

⁴Salim Baz, Al Shaykh Jirjus Baz, p. 20.

⁵Rustum Baz, Mudhakkirat, p. 10.

At every point in his struggle with the Khazins, Amir Hasan found his plans frustrated by Jirjus Baz. When he tried to make a cadastral survey of Kisrwan to reassess the amount of miri, the Khazins sought the help of Jirjus Baz to stop the survey, for if it were allowed to take place, the survey would have resulted in a large loss for the Khazins. Jirjus succeeded in producing an order from Amir Bashir to cancel the project.¹ In another clash between the Khazins and Hasan, Jirjus tried to help Shaykh Bsharah al Khazin to restore the scales for weighing silk to Zuq Mkayil, where they had been before Hasan moved them to Juni where he could control them.² Jirjus persisted in his hostile policy toward Amir Hasan until in 1807 he succeeded in removing Hasan from his position of responsibility over Kisrwan and returned to the Khazins their free hand over the muqata'ah.³

Jirjus also opposed Bashir openly in Church politics. Bashir and the Apostolic delegate, Louis Gondolffi, tried to keep the aged archbishop Bulus Istfan on the diocese of the Batrun, while the Baz brothers stood with Patriarch Tiyyan in appointing Jirmanus Thabit bishop on the diocese.⁴

The Amir was also concerned about the informal alliance between Jirjus Baz and Bashir Jumblat which developed toward the end of Jirjus' reign. They put the Hakim under their power by collaborating and compelled him to do whatever they wished.⁵ Their activities were annoying to the Amir, particularly their intervention on behalf of the Arslan amirs in Shwayfat. Bashir was gradually forced by the two shaykhs into settling the issue with the Arslans.

¹Haydar, Lubnan, p. 512.

²Dimashqi, Tarikh, pp. 82-83.

³MAE, Correspondence Consulaire, dispatch from Tripoli, 20 May, 1807; Haydar, Lubnan, p. 512; Dimashqi, Tarikh, p. 83.

⁴Tiyyan papers, PAB; also Harfush, Manarah, VIII, 94-95.

⁵Munayyar, KTS, LI, 485.

It was the wish of Shaykh Bashir Jumblat to have the settlement, and Jirjus went along with him because Shaykh Bashir had asked for his support.¹

Shaykh Bashir, though, was more politically astute than Jirjus; he understood the mudabbir's precarious relations with the Amir and was quite willing to have his powerful ally out of the way. For if Jirjus were to be removed from the scene, Jumblat would become the single force behind Amir Bashir and the Amir would be forced to be ever more dependent upon him. Thus Shaykh Bashir joined in the intrigues against Jirjus and let the Amir know of his presumed ally's dealings.²

The Yazbakis, Jirjus' earlier allies, were also quite offended to see him in concert with their rival, Shaykh Bashir, and to see that he had deprived them of their power. The Yazbakis had earlier isolated themselves by refusing to follow the leadership of Jirjus when the latter came to terms with Amir Bashir. In 1806 the Yazbakis created an embarrassing situation for Jirjus Baz when the news of their activities against Amir Bashir reached the Vali, Sulayman Pasha. The Vali summoned Jirjus to 'Akka, and wanted to know whether Jirjus condoned these movements. Jirjus denied any connections with or knowledge of the Yazbakis plans and declared that the Yazbakis must have been acting on their own initiative and thus should alone be held responsible for the consequences.³ Upon his return home Jirjus intensified the policy of repression against the Yazbaki shaykhs.⁴ This policy pleased Amir Bashir, who immediately saw that the aggravation of Yazbaki-Baz relations would weaken Jirjus.

Jirjus Baz unwittingly created a peculiar situation in the Imarah. Traditionally, power rested with the manasib who were also the leaders of the

¹ Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 123.

² Dimashqi, Tarikh, p. 83.

³ MAA, MS, No. 6469, pp. 40-41; also Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 124-25.

⁴ Ibid.

factions. The Nakadi faction was destroyed in 1796, as we have earlier seen. By 1807, the Yazbakis had also been greatly weakened by the continuing suppression exerted against them by the party in power, namely the two Bashirs and Jirjus Baz. As a result all power was concentrated in the hands of Shaykh Bashir and Jirjus Baz. Foreseeing that the Yazbakis had become very weak and unlikely to rise again, Shaykh Bashir realized that Amir Bashir would become his political prisoner if Jirjus was removed. Thus in 1807 most of the manasib were ready to act against Jirjus--Amir Hasan, the Yazbakis, Amir Bashir, and Shaykh Bashir Jumblat.

The time set by the plotters for the destruction of the Baz brothers was May 15, 1807. This date was dictated by events shaping in Mount Lebanon and the surrounding Vilayets, for the alliances which Jirjus Baz thought he had under control were really cracking. As was just mentioned, Sulayman Pasha, the Vali of Sayda, summoned Jirjus to 'Akka. He sent his advisor, Haim Farhi, to meet Jirjus in Sayda where the two men discussed matters of policy before they reached 'Akka.¹ The French consul in Sayda, calling Jirjus "ministre de la montagne," reported the meeting to his government and confessed his ignorance as to what was at issue, but surmised that it must have been important because of the high positions of the two men.² Not all the details about the visit are known to us now, but we know a little more about it than did the French consul.

Besides the Yazbaki affair, Jirjus and Haim Farhi discussed another case, that of Mustafa Barbar of Tripoli. Mustafa Agha Barbar was a Sunni Muslim soldier of fortune who came from a Lebanese village, al Qalmun. His adventures brought him to the governorship of Tripoli. In 1804, Ibrahim Pasha sent a force with Jirjus to discipline the Dinniyyah region and 'Akkar in the north, and asked

¹MAE, Correspondance Consulaire, dispatch from Sayda, 14 November, 1806.

²Ibid.

Jirjus to remove Barbar from Tripoli.¹ However, Jirjus and the head of Ibrahim Pasha's soldiers decided that they did not have strong enough forces to stand against Barbar's stronghold and therefore left him unmolested. Before returning home, Jirjus met with Barbar and reached an agreement, and they became good friends. This agreement meant a guarantee to Jirjus that no rival Shihabi would receive investiture over Jbayl, and to Barbar the use of the good offices of Jirjus in Dayr al Qamar.

In 1806 Sulayman Pasha was appointed Vali of Tripoli in addition to Sayda. He did not have sufficient power to fight Barbar and wanted to enlist the support of the Lebanese against him. The Vali summoned Jirjus to 'Akka to discuss the case of Barbar with him. The mudabbir was in straits; he had to be careful, but he confirmed what Sulayman Pasha already knew, that he was a good friend of Barbar. Refusing to commit himself against Barbar, Jirjus, nevertheless, promised the Pasha that he would stay neutral in case of an attack against Barbar.² This fell short of the Pasha's hopes, and as a result there was some cooling-off in the Pasha's attitude toward Jirjus, though he apparently did not demonstrate his displeasure at that time. Jirjus, on the other hand, seems to have thought that the business was satisfactorily settled; when he returned to Mount Lebanon, he seemed pleased with the meeting.

Amir Bashir understood the situation better, and judging that the relations of Jirjus with the Pasha were no longer excellent, and that the Yazbaki shaykhs were at their worst with the mudabbir, he saw that there was no serious obstacle in his way, especially since Bashir Jumlat approved of destroying Jirjus. The conspiracy was well knit. On the appointed day, Shaykh Bashir brought his men to Dayr al Qamar in case some resistance was made.³ Amir Bashir

¹Haydar, Lubnan, p. 425.

²Dimashqi, Tarikh, p. 82.

³Ibid., p. 85.

sent after Shaykh Jirjus Baz for some urgent business, and in the privacy of their meeting in the serail, he called in his shurta and had them strangle the mudabbir. At the same moment in which Jirjus was being murdered, Amir Hasan and the Yazbaki shaykhs were already in Jbayl under the pretext of seeking the mediation of 'Abd al Ahad Baz with Amir Bashir. There was no attempt to keep them from entering the city, and they proceeded directly to the palace of 'Abd al Ahad Baz and killed him. Meanwhile, Amir Hasan had captured the sons of Amir Yusuf in Jbayl's Crusader castle where they made their residence. The Amirs were cruelly blinded and their property confiscated.

The Baz brothers' following in the country was quite dispersed; and without the Bazes to lead, not much could be done. The people of Dayr al Qamar became agitated and attacked the serail, but when they realized that their leader was already dead, they broke up.¹ The important men in the service of the Baz brothers, such as 'Arab al Shalfun and Ilias Iddi, scribe and poet, were captured immediately. Yusuf al Turk was captured and killed, while Yusuf al Khury al Shalfun escaped. The Christians of Dayr al Qamar in turn were punished in various ways² and also the Khazins.³ To discredit Jirjus Baz in the eyes of the Francophile Maronites, Amir Bashir spread the rumor that Jirjus was in concert with the British.⁴ Then Bashir moved to depose Patriarch Tiyyan, who was a major ally of the Baz brothers and the sons of Amir Yusuf.⁵ Similarly he moved against the Maronite shaykhs of Jbayl and Jibbat Bsharri, intending to remove them from their 'uhad, but failed because they resorted to the support of Yusuf

¹Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 127; Churchill, Mount Lebanon . . ., III, 252-53.

²Haydar, Lubnan, p. 515; MAE, Correspondance Consulaire, dispatch from Tripoli, 22 November, 1808.

³Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 128.

⁴MAE, Correspondance Consulaire, dispatch from Tripoli, 20 May, 1807; also Dimashqi, Tarikh, p. 87.

⁵Congressi Maroniti, XV, 344, 345, 346, 359, 361, Propaganda.

Pasha of Damascus.¹ As for Sulayman Pasha, the Amir sent him an explanation claiming that the mudabbir had been intriguing against him. He also asked the Vali for an order to the people to keep quiet, a request readily granted by the Pasha,² who was already disaffected with Jirjus. Mustafa Barbar, faced with the fait accompli, had to keep his peace.

As for the spoils, the first to benefit was Amir Hasan who, as was immediately observed by the French consul in Tripoli, emerged from the "obscurity to which he was condemned by Jirjus Baz."³ He was appointed by his brother Bashir as ruler of Jbayl in place of the sons of Amir Yusuf.⁴ However, Amir Hasan died soon afterwards, and Bashir, instead of appointing his nephew to his father's position, appointed his own son Amir Qasim as Hakim of Jbayl. He sent with him a Druze mudabbir, thus clearly displaying the shift in power in favor of the Druze. But the Maronite mudabbir of the deceased Amir Hasan struggled against the Druze mudabbir and his master Amir Qasim until he had them both removed.⁵

The second beneficiary was Shaykh Bashir Jumlat and the Druze in general.⁶ With Jirjus removed, Jumlat remained the sole powerful chief in the Mountain. He took the place of Jirjus not only in the Shuf but also in Kisrwan. When after the death of Jirjus Amir Hasan had attacked the Khazins, Shaykh Bashir stepped in and gave the Khazins the support they had previously had from Jirjus. Amir Hasan therefore was stopped from taking the Khazin muqata'ah.⁷ As the Khazins,

¹MAE, Correspondance Consulaire, dispatch from Tripoli, 22 November, 1808.

²Al 'Awrah, Tarikh Wilayah . . ., pp. 324-25.

³MAE, Correspondance Consulaire, dispatch from Tripoli, 20 May, 1807.

⁴Haydar, Lubnan, p. 515.

⁵"Tarikh Jirjus Abi Dibs," MS, Jafeth Library, A. U. B.

⁶Dimashqi, Tarikh, p. 88.

⁷Shidiaq, Akhbar, I, 156-57.

before the intrusion of Jirjus Baz, were of the Jumblati faction, Shaykh Bashir could be considered to have restored his influence where Jirjus had taken it away.

There were other consequences to the downfall of the Baz brothers. The office of mudabbir was reduced in importance and its holder was no longer to have political power or connections; he became simply an administrator.¹ It is true, however, that after the Baz debacle, Bashir continued to employ Maronites in his administration until 1828, when he raised the Melkite Catholic poet in his court, Butrus Karamah, to the office of mudabbir. Butrus Karamah was a Syrian from the town of Hims, and by virtue of being a stranger he had no personal connections in Lebanon and there was no fear that his power might grow out of control. The Lebanese were quite conscious of this change in the office of the mudabbir. As Shayban al Khazin remarked in the 1820's, the mudabbirs in the past were important in the full sense of the word--they were men of learning and of action "unlike [those] of our own days."²

To conclude, the rise of the mudabbir as a great political figure for almost half a century made several changes in the structure of political arrangement in the Imarah. First, the order of factions was upset, and in their place two political groups came to be of importance: the following of the mudabbir and that of the Jumblati chief. In other words, the emerging political groups were the Maronites and the Druze; this point will be left at that here and elaborated upon later. Second, the grasp of power by the mudabbir had the effect of weakening the Hakim, at least temporarily. The mudabbir gained power at the expense of the Hakim and the Yazbaki faction. Third, these changes made it necessary for the Hakim, in order to regain his power, to resort to extreme measures like assassination and civil war, as the Baz case and later the war with Jumblat prove.

¹See Dimashqi, Tarikh, p. 88.

²Shayban, Tarikh, p. 436.

CHAPTER VII

CLERGYMEN, PEASANTS, AND MUQATI'JIS: THE FIRST PHASE

In the preceding chapters we discussed the position of the Church vis-à-vis the ruling class, and the clergy's role as carriers and communicators of Maronite ideology. Here the discussion will concentrate on the processes of change: the emergence of the clergy as a leading political force in the Imarah and the way their rise introduced new political practices which were not in harmony with the iqta' institutions.

The Mudabbir and the Patriarch

The first venture of the Maronite clergy into the political life of the Imarah came about by establishing an informal alliance with the mudabbir, not earlier than the last decade of the eighteenth century. The increase in the political importance of the mudabbir, an office reserved to the Maronites, coincided with the emergence of the Church from the aegis of the muqati'ji class. Organizationally the Church had reached a relatively complex structure by that time and was well provided with material and human resources. Thus it was almost inevitable that a front should develop between the two and combine the resources of both Church and mudabbir in the interest of the Maronite community.

Cooperation between the Church and the Maronite mudabbirs went back to a very early period in the history of the Imarah.¹ As we have already seen,

¹It was these Maronite mudabbirs who made it possible for the clergy to convert the Shihabis. See Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 2794, PAB.

almost all the Maronite muqati'jis started as mudabbirs or servants of the Amir al Hakim. As mudabbirs and as muqati'jis these men extended to the Church the protection and support which they had by virtue of their positions of authority. The Church in turn supported them in its own way. The Church provided them with moral support among the people; and also, in the case of those Maronite chiefs the Khazins and Khuris, the Church helped them acquire the office of French consul in Beirut through its mediation with the French government. However, not until the Church and the mudabbirs had reached positions of relative independence could one see the two take steps to support each other's political actions. This development appeared first with the Patriarch Yusuf Tiyyan (1796-1808) and the Baz brothers.

Patriarch Tiyyan occupies a special place in the history of the Maronite Church and the history of Lebanon, which has, strangely, remained obscure till now. Very little is written or known about him, even the cause of his resignation from the patriarchate.¹ Yusuf al Tiyyan was born on 5 March 1760, in a humble home.² He was chosen by Patriarch Yusuf Istfan to study at the Maronite College in Rome, where he showed great ability. Tiyyan joined the clerical profession at the age of 22, and in 1785, when only three years older, he was made an archbishop of the diocese of Damascus. Later he resigned this office and became patriarchal secretary until 1796, when he was elected patriarch. Thus he became patriarch at the age of 36, the youngest person elected to that office in the recorded history of the Maronite Church. The French consul in Tripoli described him in 1809 as a man of great talent and excellent education.³

¹A noted Maronite historian, priest Ibrahim Harfush, writing on the resignation of Tiyyan, surmises that it was for political and religious causes, Manarah, VIII, 93-96. Another Maronite historian, Bishop Pierre Dib, glosses over the issue like the rest, see Dib, Histoire de l'Eglise Maronite, I, 218.

²Salim Khattar al Dahdah, "Al Amir Bashir al Shihabi al Ma'ruf bi al Malti," MQ, XXII (1924), 573.

³MAE, Correspondance Consulaire, Tripoli, June 30, 1809.

As a young cleric he attracted the attention of Amir Yusuf Shihab and his mudabbir Shaykh Sa'd al Khury, and enjoyed their confidence. They chose him as their deputy to Rome to solve the troublesome problem of Patriarch Istfan, who was involved in the famous heresy of the nun Hindiyyah.¹ Tiyyan also held the position of judge and was well informed on the history and law of his community.² It was by his efforts and those of Bishop Yusuf Istfan that the famous Maronite College of 'Ayn Warqa was started.³ He was a single-minded and very active individual.

The Maronites of Mount Lebanon, as was mentioned earlier, supported the cause of Amir Yusuf Shihab and his sons after him, and Patriarch Tiyyan was foremost in his community to stand for them and their Maronite mudabbirs.⁴ Tiyyan saw a great opportunity for the political future of the Maronite community in the persons of Maronite mudabbirs such as Jirjus Baz. As early as 1793 when he was still a patriarchal secretary, he and the old Patriarch Mikha'il Fadil begged the Curia to send letters of commendation and gifts to Jirjus Baz and the Maronite mudabbirs of Amir Haydar and Amir Qa'dan.⁵

Tiyyan's venture into political leadership in the Ijarah was unprecedented in the history of the Church in Lebanon. This is clear from many of his actions and political decisions. In 1799 he offered the support of the Maronites to Napoleon, who was fighting at the gates of 'Akka in his campaign to take Syria. As Catholics, the Maronite clergy were not fond of the French Revolution, nor of Napoleon;⁶ but the prospects for the Maronites presented by

¹Ghanim, Barnamaj . . ., p. 307.

²Ghbra'il, Tarikh al Kanisah . . ., II, 710-11; and MAA, MS, No. 7118.

³Istfan, Zubdat al Bayan . . ., pp. 41-43.

⁴Tiyyan papers, Ms, No. 47, PAB; also Harfush, al Manarah, VIII, 96; also Dahdah, MQ, XXII, 572-73.

⁵Qirdahi Dossier, MS, No. 84. Archives of the Lebanese Monastery in Rome.

⁶See Shibli, MQ, LI, 307.

the possibility of a Catholic nation like France becoming dominant in the Levant could not be overlooked by an enlightened and dynamic patriarch like Tiyyan. In his letter to Napoleon his ambivalent attitude was well expressed. He wrote to the General that he was sending him a delegation for the love of "our brothers the French people, not for you who have persecuted the Catholic Church." Napoleon's answer was intriguing: "I am also Catholic, and you will see that in my person the Church will triumph and spread to distant lands."¹

However, Napoleon was repulsed at 'Akka and the patriarch did not have to go far in the mobilization of his community; but before the French retreat from 'Akka, he sent men with wine and other presents for the French invaders. He also gave orders to some of the Maronite shaykhs to be prepared and have their men ready.² The attitude of Jirjus Baz toward Napoleon is not clear; we know very little except that he was accused by Amir Bashir of double-dealing.³ Jirjus Baz was then seeking from al Jazzar the investiture over the government of the Ijarah, and it is unlikely that he would have taken a stand in favor of the French when they had not yet sufficiently demonstrated their power.

In any case, the initiative of the patriarch and the overt rejoicing at the Europeans' coming on the part of the Christians aroused the fears of the Druze.⁴ For the first time different attitudes were demonstrated on the part of Maronites and Druze on clearly communal basis. The Druze manasib made plans to emigrate to the Jabal al A'la in northern Syria in the event of a French victory. Some of the Druze shaykhs also attacked the Maronite caravans carry-

¹Ristelhueber, Tradition Francaise . . ., pp. 269-70.

²Daghir, Batarikat al Mawarinah, p. 75; and Butrus Sfayr, Al Amir Bashir Al Shihabi: Tara'if 'an Hayatihi wa Ahkamihi wa Akhlaqihi (Beirut: Dar al Tiba'ah wa al Nashr, n.d.), p. 44.

³Rustum Baz, Mudhakkirat, pp. 8-9.

⁴Haydar, Lubnan, p. 192; Munayyar, KTS, LI, 449; also Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 98-99.

ing wine and other supplies to the French troops. The Napoleonic episode was a passing one, but it indicated the growing split between the two communities under new challenges.

What we are mainly concerned with here is the relations which developed between the Church and the ruling establishment, especially the mudabbir and the Hakim. The relationship between Patriarch Tiyyan and the Baz brothers, the mudabbirs of the Shihabi Hakims, was one of mutual support.¹ "He did all that their interest [i.e., that of the Baz brothers] suggested to him," wrote Louis Gondolfi, the Apostolic delegate to the Congregation of the Propaganda.² As already seen, Tiyyan was active in reconciling the differences between Jirjus Baz and Amir Bashir in 1800. The patriarch's political activities, however, did not please Amir Bashir, and the two were at odds not only in matters of politics but also in Church affairs.³ In his report on the conflict between Tiyyan and the Amir, Gondolfi wrote to the Propaganda that the patriarch created an infinite number of problems and complications for the Amir by his meddling in affairs of government which were none of his business.

Patriarch Tiyyan seems to have used his good offices with the Baz brothers and their lords to support his people, the Maronites. Where some of them were in political trouble, like the Khazins, he mediated and offered instructions and advice.⁴ He would also intervene for the interest of the people in questions of taxation.⁵ But the one overriding cause of the Amir's hostility toward the patriarch was the latter's unmitigated support for his rivals, the

¹Congressi Maroniti, XV, 344, Propaganda.

²Ibid.

³Tiyyan papers, see letter sent by Amir Bashir to Jirjus Baz, and letter from the same Amir to Patriarch Tiyyan, PAB.

⁴MAA, MS, No. 3616.

⁵Daghir, Batarikat al Mawarinah, pp. 75-76; idem, Lubnan . . ., p. 390.

sons of Amir Yusuf and their mudabbirs. The patriarch had good reason to support those Amirs against Bashir, though the latter was also a Maronite. Amir Yusuf and his sons always had a special place with the majority of the Maronites of north Lebanon, who served them well, while Amir Bashir depended almost entirely on the Druze.¹ The Druze manasib were also opposed to Patriarch Tiyyan. In a judicial verdict somehow affecting Bashir Jumblat which apparently went against the shaykh's interest, he and the patriarch seem to have exchanged uncomplimentary language. Shaykh Bashir raised a complaint with Jirjus Baz against the patriarch's conduct, stating that the language the patriarch had used with him could hardly come even from the rulers of the country to a man like him.²

Patriarch Tiyyan's ventures into political leadership were cut short by the assassination of the Baz brothers and deposition of their lords. In the agreement of 1800 between Jirjus and Amir Bashir the two men had sworn before Patriarch Tiyyan not to betray each other. Tiyyan was greatly hurt by Bashir's betrayal of this oath and the great loss to himself and to the community in the death of the Bazes and the removal of the sons of Amir Yusuf from the government.³ He tried to protest, but Bashir gave him no chance. Apparently Tiyyan wanted to save what was still possible, that is, to keep Kisrwan in the hands of its Maronite muqati'jis⁴ and stop the punishment being dealt the Baz brothers' followers. The Amir refused him audience,⁵ which meant in the customs of the country that he had fallen into disgrace.

Having dispensed with the patriarch's main ally, Amir Bashir moved to

¹See, for instance, Munayyar, KTS, L, 444; ibid., LI, 423.

²MAA, MS, No. 7118.

³Congressi Maroniti, XV, 359, Propaganda.

⁴Shayban, Tarikh, p. 530.

⁵Congressi Maroniti, XV, 344, Propaganda.

get rid of the patriarch himself. He wanted to force him to resign; but Gondolfi, the Apostolic delegate, realizing the displeasure such a step would create in Rome, advised the Amir to refrain.¹ Gondolfi himself was actually pleased with the turn of events² because of his longstanding conflict with the patriarch. Secretly the Apostolic delegate was the private chaplain of the Amir and upheld his cause.³ He promised the Amir to execute his wishes, but with caution. Gondolfi then met the patriarch and explained to him that the Hakim was angry with him and that he could not under any circumstances be pardoned by the Amir.⁴ In this way he suggested subtly that Tiyyan should resign, making him understand that such was the will of the Hakim.⁵ The patriarch asked for time to think it over and after a few days informed the Apostolic delegate of his intentions to resign.⁶ On 3 October 1807 he sent his letter of resignation to Rome, asserting that "the violent antagonism toward me of our rulers and the suspicions in the community oblige me to resign my office."⁷ He then went into isolation in the monastery of Qannubin awaiting the Pope's reply, which came to him on 19 November 1808.

That was the first case of a patriarch's resignation from office in the recorded history of the Maronite Church. The "suspicions in the community" referred to in Tiyyan's letter were some differences among the prelates which were made use of by Bashir to help evict the patriarch.⁸

¹Ibid., MSS, Nos. 345, 346.

²Ibid., MS, No. 344.

³MAE, Correspondance Consulaire, Tripoli, 7 June, 1807.

⁴Congressi Maroniti, XV, 345, Propaganda.

⁵Ibid., MSS, Nos. 345, 359, 361; see also Dagher, Batarikat al Mawarinah, pp. 75-76.

⁶Congressi Maroniti, XV, 345, Propaganda.

⁷See text of letter in 'Anaysi, Silsilah . . ., p. 62.

⁸Harfush, Manarah, VIII, 93-96.

A new patriarch was then elected, Patriarch Yuhanna al Hilu (1809-1823). Though he was described by the French consul in Tripoli as the creation of the Amir,¹ Hilu kept a good measure of independence from the Hakim; and except for some intercession with the Amir for his people, the Maronites, he tried to steer clear of politics. The Amir no doubt supported him because he could not be expected to be as troublesome as Tiyyan, considering his advanced age. Bashir for his part followed the Latin rite and had his sons do so as well, in order to maintain his freedom from the Maronite clergy.² But later when he quarreled with the Apostolic delegate, Gondolfi,³ he returned to the Maronite rite.

The assassination of the Baz brothers and the deposition of Patriarch Tiyyan ended what might have become one of the most interesting developments in the political life of Mount Lebanon. However, the diminution of the functions of the mudabbir did not completely break this relationship, and the Church continued to have some rapport with the mudabbirs concerning information and intercession with the palace.⁴ The fact that the Church and the mudabbir could reach a working accord even for a short time is indicative of the new force and purpose of the Maronite Church and community. This new force could not have been stemmed but by an act of violence, and was soon to re-emerge under new forms.

One of the immediate effects of the episode of Tiyyan and the Baz brothers was to bring into the open the undercurrents which were moving the Maronites and the Druze in opposite directions. Henceforth, as the Maronite challenge to Druze supremacy grew, the two communities moved more and more apart. The impor-

¹MAE, Correspondance Consulaire, Tripoli, 30 June 1809; *ibid.*, 20 October 1809.

²*Ibid.*; 7 June 1807; Congressi Maroniti, XV, 362, Propaganda.

³Guys, Relations . . ., II, 303.

⁴Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 158, 8348.

tance of the Church and its widening activities, as well as the Maronites' growing self-assertion in the affairs of the Imarah, contributed to the stimulation of community feeling among the two groups.

The different social conditions of the two communities and their developing sense of communal consciousness stirred up momentous new events in Mount Lebanon. The Druze were a small community compared to the Maronites, yet to a large extent could be considered the ruling group. The Maronites were numerous and mostly peasants, many of whom came under the immediate rule of Druze muqati'jis. The ruling Shihabi Amir and the secular spirit of the iqta' institutions were the uniting factors.

The trend of change, though not always taking overt expression and sharp class orientation, was nevertheless basically the result of the mutually enforcing factors of religious group feeling and class distinctions. The Maronites were becoming aware that they were both a distinct community and, on the whole, the majority of the peasant class. This trend not only contributed to the separation of the two religious groups but also to the undermining of the iqta' political institutions. The following analysis of events serves to substantiate this generalization.

After the assassination of the Baz brothers, Amir Bashir and Shaykh Bashir Jumblat emerged as the only undisputed rulers of Mount Lebanon, as we have seen in the previous chapter. Amir Bashir, whose support came mainly from the Druze manasib, found himself in the unenviable position of leaning heavily on only one chief muqati'ji, Shaykh Bashir Jumblat. This situation was unprecedented in the history of the Shihabi Imarah, since the Hakim formerly had always been able to count on the heads of one or more factions. While the Druze community with Bashir Jumblat was in the process of coming under a single man's leadership, the Maronites were finding themselves without an influential figure who could lead them. The Khazin shaykhs had long ceased to belong to the circle

of influential manasib, while the Abillama' also were of limited power. Maronite opposition to the Amir, which continued to mount until 1823, was therefore led mainly by clergymen and peasants. Amir Bashir was not only at odds with his religious affiliates but had no freedom to choose among the power groups available in the country because of the firm grip of Shaykh Bashir Jumlat.

Peasant Rebels and Clergymen

Maronite opposition to the two Bashirs came to an eruption point in 1820. The uprising is known in the annals of Lebanese history as the 'ammiyyah, that is, the common people's uprising. The circumstances which brought this to a head were the new demands for more revenue made by the Pasha of Sayda. Over the years the Amir had raised the amount of miri several times. The practice was to collect the original fixed sum more than one time, hence the customary reference to one miri, two miris, etc. By failing to deal effectively with the Pasha and limit his demands, the Amir was forced to collect another tax from the people. He borrowed some of the amount from merchants, and some from the affluent Shaykh Bashir. He could not collect from the Druze muqata'ahs because the Druze manasib stood in his way.¹ He turned then to the Christians, who he thought had no strong leaders to oppose an additional collection of miri, and made demands on them and their clergy.² This sparked a popular revolt among the Christians. The 'ammiyyah revolt deserves special attention as a new kind of movement reflecting new sentiments, as well as introducing political practices which contributed to the undermining of the political practices of the iqta' system.

¹See letter of Abbot Ignatius Sarkis in Yazbak, AL, 1956, p. 390.

²Matta Shihwan, "Hayat Matta Shihwan wa ma Jara fi Ayyamihi min al Hawadith fi Lubnan," ed. Basilius Qattan, Kawkab al Bariyyah (B'abda, Lubnan, 1911), p. 476; Hattuni, Nabdah, p. 241.

There is a consensus among historians that Bishop Yusuf Istfan (1759-1823) was one of the main leaders of the 'ammiyyah rebellion.¹ Hardly a thing has been done in the study of the history of Lebanon to bring this interesting figure to light. Born Khayrallah Istfan in 1759 in the region of Kisrwan, he lost his father at the age of six; but as a member of a family with extensive clerical background and connections, he managed to have a good religious education. He had a scholarly bent and, in the absence of adequate educational facilities, educated himself.² The Swiss traveler Burckhardt, when he met Bishop Istfan, thought that he had received his education in Rome and commented that the bishop "had some notions of Europe."³ He was able, moreover, to acquire a knowledge of law from Bishop Jirmanus Adam,⁴ and was well versed in Syriac, revising some of the books of prayers.⁵ Istfan was also interested in the history of the Maronite community and is often quoted as an authority on that subject.⁶ Abu Khattar al 'Aynturini praises him and acknowledges that he wrote his history with the help, direction, and supervision of Bishop Istfan.⁷ In fact, it is interesting to note the similarity in the fates of the two men; both Bishop Istfan and al 'Aynturini were leaders in the 'ammiyyah uprising and lost their lives as a result of it. The intellectual activities and sense of public service in the career of Bishop Istfan were crowned by his realization of the most important Maronite cultural achievement, the College of 'Ayn Warqa.

¹ Shidiq, Akhbar, II, 145; also MAA, MS, No. 6468, p. 48; also Hattuni, Nabdhah (Yusuf Yazbak edition, 1956), pp. 199-200, 206-08. See also 'Isa Iskandar al Ma'luf, "Al Azjal fi al Amir Bashir," al Manarah, VIII, 117-18.

² Istfan, Zubdat al Bayan . . . , pp. 48-49.

³ Burckhardt, Travels . . . , p. 22.

⁴ Yazbak, AL, 1956, p. 435.

⁵ Blaybil, TRIM, LI, 682-83.

⁶ See Shayban, Tarikh, pp. 517-18.

⁷ 'Aynturini, MTL, XLVI, 175.

When Istfan was still a priest, he was appointed by Amir Bashir as the Christian judge for north Lebanon.¹ In 1809 the people of the diocese of Jbayl and al Batrun attempted to make him their archbishop, but he accepted instead a titular bishopric and also became patriarchal secretary to Yuhanna al Hilu.² He continued, however, in his post as a judge. Although in this capacity he was an official of Amir Bashir, his relations with the Hakim were not very smooth. Nonetheless the Amir respected his judgment.

There were two issues which created tension between Amir Bashir and Bishop Istfan. The first was caused by the latter's desire to remain free from the Hakim's interference in his judicial function. In one case, for example, the Amir wanted, curiously enough, to force the bishop to try a case in which one party had a standing suit filed against the bishop himself. The bishop informed Bashir that he could not in all conscience try a case in which one of the parties had a quarrel with him. When the Amir insisted, the bishop angrily ignored the Amir's request and went home.³ Another issue which disturbed the relations of Istfan and Bashir was the continually increasing taxation. The bishop pleaded for the poor people and warned the Amir about his policies, which did not endear him to the Hakim's heart.⁴

The second main reason for tension between the Amir and the bishop had to do with their relationship as two Maronites, one lay and the other clerical. As a member of the Church, the Amir had to heed the princes of the Church on what they thought in the interest of the community. In 1817 the Amir, together with his chief ally Shaykh Bashir Jumblat, tried to influence affairs in the

¹Ziadah, al Qada' al Maruni . . ., p. 61, n. 4.

²Hilu Papers, August, 1809, PAB.

³Hilu Papers, 9 November, 1816, and MS, No. 267, PAB.

⁴Yazbak, AL, 1957, P. 205; 'Abbud, Basa'ir al Zaman . . ., pp. 230-31.

Church; but they were successfully opposed by Patriarch Hilu and Bishop Istfan.¹ More important was Bishop Istfan's growing displeasure over the Amir's attitude toward his own religion and the place it should play in the Imarah.

The Shihabis' conversion to Maronite faith from Sunni Islam is a long and as yet little known story. Since the subject is outside the scope of this discussion, a brief account will be given here in order to clarify the question of Istfan's conflict with the Amir. During Patriarch Tiyyan's period, some of the clergy attempted to force the question of the secrecy of the Shihabis' religious practice into the open. The patriarch did not concur and had to raise the case with Rome for a final decision. He wrote a long letter explaining the whole issue from its beginning, stating that the Shihabs were converted from Sunni Islam at the hands of the clergy,

but gradually, that is one after the other until they have now all become Christians. [However,] they did not accept the [Christian] faith until they were assured by some of those preceding heads [of the Church] that they [the clergy] would not put them under obligation to declare themselves openly; but they [also] made it a condition upon themselves that if they were asked by those who have the right to ask them about that question, like the Vezirs of the Sublime State, they would not deny their faith but affirm it. They have continued in this fashion to this day.²

Then he went on to explain how they performed their religious duties in secret and how in public they went as Muslims. Gradually they had disclosed their faith to their contemporaries to the extent that some of them appeared in Church.

In 1818 certain incidents (to be discussed later) took place in Mount Lebanon which upset religious susceptibilities, and Amir Bashir gave orders to his kinsmen, the Shihabis, to show themselves in public as Muslims and to fast during Ramadan. This step was too much for Bishop Istfan, and he considered it to have broken the original covenant, although actually it had not. The Hakim's orders only altered what had at that time become an open secret, and constituted

¹Hattuni, Nabdah, p. 242.

²Tiyyan papers, MS, No. 227, see also MS, No. 228.

a setback to the advance of the Maronite faith. Istfan wrote a letter to Patriarch Hilu urging him to take action against the Amir's orders and to have the clergy desist from giving the Amir private religious service. He warned Hilu that if he did not stop the Amir's orders then and there, he would find it almost impossible to retrieve the situation in the future.¹ There is no evidence that the patriarch actually brought this issue with the Shihabis to a head. The incident, however, demonstrated the complex relationships developing between Church and State during that period.

The conflict between Bishop Istfan and the Amir culminated in 1820 when the bishop stood at the head of the people in resisting Amir Bashir's taxation policy. He was not, however, the only cleric involved in the uprising; there was a general wave of discontent among the lower clergy and some of them took active part in the rebellion.² Tannus al Shidiaq, who took part in those important events, tells us that Bishop Yusuf Istfan was the organizer of the rebels. He organized the people into village communes in which each village chose one wakil, deputy, to lead their people and act for them with the rest of the country's wakils and the government.³

The institution of wakils established by Bishop Istfan was of long duration in the Mountain affairs, and became of great importance in the changing political practices of the Imarah. Fortunately we have a record of the kind of covenant made between the villagers and their wakils which gives an idea of what the wakils stood for. This example is the covenant of the village of Bash'alah written in August 15, 1821. (This was during the second round of the uprising, which is usually referred to as 'ammiyyat Lihfid, whereas the first round in

¹Hilu papers, MS, No. C. 118, PAB.

²Shihwan, Kawkab al Bariyyah, 1911, pp. 479-80; Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 159; Ma'luf, Manarah, VIII, 117; Mashaqah, al Jawab, pp. 83-84; Nawfal, Yusuf Bayk Karam . . ., p. 92.

³Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 145; for wakils, see also Haydar, Lubnan, p. 685.

1820 is known as 'ammiyyat Intilias.) Following is the text of the covenant made between the people of Bash'alah and their wakil delegating authority to him to represent them with the rest of the country and the government.

The reason for writing this, and what makes it necessary, is that we the undersigned, all the natives of Bash'alah in general, old and young, have freely accepted and entrusted ourselves and our expenses to our cousin¹ Tannus al Shidiaq Nasr, and whatever is required of us in general and in detail, with respect to the 'ammiyyah. His word will be final with us in all [matters] of expenses and losses. [Regarding] the call to arms, we shall obey him in the recruitment of men in our interest and that of the common people [al jumhur al 'ammiyyah]. We shall not disobey or relent, and whoever disobeys or relents in what we have written here shall incur upon himself our hostility and severe punishment.

This is what has been agreed upon between us and him [i.e., the wakil], and he shall act according to his conscience, not favoring anyone over the other nor relenting in the questions of our interests. Whatever he arranges as the tax, we shall accept it; and if he relents in [pursuing] our interests, we shall hold him accountable. Neither we nor he shall go against [what is hereby written] in any way. God be our witness.

If we [suffer a loss], it will be shared by all of us equally. We should² all be [united] as one person [having], one word, and [paying] one tax. . . .

It is clear from this statement that the wakils were undertaking the task of managing the public affairs of the people and relating their particular affairs to the country as a whole. The delegation of authority by the people to the wakil included fixing the amount of tax, leading the people in arms, participating in the making of decisions as a deputy for the village at the 'ammiyyah's council, and representing the people with the Ijarah government. For all these powers he was held accountable by the people. What is significant here is that these powers delegated to the wakil were the traditional functions of the muqat-i'jis, and therefore seriously affected the iqta' system.

The events of the uprising demonstrate the trend against the iqta' institutions. The rebels from all the Maronite districts, the Matn, Kisrwan, Jbayl, al Batrun, and Jibbat Bsharri, met at Intilias, in the village Church of Saint

¹The term cousin here is a figure of colloquial Lebanese speech and does not really refer to blood relations.

²Istfan al Bash'alani, Tarikh Bash'alah wa Salima (Beirut: Matba'at Fadil wa Jmayyil, 1947), pp. 533-34.

Ilias. The Druze-dominated muqata'ahs of Jabal al Shuf and the iqlims stayed away.¹ At the meeting the rebels swore that they would stand together, put the public interest first, and refuse to pay anything but the one and original tax. To this effect they wrote a covenant among themselves, composed by Bishop Yusuf Istfan.²

After the meeting at Intilias, Amir Silman Sayyid-Ahmad and Amir Hasan Shihab, both longstanding candidates for the Hakim's office, went to the 'ammiyyah and encouraged them.³ They also entered into agreement with the wakils and swore that if they were to come into power, they would charge only the basic tax.⁴ Amir Bashir tried to appease the 'ammiyyah, but they refused to listen and were determined to force him to give up his orders for collecting the tax.⁵

Amir Hasan and Amir Silman made their pledges to the 'ammiyyah and rallied the Yazbakis to their side. The leader of the Yazbaki faction, Shaykh 'Ali al 'Imad, had long been in exile in Syria and Egypt. Learning of the events in the Mountain, Shaykh 'Ali left his exile in Egypt and went to 'Akka, where he and other Yazbaki leaders were well received by the Vali of Sayda, 'Abdallah Pasha. The 'ammiyyah sent six wakils to the Vali with Shaykh Fadl al Khazin at their head; the latter, being the only Khazin shaykh to rally to the 'ammiyyah, was elected chief by them. The Pasha promised the 'ammiyyah that he would not exact from them more than the original amount they had paid in the past, and made them understand that he was acting against the two Bashirs.⁶

¹Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 145; Hattuni, Nabdah, p. 242.

²Ibid.; Yazbak, AL, 1955, p. 159; 'Abbud, Basa'ir al Zaman . . ., pp. 230-31.

³Haydar, "Nuzhat," p. 219; and Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 145.

⁴Shihwan, Kawkab al Bariyyah, 1911, pp. 478-79; also MAE, Correspondance Consulaire, Sayda, 27 March, 1821; and MAA, MS, No. 6468, p. 48.

⁵Shihwan, Kawkab al Bariyyah, 1911, pp. 478-79.

⁶Ibid.; also MAE, Correspondance Consulaire, Sayda, 27 March, 1821.

At this point Amir Bashir, seeing that the Pasha was changing his attitude and that the 'ammiyyah could not be broken up, decided to retire from the government of Mount Lebanon.¹ Thereupon 'Abdallah Pasha sent an investiture to Amir Silman and Amir Hasan. The two Amirs met the deputation of the Pasha near Sayda, where they were invested; they then marched to Dayr al Qamar and were met on the way by the 'ammiyyah and the Yazbaki followers. Amir Bashir and Shaykh Bashir left Mount Lebanon but kept close watch on the events there. The two Amirs proceeded to collect the taxes for the Pasha, but soon they, too, were faced with the problem of new and increased demands. The Yazbaki shaykhs tried to resist the new impositions but the Pasha did not yield. The two Hakims sent a message to the Shaykhs to accept the Pasha's demands. The two Hakims had no private resources to help them live up to the promise they had given to the Pasha, and the resources of the Yazbaki shaykhs were meagre. Meanwhile, the 'ammiyyah sent word through their wakils that if the Hakims changed the terms of their agreement regarding taxes, they would not support them.² On top of this, the two Hakims had no real support among the Druze population, who were then mostly inclined toward the Jumblatis. The Amirs had great fear of the Jumblatis and of what they might be preparing for them,³ but had no choice except to levy a high tax.

At this turn of events, Amir Bashir sought to win the Pasha's favor and asked that he be allowed to return and live in Jazzin, to which the Pasha agreed. Then the people and the manasib started to protest and expelled the Hakims' collectors.⁴ This paved the way for the return of Amir Bashir, and the Pasha grudgingly had to approve. The failure of the two Amirs demonstrated the hopelessness

¹Shihwan, Kawkab al Bariyyah, 1911, 478-79; and Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 145.

²MAE, Correspondance Consulaire, Sayda, 27 March, 1821.

³Ibid.

⁴Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 675-76.

of the Yazbaki faction. It also pointed up the need for the two Amirs to establish stronger relations with the Maronite 'ammiyyah beyond mere exploitation of its trouble-making potential. However, the Amirs failed to establish a positive relationship with the 'ammiyyah which would develop real and lasting loyalty on the latter's part. While the 'ammiyyah problem was not solved, the Yazbakis in their turn fell an easy prize to Shaykh Bashir Jumblat by coming to terms with him, and gave tacit recognition of the precedence and leadership of the Jumblati shaykh.¹

After his return, Amir Bashir proceeded systematically and skillfully to execute his new policy. He first settled existing differences among the manasib in Jabal al Shuf, then sent his son to collect the miri from the Maronite north. Again, the people rose up against the Amir's son and sent messengers to all the regions to rally at a place called Lihfid. Having received news from his son about the uprising, Bashir took steps himself to settle the issue. He tried to negotiate with the heads of the uprising, but they insisted on being treated on equal terms with the Druze with respect to taxation, and possibly other matters of which there was no explicit mention.² The Amir was willing to go along with them on the point regarding the tax, but soon he found something more in the demands of the 'ammiyyah. Something very interesting appeared during these negotiations which demonstrated the far-reaching effects of the revolutionary spirit among the Maronites at that time.

In the demands which the 'ammiyyah put forward to the Amir, they asked that the governor appointed over them should, first, not be invested through the Ottoman Vali, and second, should be one of them. (It may be remembered here that the Vali of Tripoli invested the Shihabi Amir over the northern part

¹Ibid., p. 677; Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 157-58.

²Haydar, Lubnan, p. 659; Hattuni, Nabdhah, p. 242; Yazbak, AL, 1956, p. 390.

²Haydar,

of Lebanon, and when the same Vali held both Tripoli and Sayda, the Amir received two investments from the same Vali.) Haydar wrote of these demands, "they decided on disobedience and sent a copy of their conditions [to the Amir], which were utterly unreasonable. One of these was that whoever is the Hakim, he should not be appointed by the [Ottoman] State."¹

This independent spirit on the part of the Maronites went too far for the Amir, who categorically refused their demands. There was fighting in Lihfid, Kisrwan, Jibbat Bsharri, and other places. The Amir sent for Shaykh Bashir jumlat to come to his aid, and to the aid of the Druze manasib who were with him.² In the meantime Amir Silman and Amir Hasan rallied to the 'ammiyyah and joined in the fighting. They also had the Matawilah shaykhs, who had previously made an alliance with the 'ammiyyah to stand with them.³ But the fighting ended with the defeat of the 'ammiyyah and the two amirs, Silman and Hasan. Bashir then collected the tax as he had originally intended and imposed further penalties for insubordination. Had it not also been for the intercession of the elderly Patriarch Hilu, he would also have done much harm to the Maronites of Jibbat Bsharri.⁴

Al 'Aynturini was caught, tortured and then released, to die soon afterward in a Maronite convent in Jbayl. Bishop Yusuf Istfan fled to a place in 'Akkar called Dahr Safra. From his hiding place the bishop wrote to the patriarch not to intercede on his part because he had decided to spend the rest of his life in worship.⁵ But the Amir did not leave him alone, and in 1823, when

¹Haydar, Lubnan, p. 685; Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 155.

²Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 685, 687, 688, 689; Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 155, 157.

³Hilu papers, MS, No. 461, PAB.

⁴Hattuni, Nabdah, p. 247; Yazbak, AL, 1957, pp. 83-84; Nawfal, Batal Lubnan . . ., p. 92.

⁵Hilu papers, MSS, Nos. 484, 485.

the Amir had pardoned him and he went to see the Amir, he was poisoned and died after leaving Bashir's palace.¹

The demands made by the 'ammiyyah underlined certain important ideological aspects of the 'ammiyyah rebellion. First, a sharp breakdown in the political community between Maronite and Druze, based on different group interests and sentiments, became evident. Matters even went beyond the stage of overt expression of interest, and fighting broke out in some mixed villages between Christians and Druze over the issues raised by the 'ammiyyah.² The Maronites clearly and explicitly demanded that they should be treated by the Hakim on equal footing with the Druze. Not only was this point made in their demands to the Amir, but the sentiment spread among the villagers like fire and was expressed in popular poems in colloquial.

A synopsis of a long poem on the 'ammiyyah, written in 1820, will illustrate the popular feeling. The poet, Yusuf Ma'luf, says that the tax was imposed mainly on the Christians and their clergy. But the people were annoyed, the poet goes on, and wondered why the Christians were used only for the payment of taxes while fighting was considered the business of the Druze.³ The people swore that they would not comply with such a state of affairs and that they were willing to rise against it. Because none of this had ever happened before, the poem continues, and because the Christians and the Druze had not been treated differently since the days of Fakhr al Din, they resolved in a public gathering to resist this new situation.⁴

¹Yazbak, AL, 1955, p. 159; Nawfal, Batal Lubnan . . ., pp. 93-94; Hattuni, Nabdhah (Yazbak ed.), pp. 206-07; 'Abbud, Basa'ir al Zaman, pp. 230-31.

²MAE, Correspondance Consulaire, Sayda, 6 May, 1821.

³The same idea occurs in a letter of Abbot Ighnatius Sarkis, see text in Yazbak, AL, 1956, p. 390.

⁴Ma'luf, Manarah, VIII, 120-22.

It is clear here that there were two main ideas moving these people. One was historical, namely, that they and the Druze had formed one commonwealth under equal conditions in the Ijarah since the early days of the Ma'nis. The second idea was that they were a distinct community desiring to impose on the rulers their own sense of what was just.

The 'ammiyyah uprising embodied some new ideas. First in importance was the idea of public welfare, "al salih al 'umumi." The idea was used by the people to refer to the interest of the subjects as a whole, particularly the Christian public, since the uprising was clearly carried on by the Christians. The distinctions between the private interest and that of the public are evident in the covenants written between the villagers and their wakils. The appearance of general ideas of this kind reflected new modes of thought unfamiliar under the iqta' system, where the mental set had been particularistic. No universal ideas like private and public welfare had then been entertained, and the individual had viewed himself as part of the 'uhdah and had not envisaged different ways of existence. To think in terms of public interest implies an awareness of a distinct group of people existing under equal conditions without distinctions among the members.

There are two aspects to this group consciousness manifested in the 'ammiyyah, which constituted the common condition of existence among them. In the first place, the 'ammiyyah were commoners and of peasant stock, a fact indicated by the name they gave to their movement.¹ The class consciousness is also evident from the fact that peasants participated in the uprising against the wishes of their muqati'jis, particularly the Khazins and the Abillama's,

¹See for instance the ideas expressed in the memoirs of the clergyman Matta Shihwan, of peasant background himself, Kawkab al Bariyyah, 1911, pp. 476-77.

who stood with the Druze manasib and signed their compact.¹ The only Khazin who joined the 'ammiyyah was Shaykh Fadl al Khazin,² who, nevertheless, later in the struggle betrayed the 'ammiyyah and joined the other side.³

The other feature reflected in the group consciousness of the 'ammiyyah movement was the community feeling. The Christians, mainly Maronites, were looking at the whole event as a struggle of Maronites against Druze domination and privileges.

The second main idea embodied in the whole uprising was that of independence. The spirit of independence shown by the Christians in demanding freedom from the Ottomans strikes a familiar note in Maronite ideology. As we have seen earlier, the spirit of independence and the feeling of being a distinct community were major ideas in the clerical view of Maronite ideology. The processes of political life in the Ijarah were henceforth to be increasingly shaped by these new ideas and trends, to the detriment of the traditional iqta' institutions.

The 'ammiyyah movement affected also the political institutions of the iqta' system, and one witnesses in it a departure from earlier practice. The introduction of the wakils into the system and the commoners' attempt to participate in such major political activities as deposing and electing the Amir and the regulation of taxation were contrary to the iqta' institutions and the prerogatives of muqati'jis.

A strong communal feeling among one group naturally generates the same

¹See the text of the pact and signatures of the manasib, Druze and Christians, Yazbak, AL, 1956, pp. 510-12. The editor makes the mistake that the pact was that of the 'ammiyyah; in fact it was that of the manasib referred to in Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 676-77; also Hattuni, Nabdhah, pp. 246-47; Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 145, 146, 159; Haydar, "Nuzhat," p. 219; Shihwan, Kawkab al Bariyyah, 1911, pp. 479-81.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

with its neighbor. The Druze were themselves becoming suspicious and cautious¹ after the unprecedented Maronite demonstrations. Unlike the Maronites, the Druze community did not go through internal renovating experiences, and its strong communal unity against the Maronites is not very easily understood. Some explanation, however, will be attempted here. Druze feeling might be partly explained by the defensive reaction they built against the Maronite challenge, and second, by the course of events which gave them a single political leadership under Shaykh Bashir Jumblat, in contrast to the multiplicity of leaders in the past. After the demise of Jirjus Baz, the Druze came increasingly under the control of Shaykh Bashir Jumblat, as will be seen from the Mukhtarara affair, discussed below. This does not mean, however, that the Druze mansib were removed or replaced by Bashir Jumblat, but simply that they gradually became less powerful and more dependent upon him.

There are good indications that Amir Bashir was not happy about Druze leadership falling to a single man. He tried secretly to encourage the Yazbakis and to have them stage a come-back in 1818, but it came too late. The attempt was foiled by the vigilance of Bashir Jumblat, who uncovered the plot and faced the Amir with it. The Amir denied any connections with the Yazbakis; and to make good his word, he had to have his main link in the plot secretly executed. This man was Shaykh Sharaf al Din al Qadi, his Druze judge; he had Yazbaki affiliations.²

Amir Bashir had much to fear from the ambitions of Shaykh Bashir Jumblat. The shaykh's real aspirations were not clear, but it was known that he was trying to cultivate his relations with the Ottoman Valis and was increasing his forces at home. For instance, sensing that 'Abdallah Pasha, the Vali of Sayda, was under the influence of the fanatical Muslim shaykhs of his entourage, Shaykh

¹Yazbak, AL, 1956, p. 390.

²See Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 139-41; Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 650-51.

Bashir started to show public signs of adhering to Islam and built a mosque in his stronghold of al Mukhtara.¹ An incident that occurred around 1818 also accentuated this trend. Shaykh Bashir encouraged a rash Shihabi youth to become reconverted to Islam, and aroused in his mind prospects of becoming Hakim.² In an unsuccessful love affair in which this youth was prevented from marrying a cousin of his, he killed his uncle and his father and ran away to Damascus, where he pretended to have killed his kinsmen because they were apostates. In Muslim law, renegades, if not willing to return to Islam, should be killed; thus the law protected him in Damascus.

No matter how silly this affair was, which all had its start with the connivance of Bashir Jumblat, it left serious impressions with Amir Bashir and the Christians and was completely distasteful to both. People had some notions about the religious status of the Shihabis; but they guarded their mouths in matters affecting other people's susceptibilities, especially when it concerned the Hakim. It was after the above incident that Amir Bashir gave orders to the Shihabis to show public signs of their allegiance to Islam³--a measure which aroused the ire of Bishop Yusuf Istfan.

Amir Bashir was not in a position to remove Shaykh Bashir Jumblat, no matter how much he wanted to. Circumstances did not help him, particularly because of the presisting hostile attitude of the Christians toward him, and he therefore grudgingly kept his peace. However, he had great patience and could wait for his moment, which came in 1823.

In 1821, against the advice of Bashir Jumblat,⁴ Amir Bashir became in-

¹ Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 139, 197; and Mashaqah, al Jawab, pp. 66-67.

² Ibid.; MAA, MS, No. 6469, p. 46; and Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 136-39.

³ Ibid.

⁴ See Mashaqah, al Jawab, p. 96; Haydar, Lubnan, p. 722.

volved in Ottoman politics, allying himself with 'Abdallah Pasha against the Vali of Damascus. The affair ended in the disgrace of the two, the Hakim and 'Abdallah Pasha, although they had military success. The Ottoman government removed both of them. Amir Bashir left for Egypt where he tried to establish relations with the rising star of Egypt, Muhammad 'Ali, while 'Abdallah Pasha defiantly stayed in 'Akka. Muhammad 'Ali, who was cultivating his relations with political chiefs in Syria with an eye to the future, mediated the dispute and forced the Ottoman government to restore both Amir Bashir and 'Abdallah Pasha to their respective offices.

Bashir Jumblat cleverly escaped the Amir's fate at the time of the affair. As soon as events turned to the worse, he established contact with the Pasha of Damascus, who was backed by the Ottoman government. As the Yazbakis, who had been on the side of the Vali of Damascus during the dispute, had failed to demonstrate to the Pasha their power and popular support, the Vali was glad to invest the Shihabi candidate of Bashir Jumblat, Amir 'Abbas,¹ instead of the Yazbaki candidate, Amir Silman Shihab. Actually, this step was made with the complicity of Amir Bashir, who regarded it as a makeshift arrangement until he could straighten out his relations with the Ottoman government. Amir 'Abbas proved to be a mere figurehead. Bashir Jumblat was the power behind the throne,² and the conduct of the two leaders flouted the expectations of Amir Bashir, who had expected them to honor the understanding.

When Amir Bashir returned around the end of 1822, however, he had the allied backing of 'Abdallah Pasha and Muhammad 'Ali of Egypt. His hand was stronger than ever for dealing with Bashir Jumblat. Finally, after the Amir had made it clear to him that he was in disfavor by levying endless demands and

¹Ibid., p. 723.

²Mashaqah, al Jawab, p. 91.

²Mashaqah

imposts on him, Shaykh Bashir decided he had better leave the country.¹

Impatient with the long period of exile, in 1825 Shaykh Bashir determined to have a decisive confrontation with the Hakim. He sent orders to his lieutenants to mobilize their forces. After rallying the support of Amir Silman, he won over Shaykh 'Ali al 'Imad by lucrative gifts.² He ordered his men and supporters to meet and wait for him in his stronghold of the Mukhtara, and then moved from his exile near Tripoli without the permission of its Pasha and against the latter's will.³ Jumblat also sent messages to the shaykhs of Jibbat Bsharri, al Kura, Jbayl, and KISRwan to rally behind him and Amir Silman. In these letters he tried to appeal to the recipients' feelings of discontent with Amir Bashir.⁴

However, the picture was wholly different this time. In their earlier struggle with Amir Bashir, the Maronites of the north knew very well the decisive role played by Shaykh Bashir Jumblat in quelling their revolts. Besides, a new factor had to be taken into consideration by the Maronite people of the north as well as by those of the mixed areas in the south. Amir Bashir was, after all, a Maronite, while the Shaykh was a Durzi (pl. Druze) and the main forces he had gathered in al Mukhtara were Druze with a large number of 'uqqal.⁵ The attitude of the Church was another important element. Since the Jumblati shaykh's fall into disfavor, the Amir's relations with the Church had been improving. The clergy could easily see that the Druze were set against the Amir and were standing behind one leader. Already there were rumors that the meeting at the Mukhtara had the purpose of subjugating the Christians to the Druze.⁶

¹ Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 746-47.

² Ibid., p. 757.

³ Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 8230, 8232, 8233, FAB.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 205; and Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 762-66.

⁶ Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 191

The young new patriarch, Yusuf Hbaysh (1823-1845), was on the side of the Amir and sent orders to Maronite shaykhs in Jibbat Bsharri, Jbayl, and Kisrwan to go with their men to the support of the Amir.¹ He himself kept well informed about Shaykh Bashir's movements through his correspondence with the clergy and Shaykh Butrus Karam of Ihdin. The fact that the patriarch's orders were heeded was no better demonstrated than by the attempt of a Khazin shaykh who, accused of having supported Shaykh Bashir, went to great pains to clear himself with the patriarch.²

However, partly by the efforts of the patriarch³ and the Amir, and partly by the intuitive feeling that the battle at the Mukhtara would affect their welfare as a group, the Maronites went to the support of the Amir. Some Maronites fought for the Amir against the will of their muqati'jis.⁴ The war at the Mukhtara shook southern Lebanon but left the north untouched, except for the effect of the modest support the Maronites of that region gave the Amir. Maronites from the Matn, Qati', Dayr al Qamar, and Jbayl fought for the Amir, whose army was mostly formed of Maronites,⁵ with the exception of the soldiers sent to him by 'Abdallah Pasha of Sayda.

This was not yet a war of Christian versus Druze, for a number of Druze shaykhs allied themselves with Amir Bashir, for instance some Talhuq and 'Abd al Malik shaykhs.⁶ Also, a small number of Abillama' amirs and Maronite shaykhs from Kisrwan joined forces with the Jumblati faction. The war resulted in vic-

¹Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 261, 8230, 8232, 8233.

²Ibid., MS, No. 8245.

³On the attitude of the clergy see Mashaqah, al Jawab, p. 94.

⁴See letter from Bashir II to Amir Haydar Abillama' reproduced Sfayr, Al Amir Bashir . . ., p. 152.

⁵Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 205, PAB; also Abu Shaqra, al Harakat fi Lubnan . . ., p. 13.

⁶Haydar, Lubnan, pp. 757-61; Yazbak, AL, 1956, p. 31.

tory for the Amir; Shaykh Bashir Jumblat and Shaykh 'Ali al 'Imad escaped and their forces were dispersed. Shaykh 'Ali was captured in Damascus and killed, while Shaykh Bashir Jumblat was later sent to 'Akka by the Vali of Damascus, where he was strangled by the Pasha's orders. Most of the Druze and, strangely enough, some of the Melkite Orthodox Christians were punished by the Amir for siding with Shaykh Bashir.¹

The Mukhtara affair marked a turning point in the politics of Mount Lebanon. It resulted in reorganization of political forces and alliances. The Amir's complete dependence upon Druze support shifted for the first time, and he started to rely on the Maronites. A new bridge was also built between him and the Maronite clergy; but before we get to that stage, we should summarize the changes seriously affecting the political institutions of the iqta' system which have taken place so far.

We have seen first that the clergy tried to establish a favorable political position with the government through the mudabbir, an effort which, after a good measure of success, was curbed violently. But the venture itself served as a warning of the growing strength and assertion of the Churchmen.

In the second place we have observed how, under the guidance of some of the clergy, the people organized into new units for political action at the local and national level. The assumption of leadership by a chosen wakil of the people, in matters of taxation and war and in relations with the higher authority, was a direct threat to the established system of iqta' institutions as described in this study.

Third, the group alignment started to change from iqta'i faction orientation and smiyyah to group orientation based on ethno-religious grounds.

Fourth, leadership stemmed from the common people, who articulated their interests and took steps to put their demands into effect. The common people

¹Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 205, PAB.

started to take a part with the muqati'jis in deposing and electing the Hakim. The most significant aspect of this incident was that the commoners were able to go a long way in this direction and therefore induce Shihabi candidates to turn to them for support, a prerogative which as a rule was in the manasib's hands. Not only the Shihabis considered it meaningful to seek the support of the commoners; Druze shaykhs also had to deal with them.

The attitude of the Druze manasib on this question is quite interesting. The Yazbaki manasib, who were in favor of changing Amir Bashir, were strongly torn by what was happening. The initiative for political change was obviously taken by the Maronite common people, but the pride of the Druze manasib and their strong adherence to traditions and to the prerogatives of the manasib put them in sharp opposition to such movements. As a result, two different steps were taken by the Yazbaki manasib. One group under the leadership of Shaykh 'Ali 'Imad decided to work with the 'ammiyyah. The shaykh went secretly and talked with the Maronite leaders who were holding a meeting at the monastery of Mayfuq in al Batrun,¹ and was apparently quite satisfied with his visit upon his return to Dayr al Qamar.² Another group of Yazbaki shaykhs acted differently. When the Shihabi Amirs Silman and Hasan openly espoused the cause of the 'ammiyyah, they sent a messenger, the historian Tannus al Shidiaq, to the Talhuq shaykhs calling upon them to follow the Amirs to the spot where the 'ammiyyah were assembled. The Talhuqs' answer was quite revealing: "We do not get led by the Christian commoners of that country," they replied, "it is held a shame by us."³

The importance of the step taken by the Shihabis and some of the manasib in turning to the 'ammiyyah for political support was that the people and the clergy were now able to reach the Shihabi candidates and Hakims without the in-

¹MAE, Correspondance Consulaire, Sayda, 1 May, 1821.

²Ibid.

³Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 154.

intermediate link of the muqati'jis. The direct relationship between the Hakim and the clergy and commoners grew much stronger after the 'ammiyyah. This development led the Hakim to form a new concept of his office. This new concept was clearly expressed in Amir Bashir's letter to Shaykh Bashir Jumblat in which he asked him to disperse his men, "because they are the subjects of the Hakim of the country."¹ In this letter the Amir was ignoring the fact that the men were actually the subjects of the muqati'jis, Shaykh Bashir and the other manasib on his side.

Another aspect of change which could easily be seen in the discussion of this period was the weakening of the political power of the manasib. Partly by Bashir's own design and in part by developments beyond his control, the major Druze manasib were crushed. First, the Nakads were destroyed by the manasib as a result of rivalry among the faction leaders, with Bashir's complicity. Second, the Yazbakis lost their power and effective leadership after the alliance between the mudabbir, Jirjus Baz, and Shaykh Bashir Jumblat. Although Amir Bashir went along with this Jumblati policy, he did not wish to carry it as far as it actually went. He wished but was unable to save the Yazbaki faction, and its leaders, the 'Imads, were greatly weakened by almost two decades of oppression and exile.

Finally, the Jumblats' growing power menaced the Amir, who took a decisive stand to destroy the foremost muqati'ji of the Imarah, Shaykh Bashir Jumblat. The destruction of the Jumblat power was the only overt and deliberate action taken by Amir Bashir II to destroy the muqati'jis. With the removal of the Jumblats, the last powerful muqati'ji house in Lebanon was deprived of political power and Bashir set out to build a new policy which would suit his ends.

¹Haydar, Lubnan, p. 750.

CHAPTER VIII

CLERGYMEN, PEASANTS, AND MUQATI'JIS: THE SECOND PHASE

The Mukhtara affair signaled a definite change in political conditions under the Imarah, a change which encompassed the ruling class and the political institutions. The muqati'jis in general were put under firmer control by Amir Bashir, and many of them lost their muqata'ahs because of their role at the Mukhtara. Bashir appointed commoners, mostly Christians, as his officials and members of his family to run the 'uhdahs taken from their former legitimate holders.¹

For support Bashir relied more on the backing which the Church could muster for him and his direct influence with the people.² The clergy's venture into politics thus was given an additional and great push forward. The consequences of this for the configuration of political alignments and roles were very important. All the new tendencies and changes in the system pointed out earlier took a stronger expression. Though the new alliance between Bashir and the Christians did not replace completely the older iqta' alignments, its coming into being seriously challenged the continued existence of the earlier forms of the manasib's undisputed leadership.

The basic change in the relations of Amir Bashir with the Maronites and their clergy came at just about the time Patriarch Yusuf Hbaysh (1823-1845) was elected as head of the Church. The new patriarch was well educated, the first

¹Dahdah, MQ, XXII, 574-75; also Abu Shaqrah, al Harakat fi Lubnan . . ., pp. 15-16, 26.

²See for instance Ma'luf, TZ, pp. 154, 156, 157-59.

graduate of the 'Ayn Warqa College to rise to that dignity. He was young and had not yet attained the legal requirement of 40 when he was elected; the Holy See had to give him a special dispensation to waive the age requirement. Patriarch Hbaysh belonged to a family of small shaykhs in Kisrwan which, though it did not have much power, was still one of the oldest Maronite houses of a'yan (nobility).

The Amir's collaboration with Patriarch Hbaysh stands in clear contrast to the guarded and aloof relations he maintained with Patriarch Yuhanna al Hilu, Hbaysh's predecessor. This difference becomes particularly clear from examination of the archives of the two patriarchs in Bkirki, in which the papers of al Hilu have very little connection with the Amir al Hakim whereas those of Patriarch Hbaysh are very rich in such references. An analysis of these papers gives an idea of the nature of the Church's political relations with Bashir, as well as the political roles which the clergy came to play at that time.

The New Basis of Political Support

The patriarch and his Church became prominent and powerful through a process by which the Hakim found it necessary to rely on the clergy's prestige for political support. It should be noted, however, that although the muqati'ji houses were weakened by the policies of Amir Bashir, the Church did not replace them but entered as a new force in the political arena and also reinforced the Amir's power and gave him the support which he could no longer get from the muqati'jis. Thus the clergy, as a status group, were sharing the power and prerogatives of the muqati'jis but not really taking over from them. Maronite muqati'jis were no exception and those who still maintained their place had only regional importance, unlike the patriarch whose prestige and power extended to the whole community.

The patriarch's leadership in this stage of relations with the Hakim depended upon the extent of confidence and support given him by the Amir. In

the same way, the Amir's delegation of power and support to the patriarch depended on the extent to which he needed the patriarch and the extent to which the latter was willing to support his policies. To judge from the Hbaysh papers, the Amir supported the patriarch both by giving him power to make decisions and satisfying his demands.

This relationship of mutual support can be observed in the light of the role the patriarch played vis-à-vis the muqati'jis and the people. Obviously these relations, if they were not to be revolutionary, had to be based on the Hakim's willingness to give them backing, for he was the decision-maker. Thus the Amir honored the patriarch's decisions and encouraged him to settle disputes and problems among Maronite muqati'jis and among various other classes of people.¹ For instance, in cases where Maronite muqati'jis had some differences among themselves over land, 'uhdahs, or personal quarrels, they raised these problems with the patriarch for settlement.² The patriarch's authority to settle these questions was informally delegated to him by the Amir. Such matters were also sometimes raised with him because as a man of influence he could have them settled in the Amir's court. Thus the patriarch was a man of great political influence, but not a holder of political office.

The Amir encouraged the muqati'jis to look to the patriarch as a man of influence to whom they should turn for problem-solving, and actively supported the patriarch's decisions and views.³ As an example, a dispute which arose between two Khazin shaykhs will illustrate this process. The two shaykhs took their quarrel to the Amir, but instead of taking action himself the Amir made them go and seek a settlement from the patriarch. Then the Amir sent a

¹See Rustum, UATS, III-IV, 228; Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 2281, PAB.

²Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 151, 260, 752, 2281, 3529, 6162, 7383, 7562, 8056, 8127, 8581.

³Ibid., MSS, Nos. 260, 7464, 7465, 8122.

briefing to the patriarch through Archbishop 'Abdallah al Bustani about the most desirable way of settling the problem. Archbishop Bustani wrote to the patriarch:

Your Holiness should order this restoration [of land] . . . and should enjoin on both parties to end all disputation and quarrels. His highness's purpose in making this peace is to put an end to trouble, and it is his intention to have this take place under your orders and with your efforts. . . .¹

As is clear from this account, the Amir's policy seems to have been definitely aimed at strengthening the power of the patriarch in his community. The muqati'jis and the common people, as a result, turned more and more toward him, and increasingly demands were mediated by the intercession of the patriarch. The problems brought to him related to disputes among the muqati'jis and those between the latter and the common people.² Even administrators in the Amir's service were anxious to win the patriarch's good will and favors.³

The people also used the good offices of the patriarch to solve their own problems. They usually proceeded to do this through their bishops or priests. Here, too, there were a variety of reasons for which the people resorted to the Church, including disputes with their muqati'jis, Christian and Druze, over land, taxes, and personal matters.⁴

The muqati'jis' need for the patriarch lay not only in connection with general disputes but went much farther to questions concerning their 'uhdahs. Sometimes muqati'jis found it necessary to seek the help of the patriarch in order to be reconfirmed on their 'uhdahs or to have a sequestered muqata'ah returned to them.⁵ Requests for help came not only from Christians but also

¹Ibid., MS, No. 3238.

²Ibid., MSS, Nos. 151, 752, 768, 3128, 3129, 3489, 5301, 3529, 8059, 8122.

³Ibid., MSS, Nos. 3763, 6188, 8581.

⁴Ibid., MSS, Nos. 2305, 3217, 3242, 3522, 3526, 3541, 3542, 3535, 3541, 5812, 6382, 8215.

from Muslims, particularly from the region of Tripoli and al Dinniyyah,¹ which during the Egyptian period became a dependency of the Amir's government. One letter from a Muslim notable of Tripoli puts the reasons behind the patriarch's power quite bluntly: ". . . your requests are well received by his highness [the Amir] and thus we hope that you will fulfil what we have mentioned above."² However, the Amir was not at ease about the patriarch's efforts to intercede on behalf of the Muslims and once wrote to him that he was not happy about the consequences of such intercessions.³ Also, it seems, the patriarch received requests from Druze shaykhs for mediation with the Hakim.⁴ On the whole, the patriarch assisted those who sought his support with good success, to the extent of reinstating some shaykhs over their muqata'ahs.⁵

Some of the clergy who enjoyed power as the Amir's judges were able to help the Maronites considerably. Thus on two important occasions, after the Baz affair and after the 'ammiyyah of 1820, Maronite clerical judges in northern Lebanon helped the Maronite village shaykhs to be reinstated in their former positions and to regain their property sequestered by the Amir.⁶ They also were able to uphold the Maronite people's rights against claims made by the former Matawilah lords to land then held by Maronites.⁷

The patriarch attended to all this business and solved those problems that he could independently, and the rest which had to be handled directly by the Amir he sent to Bayt al Din, the Hakim's palace. The increase in the vol-

¹ Ibid., MSS, Nos. 2493, 2958, 3746, 4608, 5893, 7320, 7324; see also Rustum, UATS, I, 59-60.

² Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 7320.

³ Ibid., MS, No. 8122.

⁴ Ibid., MSS, Nos. 7320, 7452, 7482.

⁵ Ibid., MSS, Nos. 3764, 3863 (? , number not clear), see year 1835.

⁶ Hilu papers, 13 September, 1811, also 21 August, 1823, PAB.

⁷ Ibid., see papers of 1811.

ume of daily work was managed by the clergy, particularly the two patriarchal secretaries.

These activities and involvements all pointed to the growing power of the Church and the dependence on it of the manasib as well as the common people. Naturally, to the extent that the people looked to the patriarch as their patron they also placed themselves under his leadership. The Church's attempts at political leadership which had earlier ended in failure were now becoming successful. The short-lived link between the Church and the Maronite mudabbir was successfully replaced, a little over a decade later, by an alliance between the Church and the Maronite Amir al Hakim.

The relationship between the Amir and the patriarch was built on mutual service and support. The patriarch needed the Amir for the continued progress of the Church, its activities, liberties, and welfare. The Amir readily granted this, since, as we have seen, it was an old tradition under the Ijarah to respect religious liberty and to offer the Church protection.¹ In addition to this the Amir strongly supported the patriarch's efforts to keep the Protestant missionaries out of the Mountain; as a result the missionaries were forced to remain in the coastal cities.²

The patriarch needed the Amir also for protection and favors for the Maronites. The Maronites were then becoming more assertive and had visions of increasing their political power in the Mountain. The Amir could enhance that cause immensely. Actually, the patriarch and other prelates recurrently used the good offices of the Amir in the service of the Maronites.³ The Amir's support was also sought by the patriarch against the Druze. The patriarch did not

¹ For the Amir's pecuniary rewards to the Church see Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 7344, 7382, 7387.

² Ibid., MSS, Nos. 3242, 2288, 2305, 3217, 3535, 6223, 1095.

³ Ibid., MSS, Nos. 2288, 2305, 3217, 3242, 3526, 3535.

hesitate, for instance, in 1832, to request the Amir's help on behalf of Maronites who were subjected to some oppressions by the Druze. The Amir granted the patriarch's request, letting him know that "his highness was well disposed, though in secret, toward the Christians' welfare. . . ." ¹

The Dynamics of the New Politics

In supporting the Amir, the Maronite clergy were assisting a Maronite Hakim, friendly to the Maronites, and facing a problem with his Druze subjects. This policy was in line with the interests and aspirations of the Maronite community. It was in this spirit that the Church and the Maronite people readily came to the help of Amir Bashir in his war with the Jumblati faction in 1825. The Amir's need to mobilize popular support among the Maronites became urgent after the Mukhtara affair and during the development of the conflict between Muhammad 'Ali of Egypt and the Pasha of Sayda, 'Abdallah Pasha.

As soon as news started to reach the Amir that Muhammad 'Ali was preparing for the occupation of Syria, he took his usual stance of wait-and-see, ² at the same time, however, secretly assuring Muhammad 'Ali of his support. Taking advantage of the fluid situation created by the Egyptian preparations against 'Akka, Amir Bashir postponed the payment of tribute to 'Abdallah Pasha under the pretext that he was short of money. Although 'Abdallah Pasha accepted this answer, it was clear that the Amir was no longer going to put up with the Pasha's demands for more tribute and was preparing for resistance if the latter wanted to press his request. The Maronite clergy backed the Amir on this stand, promising Maronite support, for which he was grateful. ³ Similarly, when Amir Bashir

¹Ibid., MS, No. 2490. For this alliance with the Christians against the interest of the Druze see also Ma'luf, TZ, pp. 139, 156-59; Ismail, Histoire du Liban . . ., IV, 109, n. 1.

²See, for instance, Rustum, UATS, I, 103-04.

³Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 2357, PAB.

made up his mind to stand with Muhammad 'Ali and his son Ibrahim Pasha, the Maronite clergy threw their full weight behind him, with moral backing as well as mobilization of the Maronites for war.¹ The Church's hierarchical organization with its clergymen in every community in the Mountain proved to be a great help in that effort.² The patriarch sent orders through the archbishops and bishops to have the parishioners make ready to support and serve the cause of the Amir and his allies the Egyptians.³

The Druze disaffection with the Amir and their early resistance to his allies, the Egyptians, no doubt weakened Bashir's position with Ibrahim Pasha. Thus the Maronite community's support was extremely valuable to the Amir to maintain his standing with his senior ally. The Amir's reliance on Maronite backing continued throughout the Egyptian period; and, as 1840 demonstrated, his position became vulnerable as soon as he lost Maronite support.

In order to cope with the situation, the Amir thus arranged with the Church prelates to bring the Maronites together and form a united group of them. This effort included the writing of a covenant among the Maronite people pledging unity and loyalty to the Amir.⁴ The prelates carried out the plan and tried to make it known to the whole community through the Church organization. Letters were sent to the outlying districts stressing the importance of being on their guard and maintaining unity.⁵ The Amir and his son Amin took certain steps to encourage Maronite group solidarity, thus playing into the hands of the clergy and giving them more power and satisfaction.

¹Ibid., MSS, Nos. 8628, 8073, 6685, 6680, 7262, 5217; also Rustum, UATS, I, 124-25.

²Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 3217, 3242, 7262, 6381, 6347.

³Ibid., MSS, Nos. 2399, 2490, 2492, 2504, 2515, 5781, 2448.

⁴Ibid., MS, No. 5217; also Rustum, UATS, I, 124-25; ibid., III-IV, 228.

⁵Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 5294, 22 April, 1838, 5293, 20 June, 1838.

In an effort to mobilize Maronite support behind his father, Amir Amin wrote to the patriarch in 1838 regarding his efforts to unite the Maronites and to ward off the Druze danger against them. The letter read:

The movement of the Druze in the Mountain is not unknown [to you], and that the Christians, in order to guard against the evil consequences of this movement, have become one solidary group [ta'asabu] in this country and are united in the bond of religion. They have become like one man under the command of his highness [Amir Bashir]. They came to his highness and received arms to protect themselves and [to enter] the service. . . . We beg your beatitude to summon the shaykhs and notables of Jibbat Basharri and to form a unity among them, then to choose . . . three hundred young men . . .¹ [and send them here] so that as soon as they arrive we can give them arms.

The first sentence in this letter refers to the conflict which had arisen between the Druze of Hauran in southern Syria and the Egyptian forces. The impact of the Druze revolt in Hauran upon Lebanon was marked and served to revive the hostile sentiment of the Druze of Lebanon against Bashir. A good number of the Lebanese Druze went to the support of their brothers in religion. The failure of the Egyptian soldiers to subdue the Druze of Hauran made Ibrahim Pasha request the help of Amir Bashir. Having to depend entirely on Christian forces in this campaign, the Amir's policy of cultivating relations with the Church and of building up the power of the Maronites began to pay off. The Maronites gave the Amir full backing in his campaign against the Druze and in other efforts as well.

In short, we can see that in most of his relations with the Maronite community the Amir needed the clergy in executing his policies as well as in mobilizing support.² The clergy helped amply, even in supplying fighting men and organizing them for war.³

The clergy were also able to assist the Amir by collecting political

¹Ibid., in 1838 (1254 A.H.)--number illegible.

²Ibid., MSS, Nos. 2272, 3996, 4032, 6347, 7441, 7444.

³Ibid., MS, No. 7262.

and military intelligence. By virtue of the large number of Maronite clergymen scattered throughout Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Europe, the patriarch had an excellent network providing him information from near and far.¹ For example, during the beginning of the Egyptian-Ottoman war the Amir asked the patriarch to have his clergymen in Aleppo write him about the movements of troops and their commanders. This correspondence was carried on in the unfamiliar Karshuni script and in Syriac.

In the preceding account we have been concerned with the relations between the ruling Hakim and the clergy. Now the discussion will focus on how the clergy used their influence and advantage to shape the course of events, which contributed to a considerable extent to the downfall of the iqta' system.

It should first be pointed out, though, how the patriarch put his policies into effect. Patriarch Hbaysh stayed almost all the time in his patriarchal residences at Qannubin and Bkirki. We know of only one public visit he made to the Amir in Bayt al Din, on which he was received ceremoniously by the Amir and with acclaim by the Maronite people in the area. Therefore, in the conduct of public affairs and the administration of his policies the patriarch made use of the Church organization facilities. With him at his residence he had two bishops as secretaries who not only helped him in the day-to-day business but were also his advisors; particularly influential was his secretary and later patriarch, Bulus Mas'ad. The archbishops in their dioceses and the priests in their villages were the agents of the patriarch in carrying out Church policies. For instance, Archbishop 'Abdallah al Bustani of the diocese of Sayda, whose See was near the Amir's capital, handled some of the patriarch's affairs with the Amir. The Archbishop of Beirut, Butrus Karam and later Tubiyyah 'Aun, dealt mainly with the European consuls in Beirut and with representatives of the Otto-

¹Ibid., MSS, Nos. 2242, 2257, 2416, 3278, 3583, 5298, 5299, 6392, 6663, 8356, 8357.

man government. Bishop Nqula Mrad was a patriarchal emissary in Istanbul and Europe. Other figures in the Church each performed the role within the realm of his office and connections, such as the priests Arsanius al Fakhury, Yuhanna al Islambuly, and others.¹ In 1840 the patriarch appointed as a personal representative in Istanbul with the Porte a Maronite merchant, Ilias Hawwa.²

Within the framework of understanding between the Church and the Amir, as previously stated, the extent of the latter's reliance on the Church was affected by current events and situations. During the period between the Mukhtara affair in 1825 and the Egyptian occupation in 1832, the government of Amir Bashir was not faced with any major problem. The destitution of Bashir Jumblat left the Druze community with weak leadership and depressed hopes, while the Maronites improved their relations with the Amir's government and benefited politically and economically from the weakening of the Jumblati faction. The muqata'ah of Bashir Jumblat and his land came under the direct control of the Amir, who controlled it by appointed officials chosen from among his supporters.

The Egyptian occupation of Syria required the Church, the Maronite people, the Amir, and the Druze to make major decisions. By taking sides with the manifestly superior military power, the Amir saved his country, at least temporarily, from the effects of conquest and from drastic changes in its traditional institutions. As a result, the Egyptian reorganization of government affairs in Syria had minimal effects in Mount Lebanon. Although the political institutions of the Imarah were not directly disturbed, however, the challenges of the Egyptian power affected the newly forming group alliances in the Mountain and had corresponding effects on the institutions themselves, as we shall soon see.

The Maronites, motivated by the liberal reputation of the Egyptian government and their own united front with the Amir, threw their full weight behind the

¹Ibid., MSS, Nos. 5217, 3996, 3997, 6347, 6381, 3242, 6382, 6240, 6373.

²Bulus Qar'ali, Al Bayraq, October 31, 1949.

Amir's senior ally, Ibrahim Pasha. The Maronite alliance, however, was not entirely free of problems. A certain archbishop wrote to the patriarch sounding off about the Maronites' disappointment about the Egyptian taxation policy. The prelate explained how the promise to reduce imposts which he had conveyed to the people earlier had not been realized. He described how disappointing this was for the people and how he was having a hard time explaining the situation to them.¹ Nevertheless, while the higher clergy could try to appeal for relief and better treatment for the people, they could not let specific unpleasant measures prejudice the Amir's policy of the alliance with the Egyptians. Thus they had to bear patiently the inconveniences created for them by the Egyptians.

Meanwhile, the Druze on the whole remained loyal to the Ottoman government and resisted the alliance between the Amir and the Egyptians. Seeing a possibility of permanently weakening the Druze political hold on Mount Lebanon, the Church and the Amir employed the advantages that fell to them from the hostile attitude of the Druze toward the Egyptians to build up stronger feelings of solidarity among the Maronites. The effort to build up a coherent community distinct from that of the Druze, and the breaking of the iqta' ties binding the Maronites to Druze muqati'jis, took a sharper turn during the 1830's.

An incident which took place in 1832 will illustrate this point and the way the Church acted to achieve its objective. The incident concerned a certain Maronite, Lutfallah, from the village of Falugha in the Matn region, who was a subject of Amir Haydar Abillama'. The population of the Matn region was composed mainly of Maronites and Druze, while its muqati'jis, the Abillama' amirs, were mostly Christians converted from the Druze faith. A multiple complaint was raised against Lutfallah: that he had been acting in complicity with the heads of the Druze clans; that he was friendly with a certain Druze, Yusuf al A'war,

¹Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 2515, PAB.

and was not cooperating with Hanna 'Asi, apparently an influential Maronite villager who had the backing of the clergy; and third, that he had joined hands with still another Druze in beating a Christian. All this was reported by Amir Haydar to Abbot 'Ammanu'il. The archbishop of Beirut, Butrus Karam, instructed the abbot to send for Lutfallah to the monastery of Saint Rukuz and tell him to stand with the Christians and redress the situation.

Lutfallah went to Saint Rukuz for the hearing and cleared himself with the abbot and the archbishop, who then reported the affair to the patriarch. In effect, Lutfallah claimed that he was not acting in a way prejudicial to the interest of his fellow Maronites. On the contrary, he was in line with the general policy and was following the orders of Amir Amin Shihab and his father, the Hakim. Second, he explained that the Druze with whom he was friends were those who declared themselves obedient to the Abillama' amirs, not to the rest of the Druze community in the country; third, that the misunderstanding with the mentioned Hanna 'Asi was caused by ill-founded suspicions; and finally, that with the rest of the Druze he was always alert and that he was always encouraging the Christians and acting in their interest.¹

Some generalizations about the changing political process can be drawn from this particular incident. First, the Church and even the Maronite muqati'jis were acting together to build up the solidarity of the Maronite people as a community. Second, the clergy clearly were active in trying to sever political and social relations between the Maronites and the Druze. This meant, in effect, not only the separation of the two communities but also the rejection of the iqta' tie of smiyyah between the Maronite subject and his Druze lord, or between the Druze subject and his Maronite lord. The implications of such an endeavor for the position of the Druze muqati'jis in southern Lebanon and the institutions

¹Ibid., MS, No. 2255.

of the Imarah obviously were quite serious. The Druze manasib had no doubt as to the threat to their authority coming from the Maronite clergy. In 1841 the Druze muqati'jis were convinced that the patriarch's purpose was to dislodge the muqati'jis from their position of authority and power in Lebanon.¹

The process of building up the group solidarity of the Maronites and of marking their separateness from the Druze continued throughout the 1830's. We have seen a little earlier how in 1838 the Amir's policy was to emphasize this solidarity so that he could rely more heavily on Maronite support. He needed men not only to fight but also to demonstrate to Ibrahim Pasha that he was still strong in Lebanon and thus dispel any ideas the latter might have had about interfering directly in the affairs of Lebanon. With the active help of the Church he had the Maronites behind him in his undertakings.

The political goal of the Church was to have a Maronite Imarah in which power would be concentrated in the hands of a Maronite Amir supported by Maronite people. The government of Amir Bashir and his policies after the battle at the Mukhtara represented to the Maronites the ideal they sought. To ensure the firm establishment of that regime and prevent its collapse was therefore a paramount concern of the Church. Also, the Church hoped for the weakening of the predominant Druze manasib, especially by drawing away the loyalty of their Maronite subjects.

The Maronite prelates' dream of perpetuating the situation which had obtained since 1825, namely the existence of a Maronite Imarah, was to pass through serious tests and great upheavals. Inklings that something was going amiss started to appear around 1840. The situation in Mount Lebanon at that point was becoming very complicated, beyond the ability of the Church or any single party to solve it. At the same time, the Egyptians' relations with the Amir were tense; after the major wars were fought they ceased to show the Amir

¹Ibid., MSS, Nos. 6656, 6657.

the same warmth as they had earlier.¹ There were signs that Ibrahim Pasha was contemplating far-reaching changes in the Mountain which would include the deposition of the Amir. The clergy were so upset about these matters that, on their own initiative, they asked the French consul in Beirut to use his government's good offices to prevent any such interference on the part of the Egyptians.² Another complicating factor was the fact that the Amir was forced by Ibrahim Pasha to let some of his Druze subjects be drafted into the regular Egyptian army, which further deteriorated the Amir's relations with the Druze community. Added to this, the new tax imposed by the Egyptians, the ferde, was unusually high.

The Church on its part was willing to put up with everything short of the disturbance of its major aim, a Christian Imarah. This meant going along as far as possible with Amir Bashir's policy of alliance with the Egyptians. The Maronites, it should be noted, in contrast to the Druze showed no concern over the fact that the Egyptian conquest had severed centuries-old relations with the Ottoman State. Patriarch Hbaysh told the French consul clearly that the high taxes they paid to the Egyptian government were at least compensated for, to a certain extent, by the security and order under their rule, whereas, he said, he found no purpose in the tax paid to the Ottoman government.³ Thus utilitarian considerations were replacing the established norms of Ottoman sovereignty.

So far as the people were concerned, the last year of the Egyptian occupation was marked by restlessness. The impact of the corvée, the high taxes, and the fear of conscription brought popular feeling to a head. At the begin-

¹ Ibid., MS, No. 8122.

² Ibid., MS, No. 2767.

³ Isma'il, Histoire du Liban . . ., IV, 171, n. 1.

ning of 1840 the people of Dayr al Qamar wrote to the patriarch, sounding him on this question and expressing their fears of conscription.¹ The patriarch and his prelates, however, were in no way willing to go along with premature adventures, although they were unhappy about many of the Egyptians' policies.² The Maronite muqati'jis, too, were unhappy about Amir Bashir and the Egyptian administration, but they were reluctant to take action themselves; and in an unusual show of spiritlessness, they hid behind their subjects and let them take the initiative and bear the responsibility. Not much could be expected from the Druze muqati'jis in 1840, since most of them were in exile. The Druze population, without their traditional leaders, were not in a position to show much initiative. The spirit of revolution among the Christian common people, on the other hand, was by that time well ignited, and threatened with its flames not only the Egyptians but also the muqati'jis of Mount Lebanon.

Change and Revolution

In May of 1840 the revolt against the Egyptians broke out among the Maronite people and some of the Druze³ in a fashion reminiscent of the Intiliyas 'ammiyyah, as was readily observed by Amir Haydar Abillama'.⁴ At first a number of the Druze joined in and pledged unity with the Christians against the Egyptians. The meeting and the covenant were made at Intiliyas in the same church where the covenant of the 1820 rebellion was made.

The parties, the organization, and the slogans of the rebellion, though under different circumstances, were also similar to those of 1820. With respect

¹Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 5845, PAB.

²Patriarch Bulus Mas'ad, "Tarikh Suriyyah wa Lubnan fi 'Ahd al Dawlah al Misriyyah," MS, Jafeth Library, A. U. B., p. 2. Also Fakhury, "Tarikh ma Tawaqa'a . . . ," pp. 1-2. See also Qar'ali, al Bayraq, 31 October, 1949.

³For a detailed account of this revolt, see Laurent, Relation Historique . . . , I.

⁴See Amir Haydar Abillama's report to Patriarch Hbaysh, Rustum, UATS, V, 92.

to the parties, the rebels were mainly Maronite peasants from north and south Lebanon. Some of the Maronite a'yan rallied behind them, others were reluctant to commit themselves and willing to let the responsibility fall entirely upon the peasant subjects. Only a few of the peasant leaders of the rebellion are known to us and they were almost all Maronite, like Habib 'Aql, Abu Samra, and al Shantiri, and one Shi'i, Ahmad Dagher. There was no question that the lead was taken by the peasants themselves. The truth of this statement is not altered by the fact that in certain cases the rebels chose a member of the a'yan to be their leader, because such arrangements proved to be only formal. The accounts of the revolution given by the chroniclers show beyond doubt that in the course of events the leaders were of the 'ammiyyah. In an interesting reversal of roles, the a'yan, amirs and shaykhs, as reported by the chroniclers, followed behind the peasant leaders, as these decided on the conduct of the war and in action.¹

As for the Druze they again dropped out of the picture early in the struggle and agreed to accept Bashir's promises, some of which, if true, would have been fine examples of the cynicism of that old Hakim. Bashir promised, we are told, to make the Druze masters of the Maronite heartland of Kisrwan.² At any rate, the peasants carried on with the rebellion after the Druze left off, with only some of the Christians of the mixed areas turning back in fear of the Amir and the Druze.³

The higher clergy were greatly disturbed by what the Maronite peasants

¹See for instance Shidiq, Akhbar, II, 226, 228, 229; also Mas'ad "Tarikh Suriyyah wa Lubnan . . . ," p. 6.

²Ismail, Histoire du Liban . . ., IV, 67; also Ferdinand Perrier, La Syrie sous le Gouvernement de Mehemet-Ali Jusqu'en 1840 (Paris: Arthus, Bertrand, Librairie, 1842), p. 381.

³Fakhury, "Tarikh ma Tawaqa'ah . . . ," p. 5.

had done. Partly on their own initiative and partly at the request and exhortation of the Amir, the clergy attempted to calm the people down and to mediate the differences with the Amir.¹ This was not successful, and the peasants wrote to the patriarch begging his understanding.² The revolt started in May, and in the middle of July the patriarch changed his position and came out openly in support of the rebellion, exhorting all the Maronites to rise to arms.³ The clergy then took an active part in encouraging the people.⁴

The reasons behind the patriarch's move to support the rebels are not very clear, especially since at stake was the whole dream of a Christian Imarah at last made possible by Bashir. However, one can detect some good reasons for the patriarch's decision. In the first place, his enthusiasm for the Egyptians had cooled off after the latter had demonstrated their high-handed ways in dealing with the Amir and the affairs of the country.⁵ Second, the rebels were his people. Third, the harshness with which the Amir suppressed the rebels in Kisrwan and other Maronite regions could not have failed to arouse the patriarch's antipathy. Fourth, the European Powers had just concluded the Treaty of London to oust Muhammad 'Ali from Syria in mid-July--which helps explain the patriarch's timing of his open commitment in favor of the rebellion.

Whatever the reasons behind the patriarch's position, the effect of his stand with the rebels was quite salutary. For one thing, it prevented the development of a gap between the people and the clergy with their newly acquired com-

¹Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 5845, 5783, 5784, 8071; also Rustum, UATS, V, 80-81, 85-92, 117-18.

²Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 5844.

³Isma'il, Histoire du Liban . . ., IV, 71, n. 1. See also Poujade, Le Liban . . ., pp. 119-20. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers IX (Accounts and Papers, 1841) Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of the Levant, Part II (London: T. R. Harrison, 1841), p. 192.

⁴Ibid., p. 289; also Perrier, La Syrie . . ., p. 379.

⁵Qar'ali, al Bayraq, October 31, 1949.

munity leadership. Furthermore, in terms of relations with the Ottoman government and the European Powers, the patriarch's standing improved greatly.¹ When the revolt succeeded and the European and Ottoman presence in Syria became dominant, the victorious powers recognized the patriarch as the leader of his people and settled down to deal with him.² Amir Bashir was the first to foresee this eventuality as he was leaving his palace. He ordered his treasurer to send a large sum of cash to the patriarch, declaring that he needed the patriarch then more than anyone else in the world.³ The Amir, of course, had his eye on the future, hoping for a come-back.

As for the organization of the rebellion, to a large extent it followed a pattern similar to that of 1820. Elected wakils were summoned by the leaders of the rebellion, five from each village, to form a central committee, diwan, and take charge of the rebellion.⁴ For the purposes of fighting, the Mountain was divided into four camps (kashat): one in al Shuf, the second in Jazzin, a third near Beirut, and a fourth in Jbayl.⁵ Each of these camps had its own chosen leaders.

During the second phase of the rebellion, 1841-1845, when the Maronites fought against Druze supremacy, the patriarch organized the people by dividing the country into six muqata'ahs, one wakil from each.⁶ The institution of wakils

¹The patriarch's political influence was attested to by Mr. Wood in a letter to Viscount Ponsonby, see Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers IX, Correspondence . . ., Part II, 192.

²See Rustum, UATS, V, 112-20, 188; also Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 6702.

³Mashaqah, al Jawab, p. 146.

⁴Rustum, UATS, V, 102-03. This call to revolution is also given by Baron I. de Testa, Recueil des Traités de la Porte Ottomane avec les Puissances Étrangères depuis le Premier Traité Conclu, en 1536, Entre Suleyman I et Francois Jusqu'a nos Jours, III (Paris: Amyot, Bibliothèque Diplomatique, 1868), 75. (Henceforth Testa, Recueil.)

⁵Fakhury, "Tarikh ma Tawaqa'a . . .," p. 2.

⁶Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 7487. See also the Patriarch's order to the

was a policy the Church adhered to throughout the period from 1840 to 1845, when wakils became recognized by the Ottoman government and the European Powers.¹

Similarly, the slogans used by the people reflected the same ideological bearings of the 1820 uprising. First, the rebellion had Christian overtones well expressed by its leaders in a letter to the patriarch: "We have come together in a real Christian unity free from [personal] purposes and from spite, made rather for the welfare of the common folk [jumhur] of the community."² The initial agreement of the Druze to rise with the Maronites, it will be remembered, was broken off, and they were accused by the Christians of bad faith. The ideological note stressing the Maronite separateness from and contrast with the Druze took a stronger expression after 1840.

Religious and class consciousness were clearly expressed in a letter from the people of Zahli to the French consul, Poujade, in 1843 (?). In this document the Christians explained that the Druze were forced by their muqati'jis to fight the Maronites, and had they been free they would not have taken to arms; and that no peace was possible in Lebanon so long as the Druze chiefs continued to have special privileges and immunities; nor would there be peace if they continued to rule "our brethren," the Christians in the Druze-dominated areas. Such a situation was entirely unacceptable. Then, offering their theory of the origin of the Druze muqati'jis' privileges, the people from Zahli maintained that these prerogatives had been given by Amir Bashir and could be taken away at his will. They then wrote:

Lebanon is not the property of the Druze, it is ours. The Druze are refugees whom we received among us when they escaped from Egypt after the murder of

Maronite peasants in Druze muqata'hs regarding the election of wakils and preparation for the eventuality of conflict, MS, No. 6288 (?), 28 April, 1841.

¹Poujade, Le Liban . . ., p. 35; Testa, Recueil . . ., III, 139-61, 162, 169, 173; also Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 7002, 7487.

²Rustum, UATS, V, 94.

the imposter the Hakim bi Amrihi. Thus they are by no means the proprietors of the country, but strangers here.¹

Another feature of the ideological aspect of the rebellion was the spirit of independence and the resistance to the foreign ruler. The rebels made it clear that they were not acting against the Amir himself nor against the Shihabi dynasty and its prerogatives, but against the foreign power, the Egyptians, who tyrannized over both the Amir and the people.² In a remarkably sophisticated revolutionary tract, the leaders of the rebellion dwelt on the subject of how the Egyptians had deprived them of their freedom and how they had defiled whatever the Lebanese held sacred. In recapitulating the lessons which, they said, the Egyptian experience had taught them, they summed up the whole situation in one sentence: namely, their aim was to rise against this "slavery whose end is death." They also took as their example the Maccabeans, and Greek revolutionary experiences:

The cause of justice is invincible and will succeed with God's help. . . . Let no one fear the might of this state [i.e., the Egyptian] because the end of injustice is perdition; the Greeks have risen before you and have attained absolute freedom.³

Other rebel slogans concerned taxes and plans for governmental reorganization. A long list of grievances was presented to the Amir regarding taxation, the corvée, and suggestions for the future reorganization of the people's affairs. First, the leaders of the rebellion repeated the demands made in 1820 that they should pay only the original basic tax, doing away with all the additions which had been made during the succeeding years. They demanded, second, an end to the

¹Poujade, le Liban . . ., pp. 245-46.

²Fakhury, "Tarikh ma Tawaqa'a . . .," p. 4; also Laurent, Relation Historique . . ., I, 35, 57.

³Rustum, UATS, V, 102-03; also Testa, Recueil . . ., III, 74-76. In Rustum the revolutionary experience of the French, not the Maccabeans, is mentioned, UATS, V, 102, whereas in Testa the Maccabean experience is given as the example for the rebels, Recueil . . ., p. 75. On the Greek revolt, cf. Albert Hourani, A Vision of History: Near East and Other Essays (Beirut: Khayats, 1961), p. 81.

corvée in the iron mines of al Matn, and third, that their arms not be confiscated as instructed by Ibrahim Pasha. The fourth demand, and most interesting, was for reorganization of the administration. It will be remembered that in the chapter on the mudabbir, mention was made that Bashir, after reducing the Maronite mudabbirs to simple administrators, next employed as his mudabbir the Syrian Melkite Catholic, Butrus Karamah. It is quite likely that the Amir took this step to insulate himself from the growing influence of the Maronites. As a result, Butrus Karamah became the object of Maronite hostility. In a clear demonstration of their broad view of the issues, the rebels requested that the Amir should expel Butrus Karamah from his diwan and form a new diwan with new composition.¹

The reorganization of the Hakim's administration was a major aim of the Maronites for the political future of Lebanon. The Church and the Maronite people² wanted a council (diwan) representing the various communities to help the Amir in the administration of public affairs. The Druze at first approved the scheme,³ thinking it would give them the advantage of being represented in the administration of the Amir's business whereas previously they had had no members of their community in administrative jobs. But they soon dropped the plan and attacked it violently once it was instituted.⁴ Apparently the Druze had no idea of the far-reaching consequences of the plan as it was envisaged by the patriarch, and were particularly apprehensive of a Maronite majority in the council.⁵ The Maronites wanted an administrative council who would conduct

¹Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 8206 seq.; Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 227.

²Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 8217, 8218, 5805; Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 227.

³Ibid., p. 275.

⁴Ibid., p. 249; Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 5779.

⁵Laurent, Relation Historique . . ., I, 269.

the business of government directly and whose jurisdiction would cover the muqata'ahs. This meant encroachment upon the independent prerogatives of the Druze muqati'jis.¹

The Ottoman government, however, approved the Maronites' demand, since reorganization of the country's administration was in line with the Sultan's reform. Thus the Ottoman government instructed the new Hakim, Bashir III, to convene an administrative council of 10 men to settle disputes and conflicts according to the law.² It was to be formed of three Maronites, three Druze, one Sunni Muslim, one Melkite Orthodox, one Melkite Catholic, and one of the Matawilah.³ These were to receive a fixed salary and be elected by the people. However, as it turned out, the Christian clergy chose the members of their communities on the council. The Amir was to preside over the council in person or by deputy. The Christians sent deputies to the council, but the Druze refused to do so in defiance of the Amir and in anger over the threat it posed to their prerogatives.

Thus the people, the organization, and the slogans of the first phase of the revolt showed a clear and persistent pattern. The revolt was popular in formation, Maronite in ideology, and free from iqta' ties in organization.

In its operation the anti-Egyptian phase of the rebellion went through two stages. The first lasted from mid-May to around the end of July. This ended in failure, with the people put down and dispersed by the forces of Amir Bashir and the Egyptians. Some of the leaders of the rebellion, a'yan as well as commoners, were captured and exiled. Although exile was not a punishment inflicted on the common people, the majority of those exiled were commoners;

¹Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 249; and Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 5779.

²Testa, Recueil . . ., p. 90. In Shidiaq council members are said to be 12, Akhbar, II, 249, 253.

³Testa, Recueil . . ., III, 91.

there were 12 members of the a'yan among the exiles and 45 commoners.¹ However, the uprising was resumed in the first part of September when a small contingent of Ottoman, English, and Austrian forces disembarked at the bay of Juni on the coastal strip of Kisrwan. Encouragement and supply of ammunition by the allied forces revived the spirit of revolt. The fighting again rested on the shoulders of the Maronites, while the Druze stayed away. Some of them were fighting in the army of Ibrahim Pasha, since they formed part of his troops.² The Maronites, however, distinguished themselves in the field and harrassed the Egyptian forces effectively. The gratitude of the Ottoman Empire was expressed by a promise to exempt the Maronites from taxes for three years, and the Sultan sent the patriarch a diamond-framed medal.³

In the meantime, the Ottomans with the support of their European allies, mainly Britain, invested with authority Amir Bashir Qasim Milhim, known as Bashir the Third, making him the Hakim of Mount Lebanon. Bashir II had tied his fortunes with the Egyptians down to the last moment and was sent into exile.

The rebellion in the country, however, did not end with the defeat of the Egyptians but continued to smolder until 1845. The whole country, in fact, was in revolt, the Druze manasib no less than the Maronite peasants. With the downfall of Bashir II and the defeat of the Egyptians the country was again open for the Druze manasib, who returned home and took over their former muqata'ahs.⁴ But by then, since 1825, a new kind of alliance had been formed in the political forces of the Mountain. The old established system of alliances between the Hakim and the factions of the manasib was largely replaced by the alliance of the Hakim with the Maronite Church and the Maronite people. The return of the

¹Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 236.

²Hattuni, Nabdhah (Yazbak edition), pp. 234-37; Laurent, Relation Historique . . ., I, 97, 108.

³Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 6143, 6184, 6360, 5810.

⁴Mas'ad, "Tarikh Suriyyah . . .," p. 11.

Druze muqati'jis meant that they would challenge this new situation, as well as the newly acquired powers of the Church and its people. The Maronites were clear about this, and as the priest Arsanius al Fakhury wrote, the Druze insistence on rejecting the Shihabis was motivated by their desire to continue their dominion in the Mountain (al taghalub fi al Jabal), which was no longer possible.¹ In so doing, the Druze manasib were caught between their superiors, the Shihabi dynasty, and their subjects, some of the Maronites living in their muqata'ahs. Thus they had to fight on two fronts.

At the same time the Druze manasib were soon made to feel unwelcome by the Maronites.² The people of Dayr al Qamar refused to receive their former muqati'jis, the Abu Nakad shaykhs.³ Amir Bashir III appointed a Maronite shaykh as an overseer fo Dayr al Qamar,⁴ and the Nakads had to take up new homes in the village of 'Baiy. The Maronite subjects of the Jumblat muqati'jis were quite displeased by the return of their old lords, the sons of Shaykh Bashir Jumblat. Complaints against them were sent to the patriarch. One of the villages, Jun, complained to the patriarch about the harsh treatment they were receiving from their lords, the Jumblati muqati'jis, and sought the patriarch's help in persuading the Jumblats to withdraw the Druze officer who had been appointed to keep the villagers under control, because he was obnoxious and it was too costly for them to pay for his upkeep.⁵

The direct relations which the people had earlier enjoyed with the Shihabis made it difficult for them to accept their former muqati'jis. While they

¹Fakhury, "Tarikh ma Tawaqa'a . . . ," p. 25.

²See Isma'il, Histoire du Liban . . ., IV, 125, n. 2; also Pujade, Le Liban . . ., p. 30.

³Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 255.

⁴Ibid., p. 249; and Rustum, UATS, V, 195.

⁵Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 5812; for the complaint against the Arslans by the people of 'Aramun of the Gharb, see ibid., MS, No. 8215. Others, see ibid., MS, No. 3522.

resisted the return of the muqati'jis, they became ever more attached to a Shihabi ruler who would protect them from the muqati'jis.¹

The patriarch, worried by these developments and by the blow which the Shihabi dynasty had received from the whole Egyptian episode, took matters into his own hands. Already during the Egyptian phase of the revolt, on 29 October, 1840, he had put forth a petition on behalf of the Church and the Maronite community to the Ottoman government. The petition sent to the Sublime Porte discussed the freedom of the Church, freedom of religious practice, and the regulation of taxes. But the most important point the patriarch made in that document was to stress the Maronite demand that the Shihabi government's prerogatives should be guaranteed, unchanged, in Mount Lebanon. This point was emphasized to prevent any possible schemes, whether on the part of the Ottoman government or the Druze. Thus the petition read:

That the Hakim of Mount Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon should always remain, in accordance with the ancient custom, a Maronite of the noble Shihabi family; [also] because the Maronite inhabitants of Lebanon . . . are larger [in numbers] than all the rest. That the investment of this Hakim should be made by edict from the Sublime Porte only, not from anyone else. That an Advisory Council [Diwan Sawra] should be instituted in Lebanon for the administration of the affairs of the Mountain and all its interests, as will be reckoned by us later.²

The patriarch received a promise from the Ottoman government on this point,³ which he later used skillfully to influence the European powers in favor of the Shihabis.

However, without wasting any time after the dispatch of this petition, the patriarch proceeded to build up the solidarity of the Maronite community, with its different classes, so as to be prepared for a possible later showdown

¹ Poujade, Le Liban . . ., p. 30.

² Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 5805, 6157.

³ Ibid., MSS, Nos. 6335, 6381.

with the Druze and to demonstrate public support for the Shihabi Amir.¹ On 29 March, 1841, he brought the Maronite leaders together and made them sign a covenant pledging unity.² The existing document for this pact is a lengthy one and agrees in substance with the one published in Shidiaq's account, except that Shidiaq failed to mention the major Maronite demand, namely that the Hakim should be a Maronite of the Shihabi family.³ The main points of the pact were the following: that the Hakim should always be a Maronite of the Shihabi family; that the Maronites should stand together in Christian love; that all should be obedient to the Sultan; that the public interest should be carefully guarded; that the ranks and titles of each person should remain respected as in the past; that wakils should be instituted in all the muqata'ahs to "reform the people," and pacts should be written by the people and their wakils; and finally, that all the Maronites should be united in respecting this agreement and whoever broke his oath would incur the hostility of them all, and that if other Christian sects should join them they would be welcome.⁴

This covenant was signed by all the Maronite a'yan and circulated by the patriarch's orders to the various villages north and south.⁵ The clergy also took active steps to keep the Maronites aware of what was going on, so that they would not give in to the Druze. These efforts had the effect of foiling the Druze attempts to induce their Maronite subjects to sign new pacts with them.⁶

¹See his orders to the Maronites in the mixed areas, MS, No. 6288 (?), 28 April, 1841.

²Ibid., MS, No. 6198.

³Cf. Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 6157, 6690; and Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 250-51; also Rustum, UATS, V, 208-11.

⁴Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 6157, 6690, 6198.

⁵Ibid., MS, No. 6288 (?), 28 April, 1841.

⁶Ibid., MS, No. 5779.

There are certain elements in the policy of the Church up to 1841 which should be carefully noted. The Church wanted to effect changes in the Imarah without alienating any more than necessary the Ottoman government, the Maronite manasib, and the Druze manasib. The pact carefully stressed the loyalty of the Maronites to the Sultan and adroitly asked that the appointment of the Shihabi Amir of Lebanon should be made by the Sublime Porte. The effect of this last point was to preclude the Druze manasib from their traditional role of election, and at the same time instigate a possible later clash between the Druze and the Sublime Porte. This possibility could have been anticipated then because the right of choosing a Hakim was the prerogative of the Druze manasib. The Maronite request also would protect the Hakim from the vacillations of the Ottoman Valis nearer home. Advantage to the Maronites lay in the fact that as the Shihabi Amir would be selected for life, the Ottoman government could not have strong control over him.

In the second place, the pact included a stipulation regarding the respect for ranks and governmental privileges of the Maronite manasib. Thus the Church was put on record as supporting the traditional rights of the nobility. It was necessary for the Church to maintain unity among the socially divided Maronites. The Church therefore tried to steer a middle course between the peasants and the Maronite nobility by recognizing the social ranks of the nobility and their governmental prerogatives, on the one hand, and on the other, by conceding some rights to the peasants. Therefore, another stipulation was made which satisfied the Maronite common people, who had proved their political importance over the preceding few decades. The pact provided for the institution of wakils in the muqata'ahs to reform the people. Although this statement about reforming the people was vague, in actual practice, as we can tell from the events of 1841, the wakils were to share the powers of the muqati'jis.

In effect, what the Church was doing was to maintain unity among the

opposing interests of its community by guaranteeing the muqati'jis in their offices and ranks, while conceding to the people a measure of leadership. The effect of this was to strip away some of the functions and powers of the muqati'jis without abolishing their offices.

In the same way, the patriarch aimed at initiating all these changes without unduly arousing the hostility and anger of the Druze manasib. He therefore kept some good rapport with a number of the Druze manasib, and tried to settle differences through mediation.¹ He was partially successful in mediating their differences with Bashir III when the latter tried to take away some of their estates in the Biqa' valley.² Simultaneously, he was trying to divest the manasib of some of their functions by sponsoring the Diwan al Shawra and by establishing wakils in their muqata'ahs.

If these gradual political changes at which the patriarch was aiming could not be realized peacefully and without bloodshed, the explanation was to be found in the increasing complexity of the situation and the impossibility of controlling all the pieces in the game, in the right time and the right way. Persisting divisions in the community and accidents also accounted for the difficulties, as will be seen in the following.

The most troubling complication came from Bashir III, the Hakim. Bashir III was in many ways a problem for the patriarch and the other prelates. The Church was determined to support him because he was a Maronite Shihabi Hakim and the appointee of the Ottoman government and its European allies. Yet he was an incompetent person, lacking in tact, foresight, and the art of politics. This created several complications for the Church and seriously hindered the success of its policy discussed above, for the Amir did not even impress the

¹Ibid., MSS, Nos. 6399, 7452, 7482, 7174, see letter 11 June, 1841; Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 253.

²Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 6451, 28 August, 1841; Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 253.

Maronite people themselves and the Church had to go to great trouble in trying to unite the Christians with all their prevailing differences behind him.

To add to the vexing situation, the Amir rarely listened to the patriarch's advice and warnings.¹ He took a very hostile attitude toward the Druze manasib² and exasperated almost everybody. The uneasiness which he created among his supporters as well as his enemies is illustrated in a report to the patriarch. A cleric who frequently represented the patriarch with the Amir stated that because of the changes in the Amir's character and his instability, nothing could be certain.³ Nevertheless, it should be clearly understood here that the Church supported Bashir III during his rule, even though many Christians were trying to have Bashir II or one of his sons return to Lebanon. The patriarch's instructions to his representative in Istanbul leave no doubt that the Church took the reasonable risk of supporting the ruling Amir rather than advocating the return of Bashir II.⁴ The reasons behind its stand was that any opposition to the Ottoman-supported ruling Amir, Bashir III, would threaten the Maronite Shihabi dynasty's ability to maintain its rights to the government of Lebanon and would thus play into the hands of the Druze and the Ottomans.⁵ Furthermore, an antagonistic attitude toward the Hakim would divide the Maronite community.

Bashir III, however, embroiled his relations with the Church, particularly mishandling the question of taxation.⁶ His opposition to the Church which was supporting him and the crudity of his methods was clearly illustrated by his en-

¹Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 7444.

²See Ismail, Histoire du Liban . . ., IV, 110-11.

³Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 7570 (?).

⁴Ibid., MSS, Nos. 8206, 6182, 6381, 6423, 6483, 6487.

⁵Ibid., MSS, Nos. 6427, 5776, 6488, 6381, see also year 1841, drawers 17 and 18.

⁶Ibid., MS, n.d. and n. number, see year 1841; also MSS, Nos. 6488, 5776.

counter with Archbishop Tubiyya 'Awn, the patriarch's right-hand man in dealing with the European consuls in Beirut and the representatives of the Ottoman government.¹ Angry at the patriarch's independent course and opposition to his taxation policy, the Amir summoned clerical and lay Christian leaders to his palace, including Archbishop Tubiyya 'Awn. In the meeting he "started preaching," as 'Awn put it, about the evils of listening to the clergy, drawing examples of their fate in Spain and France. These ideas, 'Awn noted, were put in his head by his advisor, Francis Misk, who was a British agent. Undaunted, Archbishop 'Awn retorted to the Amir's charges. Reporting to the patriarch, he said the Amir did not scare him, "for the people are in our hands, not in his."²

Regardless of the numerous quarrels which Bashir III picked with the patriarch and his clergy, the Church continued to support him, not for his person but for what he stood for.³ Finally, realizing his great dependence on the cooperation of the Church, the Amir had to bow down in humiliation to the patriarch, demonstrating that the people really were with their clergy and not with him. In a dramatic encounter with the patriarch's representative he succumbed to the patriarch's demands and agreed to his conditions for cooperation. He wrote and signed a statement that he would do whatever the head of the Church bid and act upon his advice as to whom he should employ in his service.⁴

The submission of Bashir III to the patriarch was one example of the precedence of the patriarch's position in the country. This was not the only

¹ Ibid., see for instance, MS, No. 6382.

² Ibid., MS, No. 6425.

³ Ibid., MS, No. 6427, see also year 1841, drawer 17; also MSS, Nos. 6423, 6182.

⁴ Ibid., MS, No. 6449.

instance of the sort; during that period most leading Shihabis turned to him in political and other matters for guidance.¹

The Amir's willingness to let himself be ruled by the patriarch unfortunately came too late and nothing could be done to stem the growing feeling against him. His ineptitude forced the Church and the Maronite people to settle their differences with the Druze by force. Infuriated by the Amir's hostility toward them and suspicious of the patriarch's policies which aimed at curbing their powers, the Druze manasib decided to take up arms against the Amir and his Maronite supporters.

In general the attitude of the Druze toward the Shihabis had changed after Bashir Shihab II, and their lack of enthusiasm, if not disaffection, toward the Shihabis could be traced back to the war at the Mukhtara and the Hakim's policies of allying with the Maronites against them. With the downfall of Fashir II and the Druze manasib return to Lebanon, the whole question of Shihabi legitimacy was put to debate. Bashir III proved to be insensitive to this delicate situation, and instead of pacifying their discontent, aroused their enmity and fears by following his predecessor's policies of keeping away from them the muqata'ahs which they had earlier held. They prepared to resist him and also petitioned the Ottoman government to remove the Shihabis from the government of the Mountain. In this petition the Druze argued that the Shihabis were Christians, and therefore they could not accept their authority, being Muslims themselves. They requested in their place a Druze or Sunni Muslim Hakim and let the Ottoman government understand that they would be willing to accept an Ottoman governor.²

The breakdown in the legitimacy of the system was also demonstrated in

¹Ibid., MSS, Nos. 5799, 6650, MS dated November, 1841; also Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 260-61.

²Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 5779, 6421, 6898; also letter from Arsanius al Fakhury to Patriarch Hbaysh, 14 July, 1841.

action when the Druze rose up in arms against Bashir III. In their assault on the Amir the Druze did not, as their former traditions had prescribed, raise the banner of revolt in the name of another Shihabi amir. This showed that they were acting against the whole dynasty and not against the particular ruling amir.

At the same time the Maronites were quite offended by the Druze attitude toward the Shihabis and declared their intention not to submit to an Ottoman or any other governor except one of the Shihabi house and of the Maronite faith.¹ Thus, when during the vital years of struggle, 1840-1845, the Druze once attempted to put up as Hakim a Shihabi who had earlier reconverted to Islam, Amir Silman, the Church adamantly refused to accept him and insisted on a Maronite Hakim.²

Generally speaking, chances of reunion between the two groups, and agreement on the part of some of the Druze to accept a Shihabi Hakim, were not completely destroyed; but the attempts made were quite weak and ineffective to create a real front for such a hard goal.³

In October, 1841 the Druze attacked the Amir al Hakim in the town of Dayr al Qamar, where he was staying in the traditional palace of the Shihabi rulers. The people of Dayr al Qamar defended their Amir and town courageously and were able to keep the Druze out for some time, though they were isolated in the midst of Druze territory. The preparations which the patriarch had made were immediately activated. He mobilized the whole Maronite community, directed them, and provided for most of their expenses from the funds of the Church and orders of monks.⁴ As a result a sizable Christian army formed at the town of B'abda, midway between north and south Lebanon.

¹ Ibid., MSS, Nos. 6335, 6381.

² Ismail, Histoire du Liban . . ., IV, 112-15.

³ Some of these attempts are discussed in Dib, L'Église Maronite . . ., II, 377-79; also Poujade, Le Liban . . ., pp. 57, 77-78.

⁴ Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 6481; also Laurent, Relation Historique . . ., I, 286, 325, 353-54.

Before discussing the actual outbreak of hostilities, it is important to make note of the stand which the Shihabis took in the conflict. They all turned to the Christian side and fought at the head of the Christian forces.¹ Leadership was given to Amir Milhim Shihab,² but as we shall soon see, his leadership was not effective. Some of the Shihabis still would have liked to keep some link with the Druze manasib; but when a certain Shihabi was known to have established contact with the Druze, he was unanimously denounced as a traitor by the Christians at B'abda and had to be rushed off to a distant place away from the wrath of the people.³

The purpose of the gathering at B'abda was to go to the rescue of the Amir and of Dayr al Qamar. But the Christian army stayed too long in B'abda without acting, regardless of the urgings of the patriarch, the Amir, and the people of Dayr al Qamar.⁴ The reason for inaction was not that the leaders of the Christians did not realize the urgency of the situation, but rather because they could not act. There was no real leadership among them. In a letter by one of the clergymen representing the patriarch the condition of the Christian army was described as hopeless, because every person there considered himself a leader; different opinions were numerous and no one seemed to take any action.⁵ How did this degree of confusion develop, especially in view of what we know of the painstaking efforts of the patriarch and his prelates to unite their community for action in the eventuality of war?

The fundamental reason was the rivalry between the old leaders, the Mar-

¹Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 7174; also Laurent, Relation Historique . . ., I, 302; Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 259-64.

²Ismail, Histoire du Liban . . ., IV, 120-22.

³Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 266.

⁴Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 6424.

⁵Ibid.

onite muqati'jis, and the new leaders, the clergymen and commoners.¹ In considering this factor it should be remembered that the political breakdown on the basis of religious alignment destroyed the old iqta' ties between the muqati'jis and the subjects. This disintegration of the iqta' tie affected Christian muqati'jis as well as Druze ones. Thus Maronite muqati'jis, feeling the blow to their privileges, were reluctant to fight.² Many of them were on the point of defecting, were it not for the patriarch who threatened them with excommunication.³ Even with that threat there were secret dealings and compacts with the Druze manasib. When such clandestine agreements became known to the common people, they accused their a'yan families of bad faith.⁴ For instance, Shidiaq, who was by no means a fanatic nor a careless writer, keeps repeating the term "traitors" in describing these Christian shaykhs.⁵

Whether the Maronite muqati'jis were traitors or not is another matter, but one thing is certain: their old established political prerogatives were jeopardized by the actions of their own community. They could see that what was happening to the Druze muqati'jis in that war was also happening to them. Like the Druze muqati'jis their power and privileges were contravened by the institution of wakils.⁶ Nor were they pleased by the alliance between the Church and the Shihabi Amir, to say nothing of the Church's plan to strengthen the Amir against the muqati'jis.⁷

¹See Ismail, Histoire du Liban . . ., IV, 137-38.

²Hbaysh papers (no number), 31 October, 1841 (?), a letter from Shaykh Kisrwan al Khazin to the Patriarch justifying and defending himself against the charge that no men of his 'uhdah went to fight. See also MS, No. 7174.

³Charon, Histoire des Patriarchats . . ., II, Fasc. 1, 89.

⁴Testa, Recueil . . ., III, 119-21.

⁵Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 258-61, 265-67.

⁶Testa, Recueil . . ., III, 159-61, 173; Ismail, Histoire du Liban . . ., pp. 235-36, 244.

⁷Ibid., pp. 257-59.

An open conflict which developed between shaykhs and a wakil in KISRWAN illustrates these issues very clearly. Angered by the wakil's encroachments on their rights, the shaykhs tried to reassert their powers in a traditional iqta'i manner, namely by quartering their men on the wakil's property. The patriarch sent instructions to some clergymen in KISRWAN to redress the situation. In his report to the patriarch, the wakil wrote:

The next day they [the local clergymen] wrote a letter to the shaykhs who are quartering with their men [on our property] [ordering them] to return to their places. But Shaykh KISRWAN [al Khazin] demanded [that we offer him] service; after many appeals he insisted on five hundred piasters.

No intercession helped in any way; he explained, and the shaykhs acted against the patriarch's orders: "They did not agree to go, and things rather worsened by their declaration: 'We do not receive orders from anyone.'" Then the crux of the matter was made clear:

. . . When his Holiness issued the orders to us to go to the Dog River and in compliance with these orders we went there, the common people chose us with the consent of the archbishops and the shaykhs to be their wakil. Then as we were carrying out our functions, we talked with them [the shaykhs], in matter of fact, regarding some arrangements [to be made]. At that point, ideas started to roll in their minds that no peasant should become illustrious or know how things are run. . . . We became sensitively aware of that and realized that [their] purpose is not what we had hoped. . . . Regarding what they say, that we interfered with them by drafting their men, that could be investigated by impartial persons.¹

Then, after referring to some of the points of conflict between him and the shaykhs concerning the assertion of his authority as a wakil over their men, the writer concluded his letter with an interesting reference to the similarity of his position and that of the Christians living under Druze muqati'jis.²

The Church policy of creating wakils who would take over a part of the functions of muqati'jis without entirely displacing them would probably have worked under less critical conditions. Had the scheme to appease the Druze muqati'jis been successful and armed conflict with them avoided, the policy of

¹Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 6233.

²Ibid.

the Church would have been conducive to the development of the political system and the peaceful breakdown of the iqta' institutions without the disastrous course which actually followed. The intensity of the conflict between the two groups, Druze and Maronite, however, was aggravated by the combination of religious as well as class differences. By failing to reach a compromise with their Druze counterparts, the Church policy lost ground with the Maronite muqati'jis, too.

The friction resulting among the Maronites from the existence side-by-side of these two offices, muqati'ji and wakil, prevented effective action in the war. Particularly because of the war, the Church had to try to submerge these class differences within its community. Thus the fact that the Church was unable to declare itself decisively, and quickly enough, for either the wakils or the muqati'jis, commoners or a'yan, left the Christian front in B'abda torn with indecision and lack of leadership.

Later, though, after the Christian manasib had shown themselves ineffective, divided, and wayward in their loyalty, the Church put its populist sentiment more forcefully, an attitude reflected in a petition presented to the Ottoman government through the French consuls. This document should be considered as the first major political program put in writing in the political history of Mount Lebanon, and because of its importance it will be included in full in the appendix. Suffice it here to say that it embodied the principles of a Christian Imarah, headed by a Shihabi Christian Amir over a rationalized system of administration consisting of a central council with the Hakim and provincial administrators, all bound by law.¹ There is, significantly, no reference to the muqati'jis, whose jurisdiction the program abolished, whether Christian or Druze.

¹Ibid., MS, No. 5817.

Breakdown and Reorganization

To return to the analysis of the consequences of the armed conflict between Druze and Maronites, the result of the Christian army's inaction was, naturally, defeat. The Amir was rescued by Ottoman officials from the Druze assault and was taken to Beirut, but not before he had been insulted by the Druze on his departure from Dayr al Qamar.¹ From Beirut he was sent aboard an Ottoman ship to Istanbul, and no one bothered to protest except himself.

Behind him Bashir III left a tangled problem made much worse by the Maronites' failure to achieve a military victory. The situation was something like this: the Druze, isolated from the Maronites, looked like quite a small minority, but a confident one. The fact that they took up arms against their Maronite subjects and neighbors served to publicize the Maronite claim that the Druze muqati'jis were oppressors and not qualified to remain rulers. This greatly hurt the Druze cause with the European powers,² whose presence in Lebanon after the Egyptian withdrawal was a major determining factor in the settlement of the Lebanese question. The Druze problem was still the more insoluble because of the adamant and insistent demand of the Druze manasib to have nothing more to do with the Shihabi dynasty. This attitude, whether the Druze realized it or not, was a serious blow to the whole iqta' system of political organization in Mount Lebanon, and therefore affected them more than it did the other groups. As they could not create a new ruling house overnight, the Druze played into the hands of the Ottoman government by asking for a Muslim governor. As they were themselves to see very soon, the newly installed Ottoman ruler was by no means inclined to tolerate the independence of the muqati'jis in the practice of their autonomous prerogatives over their muqata'ahs.

¹Shidiaq, Akhbar, II, 268-69.

²Testa, Recueil . . ., III, 197-98, 199; Ismail, Histoire du Liban . . ., IV, 228.

The Maronites' failure to reach a military victory complicated the question enormously. While the Druze victory did not solve anything, a military victory for the Maronites would have been politically more decisive, for the following reasons: the Maronites were a majority in the country; they had the ruling dynasty, the Shihabis, on their side; they were fighting on the side of the established authority, the Hakim sanctioned by the Ottoman government, and the revolutionary aspect of their struggle against the iqta' system was overshadowed by this support for the Hakim. The uprising of the Druze against the Amir was technically against the Ottoman government. If the Maronites had been able to demonstrate by forceful action that they could protect the Amir and keep him in power, the Druze muqati'jis would have been subdued and forced to compromise their power, exactly as they were under the able Amir Bashir II. The Shihabis were also to blame for failing to assert themselves at that time; had they done so, the ideal of a Christian Imarah, headed by their family, would most likely have been achieved. Their failure then meant the loss forever of their dynasty's prerogatives over the government of Mount Lebanon.

After the debacle at Dayr al Qamar the Maronites continued to struggle, hopelessly, to reinstate the Shihabis at the head of the government. This attempt absorbed most of the diplomatic efforts of the Maronite Church. In vain they invoked the arguments of legitimacy and custom with the Ottoman government. The Ottomans were not fond of the Shihabis after seeing the effectiveness with which the Lebanese Hakim could play the game of foreign policy independently of the Porte. They made it clear to the Maronite prelates negotiating with them, Archbishop Tubiyyah 'Awn and the priest Yuhanna al Islambuly, that although the Shihabis had a legitimate claim to the government of Lebanon, they had proved themselves incompetent and therefore no longer merited that dignity. The Ottoman authorities further argued that the Shihabis could not rule because the Druze had ceased to recognize their dynastic claims. The patriarchal repre-

representatives insisted that the Ottoman government had promised, through the patriarch and the European consuls, to maintain the Shihabi dynasty,¹ and that the Druze were rebels and it was the duty of the government to suppress them; but all this went unnoticed by the Ottoman Pasha.²

An Ottoman governor, 'Umar Pasha, was appointed on 14 January, 1842. With opposition from the Druze as well as from the Maronites and their Church,³ however, he could not last for even a year. Therefore, at the beginning of 1843 the Lebanon was divided into two provinces, Qa'immaqamiyyah, each having a chief executive. For the northern part of Lebanon a Maronite governor, Amir Haydar Abillama', was appointed at the suggestion of the Maronite patriarch. Southern Lebanon was given a governor from the Druze community, Amir Ahmad Arslan. This plan of dividing the country into two governments based on communal distribution of the population had the approval of the European powers, particularly Britain. But the indecision of the Ottoman government and the European powers, on the one hand, and on the other, the opposition of the Maronites and Druze, made solution impossible to the problem of those who belonged to one community but were living in territory under the government of the other.

Thus the division plan was not a satisfactory solution. The Christians continued to clamor for the restoration of the Shihabis, without success.⁴ Another grievance, as suggested above, was the status of the Maronites living under the Druze governor and their subjection to Druze rulers. Attempts were made by the Church to remove these Maronites from the jurisdiction of the Druze governor and attach them directly to the Christian governor.⁵ In a petition to the

¹Hbaysh papers, MSS, Nos. 6335, 6381; also Qar'ali, al Bayraq, October 31, 1949.

²Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 6453, 30 December, 1841; ibid., MS, No. 6381.

³Ibid., MSS, Nos. 7125, 7124; Ismail, Histoire du Liban . . ., IV, 177, 180-81.

⁴Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 6898.

⁵Ibid., MS, No. 6676.

Ottoman government the patriarch and the prelates wrote that it was easier for the Christians to die than to consent to live under Druze rule.¹ The patriarch's emissary in Europe, Bishop Nqula Mrad, sent reports to the Christian governor not to submit to the Ottoman authorities regarding the Christians of the mixed areas, since he had received favorable promises from the European powers.² However, nothing decisive was done on this question until after the resumption of hostilities between Druze and Maronite in 1843 and 1845.

After the last major armed encounter in 1845, the Maronites again failed to impose themselves on the Druze by military force. The resumed fighting did have the result of pointing out the inadequacies of the division plan. However, instead of thorough reorganization of the Lebanon, the Ottoman government modified the existing plan of division, with the approval of the European powers. This ameliorated the condition of the Maronites living under the Druze Qa'immaqamiyyah. The new plan was known as the arrangement of Shakib Afandi, the Ottoman official responsible for its promulgation.

The constitution of the new Qa'immaqamiyyah consisted of six articles and 13 sections pertaining to the government and administration of each province. Each governor was to rule with the assistance of a council of advisors and judges consisting of 12 members, two from each community in the Mountain: Maronite, Druze, Melkite Orthodox, Melkite Catholic, Sunni Muslim, and Shi'i Muslim. The last were given a councilor but not a judge in the council, for that task was allocated to the Sunni judge.

The governor was in theory appointed by the Vali of Sayda and was responsible to him. The members of the Council were to be chosen in each community by their clergy, except for the Muslim councilors who were to be appointed

¹Ibid., 7 November, 1844; MAA, MS, No. 803.

²Lebanese Monastery in Rome, Dossier Abbot Qirdahi, MS, No. 71, 20 April, 1843.

by the Vali of Sayda. The governor presided over the council, and when by reason of attending to his duties he could not attend, a deputy governor was to be appointed to preside in his place. The main functions of the council were to allocate the miri annually and to carry out the judicial functions.

Thus the muqati'jis were deprived of their former functions of controlling and administering the financial affairs of their muqata'ahs, and of their judicial functions. They also lost their political prerogatives as electors of the Hakim and the privileges they had held with respect to the making of policy with the Hakim. Furthermore, the muqati'jis' authority over those subjects who were not of their religious group was annulled, and wakils were installed for this purpose in their place. The wakils, to be elected in each village by the villagers themselves, were to be directly responsible to the governor of the district, Druze or Christian. They were responsible for the collection of the taxes from their villages and for public order. The muqati'jis held the same responsibilities as the wakils but only over the subjects of their own religious community. The Church fought very hard for the institution of these wakils, and the French consul in Beirut, Eugène Poujade, helped considerably in achieving this goal.¹

Again the new system of division was not successful, and for the same reasons that had made earlier attempts unacceptable to both sides. The Druze muqati'jis did not gain what they wanted, the continuation of their governmental prerogatives; the Maronites were not happy about the system of dividing their community,² nor were the guarantees given them effective. In practice the whole system seemed to exacerbate the feelings of hostility between the two communities, until in 1860 a fanatically religious war brought down the Qa'immaqamiyyah arrangement.

¹Poujade, Le Liban . . ., p. 114. For the Shakib Afandi constitution see text in Testa, Recueil . . ., III, 200-207.

²Mas'ad and Khazin, UT, II, 323, see Christian petition.

At the end of the conflict in 1861, the European powers, with the especially active participation of France, intervened to reorganize the system of government. The Mountain was reunited under a new system known as the Mutasarrifiyyah which lasted until World War I. Under the Mutasarrifiyyah a new constitution was given to Lebanon, and the last iqta' prerogatives were officially abolished. The administration was made hierarchical, starting from the local base of elected village officials to an Administrative Council of 12 on top, presided over by a Christian Ottoman governor appointed by the Porte with the approval of the European powers.

The goals which the Christians could not achieve through armed conflict were mostly compensated for by the achievements of the Maronite Church in the diplomatic line. The compromise reached in the establishment of the Mutasarrifiyyah could have been much worse for the Christians, considering their repeated military failures. But thanks to the Church's good offices with France and its elaborate system of connections, not everything was lost.

To summarize the main features of the developments discussed in this paper: the alliance which was established between the Amir al Hakim, on the one hand, and on the other, the Maronite Church and people, affected the class of muqati'jis unfavorably. This alliance not only tied the Shihabis to the Maronites, but also affected the whole sense of legitimacy upon which the political institutions of the Imarah rested. The Maronites were thinking of a Maronite Amir of the Shihabi house as the only legitimate ruler, while the Druze finally rebelled against the Shihabi dynasty, refusing to accord it any respect.

In the second place, the structure of the Imarah system was subjected to the introduction of plans which corresponded with the new awakening spirit of ethno-religious consciousness. The iqta' bond, smiyyah, which had held the subject to his muqati'ji and to the muqati'ji's faction, was shattered by the efforts of the Church to awaken the national religious feeling among the Maro-

nites. New institutions in conformity with ethno-religious ideology replaced the personal tie to the muqati'ji and the secular institutions which had regulated the political relations. Elected representatives of the common people, wakils, were established, challenging the authority of the muqati'jis and sharing their power. The right of the muqati'jis to choose their Amir al Hakim also gradually slipped out of their hands until at last they lost it completely by 1843.

In the muqati'jis' place the Church took up political leadership. It mobilized the people for political and military action, articulated their views and interests, settled their disputes, and defended them. In addition, the Church filled the new need for diplomatic relations with the European powers and also handled the community's relations with the Ottoman government.

The armed conflict between the two major groups, Maronite and Druze, during the years between 1840 and 1845, led to the reorganization of the whole political system on a communal basis. The new political ideas, group consciousness, and interest constituted the main forces moving and shaping events in the Mountain. The result was the downfall of an old established order of political life and the introduction of a new system and mode of thought based on communal relationships.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION: POLITICAL CHANGE

We have been inquiring into the processes of political change in Mount Lebanon over a period of roughly one century, from the middle of the eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century. The empirical exposition of the material has been arranged according to a conceptual framework which has not been explicitly stated, though implied at every step. Now we shall be concerned exclusively with abstract comparative analysis of the iqta' system and with the processes of change, in the hope of reaching some meaningful generalizations about political change.

A Comparative View of the Iqta' System

The concept of iqta', in the context of Middle Eastern history, has usually been used interchangeably with the concept of iltizam, more or less in the sense of a tax-farming system prevalent in the Ottoman Empire. In contrast, I am using the term iqta' here in a more specialized and distinct sense as a political concept in relation to the political system of Mount Lebanon. Thus iqta' is defined here as the political system in which authority is distributed among a number of hereditary aristocratic chiefs subordinate in certain political respects to a common overlord, the Hakim. This will at once preclude comparison of the political institutions of Mount Lebanon with those of most other Middle Eastern countries¹ and put them on a comparative basis with generically

¹It might be remarked here that comparisons possibly could be made with other Middle Eastern systems of certain mountain regions in the Ottoman Empire,

similar systems in other places regardless of geographic considerations.

In discussing the traditional type of authority Max Weber considered the Middle East as the area where the best illustration of the patrimonial subtype of the traditional system is to be found, namely that system where the ruler exercises control by means of personal servants, mostly slaves and soldiers.¹ Weber's observation underlines a basic feature of the Mamluk and Ottoman government and serves here to show that the iqta' system of Mount Lebanon was the exception which proved the rule. Other systems which may fruitfully be compared with the iqta' institutions of Mount Lebanon will be suggested in the course of the following analytic exposition of the system. However, the limitations of this discussion make it impractical to develop elaborate comparisons, and we shall have merely to suggest areas comparatively relevant rather than discuss them in detail.

In this analysis of the political system three variables will be considered essential: legitimacy, actors, and institutions. By legitimacy is meant the value orientation of a group or groups of people as it is expressed in their culture in normative forms. Here we are concerned with legitimate authority in a political system or the social norms which make people obey authority holders. As a traditional system, iqta' compares with Weber's traditional subtype, feudalism.² Legitimate authority which the rulers under the

like Mt. Nablus in Palestine, the hilly country of Safita in Syria, and the Kurdish mountains. However, our present knowledge of the political systems of these areas is very inadequate for such a task. For the non-feudal character of some Arab provinces, see Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society . . ., I, Part I, 147-48.

¹Max Weber, "The Three Types of Legitimate Rule," in Amitai Etzioni (ed.), Complex Organizations: A Sociological Reader (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962), pp. 8, 9.

²For a view of feudalism as a comparative political phenomenon occurring in different areas of the world see Rushton Coulborn (ed.), Feudalism in History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956). Also Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, trans. L. A. Manyon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), particularly instructive are pp. 441-47. Also Lawrence Krader, "Feudalism and the Tatar Pol-

Imarah enjoyed rested in the reverence people gave to the practices and norms handed down to them from their forebears. These practices reflected the enduring wisdom of the past and the unity of the living generations with their forefathers. Naturally, they were congenial to the people's interests and security in life and property, though it was not simply because of their utility that these practices were held in respect, but because they had been learned by the people as the right way of conduct. These practices were, in a sense, beyond the people, i.e., they were not things which could be done or not done at will.

Was there, it may be asked here, a personal element in the legitimate source of authority in the iqta' system besides these time-honored practices? Weber contended that the source of legitimate authority in all the subtypes of the traditional type had elements of both, tradition and personal obligation. It will be useful here, in considering feudalism or iqta', to take the personal factor into account with some qualifications. As was clearly pointed out by Reinhard Bendix in his criticism of Weber's views on Western feudalism, the source of legitimacy in both subtypes, feudalism and patrimonialism, tends to be impersonal and legalistic.¹ This is true, first, because custom tends to be quite similar to unwritten law, and second, because obedience was owed, in the iqta' system, for instance, not to the person of the muqati'ji as an individual or for his personal qualities but rather because he belonged to a general category of men, those of special status and lineage. Thus the holders of authority, like the muqati'jis, could not exercise authority in an arbitrary fashion but were subject to a high degree of restraint by tradition. It would

ity of the Middle Ages," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. I, No. 1 (October, 1958).

¹Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (New York: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1962), pp. 364, 382. Coulborn also stresses the personal aspect of feudal relations in a way that makes it overshadow custom; Coulborn, Feudalism . . ., pp. 4-5.

also be instructive in this respect to observe, for instance, that the iqta' bond of loyalty between the subject and his master, smiyyah, was not loyalty to the master alone but to his house or to his faction as well. Generally speaking, relationships based on recognition of authority, in feudalism and in the iqta' system, tend to be expressed formally in accordance with a code of honor, exchange of loyalty symbols, and similar acts. Another formal and legalistic aspect of iqta' order, therefore, was the institution of contract. Not only did the Hakim and the muqati'jis write occasional contracts of loyalty and mutual support, but also, on occasion, this was done between muqati'jis and their subjects.

It might be useful to point out here that in the iqta' system of Mount Lebanon the chiefs were not possessed of charismatic qualities or divinely sanctioned rights. Their relations with their subjects were immediate, business-like, day-to-day routine, rather than distant and based on emotional appeal. Superstition or magic, if any, were not at all involved in the political or social relations of the people. Even religious activities were conducted in the personal, separate sphere of action.

The actors, our second variable, are the holders of legitimate authority whose commands generally are obeyed. In the iqta' system they were a clearly delineated group holding a monopoly in the exercise of power. The mark of their distinctness from others in the iqta' system was their membership in a class of nobility (a'yan), without which no one could claim the right to be obeyed. Admission to this inner circle was closed, as a rule, subject only to infrequent opening by the Hakim, who on occasion bestowed a muqata'ah and title upon some deserving warrior or personal advisor. In order that the rights of government should continue on a permanent basis, the title of nobility once acquired became hereditary within a patrilineal kinship group. Style of life, including signs of affluence, protocol, and the like, distinguished the actors from the rest of the population.

All the actors had equal official rank, that is, they were all muqati'jis, and only the Hakim had an office above them. The actors in the iqta' system, as could be seen from the account in chapter ii, represented not more than 12 houses, each house of which had numerous members acting as muqati'jis. The muqati'jis were ranked according to a hierarchy of title, but this did not make a difference in their actual power. The muqati'jis' actual power differed from house to house and from one member to another. On the whole it was concentrated in a few houses of the shaykh rank centering their political activity around the Hakim.

Our third category in the analysis of political community is the term institution, referring to an integrated pattern of behavior considered by the members of a group, or groups, as the correct or proper way of action. Institutions therefore are practices, not social units. Political institutions are the rules governing legitimate power relationships in a social system.¹ They express the ideology with which they are consistent and define the class of men they affect.

For instance, the rule regarding punishment for a wrong committed by a subject prescribed the muqati'ji's right of punishment and limited his powers of sentencing to beating, imprisonment, or forced labor. The right of the muqati'ji to punish in non-criminal and non-religious matters was a rule respected as tradition by the subjects, the muqati'jis, and the Hakim. As for the rule regarding punishment inflicted upon the muqati'jis, this could only be applied by the Hakim. Here again, his prerogative was limited by tradition, and the sentence could only be exile or damage to or sequestration of property.

As another illustration, take the rule governing relations among the actors in the event of war. The Hakim had the right to demand military service

¹For this definition of the term see the following: Lloyd Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy: A Study of Integration and Conflict in the Political Institutions of an East African People (Cambridge: W. Heffer and Sons, n.d.), pp. 5, 9. Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963), p. 177.

from the muqati'jis, and it was their duty to offer him service. The rule was for the Hakim to act through the muqati'jis. If the Hakim had demanded military service from the subjects directly, he would have been introducing a new practice; and this not only would have affected the actors but would have involved a new concept of the Hakim and a new legitimizing myth to support his claim.

It is the hypothesis of this work that in an integrated political community these three variables--legitimacy, institutions, and actors--should always be consistently inter-related. The use of these three variables is in accord with Weber's typology, although in analyzing each type he puts the emphasis on legitimacy and the structure of control, that is, the means of administration.¹ In a typology of a political community, however, a clear distinction should be made between political institutions and the administrative structure. The former means the rules according to which legitimate power relationships are regulated, while the latter is simply the manner in which legitimate authority-holders exercise their control and implement their decisions. The distinction between these two terms will be taken up again shortly; the point here is to observe the central importance of political institutions as a category distinct from administration, in the analysis of political systems. For although administrative means have strong relations with the other components of the political system, they can also be considered to a certain extent politically neutral. It is not inconceivable for different types of political systems to use similar means of administration. Traditional monarchies, for instance, may resort to the use of bureaucratic machinery of civil servants and military organization; they may even avail themselves of electronic computers to reduce the number of human hands required for a job. In contrast to this,

¹Weber, Complex Organizations . . ., p. 4. Also The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe: the Free Press, 1947), pp. 324-66. (Henceforth Theory.)

political institutions will not be generically the same in two different types of political systems.

It remains for us here to take account of the concept of power and how it fits into this framework. It would be possible to consider the concept of power as a separate variable in this scheme, although for the sake of conciseness it is being subsumed under the concept of legitimate authority. Power, which is the capacity to have something done, may be social, economic, or political. Political power is included in the definition of authority. Social and economic power become politically relevant when they bear upon the exercise of legitimate authority.

Now I believe we are in a position to delineate the basic features of the iqta' order under the Shihabi Imarah. The iqta' system was primarily a political system, not social, economic, or administrative. It was a system in which special legitimate power relationships existed among a number of semi-autonomous actors, the muqati'jis, and their overlords, the Hakim on the one hand and the Ottoman Vali or the Sultan on the other. The emphasis here is placed on the institutions in terms of which the actors were controlled by other actors.

The definition of iqta' in political terms and its distinctness from other systems is essential for the understanding of the concept and the process of change. However, the fact is not being overlooked that a political system cannot be treated completely apart from social and economic considerations. A social or economic system which is not congenial with the political organization of society will soon lead to conflict and instability. Thus the iqta' order had its own special social and economic systems, which were consistent with it in terms of both belief-system and organization. Respect for traditions, division of society along status lines, and the importance of kinship ties, particularly among the ruling aristocracy, were salient features of the social order.

Economically, the system was based on the inviolability of private property. Ownership of land was widespread, but the major part of the land was concentrated in the hands of the ruling muqati'ji houses. As a result of the disproportionate distribution of land, in a basically agricultural economy, the production system rested on tenant-farming.

However, these two social and economic orders were not the distinctive features of the iqta' system. In many respects the social order and the mode of production in certain other Middle Eastern regions were quite similar to those of Mount Lebanon, yet the political organization in those places differed basically from Lebanese iqta'. The landlord and the multazim in some of these areas had authority and power over their peasants, but they did not have the same political relationships with their subjects or the same relationships with each other as were found in Lebanon.

Here lay the distinctive political feature of the iqta' system in Mount Lebanon: military and governmental rights were vested, by inheritance, in semi-autonomous muqati'jis who were also subject in their relations and actions to authoritative coordination by an overlord, the Hakim. The latter in turn had to coordinate the affairs of his government with the broad and general imperatives of subordination to the Ottoman Sultan. Vassalage was not based on service but on status. As Weber observed, a distinctive and unusual characteristic of European feudalism was that the sentiments of loyal obedience and pride of status, which most frequently occur apart from each other, existed together.¹ In the same manner in the iqta' system under the Ijarah, the sentiment of pride was not concentrated in the highest authority in the land but was dispersed among a large number of loyal chiefs. The virtues of the iqta' system, therefore, were attributable to the fact that a measure of independence was possible

¹See Bendix, Max Weber . . ., p. 363.

among the actors without disunity or chronic hostility, distance without misunderstanding, and freedom without chaos.

Finally, we have distinguished the iqta' order from an essentially administrative system, in spite of the levels of subordination which characterized it. The muqati'ji was subordinate to the Hakim, the Hakim to the Vali, the Vali to the Sultan. But in this scale of subordination, it should be remarked here, political relations were much more solid between muqati'jis and Hakim than between Hakim and Vali or Sultan. Before we discuss the specific reasons why this order of subordination was not an administrative order, it will help to review the distinction between politics and administration.

An administrative relationship is one in which authority is delegated by a ruler to a non-ruler. The source of authority, rather than functional differentiation, is considered here as the basis of distinction between politics and administration, because political and administrative functions may be combined in some cases. An administrator's functions may include making authoritative decisions as well as carrying them out. Thus, the writer feels, the source of authority explains the difference better. While the administrator draws his authority from the actor, the latter draws his authority directly from the legitimating principle in society,¹ whether that be tradition, the people, the law, or charisma. The administrator draws his authority only indirectly from the legitimating principle in society in that he receives it from the legitimate ruler. The power an administrative officer may enjoy which is drawn from sources other than delegation by political authority is not authority but influence. When his powers exceed the limits of his official duties, he be-

¹Smith fails to observe that what distinguishes the actors is legitimate authority, not simply power. Thus his distinction between politics and administration on the basis that the former rests on power and the latter on authority is confusing and inadequate.

comes de facto a political actor, as did the mudabbir in the Ijarah.¹

Another distinction between the administrator and the actor concerns the means of control. The administrator is supposed to use such means as are placed at his disposal by the actor, and in the light of the actor's political decisions. He has no personal claim to the means of administration under his command, unlike the political actor, who either owns or claims the means of control, depending on the kind of system.

The system of subordination in Mount Lebanon differed from administrative subordination in the fact that the actors were legitimated by traditions in their own society. This applied to both the Hakim and the muqati'jis. In the same way the Hakim did not draw his authority by means of appointment by the Sultan or from the official duties assigned to his office by the Ottoman government; the sanction of the Ottoman government confirmed his legitimate authority. This may have differed from what the Ottoman government officially considered the Hakim of Mount Lebanon to be; but to see the subtle difference here we have to remember that in traditional society, a term which characterizes both the Ottoman government and the Lebanese Ijarah, it is not the definition by law that matters but definition by tradition. Traditions are actual practices, not defined and not held self-consciously; and in the practices of Lebanese iqta', the Hakim was legitimate if he conformed with the conditions laid down in the iqta' institutions, part of which was the confirmation of his authority by the Ottoman Vali or Sultan. This amounted simply to recognition of subordination to the Sultan and payment of tribute, not actual government by the Sultan.

In the same way the muqati'jis were not the officers of the Hakim. A muqati'ji was a political holder of authority whose house might or might not

¹Comparative cases can be found in administration in Iran; see Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 127ff.

have originally received its status from the Hakim. Yet whatever his origin, once a person was a muqati'ji he enjoyed his rights and privileges by tradition, not by the Hakim's favor.

On the basis of the second criterion, namely, who claims the means of control, the iqta' system clearly did not correspond to an administrative organization. Men, wealth, property, and arms in Mount Lebanon were claimed and controlled by the Hakim and the muqati'jis, not by the Vali or Sultan. However, a distinction between the Hakim and the muqati'jis should be observed, since the Hakim did not claim the right to control these administrative means in the same way as did the muqati'jis. Actually these means were claimed and controlled directly by the muqati'jis themselves. Of course the Hakim had some retainers, huwalah, like a police force, but these were not kept on a sufficiently large scale for their use to be politically effective. As for mercenary armies, he had neither the financial means nor the muqati'jis' acquiescence for the maintenance of a standing force; he simply availed himself of mercenary troops on some occasions of war. The Hakim had neither a muqata'ah of his own nor extensive landholdings, but drew most of his income from the share he had in the country's taxes. Most of this was spent, moreover, on the cost of his household, including his assistants, servants, and huwalah.

However, the Hakim also had part of the muqati'jis' claim to the means of control. First, by definition of the iqta' institutions, the muqati'jis owed him service and it was their duty to go to his aid. Second, by the force of the same institutions the muqati'jis were morally obliged to obey the Hakim. Third, he had the right to impose punishment on the muqati'jis by ordering their exile or inflicting damage on their property. There was no resistance to the Hakim with respect to these means of control, since they were considered the Hakim's prerogatives. In imposing punishments, such as damage to property, he could rely on the huwalah as there generally would be no resistance; or should

some conflict arise, he could count on the support of some of the muqati'jis against others. Fourth, the Hakim had control over part of the judicial machinery, namely jurisdiction in criminal cases and some civil disputes like determination of property rights.

As for the Vali, he did not have sufficient means of control, as a rule, to impose his will on the actors in Mount Lebanon, nor had he a claim to their means of control. The reason for his weak situation was that as an appointee of the Ottoman government, he was subject to dismissal after a short term¹ and was not provided by the central government with the necessary funds or sufficient troops. Actually, he had to provide himself with troops recruited locally, and his control over the government's stationed troops was not firm.² Some Valis, however, overcame these handicaps by establishing themselves as de facto potentates beyond the ability, or at least the determination, of the Ottoman government to unseat them. They managed this by skill, intrigue, and ability to impose taxes on the subjects and provide for an elaborate machinery of control of their own. Under Valis of this kind the Lebanese actors enjoyed less freedom of action and independence than during the tenure of ordinary weak Valis. But the Lebanese never quite lost their independent ability to oppose the Vali. Even in extreme cases like that of the Jazzar, they were able to assert themselves by means of war.

Nevertheless, administration in the sense of household officialdom was not unknown in the Lebanese iqta' system. The Hakim and, to a minor extent, the muqati'jis had servants to conduct their public business. Only the Hakim's administration deserves some attention here. At the lowest level, the Hakim

¹During the nineteenth century the Vilayet of Damascus had 61 Valis, or an average tenure of less than two years in office for each. Similarly Aleppo had 52. See Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, Khitat al Sham, III (Damascus: Matba'at al Taraqqi, 1925), 106.

²Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society . . ., p. 218.

employed a few slaves and manual servants to attend to his stables and kitchen. Above them he had retainers, accountants, scribes, and political advisors, or mudabbirs. None of these, however, enjoyed any authority except by delegation and as a personal servant of the Amir. Their functions were not to run the country for the Hakim but rather to help him in carrying out his work. They had no authority over the muqati'jis or the subjects.

Political Change: A Conceptual Framework

In analyzing the political institutions of the iqta' system our major concern is to find out the system's ability to introduce and adapt to change. To reach some conceptual scheme for the understanding of change and development, it will help to examine some of the most noteworthy attempts that have been made at conceptualizing these processes. It would be useful to start this inquiry with Weber. Although Weber did not give us a comprehensive theory of change, and even less of development,¹ there are nevertheless major contributions in his analytical method to aid the student in forming such a theory.

The method advocated by Weber for the study of a social system is the construction of ideal types. Ideal types are abstract conceptual constructs meant as heuristic devices. Concepts which are abstracted from concrete reality are tools of the mind and acquire a fixed and stable nature by virtue of their logical relations. They are not, however, to be confused with reality, for they are purely conceptual constructs designed for the purpose of analysis because they have the advantage of being "stable in the flux of events."²

Having defined his method, Weber draws three types of authority which are really types of political systems. These three ideal types are the traditional, the charismatic, and the rational. In all three types Weber treats of

¹Bendix, Max Weber . . ., pp. 296, 326, 381, 382.

²Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), p. 101.

two main variables which seem to be the answers to the question of why and how authority holders are obeyed. These variables are legitimacy and the means for exercise of authority. In each of these three types Weber maintains that there a number of sub-types which differ according to the ways authority is exercised, not in the basis of legitimacy.

Insofar as political change is concerned, Weber does not give a consistent or comprehensive account of it, nor for that matter does he seem to be interested in the discussion of development. Instead we have some observations about changes which take place in the three types he has postulated. For instance, we have some idea about the changes which occur in the patriarchal sub-type of traditional authority, namely the changes in the means of control from household administration to one in which the ruler brings to his aid personal servants, slaves, and soldiers so that he may impose his authority over an extended domain. That is how the patriarchal sub-type changes to patrimonial. Another case of change which engages Weber's attention to a considerable degree is the routinization of charisma. He is concerned here with what happens to the charismatic leader when his charm fades. Weber maintains that soon after its origination, charismatic authority becomes transformed into the traditional or rational, or a combination of the two types.¹ But if, as he maintains, the "pure form of charismatic authority may be said to exist only in the process of originating," then it becomes particularly relevant to treat charisma as a type of authority existing in varying degrees, as Shils argues, in all other types of authority. The implication of this position, of course, is to throw doubts on the possibility of treating charismatic authority as a comprehensive type of political system, and to define it as a quality of domination found in various types.

However, insofar as change is concerned here, it would be unwise, as

¹Weber, Theory, pp. 364, 367-69, 386.

Bendix cautions, to conclude from Weber's remarks regarding the transformation of charisma a theory of historical change or change in general.¹ We have to be content with the fact that Weber did not offer a clear answer to the question of change. However, the implication in his writings is also clear that traditional systems are characteristic of the past and the under-developed, and the rational of the modern. The bearing of this argument is that the course of change is from traditional to rational; and Talcott Parsons states this explicitly in Structure and Process.² In most analyses of change and of typologies of social systems the traditional and the rational seem to occupy the two ends of the continuum.

Some observations regarding Weber's views will be mentioned in brief here, with further discussion to come later. First, as a heuristic logical device, there is no necessary reason why the number of types of political systems should be limited to three. Second, the emphasis upon legitimacy and administration tends to obscure the importance of purely political factors like institutions. Third, the polarization of the rational and the traditional into two antithetical types makes the process of change from one to the other take place by leaps, in an utterly unconnected manner. This tendency to gloss over the intermediate stages of change is particularly evident in Parsons' treatment.³

Another relevant conceptual framework of political change is the one offered by M. G. Smith in his study of the traditional system of government in Zazzau.⁴ Smith's emphasis on the construction of abstract schemes consisting of logically related variables puts his approach in the same line as that of

¹Bendix, Max Weber, pp. 325-26.

²Parsons, Structure and Process, pp. 116-17; similarly, Binder, Iran, pp. 46-47.

³Parsons, Structure and Process, pp. 110-16.

⁴M. G. Smith, Government in Zazzau (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), see particularly pp. 294-322.

Weber. He envisages two aspects of change in a political system, one occurring in form and the other in substance.¹ By the form of government here he means concepts which define the constitutive parts of a governmental system and their relationships. Substantive change, on the other hand, is change in the specific administrative and political functions of office.² The concept of formal change requires some further elaboration here because of its central place in his scheme and its relevance to the whole discussion of change.

First, let us remember that by form of government he means the abstract construct, formally defined ideas believed to constitute the essential features of government relationships. He introduces the phrase "structure of process" by which he means, apparently, that any change in the basic concept of that formal definition of the system will be logically related and will affect the whole. It should be noted here, however, that Smith's construct is not of the ideal type; it consists, rather, of a successive sequence of ideas, each logically prior to the following one. Smith's argument regarding formal change is of this simple kind: a is b, a then b, b then c, c then d; therefore: a then d and/or c or b.³ The whole argument, of course, depends on the first analytic statement, a is b, that is, office presupposes status. The point Smith is making is that any change in the original definition, a is b, will result in change in the whole logical chain. Thus for him formal change can only be successive.

It seems that the purpose of Smith's logical construct is quite different from that of Weber's ideal type, for while the latter is merely a heuristic device, Smith's logical analysis is not instrumental but bears on substance, i.e., in his view the conceptual scheme corresponds to the actual historic event.

¹Ibid., p. 304.

²Ibid., p. 309.

³Ibid., p. 301. I have put his argument in symbolic form to make it clear to the reader.

On the basis of this Smith asserts that changes in the content, or substantive change, corresponds to formal change.¹ This assertion is somewhat baffling because it either tells us nothing new about substantive change, or it has a metaphysical dimension which is left unclear in the exposition. As it stands, the argument seems metaphysical in that it asserts that there is a rational order corresponding to reality.

Smith's conceptual framework is neither very clear nor easy to understand. The utility of the concept of a successive chain of logical change in form is questionable. One does not try to understand a social complex by reducing its basic feature to a simple analytic statement. Even if that proved logically possible, the question of its usefulness in explaining actual processes of change remains to be seen.

However, Smith's argument is useful in its suggestion that we can conceptualize in logical terms about change. This means that we can draw ideal types even of change and development, although ideal types are "stable in the flux of events." Change is a process of concrete historical reality which is always moving in some direction, but its occurrence is not necessarily unique or unrepeatable. The student does not have to remain in the concrete and incomparable, which has no meaning except historical, that is, in relation to the particular events which precede and follow. In other words, the process of change is not necessarily a causally successive and unilinear one. Insofar as the process of change is an intelligible course of events, it is also pliable to be rendered into rational patterns of relationships among a complexity of variables. Thus in taking one ideal type of a political system, change will not necessarily occur successively in Smith's sense, i.e., not all change will follow necessarily after change in one and only one variable in the original definition, but may happen as a result of a change in any one of the variables

¹Ibid., pp. 304-10.

constituting the ideal type. New institutions, for instance, may be introduced into a system which will in time affect legitimacy and the actors. One has only to look at the effects of the introduction of the electoral institution into the colonial areas¹ or of the attempts of traditional autocrats to change some aspects of their government by installing parliamentary institutions, for instance, or modernizing the administration or army.

In his analysis of the Iranian political system, Binder comes to terms with the problem of development more directly than has been the case in the works discussed above. Following the Weberian method of constructing ideal types of systems, he identified three types of political systems, modifying the Weberian typology by overlooking the charismatic and reconsidering the rational. He breaks up the rational type into two distinct types, one corresponding to a working Western democracy which he calls conventional, and the other to the totalitarian regime of the communist kind which he calls the rational. Thus Binder's typology consists of traditional, conventional, and rational types, each one of which is discussed separately and distinguished systematically from the others.²

The three-type classification is then reduced to two, developed and underdeveloped systems, rendering the earlier threefold classification of lesser importance for considerations of change. Underdeveloped systems correspond roughly to the traditional type, the author maintains, while the two other types correspond to developed systems.³ Developed and underdeveloped systems are also described in terms of a number of social, economic and political criteria. Development is then viewed as a process of change from traditional to either one

¹For instance, see David E. Apter, "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda," World Politics, XIII (October, 1960), 55.

²Binder, Iran . . ., pp. 36-58.

³Ibid., pp. 37, 46.

of the other two types.¹ Change from conventional type to rational, or the reverse, does not have, it seems, developmental significance except to the extent that each type gains in the process by approximating to the criteria which define development. On the other hand, if we were to understand change in system-legitimacy to constitute a development, then a change from one type, no matter which, to the other should be considered development. In this case the two-way classification into developed and underdeveloped becomes superfluous because the two types, conventional and rational, are both developed. Binder's own concern in the book is mainly with change from one type to the other. Iran is for him the example par excellence of the confusion resulting from different claims to legitimacy and the combination of incoherent institutions of various types without real integration.

The merits of Binder's scheme are evident especially for its direct attack on the problem. There can be little dispute with the assertion that certain kinds of change take place in a direction from the traditional toward the developed types, because history provides us with instances of this sort, although there is no historic necessity in the process. For one thing, change may lead to disintegration or to traditional formalism, as in the case of routinization of charisma, and similar cases in the transformation of the Greco-Roman civilization to the formalistic Byzantine one.

However, in spite of Binder's refinement of the Weberian types, the major problem of the dichotomy in the process of political development has not yet been solved. The problem is that polarization of development between two extreme types leaves no connection to make their relations meaningful. Is the only thing we can say about the intermediate stages of change, that they are characterized by instability and therefore have no identifiable pattern? What reasons do we have to accept the dichotomy as it stands? It is not being over-

¹Ibid., pp. 37, 46, 48.

looked here that in some traditional systems, especially at the present time, there are attempts to force transition directly to the modern types. But this is not the question here.¹ The question is, rather, whether this kind of change from the traditional to the conventional or rational systems should be considered the normal or expected kind of change. As has been observed recently, in view of the lack of analytic exploration of the continuity of change,² the social sciences have not yet provided us with a clear conceptual scheme which would explain the transitional systems.³

The answer to this question, of course, could not be given by simply positing a third category to link the traditional with the modern; a more basic approach is needed. The suggestion offered here starts by questioning the advisability of adhering to the three Weberian types of authority. Among social scientists there has already been some uneasiness about the inadequacy of the Weberian classification. Edward Shils has raised critical questions regarding charismatic authority,⁴ while Leonard Binder and Vladimir Nahirny seem to feel

¹For the concept of modern society as a model for the new elites of the underdeveloped nations to emulate and the implications and dilemmas involved in this process, see Edward Shils, "Political Development in the New States: I. The Will To Be Modern," Comparative Studies in Society and History, II, No. 3 (April, 1960), 265-92; also Edward Shils, "Political Development in the New States: I. Alternative Courses of Political Development," Comparative Studies in Society and History, II, No. 4 (July, 1960), 379-411. However, the dichotomy in the process of development from traditional to legal-rational which is discussed above is not bridged here by Shils but rather emphasized in contrast to, see below, n. 2.

²Exception to this is to be seen in a most interesting discussion of the continuity in the transition from traditional to national systems by Edward Shils, "The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma: Their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries," World Politics, XI, No. 1 (October, 1958), 2, 4, 5.

³Fred W. Riggs, "The Theory of Developing Politics," World Politics, XVI, No. 1 (October, 1963), 161.

⁴Shils, World Politics, XI (October, 1958), 3, n. 1. Shils aptly criticizes Weber for his "failure to acknowledge in a systematic and explicit manner that traditional and rational-legal authority both contain charismatic elements." However, Shils leaves the reader unclear as to whether he considers charismatic

unsatisfied with Weber's classification of both the democratic and totalitarian types of authority under one rubric, namely the rational. Binder emphasizes the distinction between the two by pointing out the differences in their source of legitimate authority and in other aspects.¹ Nahirny, on the other hand, focuses his attention on the distinction between the types of ideological group and the groups on which Weber bases his distinctions, namely the personal and functional groups.²

There are basic reasons why the political scientist does not have to adhere to the three types of authority constructed by Weber. One finds in Weber's method of analysis no necessary reason for drawing three and only three types of authority. An ideal type is a heuristic device designed as a method and not reached deductively, and there is no logical necessity why one, two, five, or ten such devices should not be distinguished. So long as it is feasible to construct new types and they prove analytically useful and empirically credible, there seems to be no reason to be inhibited. In the second place, there is no pragmatic reason for limiting the number of types of authority. The concept of ideal types does not become more useful or more scientific if we draw the most general constructs possible. Utility here is measured by the high probability

authority a separate type or whether he is suggesting reconsideration of the whole scheme. For instance he writes, "The major difference among the three types consists in variations in the intensity of the attribution of charismatic properties to the incumbents of authoritative roles." The question which gives rise to this speculation is this: does charismatic authority differ from the traditional and rational-legal types only in degree, or in kind, too, as Weber clearly maintains, and what are the implications of such a position?

Other writers have suggested discarding Weber's method of ideal types; see Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962), p. 34.

¹Binder, Iran . . ., pp. 36-46.

²Vladimir Nahirny, "Some Observations on Ideological Groups," American Journal of Sociology, LXVII (July, 1961-May, 1962), 397.

that the type will make the understanding of actual systems more possible. As was suggested earlier, the existing typology leaves us in a quandry so far as a number of social systems are concerned. In the third place, there seems to be no empirical impediment to reconsidering the typology. It would be surprising to think that in the immense richness of experience there is one type of social order characterizing all the early, primitive and less differentiated systems in the world, namely the traditional. It is more likely that this limitation reflects on our own state of knowledge and our tendency to consider that which is remote and different as generically undifferentiated. Weber himself, aware of the distinctions which could be made beyond the three types, introduced subtypes to supplement his scheme.

The foregoing serves to stress the principle that new ideal types are possible and useful to construct. Once this assertion has been made, we can next move to see how it could be useful in helping us better understand the problem of political change in the iqta' system.

For this purpose a new type will be introduced which I shall call communal.¹ The term is used here in its most general sense with the emphasis on community as a collectivity of people, or national group. When one or a combination of more than one of the following factors--language, territory, religion, common culture and history, or race--become the object of emotional attachment shared by a group as a basis of its solidarity, that group may be considered a national group. It is necessary that this emotional attachment be a conscious one, if we are to distinguish it from the natural condition of being of one tribe, ethnic group or a race.

¹The use of this term is not to be confused with the way it is used by William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), p. 40. Kornhauser refers by the term to a feudal social organization. It seems to me that Edward Shils considers nationalism as a distinct type of legitimate authority in his article, "Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma," World Politics, XI (October, 1958), 2-3, although his emphasis is on the concentration of charisma in the nation.

The source of legitimate authority in the communal type is the national group, or to use a more common term, the nation. The emphasis here is on the community of men, the people, not an abstract principle or impersonal custom. What legitimates the leaders is their response to the national symbols and the values which are embodied in the nation. The idea of the nation has an emotional content and there is no clear or definite manner in terms of which it could be determined who qualifies on the basis of the national sentiment to be a leader, but those who are sufficiently inspired by it to impress their compatriots with their unique embodiment of the spirit of the nation are legitimized in the eyes of those compatriots. The claim to legitimate authority rests on the partaking in the primordial tie binding the group and the active sharing in the group sentiment and values. In the communal type individuals are compatriots, not necessarily citizens.

The concept of the people here is not of a legal nature as in the conventional type, but an ethno-cultural one. This is the basic difference between the communal and the conventional type. In the conventional type, the concept of the people is not vague or too general, but very definite, standing for the entire body of citizens who are related to one another and to their leaders by civic ties. The people in the conventional system are the ultimate source of legitimate authority only in the sense that the relations of the individuals as citizens are expressed in an enduring and fixed way, taking the form of law. Acts are legal simply if they conform with the law. The will of the people, which is a vague slogan in nationalist thinking, is clear in the conventional type and stands for the concept that the citizens express their wishes according to law and procedure. It is on such a basis that the claim to legitimate authority in the conventional type rests, namely the belief in the "legality of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority

under such rules to issue command."¹ Here political institutions are embodied in an enduring arrangement through the political constitution of the state. Holders of authority are chosen by the citizens in accordance with the legal rules; and political action is oriented toward practical problems like settling disputes and aggregating interests.

The communal type is characterized by a certain degree of indifference on the part of its members toward political institutions and the form they should take. Government by a monarch or by the leader are both compatible with the communal legitimate authority. How the monarch or the leader carries out the business of government or regulates the political relationships is immaterial so long as his performance measures up to the national image of what a national ruler should be. Any institution which fails to satisfy the national sentiment loses credence and legitimacy among the people.

The communal type differs from both traditional and conventional ones by the lack of conformity to rules regulating legitimate power relationships among the actors. Law functions less as a factor limiting and restraining the exercise of authority among the actors than as a means to control the subjects. The political relationships are usually regulated in an informal way by the actors themselves in a pattern more or less corresponding to the actual distribution of power among them. In the second place, political disputes or differences, whether among the actors or between the actors and the people, are not settled in accordance with law and procedure but in an informal and personal manner. The law in this case is made to serve the wishes of the most influential actors. Whatever law they contrive to promulgate is more or less a facade for the purpose of winning recognition and legitimation from the international community, rather than a basis for regulating their relations with the subjects. In short, neither the rule of law nor that of tradition is the principle of government in the communal type.

¹Weber, Theory, p. 328.

The structure of control in the communal system is often a form of bureaucratic organization. As an effective means of control, bureaucracy is not limited to any one type of authority but can be made use of by different types of orders that have reached a certain level of advancement. However, it varies in its degree of rationalization, methods of recruitment, quality of expertise, and in its relations to the political authority holders.

Political action in the communal system is not necessarily oriented toward the practical solution of problems, but rather toward the satisfaction of national sentiment. It is on this point that the communal type differs most basically from the rational in the sense in which the term is used by Binder. In the communal type, goal achievement is not the predominant concern. On the contrary, irrational concern regarding the satisfaction of such nationalist sentiments as pride, unity and glory of the nation, superiority, and the like, is pronounced, to the extent that policy considerations stemming from them stand in the way of practical considerations. There is a dominant tendency also toward preoccupation with national identity and internal solidarity of the group. Only to a lesser extent is there concern for the practical settlement of interest differences; generally, all interests and individual purposes are subsumed under those of the nation. This is clearly expressed in the nationalist slogan: the interest of the nation is above all interests.

The irrationality of political activity in the communal type is also expressed in other ways. For instance, the attitude of nationalists toward the enterprise of the business man is one of scorn although his endeavor and achievement are perfectly rational. In contrast to this attitude is their attachment to the instrumentality of the state enterprise, which gains recognition and value because it is tied down or made subservient to the higher ideals of the nation and therefore is not simply economic. Thus as a result the economic policy in the communal type is not really socialism but "étatisme," for

nationalists often tend to leave out the non-national baggage of socialist theory and are less tolerant of labor organization and its share in the control of economic enterprise. Thus, as Shils describes this irrational factor,

What are called "economic motives" are distrusted because it is believed that no intrinsic value resides in the economic sphere--in the way in which the religious and the political spheres possess the intrinsic value connected with sacred things.¹

Again, in the source of legitimacy the rational type differs from the communal in that the claim to legitimate authority in the former is made in the name of "truth." Truth in this case is a model of what constitutes the ultimate reality which guides, limits, and directs the conduct of men and the course of history. Legitimate political action should be oriented toward the creation of a state of affairs closer to the model. For an ideological group, reality is counterposed and stands above as a model to be realized; the national group, on the other hand, has no such dichotomy and the sense of community of the group itself is the reality. Abstract nationalist ideologies are conceptualizations of actual ethnic group feeling as the nationalist intellectual experiences it.

To sum up: ideal types of political systems may be redrawn for greater clarity and utility. Five such types may be mentioned here, namely, traditional, charismatic, communal, conventional, and rational. This does not, however, mean that a comprehensive typology has been proposed. We are simply reconsidering the approach discussed in the preceding pages to put in perspective our suggestion that the communal type is a distinct type and its identification as such is useful in the explanation of political change. Also it should be remembered that, as Weber maintained, ideal types are not to be confused with actual systems but are only limiting factors, not reproductions of reality. In actual situations there are in each type elements of the other types. However, the point of this classification is that each one of these types differs from the

¹Shils, *World Politics*, XI (October, 1958), 2.

others in respect to the three variables in each: source of legitimacy, kind of political institutions, and the character of the actors.

Change in the Iqta' System

We may now return to the iqta' system and try to find out what were the sources of change, how this change affected the system, and in what direction the transition took place. Broadly speaking, change in a political system may come from two sources: one may be produced by the environment, immediate and distant, and the other may generate inside the system. However, the term "environmental" sources of change will be limited in its use here to those which come from the society in which the political system is located. Environmental sources thus may be found in technological innovation, distribution of wealth, internal trade, migration of population, means of communication, education; or social organization like the church, labor, the clan, the family, or the unit of production. Distant sources of change include colonialism, war, international trade and communication, and the like. All these factors are potential sources of change which may or may not affect the political system. How and why these social factors become politically significant is the vital point for the political scientist. When change comes from within the system it may be the result of the actors' initiative or of latent tendencies toward change in the system itself.

On the basis of the empirical account of what happened in Mount Lebanon between the middle of the eighteenth and the middle of the nineteenth century, we can point out more directly and concisely what the stimulus to change was and how it affected the iqta' system. First, we shall focus on the changes which took place within the system independently from environmental factors.¹

¹For similar cases of political change independent from social environment, see Smith, Government in Zazzau, pp. 295-96.

Some of these changes were latent in the system, that is, they came about as a result of the inherent tendency to change in certain political practices.

The best example of this kind of change occurred with the rule of political succession. The fusion of authority with kinship subjected the former to kinship practices, resulting in confusion of inheritance with transmission of authority. Because there was no rule of primogeniture in accession to authority, the sons of a muqati'ji inherited their father's muqata'ah either equally or with different preferential treatment according to the wish of the father. The continuing process of subdividing muqata'ahs in both property and authority affected the actors and the subjects in many ways. First, as a result of this fragmentation a muqati'ji was often found in the position of ruling over one or a mere handful of subjects, with very small land holdings as his property. The diminution in material wealth and in following weakened many of the muqati'jis and affected the balance of power in favor of the Hakim and a few muqati'jis such as the Jumblats, who had great wealth and managed to retard the process of fragmentation in their landholdings.

Second, the competition for authority among members of the same house militated against the acceptance of a single strong leader as the head of the particular house, and increased the tension of rivalry among them. Third, the fragmentation of authority weakened the muqati'jis' control over the subjects and complicated their relations. The people suffered from and actively resented the fact that a subject might have to be under the jurisdiction of two or more muqati'jis and would find his obligations to them increasing. This condition was the result of the fact that brothers and cousins sometimes held a muqata'ah jointly where it was too small to divide further. It was not always clear to the subject which of them should exercise authority over him, and he resented the claims of several muqati'jis on his loyalty and services.

In the case of the Shihabi Hakim a similar problem developed. The only

requirement for succession to the throne was for the claimant to be descended from Haydar Musa Shihab. In practice there was a tendency to favor the older son, but this tradition faded as competition and rivalry among brothers and cousins increased. Consequently, there was more possibility for choice in selecting a Hakim, and Hakims were changed more frequently. The practice of choosing a Hakim from among the numerous legitimate candidates also led to the reconstitution of new political factions, after the old factions had been destroyed early in the Shihabi rule.

However, none of these changes in the political institutions affected the actors' claim to legitimacy. Only their political fortunes, and indirectly their future relations, were thereby affected. There was, in other words, no change in the type of system, i.e., no change in the definition of actors, nor any claim to rival legitimacy. Thus the system remained within its limits. The reason was simply because within the limits of traditional legitimate rule, there could be a number of compatible institutions whose coexistence did not necessarily cause a change in the legitimate basis of the system. Only if the changes in the institutions were based on a principle which contradicted the legitimacy of the system would that change affect the actors and legitimate authority.

Another kind of change within the system was initiated by the administrative staff of the Hakim, namely the mudabbir. The mudabbir was an innovator for several reasons. In his background he was different from the actors themselves; he arose from the common people, and his advancement was on the basis of his skill, the attribute of his education and knowledge of how to handle public business for the Hakim. Second, he belonged to a distinct ethno-religious group which, though an intrinsic part of the system, was nevertheless showing signs of nationalist sentiment and desire for change. Finally, he was a servant exercising authority by virtue of delegation; yet he so used that

position, with all its potential for amassing power, that he eventually took a role as one of the legitimate actors in the system. The fact that the mudabbir sought political support from inside as well as from outside the system obscures the line of distinction between environmental change and change from within. However, for the time being we shall continue to call it internal change.

The impact of the mudabbir's actions on the institutions and the actors had various results. His tampering with the muqati'jis' rights and prerogatives and the immense power he acquired aroused the fierce hostility and resistance of the muqati'jis; by nearly unanimous agreement the Druze muqati'jis destroyed the powerful mudabbir and cut down the office to its earlier size. But this did not happen until his impact on the iqta' institutions had become too hard to erase. The older pattern of equal distribution of power among the actors was upset by the policies and alliances initiated by the mudabbirs over the years. At the same time the destruction of the strong mudabbir created an imbalance in power, on the one hand among the muqati'jis and on the other between the muqati'jis and the Hakim. First, one muqati'ji house, the Jumblat, as a result of the imbalance, grabbed the powers which the mudabbir had earlier gained at the expense of the Hakim and other muqati'jis. Second, the limitations which the new situation placed on the Hakim's ability to balance the muqati'jis' powers against each other led to a loss in his power and induced him to look for new resources outside the circle of actors.

Now we can see how one development led to the next. The change introduced by the mudabbir in some of the institutions led to a change in the relations of the actors among themselves. Second, the changes in the power structure led to the need for new power resources which could no longer be generated by means of older practices and the established actors. In his attempt to seek support from external sources the Hakim contributed toward the weakening of the principles upon which authority was held by the actors, and encouraged the ad-

mission of new elements. The Hakim sought support among the Maronite people and clergy, and this in turn led to a struggle which ultimately required the change not only of the actors but also of the new legitimate basis of authority. The connections between the mudabbir and the Church, which were severed by the abrupt curtailment of the powers of the office, were soon to be taken over by the Hakim himself.

As a force existing in society but not enjoying the right to participate in political life, the Church organization is considered here as an environmental agent. By the attempts of the Church and the people to enter politics and the readiness of the Hakim to use their services and powers, environmental factors of change combined with those of the actors to create a new political situation. The Hakim's bid for new relations with outside sources in the environment took the following form. First, he asserted himself over the actors, the major muqati'ji houses, and weakened their powers. At the same time he cast a new definition and image of his office. Now the Hakim was not viewed as he earlier had been, namely as the head of lesser chiefs who were masters of their subjects, but as a ruler directly related to the subjects. Consequently he increased his direct jurisdiction over the subjects and cultivated his connections with the Church and common people, who were in the majority Maronites. Here we have to turn to the discussion of the new environmental sources of change and the reasons why the Hakim turned to the Maronite Church and people.

In the Lebanese iqta' system by far the most important changes came from the environment, particularly from the Maronite people and their Church. Not all environmental forces, however, have the same involvement in the political system or the same impact on it. What relations did the Church have with the political system? Were there interlocking spheres of concern between the two? First of all, we have to remember that the clergy had authority over the

people in at least the sphere of religious and personal matters. As keepers of religious mysteries and possessors of the right to conduct the sacraments they acquired a general influence over the people. Thus, in a sense, they were always in a competition with the secular authorities.

In the second place, the Church in Lebanon was a national organization, the most ancient of all distinctly Lebanese social and political organizations. In its history as well as by its functions, it preserved and spread the Maronite national myth. Thus as an organization harboring novel ideas and principles which contradicted the principles of the iqta' order, the Church's existence under the system was a potential source of danger to it.

Third, the Church, as an extensive organization in control of a large estate in land and cash, had a stake in public order. It needed to rely on the secular authorities for the continuance of its functioning. Therefore, not only did it lend them support, but it was also interested in establishing special influence relationships to guarantee the satisfaction of its demands.

Fourth, as the spiritual guardian of the Maronite people the Church had a keen interest in the fate and welfare of the people and in their relations with their rulers. In short, the areas of potential conflict were those in which the Church's relations with and interest in the people overlapped with the relations which the secular authorities maintained with the same people. The points of danger were where the clergy and the actors, especially those who were not Maronite, had or could put opposing claims upon the same subjects.

One of the tasks undertaken in this study has been to show how the Church itself changed from one condition to another, achieving a position in which it could affect the course of Lebanese history. The Church had to free itself from the control of the muqati'jis by reforming its internal organization and establishing its own independent resources. After reform it became the most active and extensive organization in the whole country.

The Church acted as an agent of change in two ways, one indirect and the other direct. The Church affected the political system indirectly by changing its social environment. Its activities among the common people, who were also the subjects of the actors, had considerable effect. As the bearers and disseminators of Maronite ideology, the clergy stimulated national consciousness among the Maronites. The Church preserved the history, traditions, stories of glory and of distress in the national history of the people, and sentiments regarding national independence and ethnic and religious unity. By virtue of its organizational facilities which put the clergy in direct contact with the people in almost every corner of the Mountain, and by being the body which initiated, controlled, and was responsible for the education system, the Church rekindled the national ethos of the Maronite people. The reform of the Church organization, it may be remarked in passing here, was the major reason for its elevation to a position in which it could wield such an influence.

The revival of national sentiment among the Maronites undermined the political institutions of the iqta' system, which were based on traditions of secular loyalty to the muqati'jis. The clergy's leadership here affected the iqta' institutions on both national and class levels. First, the new ethno-religious orientation of the Maronites separated them in sentiment from their Druze muqati'jis and Druze fellows; and in the same manner the feelings were reciprocated between Druze subjects and their Maronite muqati'jis. This had the effect of drawing the two communities apart and undermining authority relationships. In the second place, the Maronite clergy themselves not only were of peasant background but also were aware of the peasant background of the majority of the Maronite people. Both clergy and the common folk were showing signs of restlessness with the muqati'jis' domination over and exactions from them. The result was that clergy and peasants were taking a stand against the a'yan class of muqati'jis, affecting Druze as well as Maronite aristocracy. In

this endeavor, the clergy spurred on the political initiative on the part of the commoners and offered them leadership and guidance.

The climax in the political activities of the Church came when it rejected the whole iqta' system, the actors' legitimate claim to authority as well as the iqta' institutions. A bid was made for the reorganization of the political system of Mount Lebanon under a Maronite Imarah and Maronite domination. Agitation on the part of the Maronite peasants and their clergy in the first two decades of the nineteenth century attracted the attention of the actors, some of whom were infuriated by it and tried to suppress such insolent pride among the lowly and others of whom took steps to make political capital by uniting with them. It was the readiness of the latter to enter into political relations with the peasants that was most significant in the change in political institutions of the iqta'. Candidates for the office of Hakim, and opposing muqati'jis who rallied behind these candidates, turned to the commoners for political support in their bid for the government. Such actions were in direct violation of the old institutions which limited political dealings to the a'yan and preserved for the peasants the ascribed lot of following their masters. Also, both election by muqati'jis and the obligation of the Shihabis not to deal with the people except through their muqati'jis were violated.

The period of opposition among the Maronites, during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, was the initial stage in which the subjects were drawn into politics. This period also served as the signal to the Hakim that he could seek political support from outside the circle of the actors. By far the greatest boost for Maronite aspirations occurred when the Hakim reacted to the signal and started to ally himself with the new forces among the Maronites.

Here begins the direct impact of the Church on the political system.

The initial stage of political ties with the Hakim came in the first decade of

the nineteenth century when the Church inconspicuously entered into alliance with the Maronite mudabbir, Jirjus Baz, and his figure-head lords. The second stage, much more serious, came with the end of the long period of hostility between the Maronite Church and Bashir II, and the beginning of a new period of cooperation between them. The political leverage for the Maronites and their clergy which resulted from this cooperation did not, however, include creation by the Hakim of new political offices for the clergy or the common people. This alliance augmented the political influence of the clergy and cultivated the people's relations with the Hakim. His need for a strong ally in the Maronite community led him to support the clergy's endeavor in building up Maronite national solidarity.

How did these changes affect the political system in its basic components --legitimate authority, institutions, and actors? Here we have a full view of the challenge to the system presented by the Maronite Church. The project of a Maronite Imarah was a national Maronite demand based on new principles which contradicted those of the iqta' system. The secular idea of tradition, handed down from earlier generations and learned and venerated by the people, was challenged by a new idea based on the ties of ethno-religious group. This new concept openly denied the legitimacy of the non-Maronite muqati'jis, and undermined the Maronite muqati'jis' rights too. As for the Shihabi Hakim, the Church also made a new claim regarding him; it was no longer sufficient for the Hakim to be a Shihabi of the line of Amir Haydar, but he also had to be a Maronite. This meant the exclusion of the Shihabis who had not been converted or for some reason had returned to the Islamic faith. Not only was his basis of legitimacy modified, but the very concept of the Hakim was redefined. Henceforth he was not to be considered the head of a number of chiefs, but the head of a national community which wanted to dominate the Mountain. In other words, he became both a Maronite national head and a ruler of the people.

With the change in the basis of legitimacy, the institutions and the actors were similarly affected; and the Church and the people made a bid to change them as well. The muqati'jis were denied the enjoyment of their old functions and prerogatives, and people's deputies, wakils, were raised to take their place. An administrative council was urged, and later installed, the functions of which were to administer justice and regulate the affairs of the people according to law. The rules which determined the identity of the actors in society were changed in favor of admitting to political office a new class of people. The qualifications of status and kinship became secondary, and wakils, who were commoners, were instituted. The office of councilor in the administrative council, too, could be filled by common people on the basis of national representation.

Finally, these national demands had the effect of dividing the country on a new basis into two groups aligned on principles of group nationalism. Maronites and Druze broke away from the old iqta' ties which had applied equally to them, and became separate groups.

Before we move to a new stage of generalization, it should be observed that the emphasis here placed on the environmental and internal processes of change in the system tends to obscure the importance of international contacts and politics as factors of change in Mount Lebanon during that period. The impact of Rome on the reform of the Church and on the system of education is a good case in point. Even in brief we should also mention the importance of the Egyptian occupation of Syria, and Egyptian-Shihabi relations in enforcing the trends of change in Lebanon. In addition, the European powers' interests in the eastern Mediterranean should be noted, and their various degrees of commitment toward the Lebanese in the settlements involved during the struggle to reorganize the political life of Lebanon. These factors are discussed fairly

extensively in other works on the history of Lebanon.¹ The emphasis so far in such works and others on change in the Middle East, however, has been on the influence of the West as the main source of change; and the reader should be cautioned that this aspect has been exceedingly exaggerated, while the internal sources of change and processes have been overlooked.

A number of generalizations can now be reached on the basis of the preceding account. First: although in the institutions of a traditional system there is neither a procedure for the introduction of change nor provision for adapting to it, change nevertheless can take place in a number of ways. The institutions are often sufficiently general and vague to make a reasonable degree of change permissible and acceptable. Also, the actors themselves by virtue of their legitimate authority can introduce changes that may not necessarily contradict the sense of right and proper behavior in the system. They can, furthermore, introduce radical changes which are intended to change legitimate power relationships or may do so without being so intended.² However, there are limitations on the ability of the actors to introduce change, as we shall see next.

Second, the ability of the actors to be initiators of change depends to a large extent on the nature of power relationships among them. As was observed by David Apter in his comparison of Uganda and Ghana, a traditional system in which authority is distributed among a number of semi-autonomous chiefs, the actors, will be less able to introduce and adapt to change than one in which authority is concentrated in a single central chief.³ In a de-

¹See for instance Ismail, Histoire du Liban . . ., Vols. I, IV. Also Caesar E. Farah, "The Problem of Ottoman Administration in the Lebanon: 1840-1861" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1957). Similarly, William R. Polk, The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788-1840: A Study of the Impact of the West on the Middle East (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

²Cf. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Internal Contradictions in Bureaucratic Politics," Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. I, No. 1 (October, 1958).

³Apter, World Politics, XIII (October, 1960), 48-49.

centralized system, change will come more noticeably from the environment than from the actors themselves. This is immediately apparent in the case of the Lebanese iqta' system, for example, the staggering difficulties the Hakim had in trying to introduce change and impose his authority as the sole undisputed ruler. This general rule also helps explain why the Maronites met such great resistance in their attempt to dominate the country.

Third, changes which are disjointed lead to tension and instability in the system. Disjointed change refers to a situation in which alterations take place in one of the variable components of the political community without the realization of corresponding changes in the others. Also, changes which are discontinuous, i.e., those which occur to one section or group of society but fail to reach or similarly affect another section or sections, lead to the same consequence as disjointed change. Thus instability results when various claims for legitimate rule are made by roughly equal forces, none of which is able by itself to carry out the necessary consequent changes in the whole system.

Fourth, changes aimed at altering the basis of legitimate authority and political institutions of the system evoke greater resistance than other attempts at change.

Fifth, in the traditional system, disturbance of the existing balance of power among the actors creates a tendency among them to break through the traditional limits and restraints and seek power outside the political system. By inviting outside forces to enter politics, the actors are in effect paving the way for the new forces to become legitimized. Thus outside groups used by some of the actors to supplement their powers inside the system tend to seek legitimization of their actual participation in the political process. Their impact and success in this endeavor is relative to their own organization and possession of motivation and inner political ethos.

Sixth, these new forces will prove difficult if not impossible to stop

or control by the actors who originally invited them and encouraged their admission as participants in the political system.

Seventh, if the new elements which are encroaching on the political system are at the same time under the jurisdiction of the actors, their attempts to legitimize their political activity will create conflict with the actors. Conflict will also arise if two different claims are made regarding the same subjects, such as claims made by the muqati'jis and the Church over the same Maronite subjects.

Eighth, in case the new forces are motivated by a system of beliefs different from that upon which the established order rests, then they will seek to change the legitimate basis of authority in conformity with their own values; and their conflict with the existing actors will assume a comprehensive scope affecting the whole system. In other words, changes in legitimacy will evoke demands for changes in both the institutions and the actors. Thus, for instance, the Maronites attacked the very basis of the muqati'jis' claim to hold authority and then demanded the reorganization of the institutions on the new basis. The new institutions which they advocated defined authority as resting in actors whose basis for selection was also to be an innovation.

Now I believe we are in a position to say whether, in our analysis of the transformation of the Lebanese iqta' system, change has taken decisive and intelligible form and whether there has been some continuity between the new and the old. Earlier we defined development as a systemic change; and by these terms, what took place in Lebanon was a development from the traditional type to the communal.

The utility of positing a new type of political system can now be tested. We are faced here with a clear instance of a traditional system which was transformed into a new order neither rational nor charismatic in the Weberian sense. Yet it is clear that, in the process, the basis of legitimacy was changed from

respect for the ways handed down from the forebears, to one based on nationalism, though in an attenuated form.

The new national legitimacy was based on the Maronite claim to be a nation with ethnic and religious unity over a period of almost a millenium, and on their aspirations to dominate the political life of Mount Lebanon. To be legitimate the Hakim not only had to be a Shihabi, but a Shihabi of the Maronite faith; and the Shihabi dynasty was projected in the national literature of the Maronites as historic and religious evidence of Maronite domination of the Mountain. A claim was also put forward by a Maronite warrior, Yusuf Karam, to rule Mount Lebanon as Hakim on the basis of his popular support among the Maronite people and on the basis of his unique ability to interpret and express the essence of Maronite nationhood.

Eligibility to government office was also redefined in terms of group membership regardless of social status. New rules regulating legitimate power relationships were made and the system's functions became more differentiated than they had been under the iqta' system. Yet the national demands of the Maronites and the emerging system could by no means be characterized as a rational system, for legitimacy was not based on law or citizenship, but on the nation. The fact that political relations were later made to conform more or less to laws advocated by the Maronites did not necessarily make the system a rational one. For the law was considered simply a means to establish control in place of the Druze muqati'jis.

The development of the iqta' system into a communal one is not surprising, in retrospect, since the communal type retains certain interesting similarities with the traditional and the continuity is more in evidence than the gap separating the two.¹ Nationalists have in common with the traditionalists ap-

¹Shils stresses this continuity in the transition from the traditional to the national; see World Politics, XI (October, 1958), 2, 4, 5.

preciation of the values and validity of the past. The difference lies simply in the fact that the traditionalists stress the value of the sameness and fixed nature of past practices, while the nationalists view the nation's past as a dynamic, changing yet continuing, reality with implications for the present and future. From the preceding chapters it is clear how the Maronites justified their specific demands for change in terms of alleged past conditions, and at the same time, how their national ideology rested on the changing continuity in the character of the Maronite nation.

The continuity between the traditional iqta' system and the communal can also be observed in specific features in the emerging system. For instance, social status as a qualification for political office was not completely discredited, and the leadership of old aristocratic families continued to be accepted by the people and to play a major role in the political life of the country. If one observes the Maronite nationalists' attitude toward the Shihabi house, one will notice the strong attachment and loyalty they felt for it and their desire to preserve the Shihabi dynasty. Although there was a reaction against the a'yan and their role in political leadership, the popular attitude was still not completely uncompromising in that respect, and obviously each community in the Mountain looked less suspiciously at its own a'yan houses than at the a'yan of the other group.

However, the compromise which was finally reached between the Maronites and Druze via the mediation of international intervention moderated the effects of Maronite nationalism. First, the failure of the Shihabis to maintain their place, then the tragic career of the Maronite national hero Yusuf Karam and the frustration of his ambitions to become Hakim, and finally, the successful working of the Mutasarrifiyyah clearly indicate Maronite concessions in the moderation of their national demands. This international pressure to attenuate the effects of nationalism in Lebanon one hundred years ago has its evident effects

in today's Lebanon, with its freedom from the excessive nationalism which is rife in the Middle Eastern countries at present. In contrast to some of these countries, Lebanon today stands closer to the conventional political system than to the communal.

A word should be said about the place of charisma in this process of transition. We have observed earlier that in the traditional iqta' system signs of charisma were not in evidence, although it is not inconceivable that in certain cases there could have been strong devotion to a particular chief. The lack of charisma in the traditional system was in striking contrast to the situation in the nationalist stage. Charisma here was more in evidence, whether concentrated in the nation or in the leaders themselves.

With respect to the leadership of the clergy, it is evident that their power was in part due to their religious sanctions, but this should not go without some qualifications. The clergy's leadership was most apparent in their role as spokesmen for Maronite nationalism. It is also important to observe that the clergy in their position of national leadership did not make demands for a theocratic state, nor did they seek the establishment of government offices for themselves, but asked rather that Maronite laymen be invested with authority.

APPENDIX I

THE MARONITE IMARAH: THE CHURCH PLAN FOR THE POLITICAL REORGANIZATION OF LEBANON¹

Requests made to the Sublime State with respect to the Maronite community and the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon through the French government, the defendant of the above-mentioned community.

First, the Hakim of Mount Lebanon must be of the Maronite Shihabi house, in accordance with the existing tradition. He should always be designated by the Sublime Porte itself, not subject to the authority of any of the Pashas (Valis). The Hakim's kakhiya [mudabbir] should also be Maronite. The Hakim must maintain and act in accordance with the laws handed down by the Sublime State. As for the rest of the amirs, shaykhs, muqaddams, etc., they should not have any authority or power over the people at all. Everyone without distinction should be subject to the current Hakim and to the Sultan's laws.

Second, a definite sum, not subject to increases, should be fixed as a tax on land. It should be charged on all lands including those of amirs, shaykhs, and muqaddams, etc., even on the land of the Hakim himself, without special favors or exemptions to anyone whatsoever. A known and supportable amount of this money is to be paid annually to the Sublime State in conformity with ancient custom. This sum should not be increased at all. Also, out of

¹Hbaysh papers, MS, No. 5817, n.d. [1840-1845].

this tax plus the faridah¹ and the government land or bakalik² in Mount Lebanon, an amount should be fixed as the Hakim's salary and the salaries of one hundred retainers only, for his service.

If any money is still left from this sum, than it should be turned over to the treasury for such expenditure as is necessary for the welfare of the public. The mentioned faridah, which is imposed on every male from the age of 20 to 60, excluding the poor and the infirm, should not exceed three to 10 piasters. As for tradesmen, shopkeepers, and craftsmen who own no land but live in Mount Lebanon, whether strangers or native, they should pay a faridah of 20 to 100 piasters per head.

Third, 12 councilors, elected by the votes of the people from different muqata'ahs, should serve with the Hakim. These are to advise and discuss the matters of state with the Hakim. They will have no power at all over the people, nor will the people be compelled to offer them anything. These councilors will be either replaced or reconfirmed every three years by the will of the people. In case any one of them [councilors] behaves improperly or commits what he has no right to, the Hakim will dismiss him from his duties and call for the election of another in his place.

Fourth, the Hakim will have no power to punish any wrongdoer (mudhnib) arbitrarily, but according to the law after a necessary investigation has been carried out with precision and in writing. The examination should also be repeated several times. Moreover, no confession should be extracted from the detained by torture. The Hakim may not subject the culprit to extortions (bals) nor charge him more than what is defined by law. Prisoners should not be beaten

¹Faridah was a head tax imposed on all adult males.

²Bakalik (pl.) was special land owned by the Ottoman government but which came under the governmental control of the Lebanese Hakim and was cultivated by Lebanese peasants.

or tortured, regardless of what wrong they have committed. Also, something should be given them for necessary sustenance while in jail, like bread and some cooked food, twice a day. If a person is convicted or condemned by law to death, the execution of the verdict should be carried out without torture.

Fifth, one officer only should be installed in every muqata'ah¹ to keep peace and order among the people, and to detain the wrongdoer, examine his case in the manner discussed above, and present a report to the Hakim. The Hakim will give the report to the judges and councilors to make a judgment according to the law. The officer should have an assistant with him to register the miri, the imposts, and the incomes from the bakalik in the muqata'ah. No huwalis should be sent out for the collection of the miri. [Collection should be carried out by means of] records [related to the amount of miri] including the names of the villagers. Then the date for paying the miri should be fixed for the people, and he who fails to pay his miri on the fixed date should suffer a penalty of paying five piasters per hundred the first 10 days. If he again fails to pay, then the amount should be doubled and so on. If after all this he does not pay, the crops of his land should be confiscated as payment of his debt. The accounts should be presented every year by the mentioned [?] finance officer (sarraf), through the 12 councilors previously mentioned, to the chief of treasurers.

Those who are in debt to private individuals and have failed to pay their debt, should be sent a written warning from the Hakim or the officers fixing a time for payment. If again they fail to pay on the fixed date, their properties should be confiscated until they pay or they should be sent to jail, as may seem advisable.

¹The term muqata'ah must have been used in the sense of an administrative unit or region, not in the sense it had in the iqta' system. To this day in Lebanon the same term is used to refer to a region.

Sixth, all corvée (sukhrah), that imposed by the Hakim or by others, should be terminated and prohibited among the people of Lebanon; especially in the cities they [the Lebanese] should be free in their persons and animals, and no kharaj [dhimmi tax] should be collected from them in any of the Sultan's cities. This is because it [the kharaj] would have been paid by them as part of the imposts arranged [al matalib al muratabah] by the Sublime State. If the Hakim needs men for works, like masons and workers from the people, he may have them on condition that he pay their salary in amount equal to what they were earning elsewhere. Their service should be requested kindly and with their willing approval; their employment should not be by force.

Seventh, all the Maronites, wherever they happen to be in Mount Lebanon or any other place, should be under the protection of the French government as they were in the past. That is, if any Maronite should be insulted or treated badly by someone in the cities, he may claim the protection of the French consul, who will see that he receives justice.

Eighth, neither the Hakim nor the mentioned officers have authority or power to punish the Maronite clergy, bishops, priests, monks, nuns, etc. If any one of these should do wrong, his case should be raised with the patriarch, who resides in Mount Lebanon, who will examine the suit and punish the wrongdoer in accordance with the clerical laws and the principles of his religion.

Ninth, let there be permission granted to the Hakim and the Maronite patriarch to have a special representative [for both of them] with the Sublime State in Istanbul to deal with the State regarding the affairs of the Mountain. None of the three patriarchs who reside in Istanbul, i.e., the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian, and the Catholic patriarchs, has any powers, claims, or rights of objection concerning the Maronite community in any possible way.

Tenth, Amir Haydar Qayyidbay [Abillama'], the Maronite who is known for his good qualities and good name and who is well received by all the Lebanese

people, should be the head of his community, and observe its affairs and look after its interests and the interests of all the people of Lebanon. He should also see that the conditions written above remain in order. If any of these conditions should be changed, he should defend them. He should be on good terms with the Hakim for the good of all the people.

While waiting for confirmation of these written conditions by the Royal authority, the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon promise to offer themselves even to the point of shedding their blood to win the favor and pleasure of the Sublime State.

APPENDIX II

A COVENANT BETWEEN THE HAKIM, AMIR MANSUR SHIHAB, AND SHAYKH KIN'AN NAKAD (1177 H., 1761 A.D.)¹

The reason for writing this is that we have made a promise and a confirmation to our brother Shaykh Kin'an Nakad that [in return] for his service to us, [he will receive] our favor; and his status, influence, and intercession [with us] will be first among his equals. As for his recompense, we shall assign to his interest from the baklik one thousand piasters, two hundred piasters in addition [will he receive] from our person, and two hundred piasters from our house. His wife, Um 'Ali, will receive annually a set of assorted things. The miri of his villages will be four hundred seventy piasters including costs. The khafar [custom house of al Na'imah] three hundred piasters. [The miri for the following villages]: sixty piasters for Dfun, M'alaqah and al Salhiyyah seventy, and the Miyyah-w-Miyyah one hundred. [All the above-mentioned miri] will be discounted from his recompense, and what remains due him we will provide personally. With respect to Baq'un, we shall consider it on equal footing with the villages of his cousins. If we charge miri [on these villages, the Baq'un share] will be discounted from his original recompense. As for the jawali² in the Shuf that are in his charge and the charge of his family, we shall not collect from him in the years of exemption, in accordance with the usual practice. For the jawali of al Shihhar, during exemption years, he will be exempted, and

¹Text in Nakad, "TN."

²Head tax on Christian and Jewish subjects.

when there is no exemption we shall request of him only half a jaliyah. . . .

After this covenant which we have given him, we shall not grant precedence to any of the shaykhs in the land over him, nor conspire against him, nor transgress over his cultivated land¹ with deli² or with imarah [soldiers], nor with shaykhs or [my] relatives anywhere in the country. In matters of interest to him he will be given preference with us over Shaykh 'Ali [Jumblat] and Shaykh 'Abd al Salam [al 'Imad],³ because he will be acting in our interest better than they.

As for the people of Dayr al Qamar⁴ and the Abu Nakad family, we shall never take any action with regard to them except with his knowledge. . . . We shall not keep any secrets from him but will let him know of them, since it is proven that he will keep our secret. We shall not conceal from him things which take place in the country and among the circle of the prominent. He will be first to be consulted.

We shall not retreat a word from what we have promised him here so long as he continues to be faithful in our service, and [to remain] better than the rest of the shaykhs of the land, both of his own family and of others. He will put our interest above all other interests, including his own. He will serve us well according to the writ which we have in our possession from an earlier date. If he changes any of these conditions which he has accepted, it will be known by his deeds and words.

For all this we have proclaimed our will in his favor. By God and his Messenger Muhammad and Shu'ayb his Prophet we will not change any of these conditions. . . . Dhu al Qi'dah in the year of the Hijirah 1177.

Mansur Shihab

¹The word used is "terraces."

²Mercenary soldiers.

³These were the two leading manasib at that time.

⁴Dayr al Qamar was the Hakim's capital, but its people were the subjects of the Nakad muqati'jis.

APPENDIX III

DIOCESES OF THE MARONITE CHURCH

- I. Aleppo--the city of Aleppo.
- II. Tripoli--the city of Tripoli, the district of al Zawiyah, 'Arqa (extinct), Baniyas, the Island of Arwad and Jablah (where there were no Maronites), and Latakia (where there was only one church).
- III. Jbayl and al Batrun--Jibbat Bsharri, Bilad Jbayl, Bilad al Batrun, and Jibbat al Munaytara.
- IV. Ba'albak--the town of Ba'albak (hardly any Maronites) and the district of al Ftuh.
- V. Dimashq--the city of Damascus (a very small community), Kisrwan including Baskinta, Zabbugha, half of the district of Ghazir and Zuq al Kharab.
- VI. Cyprus--the Island of Cyprus (a small community existed here) and al Qati' to the bridge of the Beirut river.
- VII. Beirut--the city of Beirut, al Matn, al Gharb, al Shihhar to al Damur.
- VIII. Sur and Sayda--the towns of Sur and Sayda, al Shuf, al Biqa', Wadi al Taym and south to Jerusalem.

Note:

With the exception of the diocese of Aleppo, all the areas outside Mount Lebanon, or rather present-day Lebanon, can be ignored because of the negligible Maronite communities living there.

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¹Patriarch Mas'ad's incomplete manuscript was published by Bulus Qar'ali in Al Majallah al Batriyarkiyah, January, 1930. However, this document is listed under unpublished materials because my citations happen to be from the manuscript rather than the published edition, which was not convenient to use.

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